67887 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Hangbin Liu
9a6544343b net/tunnel: wait until all sk_user_data reader finish before releasing the sock
[ Upstream commit 3cf7203ca620682165706f70a1b12b5194607dce ]

There is a race condition in vxlan that when deleting a vxlan device
during receiving packets, there is a possibility that the sock is
released after getting vxlan_sock vs from sk_user_data. Then in
later vxlan_ecn_decapsulate(), vxlan_get_sk_family() we will got
NULL pointer dereference. e.g.

   #0 [ffffa25ec6978a38] machine_kexec at ffffffff8c669757
   #1 [ffffa25ec6978a90] __crash_kexec at ffffffff8c7c0a4d
   #2 [ffffa25ec6978b58] crash_kexec at ffffffff8c7c1c48
   #3 [ffffa25ec6978b60] oops_end at ffffffff8c627f2b
   #4 [ffffa25ec6978b80] page_fault_oops at ffffffff8c678fcb
   #5 [ffffa25ec6978bd8] exc_page_fault at ffffffff8d109542
   #6 [ffffa25ec6978c00] asm_exc_page_fault at ffffffff8d200b62
      [exception RIP: vxlan_ecn_decapsulate+0x3b]
      RIP: ffffffffc1014e7b  RSP: ffffa25ec6978cb0  RFLAGS: 00010246
      RAX: 0000000000000008  RBX: ffff8aa000888000  RCX: 0000000000000000
      RDX: 000000000000000e  RSI: ffff8a9fc7ab803e  RDI: ffff8a9fd1168700
      RBP: ffff8a9fc7ab803e   R8: 0000000000700000   R9: 00000000000010ae
      R10: ffff8a9fcb748980  R11: 0000000000000000  R12: ffff8a9fd1168700
      R13: ffff8aa000888000  R14: 00000000002a0000  R15: 00000000000010ae
      ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
   #7 [ffffa25ec6978ce8] vxlan_rcv at ffffffffc10189cd [vxlan]
   #8 [ffffa25ec6978d90] udp_queue_rcv_one_skb at ffffffff8cfb6507
   #9 [ffffa25ec6978dc0] udp_unicast_rcv_skb at ffffffff8cfb6e45
  #10 [ffffa25ec6978dc8] __udp4_lib_rcv at ffffffff8cfb8807
  #11 [ffffa25ec6978e20] ip_protocol_deliver_rcu at ffffffff8cf76951
  #12 [ffffa25ec6978e48] ip_local_deliver at ffffffff8cf76bde
  #13 [ffffa25ec6978ea0] __netif_receive_skb_one_core at ffffffff8cecde9b
  #14 [ffffa25ec6978ec8] process_backlog at ffffffff8cece139
  #15 [ffffa25ec6978f00] __napi_poll at ffffffff8ceced1a
  #16 [ffffa25ec6978f28] net_rx_action at ffffffff8cecf1f3
  #17 [ffffa25ec6978fa0] __softirqentry_text_start at ffffffff8d4000ca
  #18 [ffffa25ec6978ff0] do_softirq at ffffffff8c6fbdc3

Reproducer: https://github.com/Mellanox/ovs-tests/blob/master/test-ovs-vxlan-remove-tunnel-during-traffic.sh

Fix this by waiting for all sk_user_data reader to finish before
releasing the sock.

Reported-by: Jianlin Shi <jishi@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Fixes: 6a93cc905274 ("udp-tunnel: Add a few more UDP tunnel APIs")
Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-12-31 13:14:19 +01:00
Artem Chernyshev
c65603abc3 net: vmw_vsock: vmci: Check memcpy_from_msg()
[ Upstream commit 44aa5a6dba8283bfda28b1517af4de711c5652a4 ]

vmci_transport_dgram_enqueue() does not check the return value
of memcpy_from_msg().  If memcpy_from_msg() fails, it is possible that
uninitialized memory contents are sent unintentionally instead of user's
message in the datagram to the destination.  Return with an error if
memcpy_from_msg() fails.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.

Fixes: 0f7db23a07af ("vmci_transport: switch ->enqeue_dgram, ->enqueue_stream and ->dequeue_stream to msghdr")
Signed-off-by: Artem Chernyshev <artem.chernyshev@red-soft.ru>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Vishnu Dasa <vdasa@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-12-31 13:14:18 +01:00
Wang ShaoBo
7055c878a0 SUNRPC: Fix missing release socket in rpc_sockname()
[ Upstream commit 50fa355bc0d75911fe9d5072a5ba52cdb803aff7 ]

socket dynamically created is not released when getting an unintended
address family type in rpc_sockname(), direct to out_release for calling
sock_release().

Fixes: 2e738fdce22f ("SUNRPC: Add API to acquire source address")
Signed-off-by: Wang ShaoBo <bobo.shaobowang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-12-31 13:14:16 +01:00
Zhang Xiaoxu
79d4cd40da xprtrdma: Fix regbuf data not freed in rpcrdma_req_create()
[ Upstream commit 9181f40fb2952fd59ecb75e7158620c9c669eee3 ]

If rdma receive buffer allocate failed, should call rpcrdma_regbuf_free()
to free the send buffer, otherwise, the buffer data will be leaked.

Fixes: bb93a1ae2bf4 ("xprtrdma: Allocate req's regbufs at xprt create time")
Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-12-31 13:14:16 +01:00
Eric Dumazet
a443c55d96 bpf, sockmap: fix race in sock_map_free()
[ Upstream commit 0a182f8d607464911756b4dbef5d6cad8de22469 ]

sock_map_free() calls release_sock(sk) without owning a reference
on the socket. This can cause use-after-free as syzbot found [1]

Jakub Sitnicki already took care of a similar issue
in sock_hash_free() in commit 75e68e5bf2c7 ("bpf, sockhash:
Synchronize delete from bucket list on map free")

[1]
refcount_t: decrement hit 0; leaking memory.
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3785 at lib/refcount.c:31 refcount_warn_saturate+0x17c/0x1a0 lib/refcount.c:31
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 3785 Comm: kworker/u4:6 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc7-syzkaller-00103-gef4d3ea40565 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/26/2022
Workqueue: events_unbound bpf_map_free_deferred
RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x17c/0x1a0 lib/refcount.c:31
Code: 68 8b 31 c0 e8 75 71 15 fd 0f 0b e9 64 ff ff ff e8 d9 6e 4e fd c6 05 62 9c 3d 0a 01 48 c7 c7 80 bb 68 8b 31 c0 e8 54 71 15 fd <0f> 0b e9 43 ff ff ff 89 d9 80 e1 07 80 c1 03 38 c1 0f 8c a2 fe ff
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000456fb60 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: eae59bab72dcd700 RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: ffff8880207057c0
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000201 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 0000000000000004 R08: ffffffff816fdabd R09: fffff520008adee5
R10: fffff520008adee5 R11: 1ffff920008adee4 R12: 0000000000000004
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff88807b1c6c00 R15: 1ffff1100f638dcf
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000001b30c30000 CR3: 000000000d08e000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__refcount_dec include/linux/refcount.h:344 [inline]
refcount_dec include/linux/refcount.h:359 [inline]
__sock_put include/net/sock.h:779 [inline]
tcp_release_cb+0x2d0/0x360 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1092
release_sock+0xaf/0x1c0 net/core/sock.c:3468
sock_map_free+0x219/0x2c0 net/core/sock_map.c:356
process_one_work+0x81c/0xd10 kernel/workqueue.c:2289
worker_thread+0xb14/0x1330 kernel/workqueue.c:2436
kthread+0x266/0x300 kernel/kthread.c:376
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:306
</TASK>

Fixes: 7e81a3530206 ("bpf: Sockmap, ensure sock lock held during tear down")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Cc: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221202111640.2745533-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-12-31 13:14:16 +01:00
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
21a061772b hsr: Synchronize sequence number updates.
[ Upstream commit 5c7aa13210c3abdd34fd421f62347665ec6eb551 ]

hsr_register_frame_out() compares new sequence_nr vs the old one
recorded in hsr_node::seq_out and if the new sequence_nr is higher then
it will be written to hsr_node::seq_out as the new value.

This operation isn't locked so it is possible that two frames with the
same sequence number arrive (via the two slave devices) and are fed to
hsr_register_frame_out() at the same time. Both will pass the check and
update the sequence counter later to the same value. As a result the
content of the same packet is fed into the stack twice.

This was noticed by running ping and observing DUP being reported from
time to time.

Instead of using the hsr_priv::seqnr_lock for the whole receive path (as
it is for sending in the master node) add an additional lock that is only
used for sequence number checks and updates.

Add a per-node lock that is used during sequence number reads and
updates.

Fixes: f421436a591d3 ("net/hsr: Add support for the High-availability Seamless Redundancy protocol (HSRv0)")
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-12-31 13:14:15 +01:00
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
a82f5b2e08 hsr: Synchronize sending frames to have always incremented outgoing seq nr.
[ Upstream commit 06afd2c31d338fa762548580c1bf088703dd1e03 ]

Sending frames via the hsr (master) device requires a sequence number
which is tracked in hsr_priv::sequence_nr and protected by
hsr_priv::seqnr_lock. Each time a new frame is sent, it will obtain a
new id and then send it via the slave devices.
Each time a packet is sent (via hsr_forward_do()) the sequence number is
checked via hsr_register_frame_out() to ensure that a frame is not
handled twice. This make sense for the receiving side to ensure that the
frame is not injected into the stack twice after it has been received
from both slave ports.

There is no locking to cover the sending path which means the following
scenario is possible:

  CPU0				CPU1
  hsr_dev_xmit(skb1)		hsr_dev_xmit(skb2)
   fill_frame_info()             fill_frame_info()
    hsr_fill_frame_info()         hsr_fill_frame_info()
     handle_std_frame()            handle_std_frame()
      skb1's sequence_nr = 1
                                    skb2's sequence_nr = 2
   hsr_forward_do()              hsr_forward_do()

                                   hsr_register_frame_out(, 2)  // okay, send)

    hsr_register_frame_out(, 1) // stop, lower seq duplicate

Both skbs (or their struct hsr_frame_info) received an unique id.
However since skb2 was sent before skb1, the higher sequence number was
recorded in hsr_register_frame_out() and the late arriving skb1 was
dropped and never sent.

This scenario has been observed in a three node HSR setup, with node1 +
node2 having ping and iperf running in parallel. From time to time ping
reported a missing packet. Based on tracing that missing ping packet did
not leave the system.

It might be possible (didn't check) to drop the sequence number check on
the sending side. But if the higher sequence number leaves on wire
before the lower does and the destination receives them in that order
and it will drop the packet with the lower sequence number and never
inject into the stack.
Therefore it seems the only way is to lock the whole path from obtaining
the sequence number and sending via dev_queue_xmit() and assuming the
packets leave on wire in the same order (and don't get reordered by the
NIC).

Cover the whole path for the master interface from obtaining the ID
until after it has been forwarded via hsr_forward_skb() to ensure the
skbs are sent to the NIC in the order of the assigned sequence numbers.

Fixes: f421436a591d3 ("net/hsr: Add support for the High-availability Seamless Redundancy protocol (HSRv0)")
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-12-31 13:14:15 +01:00
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
bb3b40cd6a hsr: Disable netpoll.
[ Upstream commit d5c7652eb16fa203d82546e0285136d7b321ffa9 ]

The hsr device is a software device. Its
net_device_ops::ndo_start_xmit() routine will process the packet and
then pass the resulting skb to dev_queue_xmit().
During processing, hsr acquires a lock with spin_lock_bh()
(hsr_add_node()) which needs to be promoted to the _irq() suffix in
order to avoid a potential deadlock.
Then there are the warnings in dev_queue_xmit() (due to
local_bh_disable() with disabled interrupts) left.

Instead trying to address those (there is qdisc and…) for netpoll sake,
just disable netpoll on hsr.

Disable netpoll on hsr and replace the _irqsave() locking with _bh().

Fixes: f421436a591d3 ("net/hsr: Add support for the High-availability Seamless Redundancy protocol (HSRv0)")
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-12-31 13:14:15 +01:00
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
8e148d981b hsr: Avoid double remove of a node.
[ Upstream commit 0c74d9f79ec4299365bbe803baa736ae0068179e ]

Due to the hashed-MAC optimisation one problem become visible:
hsr_handle_sup_frame() walks over the list of available nodes and merges
two node entries into one if based on the information in the supervision
both MAC addresses belong to one node. The list-walk happens on a RCU
protected list and delete operation happens under a lock.

If the supervision arrives on both slave interfaces at the same time
then this delete operation can occur simultaneously on two CPUs. The
result is the first-CPU deletes the from the list and the second CPUs
BUGs while attempting to dereference a poisoned list-entry. This happens
more likely with the optimisation because a new node for the mac_B entry
is created once a packet has been received and removed (merged) once the
supervision frame has been received.

Avoid removing/ cleaning up a hsr_node twice by adding a `removed' field
which is set to true after the removal and checked before the removal.

Fixes: f266a683a4804 ("net/hsr: Better frame dispatch")
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-12-31 13:14:15 +01:00
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
9387cbf7f7 hsr: Add a rcu-read lock to hsr_forward_skb().
[ Upstream commit 5aa2820177af650293b2f9f1873c1f6f8e4ad7a4 ]

hsr_forward_skb() a skb and keeps information in an on-stack
hsr_frame_info. hsr_get_node() assigns hsr_frame_info::node_src which is
from a RCU list. This pointer is used later in hsr_forward_do().
I don't see a reason why this pointer can't vanish midway since there is
no guarantee that hsr_forward_skb() is invoked from an RCU read section.

Use rcu_read_lock() to protect hsr_frame_info::node_src from its
assignment until it is no longer used.

Fixes: f266a683a4804 ("net/hsr: Better frame dispatch")
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-12-31 13:14:15 +01:00
Chen Zhongjin
ae19622e7f wifi: cfg80211: Fix not unregister reg_pdev when load_builtin_regdb_keys() fails
[ Upstream commit 833a9fd28c9b7ccb39a334721379e992dc1c0c89 ]

In regulatory_init_db(), when it's going to return a error, reg_pdev
should be unregistered. When load_builtin_regdb_keys() fails it doesn't
do it and makes cfg80211 can't be reload with report:

sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/devices/platform/regulatory.0'
 ...
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x79/0x9b
 sysfs_warn_dup.cold+0x1c/0x29
 sysfs_create_dir_ns+0x22d/0x290
 kobject_add_internal+0x247/0x800
 kobject_add+0x135/0x1b0
 device_add+0x389/0x1be0
 platform_device_add+0x28f/0x790
 platform_device_register_full+0x376/0x4b0
 regulatory_init+0x9a/0x4b2 [cfg80211]
 cfg80211_init+0x84/0x113 [cfg80211]
 ...

Fixes: 90a53e4432b1 ("cfg80211: implement regdb signature checking")
Signed-off-by: Chen Zhongjin <chenzhongjin@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221109090237.214127-1-chenzhongjin@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-12-31 13:14:14 +01:00
Zhengchao Shao
2e32f12998 wifi: mac80211: fix memory leak in ieee80211_if_add()
[ Upstream commit 13e5afd3d773c6fc6ca2b89027befaaaa1ea7293 ]

When register_netdevice() failed in ieee80211_if_add(), ndev->tstats
isn't released. Fix it.

Fixes: 5a490510ba5f ("mac80211: use per-CPU TX/RX statistics")
Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221117064500.319983-1-shaozhengchao@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-12-31 13:14:14 +01:00
Pengcheng Yang
7201e4f4f5 bpf, sockmap: Fix data loss caused by using apply_bytes on ingress redirect
[ Upstream commit 9072931f020bfd907d6d89ee21ff1481cd78b407 ]

Use apply_bytes on ingress redirect, when apply_bytes is less than
the length of msg data, some data may be skipped and lost in
bpf_tcp_ingress().

If there is still data in the scatterlist that has not been consumed,
we cannot move the msg iter.

Fixes: 604326b41a6f ("bpf, sockmap: convert to generic sk_msg interface")
Signed-off-by: Pengcheng Yang <yangpc@wangsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/1669718441-2654-4-git-send-email-yangpc@wangsu.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-12-31 13:14:14 +01:00
Pengcheng Yang
6105ed3598 bpf, sockmap: Fix missing BPF_F_INGRESS flag when using apply_bytes
[ Upstream commit a351d6087bf7d3d8440d58d3bf244ec64b89394a ]

When redirecting, we use sk_msg_to_ingress() to get the BPF_F_INGRESS
flag from the msg->flags. If apply_bytes is used and it is larger than
the current data being processed, sk_psock_msg_verdict() will not be
called when sendmsg() is called again. At this time, the msg->flags is 0,
and we lost the BPF_F_INGRESS flag.

So we need to save the BPF_F_INGRESS flag in sk_psock and use it when
redirection.

Fixes: 8934ce2fd081 ("bpf: sockmap redirect ingress support")
Signed-off-by: Pengcheng Yang <yangpc@wangsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/1669718441-2654-3-git-send-email-yangpc@wangsu.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-12-31 13:14:14 +01:00
Pengcheng Yang
8786bde11a bpf, sockmap: Fix repeated calls to sock_put() when msg has more_data
[ Upstream commit 7a9841ca025275b5b0edfb0b618934abb6ceec15 ]

In tcp_bpf_send_verdict() redirection, the eval variable is assigned to
__SK_REDIRECT after the apply_bytes data is sent, if msg has more_data,
sock_put() will be called multiple times.

We should reset the eval variable to __SK_NONE every time more_data
starts.

This causes:

IPv4: Attempt to release TCP socket in state 1 00000000b4c925d7
------------[ cut here ]------------
refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 4482 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0x7d/0x110
Modules linked in:
CPU: 5 PID: 4482 Comm: sockhash_bypass Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.0.0 #1
Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.0-2.el7 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __tcp_transmit_skb+0xa1b/0xb90
 ? __alloc_skb+0x8c/0x1a0
 ? __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x184/0x320
 tcp_write_xmit+0x22a/0x1110
 __tcp_push_pending_frames+0x32/0xf0
 do_tcp_sendpages+0x62d/0x640
 tcp_bpf_push+0xae/0x2c0
 tcp_bpf_sendmsg_redir+0x260/0x410
 ? preempt_count_add+0x70/0xa0
 tcp_bpf_send_verdict+0x386/0x4b0
 tcp_bpf_sendmsg+0x21b/0x3b0
 sock_sendmsg+0x58/0x70
 __sys_sendto+0xfa/0x170
 ? xfd_validate_state+0x1d/0x80
 ? switch_fpu_return+0x59/0xe0
 __x64_sys_sendto+0x24/0x30
 do_syscall_64+0x37/0x90
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Fixes: cd9733f5d75c ("tcp_bpf: Fix one concurrency problem in the tcp_bpf_send_verdict function")
Signed-off-by: Pengcheng Yang <yangpc@wangsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/1669718441-2654-2-git-send-email-yangpc@wangsu.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-12-31 13:14:14 +01:00
Florian Westphal
d78649c21b netfilter: conntrack: set icmpv6 redirects as RELATED
[ Upstream commit 7d7cfb48d81353e826493d24c7cec7360950968f ]

icmp conntrack will set icmp redirects as RELATED, but icmpv6 will not
do this.

For icmpv6, only icmp errors (code <= 128) are examined for RELATED state.
ICMPV6 Redirects are part of neighbour discovery mechanism, those are
handled by marking a selected subset (e.g.  neighbour solicitations) as
UNTRACKED, but not REDIRECT -- they will thus be flagged as INVALID.

Add minimal support for REDIRECTs.  No parsing of neighbour options is
added for simplicity, so this will only check that we have the embeeded
original header (ND_OPT_REDIRECT_HDR), and then attempt to do a flow
lookup for this tuple.

Also extend the existing test case to cover redirects.

Fixes: 9fb9cbb1082d ("[NETFILTER]: Add nf_conntrack subsystem.")
Reported-by: Eric Garver <eric@garver.life>
Link: https://github.com/firewalld/firewalld/issues/1046
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Acked-by: Eric Garver <eric@garver.life>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-12-31 13:14:14 +01:00
Stanislav Fomichev
0fc4280dbe bpf: Move skb->len == 0 checks into __bpf_redirect
[ Upstream commit 114039b342014680911c35bd6b72624180fd669a ]

To avoid potentially breaking existing users.

Both mac/no-mac cases have to be amended; mac_header >= network_header
is not enough (verified with a new test, see next patch).

Fixes: fd1894224407 ("bpf: Don't redirect packets with invalid pkt_len")
Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221121180340.1983627-1-sdf@google.com
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-12-31 13:14:11 +01:00
Eric Dumazet
348d95e39f inet: add READ_ONCE(sk->sk_bound_dev_if) in inet_csk_bind_conflict()
[ Upstream commit d2c135619cb89d1d5693df81ab408c5e8e97e898 ]

inet_csk_bind_conflict() can access sk->sk_bound_dev_if for
unlocked sockets.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-12-31 13:14:11 +01:00
David Howells
55e822212e rxrpc: Fix ack.bufferSize to be 0 when generating an ack
[ Upstream commit 8889a711f9b4dcf4dd1330fa493081beebd118c9 ]

ack.bufferSize should be set to 0 when generating an ack.

Fixes: 8d94aa381dab ("rxrpc: Calls shouldn't hold socket refs")
Reported-by: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-12-31 13:14:09 +01:00
Kuniyuki Iwashima
8741792d82 soreuseport: Fix socket selection for SO_INCOMING_CPU.
[ Upstream commit b261eda84ec136240a9ca753389853a3a1bccca2 ]

Kazuho Oku reported that setsockopt(SO_INCOMING_CPU) does not work
with setsockopt(SO_REUSEPORT) since v4.6.

With the combination of SO_REUSEPORT and SO_INCOMING_CPU, we could
build a highly efficient server application.

setsockopt(SO_INCOMING_CPU) associates a CPU with a TCP listener
or UDP socket, and then incoming packets processed on the CPU will
likely be distributed to the socket.  Technically, a socket could
even receive packets handled on another CPU if no sockets in the
reuseport group have the same CPU receiving the flow.

The logic exists in compute_score() so that a socket will get a higher
score if it has the same CPU with the flow.  However, the score gets
ignored after the blamed two commits, which introduced a faster socket
selection algorithm for SO_REUSEPORT.

This patch introduces a counter of sockets with SO_INCOMING_CPU in
a reuseport group to check if we should iterate all sockets to find
a proper one.  We increment the counter when

  * calling listen() if the socket has SO_INCOMING_CPU and SO_REUSEPORT

  * enabling SO_INCOMING_CPU if the socket is in a reuseport group

Also, we decrement it when

  * detaching a socket out of the group to apply SO_INCOMING_CPU to
    migrated TCP requests

  * disabling SO_INCOMING_CPU if the socket is in a reuseport group

When the counter reaches 0, we can get back to the O(1) selection
algorithm.

The overall changes are negligible for the non-SO_INCOMING_CPU case,
and the only notable thing is that we have to update sk_incomnig_cpu
under reuseport_lock.  Otherwise, the race prevents transitioning to
the O(n) algorithm and results in the wrong socket selection.

 cpu1 (setsockopt)               cpu2 (listen)
+-----------------+             +-------------+

lock_sock(sk1)                  lock_sock(sk2)

reuseport_update_incoming_cpu(sk1, val)
.
|  /* set CPU as 0 */
|- WRITE_ONCE(sk1->incoming_cpu, val)
|
|                               spin_lock_bh(&reuseport_lock)
|                               reuseport_grow(sk2, reuse)
|                               .
|                               |- more_socks_size = reuse->max_socks * 2U;
|                               |- if (more_socks_size > U16_MAX &&
|                               |       reuse->num_closed_socks)
|                               |  .
|                               |  |- RCU_INIT_POINTER(sk1->sk_reuseport_cb, NULL);
|                               |  `- __reuseport_detach_closed_sock(sk1, reuse)
|                               |     .
|                               |     `- reuseport_put_incoming_cpu(sk1, reuse)
|                               |        .
|                               |        |  /* Read shutdown()ed sk1's sk_incoming_cpu
|                               |        |   * without lock_sock().
|                               |        |   */
|                               |        `- if (sk1->sk_incoming_cpu >= 0)
|                               |           .
|                               |           |  /* decrement not-yet-incremented
|                               |           |   * count, which is never incremented.
|                               |           |   */
|                               |           `- __reuseport_put_incoming_cpu(reuse);
|                               |
|                               `- spin_lock_bh(&reuseport_lock)
|
|- spin_lock_bh(&reuseport_lock)
|
|- reuse = rcu_dereference_protected(sk1->sk_reuseport_cb, ...)
|- if (!reuse)
|  .
|  |  /* Cannot increment reuse->incoming_cpu. */
|  `- goto out;
|
`- spin_unlock_bh(&reuseport_lock)

Fixes: e32ea7e74727 ("soreuseport: fast reuseport UDP socket selection")
Fixes: c125e80b8868 ("soreuseport: fast reuseport TCP socket selection")
Reported-by: Kazuho Oku <kazuhooku@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-12-31 13:14:07 +01:00
Sungwoo Kim
19a7814396 Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix u8 overflow
[ Upstream commit bcd70260ef56e0aee8a4fc6cd214a419900b0765 ]

By keep sending L2CAP_CONF_REQ packets, chan->num_conf_rsp increases
multiple times and eventually it will wrap around the maximum number
(i.e., 255).
This patch prevents this by adding a boundary check with
L2CAP_MAX_CONF_RSP

Btmon log:
Bluetooth monitor ver 5.64
= Note: Linux version 6.1.0-rc2 (x86_64)                               0.264594
= Note: Bluetooth subsystem version 2.22                               0.264636
@ MGMT Open: btmon (privileged) version 1.22                  {0x0001} 0.272191
= New Index: 00:00:00:00:00:00 (Primary,Virtual,hci0)          [hci0] 13.877604
@ RAW Open: 9496 (privileged) version 2.22                   {0x0002} 13.890741
= Open Index: 00:00:00:00:00:00                                [hci0] 13.900426
(...)
> ACL Data RX: Handle 200 flags 0x00 dlen 1033             #32 [hci0] 14.273106
        invalid packet size (12 != 1033)
        08 00 01 00 02 01 04 00 01 10 ff ff              ............
> ACL Data RX: Handle 200 flags 0x00 dlen 1547             #33 [hci0] 14.273561
        invalid packet size (14 != 1547)
        0a 00 01 00 04 01 06 00 40 00 00 00 00 00        ........@.....
> ACL Data RX: Handle 200 flags 0x00 dlen 2061             #34 [hci0] 14.274390
        invalid packet size (16 != 2061)
        0c 00 01 00 04 01 08 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 04  ........@.......
> ACL Data RX: Handle 200 flags 0x00 dlen 2061             #35 [hci0] 14.274932
        invalid packet size (16 != 2061)
        0c 00 01 00 04 01 08 00 40 00 00 00 07 00 03 00  ........@.......
= bluetoothd: Bluetooth daemon 5.43                                   14.401828
> ACL Data RX: Handle 200 flags 0x00 dlen 1033             #36 [hci0] 14.275753
        invalid packet size (12 != 1033)
        08 00 01 00 04 01 04 00 40 00 00 00              ........@...

Signed-off-by: Sungwoo Kim <iam@sung-woo.kim>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-12-21 17:36:38 +01:00
Eric Dumazet
7390c70bd4 ipv6: avoid use-after-free in ip6_fragment()
[ Upstream commit 803e84867de59a1e5d126666d25eb4860cfd2ebe ]

Blamed commit claimed rcu_read_lock() was held by ip6_fragment() callers.

It seems to not be always true, at least for UDP stack.

syzbot reported:

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ip6_dst_idev include/net/ip6_fib.h:245 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ip6_fragment+0x2724/0x2770 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:951
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88801d403e80 by task syz-executor.3/7618

CPU: 1 PID: 7618 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc6-syzkaller-00012-g4312098baf37 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/26/2022
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0xd1/0x138 lib/dump_stack.c:106
 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:284 [inline]
 print_report+0x15e/0x45d mm/kasan/report.c:395
 kasan_report+0xbf/0x1f0 mm/kasan/report.c:495
 ip6_dst_idev include/net/ip6_fib.h:245 [inline]
 ip6_fragment+0x2724/0x2770 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:951
 __ip6_finish_output net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:193 [inline]
 ip6_finish_output+0x9a3/0x1170 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:206
 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:291 [inline]
 ip6_output+0x1f1/0x540 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:227
 dst_output include/net/dst.h:445 [inline]
 ip6_local_out+0xb3/0x1a0 net/ipv6/output_core.c:161
 ip6_send_skb+0xbb/0x340 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1966
 udp_v6_send_skb+0x82a/0x18a0 net/ipv6/udp.c:1286
 udp_v6_push_pending_frames+0x140/0x200 net/ipv6/udp.c:1313
 udpv6_sendmsg+0x18da/0x2c80 net/ipv6/udp.c:1606
 inet6_sendmsg+0x9d/0xe0 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:665
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0xd3/0x120 net/socket.c:734
 sock_write_iter+0x295/0x3d0 net/socket.c:1108
 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2191 [inline]
 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:491 [inline]
 vfs_write+0x9ed/0xdd0 fs/read_write.c:584
 ksys_write+0x1ec/0x250 fs/read_write.c:637
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x7fde3588c0d9
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 f1 19 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fde365b6168 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fde359ac050 RCX: 00007fde3588c0d9
RDX: 000000000000ffdc RSI: 00000000200000c0 RDI: 000000000000000a
RBP: 00007fde358e7ae9 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007fde35acfb1f R14: 00007fde365b6300 R15: 0000000000022000
 </TASK>

Allocated by task 7618:
 kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:45
 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:52
 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x82/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:325
 kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:201 [inline]
 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:737 [inline]
 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3398 [inline]
 slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3406 [inline]
 __kmem_cache_alloc_lru mm/slub.c:3413 [inline]
 kmem_cache_alloc+0x2b4/0x3d0 mm/slub.c:3422
 dst_alloc+0x14a/0x1f0 net/core/dst.c:92
 ip6_dst_alloc+0x32/0xa0 net/ipv6/route.c:344
 ip6_rt_pcpu_alloc net/ipv6/route.c:1369 [inline]
 rt6_make_pcpu_route net/ipv6/route.c:1417 [inline]
 ip6_pol_route+0x901/0x1190 net/ipv6/route.c:2254
 pol_lookup_func include/net/ip6_fib.h:582 [inline]
 fib6_rule_lookup+0x52e/0x6f0 net/ipv6/fib6_rules.c:121
 ip6_route_output_flags_noref+0x2e6/0x380 net/ipv6/route.c:2625
 ip6_route_output_flags+0x76/0x320 net/ipv6/route.c:2638
 ip6_route_output include/net/ip6_route.h:98 [inline]
 ip6_dst_lookup_tail+0x5ab/0x1620 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1092
 ip6_dst_lookup_flow+0x90/0x1d0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1222
 ip6_sk_dst_lookup_flow+0x553/0x980 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1260
 udpv6_sendmsg+0x151d/0x2c80 net/ipv6/udp.c:1554
 inet6_sendmsg+0x9d/0xe0 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:665
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0xd3/0x120 net/socket.c:734
 __sys_sendto+0x23a/0x340 net/socket.c:2117
 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2129 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2125 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2125
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Freed by task 7599:
 kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:45
 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:52
 kasan_save_free_info+0x2e/0x40 mm/kasan/generic.c:511
 ____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:236 [inline]
 ____kasan_slab_free+0x160/0x1c0 mm/kasan/common.c:200
 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:177 [inline]
 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1724 [inline]
 slab_free_freelist_hook+0x8b/0x1c0 mm/slub.c:1750
 slab_free mm/slub.c:3661 [inline]
 kmem_cache_free+0xee/0x5c0 mm/slub.c:3683
 dst_destroy+0x2ea/0x400 net/core/dst.c:127
 rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2250 [inline]
 rcu_core+0x81f/0x1980 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2510
 __do_softirq+0x1fb/0xadc kernel/softirq.c:571

Last potentially related work creation:
 kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:45
 __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xbc/0xd0 mm/kasan/generic.c:481
 call_rcu+0x9d/0x820 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2798
 dst_release net/core/dst.c:177 [inline]
 dst_release+0x7d/0xe0 net/core/dst.c:167
 refdst_drop include/net/dst.h:256 [inline]
 skb_dst_drop include/net/dst.h:268 [inline]
 skb_release_head_state+0x250/0x2a0 net/core/skbuff.c:838
 skb_release_all net/core/skbuff.c:852 [inline]
 __kfree_skb net/core/skbuff.c:868 [inline]
 kfree_skb_reason+0x151/0x4b0 net/core/skbuff.c:891
 kfree_skb_list_reason+0x4b/0x70 net/core/skbuff.c:901
 kfree_skb_list include/linux/skbuff.h:1227 [inline]
 ip6_fragment+0x2026/0x2770 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:949
 __ip6_finish_output net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:193 [inline]
 ip6_finish_output+0x9a3/0x1170 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:206
 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:291 [inline]
 ip6_output+0x1f1/0x540 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:227
 dst_output include/net/dst.h:445 [inline]
 ip6_local_out+0xb3/0x1a0 net/ipv6/output_core.c:161
 ip6_send_skb+0xbb/0x340 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1966
 udp_v6_send_skb+0x82a/0x18a0 net/ipv6/udp.c:1286
 udp_v6_push_pending_frames+0x140/0x200 net/ipv6/udp.c:1313
 udpv6_sendmsg+0x18da/0x2c80 net/ipv6/udp.c:1606
 inet6_sendmsg+0x9d/0xe0 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:665
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0xd3/0x120 net/socket.c:734
 sock_write_iter+0x295/0x3d0 net/socket.c:1108
 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2191 [inline]
 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:491 [inline]
 vfs_write+0x9ed/0xdd0 fs/read_write.c:584
 ksys_write+0x1ec/0x250 fs/read_write.c:637
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Second to last potentially related work creation:
 kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:45
 __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xbc/0xd0 mm/kasan/generic.c:481
 call_rcu+0x9d/0x820 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2798
 dst_release net/core/dst.c:177 [inline]
 dst_release+0x7d/0xe0 net/core/dst.c:167
 refdst_drop include/net/dst.h:256 [inline]
 skb_dst_drop include/net/dst.h:268 [inline]
 __dev_queue_xmit+0x1b9d/0x3ba0 net/core/dev.c:4211
 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3008 [inline]
 neigh_resolve_output net/core/neighbour.c:1552 [inline]
 neigh_resolve_output+0x51b/0x840 net/core/neighbour.c:1532
 neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:546 [inline]
 ip6_finish_output2+0x56c/0x1530 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:134
 __ip6_finish_output net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:195 [inline]
 ip6_finish_output+0x694/0x1170 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:206
 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:291 [inline]
 ip6_output+0x1f1/0x540 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:227
 dst_output include/net/dst.h:445 [inline]
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:302 [inline]
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:296 [inline]
 mld_sendpack+0xa09/0xe70 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1820
 mld_send_cr net/ipv6/mcast.c:2121 [inline]
 mld_ifc_work+0x720/0xdc0 net/ipv6/mcast.c:2653
 process_one_work+0x9bf/0x1710 kernel/workqueue.c:2289
 worker_thread+0x669/0x1090 kernel/workqueue.c:2436
 kthread+0x2e8/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:376
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:306

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88801d403dc0
 which belongs to the cache ip6_dst_cache of size 240
The buggy address is located 192 bytes inside of
 240-byte region [ffff88801d403dc0, ffff88801d403eb0)

The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page:ffffea00007500c0 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x1d403
memcg:ffff888022f49c81
flags: 0xfff00000000200(slab|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
raw: 00fff00000000200 ffffea0001ef6580 dead000000000002 ffff88814addf640
raw: 0000000000000000 00000000800c000c 00000001ffffffff ffff888022f49c81
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner tracks the page as allocated
page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x112a20(GFP_ATOMIC|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_HARDWALL), pid 3719, tgid 3719 (kworker/0:6), ts 136223432244, free_ts 136222971441
 prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:2539 [inline]
 get_page_from_freelist+0x10b5/0x2d50 mm/page_alloc.c:4288
 __alloc_pages+0x1cb/0x5b0 mm/page_alloc.c:5555
 alloc_pages+0x1aa/0x270 mm/mempolicy.c:2285
 alloc_slab_page mm/slub.c:1794 [inline]
 allocate_slab+0x213/0x300 mm/slub.c:1939
 new_slab mm/slub.c:1992 [inline]
 ___slab_alloc+0xa91/0x1400 mm/slub.c:3180
 __slab_alloc.constprop.0+0x56/0xa0 mm/slub.c:3279
 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3364 [inline]
 slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3406 [inline]
 __kmem_cache_alloc_lru mm/slub.c:3413 [inline]
 kmem_cache_alloc+0x31a/0x3d0 mm/slub.c:3422
 dst_alloc+0x14a/0x1f0 net/core/dst.c:92
 ip6_dst_alloc+0x32/0xa0 net/ipv6/route.c:344
 icmp6_dst_alloc+0x71/0x680 net/ipv6/route.c:3261
 mld_sendpack+0x5de/0xe70 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1809
 mld_send_cr net/ipv6/mcast.c:2121 [inline]
 mld_ifc_work+0x720/0xdc0 net/ipv6/mcast.c:2653
 process_one_work+0x9bf/0x1710 kernel/workqueue.c:2289
 worker_thread+0x669/0x1090 kernel/workqueue.c:2436
 kthread+0x2e8/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:376
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:306
page last free stack trace:
 reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:24 [inline]
 free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1459 [inline]
 free_pcp_prepare+0x65c/0xd90 mm/page_alloc.c:1509
 free_unref_page_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:3387 [inline]
 free_unref_page+0x1d/0x4d0 mm/page_alloc.c:3483
 __unfreeze_partials+0x17c/0x1a0 mm/slub.c:2586
 qlink_free mm/kasan/quarantine.c:168 [inline]
 qlist_free_all+0x6a/0x170 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:187
 kasan_quarantine_reduce+0x184/0x210 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:294
 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x66/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:302
 kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:201 [inline]
 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:737 [inline]
 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3398 [inline]
 kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x304/0x410 mm/slub.c:3443
 __alloc_skb+0x214/0x300 net/core/skbuff.c:497
 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1267 [inline]
 netlink_alloc_large_skb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1191 [inline]
 netlink_sendmsg+0x9a6/0xe10 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1896
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0xd3/0x120 net/socket.c:734
 __sys_sendto+0x23a/0x340 net/socket.c:2117
 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2129 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2125 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2125
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Fixes: 1758fd4688eb ("ipv6: remove unnecessary dst_hold() in ip6_fragment()")
Reported-by: syzbot+8c0ac31aa9681abb9e2d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221206101351.2037285-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-12-14 11:37:29 +01:00
Xin Long
d962d42d63 tipc: call tipc_lxc_xmit without holding node_read_lock
[ Upstream commit 88956177db179e4eba7cd590971961857d1565b8 ]

When sending packets between nodes in netns, it calls tipc_lxc_xmit() for
peer node to receive the packets where tipc_sk_mcast_rcv()/tipc_sk_rcv()
might be called, and it's pretty much like in tipc_rcv().

Currently the local 'node rw lock' is held during calling tipc_lxc_xmit()
to protect the peer_net not being freed by another thread. However, when
receiving these packets, tipc_node_add_conn() might be called where the
peer 'node rw lock' is acquired. Then a dead lock warning is triggered by
lockdep detector, although it is not a real dead lock:

    WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
    --------------------------------------------
    conn_server/1086 is trying to acquire lock:
    ffff8880065cb020 (&n->lock#2){++--}-{2:2}, \
                     at: tipc_node_add_conn.cold.76+0xaa/0x211 [tipc]

    but task is already holding lock:
    ffff8880065cd020 (&n->lock#2){++--}-{2:2}, \
                     at: tipc_node_xmit+0x285/0xb30 [tipc]

    other info that might help us debug this:
     Possible unsafe locking scenario:

           CPU0
           ----
      lock(&n->lock#2);
      lock(&n->lock#2);

     *** DEADLOCK ***

     May be due to missing lock nesting notation

    4 locks held by conn_server/1086:
     #0: ffff8880036d1e40 (sk_lock-AF_TIPC){+.+.}-{0:0}, \
                          at: tipc_accept+0x9c0/0x10b0 [tipc]
     #1: ffff8880036d5f80 (sk_lock-AF_TIPC/1){+.+.}-{0:0}, \
                          at: tipc_accept+0x363/0x10b0 [tipc]
     #2: ffff8880065cd020 (&n->lock#2){++--}-{2:2}, \
                          at: tipc_node_xmit+0x285/0xb30 [tipc]
     #3: ffff888012e13370 (slock-AF_TIPC){+...}-{2:2}, \
                          at: tipc_sk_rcv+0x2da/0x1b40 [tipc]

    Call Trace:
     <TASK>
     dump_stack_lvl+0x44/0x5b
     __lock_acquire.cold.77+0x1f2/0x3d7
     lock_acquire+0x1d2/0x610
     _raw_write_lock_bh+0x38/0x80
     tipc_node_add_conn.cold.76+0xaa/0x211 [tipc]
     tipc_sk_finish_conn+0x21e/0x640 [tipc]
     tipc_sk_filter_rcv+0x147b/0x3030 [tipc]
     tipc_sk_rcv+0xbb4/0x1b40 [tipc]
     tipc_lxc_xmit+0x225/0x26b [tipc]
     tipc_node_xmit.cold.82+0x4a/0x102 [tipc]
     __tipc_sendstream+0x879/0xff0 [tipc]
     tipc_accept+0x966/0x10b0 [tipc]
     do_accept+0x37d/0x590

This patch avoids this warning by not holding the 'node rw lock' before
calling tipc_lxc_xmit(). As to protect the 'peer_net', rcu_read_lock()
should be enough, as in cleanup_net() when freeing the netns, it calls
synchronize_rcu() before the free is continued.

Also since tipc_lxc_xmit() is like the RX path in tipc_rcv(), it makes
sense to call it under rcu_read_lock(). Note that the right lock order
must be:

   rcu_read_lock();
   tipc_node_read_lock(n);
   tipc_node_read_unlock(n);
   tipc_lxc_xmit();
   rcu_read_unlock();

instead of:

   tipc_node_read_lock(n);
   rcu_read_lock();
   tipc_node_read_unlock(n);
   tipc_lxc_xmit();
   rcu_read_unlock();

and we have to call tipc_node_read_lock/unlock() twice in
tipc_node_xmit().

Fixes: f73b12812a3d ("tipc: improve throughput between nodes in netns")
Reported-by: Shuang Li <shuali@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/5bdd1f8fee9db695cfff4528a48c9b9d0523fb00.1670110641.git.lucien.xin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-12-14 11:37:29 +01:00
Ido Schimmel
5dab6fa068 ipv4: Fix incorrect route flushing when table ID 0 is used
[ Upstream commit c0d999348e01df03e0a7f550351f3907fabbf611 ]

Cited commit added the table ID to the FIB info structure, but did not
properly initialize it when table ID 0 is used. This can lead to a route
in the default VRF with a preferred source address not being flushed
when the address is deleted.

Consider the following example:

 # ip address add dev dummy1 192.0.2.1/28
 # ip address add dev dummy1 192.0.2.17/28
 # ip route add 198.51.100.0/24 via 192.0.2.2 src 192.0.2.17 metric 100
 # ip route add table 0 198.51.100.0/24 via 192.0.2.2 src 192.0.2.17 metric 200
 # ip route show 198.51.100.0/24
 198.51.100.0/24 via 192.0.2.2 dev dummy1 src 192.0.2.17 metric 100
 198.51.100.0/24 via 192.0.2.2 dev dummy1 src 192.0.2.17 metric 200

Both routes are installed in the default VRF, but they are using two
different FIB info structures. One with a metric of 100 and table ID of
254 (main) and one with a metric of 200 and table ID of 0. Therefore,
when the preferred source address is deleted from the default VRF,
the second route is not flushed:

 # ip address del dev dummy1 192.0.2.17/28
 # ip route show 198.51.100.0/24
 198.51.100.0/24 via 192.0.2.2 dev dummy1 src 192.0.2.17 metric 200

Fix by storing a table ID of 254 instead of 0 in the route configuration
structure.

Add a test case that fails before the fix:

 # ./fib_tests.sh -t ipv4_del_addr

 IPv4 delete address route tests
     Regular FIB info
     TEST: Route removed from VRF when source address deleted            [ OK ]
     TEST: Route in default VRF not removed                              [ OK ]
     TEST: Route removed in default VRF when source address deleted      [ OK ]
     TEST: Route in VRF is not removed by address delete                 [ OK ]
     Identical FIB info with different table ID
     TEST: Route removed from VRF when source address deleted            [ OK ]
     TEST: Route in default VRF not removed                              [ OK ]
     TEST: Route removed in default VRF when source address deleted      [ OK ]
     TEST: Route in VRF is not removed by address delete                 [ OK ]
     Table ID 0
     TEST: Route removed in default VRF when source address deleted      [FAIL]

 Tests passed:   8
 Tests failed:   1

And passes after:

 # ./fib_tests.sh -t ipv4_del_addr

 IPv4 delete address route tests
     Regular FIB info
     TEST: Route removed from VRF when source address deleted            [ OK ]
     TEST: Route in default VRF not removed                              [ OK ]
     TEST: Route removed in default VRF when source address deleted      [ OK ]
     TEST: Route in VRF is not removed by address delete                 [ OK ]
     Identical FIB info with different table ID
     TEST: Route removed from VRF when source address deleted            [ OK ]
     TEST: Route in default VRF not removed                              [ OK ]
     TEST: Route removed in default VRF when source address deleted      [ OK ]
     TEST: Route in VRF is not removed by address delete                 [ OK ]
     Table ID 0
     TEST: Route removed in default VRF when source address deleted      [ OK ]

 Tests passed:   9
 Tests failed:   0

Fixes: 5a56a0b3a45d ("net: Don't delete routes in different VRFs")
Reported-by: Donald Sharp <sharpd@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-12-14 11:37:28 +01:00
Ido Schimmel
ac566bd577 ipv4: Fix incorrect route flushing when source address is deleted
[ Upstream commit f96a3d74554df537b6db5c99c27c80e7afadc8d1 ]

Cited commit added the table ID to the FIB info structure, but did not
prevent structures with different table IDs from being consolidated.
This can lead to routes being flushed from a VRF when an address is
deleted from a different VRF.

Fix by taking the table ID into account when looking for a matching FIB
info. This is already done for FIB info structures backed by a nexthop
object in fib_find_info_nh().

Add test cases that fail before the fix:

 # ./fib_tests.sh -t ipv4_del_addr

 IPv4 delete address route tests
     Regular FIB info
     TEST: Route removed from VRF when source address deleted            [ OK ]
     TEST: Route in default VRF not removed                              [ OK ]
     TEST: Route removed in default VRF when source address deleted      [ OK ]
     TEST: Route in VRF is not removed by address delete                 [ OK ]
     Identical FIB info with different table ID
     TEST: Route removed from VRF when source address deleted            [FAIL]
     TEST: Route in default VRF not removed                              [ OK ]
 RTNETLINK answers: File exists
     TEST: Route removed in default VRF when source address deleted      [ OK ]
     TEST: Route in VRF is not removed by address delete                 [FAIL]

 Tests passed:   6
 Tests failed:   2

And pass after:

 # ./fib_tests.sh -t ipv4_del_addr

 IPv4 delete address route tests
     Regular FIB info
     TEST: Route removed from VRF when source address deleted            [ OK ]
     TEST: Route in default VRF not removed                              [ OK ]
     TEST: Route removed in default VRF when source address deleted      [ OK ]
     TEST: Route in VRF is not removed by address delete                 [ OK ]
     Identical FIB info with different table ID
     TEST: Route removed from VRF when source address deleted            [ OK ]
     TEST: Route in default VRF not removed                              [ OK ]
     TEST: Route removed in default VRF when source address deleted      [ OK ]
     TEST: Route in VRF is not removed by address delete                 [ OK ]

 Tests passed:   8
 Tests failed:   0

Fixes: 5a56a0b3a45d ("net: Don't delete routes in different VRFs")
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-12-14 11:37:28 +01:00
YueHaibing
af4ccae4b7 tipc: Fix potential OOB in tipc_link_proto_rcv()
[ Upstream commit 743117a997bbd4840e827295c07e59bcd7f7caa3 ]

Fix the potential risk of OOB if skb_linearize() fails in
tipc_link_proto_rcv().

Fixes: 5cbb28a4bf65 ("tipc: linearize arriving NAME_DISTR and LINK_PROTO buffers")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221203094635.29024-1-yuehaibing@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-12-14 11:37:28 +01:00
Hangbin Liu
99eec0a766 ip_gre: do not report erspan version on GRE interface
[ Upstream commit ee496694b9eea651ae1aa4c4667d886cdf74aa3b ]

Although the type I ERSPAN is based on the barebones IP + GRE
encapsulation and no extra ERSPAN header. Report erspan version on GRE
interface looks unreasonable. Fix this by separating the erspan and gre
fill info.

IPv6 GRE does not have this info as IPv6 only supports erspan version
1 and 2.

Reported-by: Jianlin Shi <jishi@redhat.com>
Fixes: f989d546a2d5 ("erspan: Add type I version 0 support.")
Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: William Tu <u9012063@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221203032858.3130339-1-liuhangbin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-12-14 11:37:27 +01:00
Kees Cook
908b2da426 NFC: nci: Bounds check struct nfc_target arrays
[ Upstream commit e329e71013c9b5a4535b099208493c7826ee4a64 ]

While running under CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE=y, syzkaller reported:

  memcpy: detected field-spanning write (size 129) of single field "target->sensf_res" at net/nfc/nci/ntf.c:260 (size 18)

This appears to be a legitimate lack of bounds checking in
nci_add_new_protocol(). Add the missing checks.

Reported-by: syzbot+210e196cef4711b65139@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/0000000000001c590f05ee7b3ff4@google.com
Fixes: 019c4fbaa790 ("NFC: Add NCI multiple targets support")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221202214410.never.693-kees@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-12-14 11:37:27 +01:00
Wei Yongjun
a110287ef4 mac802154: fix missing INIT_LIST_HEAD in ieee802154_if_add()
[ Upstream commit b3d72d3135d2ef68296c1ee174436efd65386f04 ]

Kernel fault injection test reports null-ptr-deref as follows:

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008
RIP: 0010:cfg802154_netdev_notifier_call+0x120/0x310 include/linux/list.h:114
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 raw_notifier_call_chain+0x6d/0xa0 kernel/notifier.c:87
 call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x6e/0xc0 net/core/dev.c:1944
 unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x60d/0xcb0 net/core/dev.c:1982
 unregister_netdevice_queue+0x154/0x1a0 net/core/dev.c:10879
 register_netdevice+0x9a8/0xb90 net/core/dev.c:10083
 ieee802154_if_add+0x6ed/0x7e0 net/mac802154/iface.c:659
 ieee802154_register_hw+0x29c/0x330 net/mac802154/main.c:229
 mcr20a_probe+0xaaa/0xcb1 drivers/net/ieee802154/mcr20a.c:1316

ieee802154_if_add() allocates wpan_dev as netdev's private data, but not
init the list in struct wpan_dev. cfg802154_netdev_notifier_call() manage
the list when device register/unregister, and may lead to null-ptr-deref.

Use INIT_LIST_HEAD() on it to initialize it correctly.

Fixes: fcf39e6e88e9 ("ieee802154: add wpan_dev_list")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Alexander Aring <aahringo@redhat.com>

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221130091705.1831140-1-weiyongjun@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Stefan Schmidt <stefan@datenfreihafen.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-12-14 11:37:25 +01:00
Artem Chernyshev
4fa8988a36 net: dsa: sja1105: Check return value
[ Upstream commit 8948876335b1752176afdff8e704099a3ea0f6e6 ]

Return NULL if we got unexpected value from skb_trim_rcsum() in
sja1110_rcv_inband_control_extension()

Fixes: 4913b8ebf8a9 ("net: dsa: add support for the SJA1110 native tagging protocol")
Signed-off-by: Artem Chernyshev <artem.chernyshev@red-soft.ru>
Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221201140032.26746-3-artem.chernyshev@red-soft.ru
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-12-14 11:37:25 +01:00
Artem Chernyshev
b35be171df net: dsa: hellcreek: Check return value
[ Upstream commit d4edb50688652eb10be270bc515da63815de428f ]

Return NULL if we got unexpected value from skb_trim_rcsum()
in hellcreek_rcv()

Fixes: 01ef09caad66 ("net: dsa: Add tag handling for Hirschmann Hellcreek switches")
Signed-off-by: Artem Chernyshev <artem.chernyshev@red-soft.ru>
Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Kanzenbach <kurt@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221201140032.26746-2-artem.chernyshev@red-soft.ru
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-12-14 11:37:25 +01:00
Artem Chernyshev
a4c342e645 net: dsa: ksz: Check return value
[ Upstream commit 3d8fdcbf1f42e2bb9ae8b8c0b6f202278c788a22 ]

Return NULL if we got unexpected value from skb_trim_rcsum()
in ksz_common_rcv()

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.

Fixes: bafe9ba7d908 ("net: dsa: ksz: Factor out common tag code")
Signed-off-by: Artem Chernyshev <artem.chernyshev@red-soft.ru>
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Oltean <olteanv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221201140032.26746-1-artem.chernyshev@red-soft.ru
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-12-14 11:37:24 +01:00
Chen Zhongjin
edf7284a98 Bluetooth: Fix not cleanup led when bt_init fails
[ Upstream commit 2f3957c7eb4e07df944169a3e50a4d6790e1c744 ]

bt_init() calls bt_leds_init() to register led, but if it fails later,
bt_leds_cleanup() is not called to unregister it.

This can cause panic if the argument "bluetooth-power" in text is freed
and then another led_trigger_register() tries to access it:

BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffc06d3bc0
RIP: 0010:strcmp+0xc/0x30
  Call Trace:
    <TASK>
    led_trigger_register+0x10d/0x4f0
    led_trigger_register_simple+0x7d/0x100
    bt_init+0x39/0xf7 [bluetooth]
    do_one_initcall+0xd0/0x4e0

Fixes: e64c97b53bc6 ("Bluetooth: Add combined LED trigger for controller power")
Signed-off-by: Chen Zhongjin <chenzhongjin@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-12-14 11:37:24 +01:00
Wang ShaoBo
3322193949 Bluetooth: 6LoWPAN: add missing hci_dev_put() in get_l2cap_conn()
[ Upstream commit 747da1308bdd5021409974f9180f0d8ece53d142 ]

hci_get_route() takes reference, we should use hci_dev_put() to release
it when not need anymore.

Fixes: 6b8d4a6a0314 ("Bluetooth: 6LoWPAN: Use connected oriented channel instead of fixed one")
Signed-off-by: Wang ShaoBo <bobo.shaobowang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-12-14 11:37:24 +01:00
Kuniyuki Iwashima
5c014eb0ed af_unix: Get user_ns from in_skb in unix_diag_get_exact().
[ Upstream commit b3abe42e94900bdd045c472f9c9be620ba5ce553 ]

Wei Chen reported a NULL deref in sk_user_ns() [0][1], and Paolo diagnosed
the root cause: in unix_diag_get_exact(), the newly allocated skb does not
have sk. [2]

We must get the user_ns from the NETLINK_CB(in_skb).sk and pass it to
sk_diag_fill().

[0]:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000270
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 12bbce067 P4D 12bbce067 PUD 12bc40067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
CPU: 0 PID: 27942 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc5-next-20221118 #2
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
rel-1.13.0-48-gd9c812dda519-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:sk_user_ns include/net/sock.h:920 [inline]
RIP: 0010:sk_diag_dump_uid net/unix/diag.c:119 [inline]
RIP: 0010:sk_diag_fill+0x77d/0x890 net/unix/diag.c:170
Code: 89 ef e8 66 d4 2d fd c7 44 24 40 00 00 00 00 49 8d 7c 24 18 e8
54 d7 2d fd 49 8b 5c 24 18 48 8d bb 70 02 00 00 e8 43 d7 2d fd <48> 8b
9b 70 02 00 00 48 8d 7b 10 e8 33 d7 2d fd 48 8b 5b 10 48 8d
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000d67968 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: ffff88812badaa48 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff840d481d
RDX: 0000000000000465 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000270
RBP: ffffc90000d679a8 R08: 0000000000000277 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0001ffffffffffff R11: 0001c90000d679a8 R12: ffff88812ac03800
R13: ffff88812c87c400 R14: ffff88812ae42210 R15: ffff888103026940
FS:  00007f08b4e6f700(0000) GS:ffff88813bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000270 CR3: 000000012c58b000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 unix_diag_get_exact net/unix/diag.c:285 [inline]
 unix_diag_handler_dump+0x3f9/0x500 net/unix/diag.c:317
 __sock_diag_cmd net/core/sock_diag.c:235 [inline]
 sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x237/0x250 net/core/sock_diag.c:266
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x13e/0x250 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2564
 sock_diag_rcv+0x24/0x40 net/core/sock_diag.c:277
 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1330 [inline]
 netlink_unicast+0x5e9/0x6b0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1356
 netlink_sendmsg+0x739/0x860 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1932
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:734 [inline]
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x38f/0x500 net/socket.c:2476
 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2530 [inline]
 __sys_sendmsg+0x197/0x230 net/socket.c:2559
 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2568 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2566 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x42/0x50 net/socket.c:2566
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x2b/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x4697f9
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48
89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d
01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f08b4e6ec48 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000077bf80 RCX: 00000000004697f9
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000200001c0 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00000000004d29e9 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000077bf80
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000000000077bf80 R15: 00007ffdb36bc6c0
 </TASK>
Modules linked in:
CR2: 0000000000000270

[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAO4mrfdvyjFpokhNsiwZiP-wpdSD0AStcJwfKcKQdAALQ9_2Qw@mail.gmail.com/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/e04315e7c90d9a75613f3993c2baf2d344eef7eb.camel@redhat.com/

Fixes: cae9910e7344 ("net: Add UNIX_DIAG_UID to Netlink UNIX socket diagnostics.")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Reported-by: Wei Chen <harperchen1110@gmail.com>
Diagnosed-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-12-14 11:37:24 +01:00
Pablo Neira Ayuso
f8b2965601 netfilter: ctnetlink: fix compilation warning after data race fixes in ct mark
[ Upstream commit 1feeae071507ad65cf9f462a1bdd543a4bf89e71 ]

All warnings (new ones prefixed by >>):

   net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c: In function '__ctnetlink_glue_build':
>> net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c:2674:13: warning: unused variable 'mark' [-Wunused-variable]
    2674 |         u32 mark;
         |             ^~~~

Fixes: 52d1aa8b8249 ("netfilter: conntrack: Fix data-races around ct mark")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Tested-by: Ivan Babrou <ivan@ivan.computer>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-12-14 11:37:23 +01:00
Stefano Brivio
7b09ba9036 netfilter: nft_set_pipapo: Actually validate intervals in fields after the first one
[ Upstream commit 97d4d394b58777f7056ebba8ffdb4002d0563259 ]

Embarrassingly, nft_pipapo_insert() checked for interval validity in
the first field only.

The start_p and end_p pointers were reset to key data from the first
field at every iteration of the loop which was supposed to go over
the set fields.

Fixes: 3c4287f62044 ("nf_tables: Add set type for arbitrary concatenation of ranges")
Reported-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-12-14 11:37:22 +01:00
Oliver Hartkopp
c142cba37d can: af_can: fix NULL pointer dereference in can_rcv_filter
commit 0acc442309a0a1b01bcdaa135e56e6398a49439c upstream.

Analogue to commit 8aa59e355949 ("can: af_can: fix NULL pointer
dereference in can_rx_register()") we need to check for a missing
initialization of ml_priv in the receive path of CAN frames.

Since commit 4e096a18867a ("net: introduce CAN specific pointer in the
struct net_device") the check for dev->type to be ARPHRD_CAN is not
sufficient anymore since bonding or tun netdevices claim to be CAN
devices but do not initialize ml_priv accordingly.

Fixes: 4e096a18867a ("net: introduce CAN specific pointer in the struct net_device")
Reported-by: syzbot+2d7f58292cb5b29eb5ad@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: Wei Chen <harperchen1110@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221206201259.3028-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-12-14 11:37:22 +01:00
Luiz Augusto von Dentz
a49894a5ac Bluetooth: Fix crash when replugging CSR fake controllers
commit b5ca338751ad4783ec8d37b5d99c3e37b7813e59 upstream.

It seems fake CSR 5.0 clones can cause the suspend notifier to be
registered twice causing the following kernel panic:

[   71.986122] Call Trace:
[   71.986124]  <TASK>
[   71.986125]  blocking_notifier_chain_register+0x33/0x60
[   71.986130]  hci_register_dev+0x316/0x3d0 [bluetooth 99b5497ea3d09708fa1366c1dc03288bf3cca8da]
[   71.986154]  btusb_probe+0x979/0xd85 [btusb e1e0605a4f4c01984a4b9c8ac58c3666ae287477]
[   71.986159]  ? __pm_runtime_set_status+0x1a9/0x300
[   71.986162]  ? ktime_get_mono_fast_ns+0x3e/0x90
[   71.986167]  usb_probe_interface+0xe3/0x2b0
[   71.986171]  really_probe+0xdb/0x380
[   71.986174]  ? pm_runtime_barrier+0x54/0x90
[   71.986177]  __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x170
[   71.986180]  driver_probe_device+0x1f/0x90
[   71.986183]  __device_attach_driver+0x89/0x110
[   71.986186]  ? driver_allows_async_probing+0x70/0x70
[   71.986189]  bus_for_each_drv+0x8c/0xe0
[   71.986192]  __device_attach+0xb2/0x1e0
[   71.986195]  bus_probe_device+0x92/0xb0
[   71.986198]  device_add+0x422/0x9a0
[   71.986201]  ? sysfs_merge_group+0xd4/0x110
[   71.986205]  usb_set_configuration+0x57a/0x820
[   71.986208]  usb_generic_driver_probe+0x4f/0x70
[   71.986211]  usb_probe_device+0x3a/0x110
[   71.986213]  really_probe+0xdb/0x380
[   71.986216]  ? pm_runtime_barrier+0x54/0x90
[   71.986219]  __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x170
[   71.986221]  driver_probe_device+0x1f/0x90
[   71.986224]  __device_attach_driver+0x89/0x110
[   71.986227]  ? driver_allows_async_probing+0x70/0x70
[   71.986230]  bus_for_each_drv+0x8c/0xe0
[   71.986232]  __device_attach+0xb2/0x1e0
[   71.986235]  bus_probe_device+0x92/0xb0
[   71.986237]  device_add+0x422/0x9a0
[   71.986239]  ? _dev_info+0x7d/0x98
[   71.986242]  ? blake2s_update+0x4c/0xc0
[   71.986246]  usb_new_device.cold+0x148/0x36d
[   71.986250]  hub_event+0xa8a/0x1910
[   71.986255]  process_one_work+0x1c4/0x380
[   71.986259]  worker_thread+0x51/0x390
[   71.986262]  ? rescuer_thread+0x3b0/0x3b0
[   71.986264]  kthread+0xdb/0x110
[   71.986266]  ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
[   71.986268]  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
[   71.986273]  </TASK>
[   71.986274] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[   71.986284] btusb: probe of 2-1.6:1.0 failed with error -17

Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216683
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Tested-by: Leonardo Eugênio <lelgenio@disroot.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-12-14 11:37:20 +01:00
Dominique Martinet
029a7f1c5d 9p/xen: check logical size for buffer size
[ Upstream commit 391c18cf776eb4569ecda1f7794f360fe0a45a26 ]

trans_xen did not check the data fits into the buffer before copying
from the xen ring, but we probably should.
Add a check that just skips the request and return an error to
userspace if it did not fit

Tested-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Christian Schoenebeck <linux_oss@crudebyte.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221118135542.63400-1-asmadeus@codewreck.org
Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet <asmadeus@codewreck.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-12-14 11:37:17 +01:00
GUO Zihua
3d1b5fde36 9p/fd: Use P9_HDRSZ for header size
[ Upstream commit 6854fadbeee10891ed74246bdc05031906b6c8cf ]

Cleanup hardcoded header sizes to use P9_HDRSZ instead of '7'

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221117091159.31533-4-guozihua@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: GUO Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Schoenebeck <linux_oss@crudebyte.com>
[Dominique: commit message adjusted to make sense after offset size
adjustment got removed]
Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet <asmadeus@codewreck.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-12-14 11:37:16 +01:00
Ido Schimmel
041f8dc882 ipv4: Fix route deletion when nexthop info is not specified
[ Upstream commit d5082d386eee7e8ec46fa8581932c81a4961dcef ]

When the kernel receives a route deletion request from user space it
tries to delete a route that matches the route attributes specified in
the request.

If only prefix information is specified in the request, the kernel
should delete the first matching FIB alias regardless of its associated
FIB info. However, an error is currently returned when the FIB info is
backed by a nexthop object:

 # ip nexthop add id 1 via 192.0.2.2 dev dummy10
 # ip route add 198.51.100.0/24 nhid 1
 # ip route del 198.51.100.0/24
 RTNETLINK answers: No such process

Fix by matching on such a FIB info when legacy nexthop attributes are
not specified in the request. An earlier check already covers the case
where a nexthop ID is specified in the request.

Add tests that cover these flows. Before the fix:

 # ./fib_nexthops.sh -t ipv4_fcnal
 ...
 TEST: Delete route when not specifying nexthop attributes           [FAIL]

 Tests passed:  11
 Tests failed:   1

After the fix:

 # ./fib_nexthops.sh -t ipv4_fcnal
 ...
 TEST: Delete route when not specifying nexthop attributes           [ OK ]

 Tests passed:  12
 Tests failed:   0

No regressions in other tests:

 # ./fib_nexthops.sh
 ...
 Tests passed: 228
 Tests failed:   0

 # ./fib_tests.sh
 ...
 Tests passed: 186
 Tests failed:   0

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Jonas Gorski <jonas.gorski@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Jonas Gorski <jonas.gorski@gmail.com>
Fixes: 493ced1ac47c ("ipv4: Allow routes to use nexthop objects")
Fixes: 6bf92d70e690 ("net: ipv4: fix route with nexthop object delete warning")
Fixes: 61b91eb33a69 ("ipv4: Handle attempt to delete multipath route when fib_info contains an nh reference")
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221124210932.2470010-1-idosch@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-12-08 11:28:44 +01:00
David Ahern
25174d91e4 ipv4: Handle attempt to delete multipath route when fib_info contains an nh reference
[ Upstream commit 61b91eb33a69c3be11b259c5ea484505cd79f883 ]

Gwangun Jung reported a slab-out-of-bounds access in fib_nh_match:
    fib_nh_match+0xf98/0x1130 linux-6.0-rc7/net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c:961
    fib_table_delete+0x5f3/0xa40 linux-6.0-rc7/net/ipv4/fib_trie.c:1753
    inet_rtm_delroute+0x2b3/0x380 linux-6.0-rc7/net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c:874

Separate nexthop objects are mutually exclusive with the legacy
multipath spec. Fix fib_nh_match to return if the config for the
to be deleted route contains a multipath spec while the fib_info
is using a nexthop object.

Fixes: 493ced1ac47c ("ipv4: Allow routes to use nexthop objects")
Fixes: 6bf92d70e690 ("net: ipv4: fix route with nexthop object delete warning")
Reported-by: Gwangun Jung <exsociety@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Tested-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Stable-dep-of: d5082d386eee ("ipv4: Fix route deletion when nexthop info is not specified")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-12-08 11:28:44 +01:00
Zhengchao Shao
0dfb9a5663 sctp: fix memory leak in sctp_stream_outq_migrate()
[ Upstream commit 9ed7bfc79542119ac0a9e1ce8a2a5285e43433e9 ]

When sctp_stream_outq_migrate() is called to release stream out resources,
the memory pointed to by prio_head in stream out is not released.

The memory leak information is as follows:
 unreferenced object 0xffff88801fe79f80 (size 64):
   comm "sctp_repo", pid 7957, jiffies 4294951704 (age 36.480s)
   hex dump (first 32 bytes):
     80 9f e7 1f 80 88 ff ff 80 9f e7 1f 80 88 ff ff  ................
     90 9f e7 1f 80 88 ff ff 90 9f e7 1f 80 88 ff ff  ................
   backtrace:
     [<ffffffff81b215c6>] kmalloc_trace+0x26/0x60
     [<ffffffff88ae517c>] sctp_sched_prio_set+0x4cc/0x770
     [<ffffffff88ad64f2>] sctp_stream_init_ext+0xd2/0x1b0
     [<ffffffff88aa2604>] sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc+0x1614/0x1a30
     [<ffffffff88ab7ff1>] sctp_sendmsg+0xda1/0x1ef0
     [<ffffffff87f765ed>] inet_sendmsg+0x9d/0xe0
     [<ffffffff8754b5b3>] sock_sendmsg+0xd3/0x120
     [<ffffffff8755446a>] __sys_sendto+0x23a/0x340
     [<ffffffff87554651>] __x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1b0
     [<ffffffff89978b49>] do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0
     [<ffffffff89a0008b>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?exrid=29c402e56c4760763cc0
Fixes: 637784ade221 ("sctp: introduce priority based stream scheduler")
Reported-by: syzbot+29c402e56c4760763cc0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221126031720.378562-1-shaozhengchao@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-12-08 11:28:41 +01:00
Willem de Bruijn
fcb3e02161 packet: do not set TP_STATUS_CSUM_VALID on CHECKSUM_COMPLETE
[ Upstream commit b85f628aa158a653c006e9c1405a117baef8c868 ]

CHECKSUM_COMPLETE signals that skb->csum stores the sum over the
entire packet. It does not imply that an embedded l4 checksum
field has been validated.

Fixes: 682f048bd494 ("af_packet: pass checksum validation status to the user")
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221128161812.640098-1-willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-12-08 11:28:41 +01:00
YueHaibing
dca370e575 net: hsr: Fix potential use-after-free
[ Upstream commit 7e177d32442b7ed08a9fa61b61724abc548cb248 ]

The skb is delivered to netif_rx() which may free it, after calling this,
dereferencing skb may trigger use-after-free.

Fixes: f421436a591d ("net/hsr: Add support for the High-availability Seamless Redundancy protocol (HSRv0)")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221125075724.27912-1-yuehaibing@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-12-08 11:28:41 +01:00
Xin Long
1daec08156 tipc: re-fetch skb cb after tipc_msg_validate
[ Upstream commit 3067bc61fcfe3081bf4807ce65560f499e895e77 ]

As the call trace shows, the original skb was freed in tipc_msg_validate(),
and dereferencing the old skb cb would cause an use-after-free crash.

  BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tipc_crypto_rcv_complete+0x1835/0x2240 [tipc]
  Call Trace:
   <IRQ>
   tipc_crypto_rcv_complete+0x1835/0x2240 [tipc]
   tipc_crypto_rcv+0xd32/0x1ec0 [tipc]
   tipc_rcv+0x744/0x1150 [tipc]
  ...
  Allocated by task 47078:
   kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x158/0x4d0
   __alloc_skb+0x1c1/0x270
   tipc_buf_acquire+0x1e/0xe0 [tipc]
   tipc_msg_create+0x33/0x1c0 [tipc]
   tipc_link_build_proto_msg+0x38a/0x2100 [tipc]
   tipc_link_timeout+0x8b8/0xef0 [tipc]
   tipc_node_timeout+0x2a1/0x960 [tipc]
   call_timer_fn+0x2d/0x1c0
  ...
  Freed by task 47078:
   tipc_msg_validate+0x7b/0x440 [tipc]
   tipc_crypto_rcv_complete+0x4b5/0x2240 [tipc]
   tipc_crypto_rcv+0xd32/0x1ec0 [tipc]
   tipc_rcv+0x744/0x1150 [tipc]

This patch fixes it by re-fetching the skb cb from the new allocated skb
after calling tipc_msg_validate().

Fixes: fc1b6d6de220 ("tipc: introduce TIPC encryption & authentication")
Reported-by: Shuang Li <shuali@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1b1cdba762915325bd8ef9a98d0276eb673df2a5.1669398403.git.lucien.xin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-12-08 11:28:41 +01:00
Wang Hai
8782b32ef8 net/9p: Fix a potential socket leak in p9_socket_open
[ Upstream commit dcc14cfd7debe11b825cb077e75d91d2575b4cb8 ]

Both p9_fd_create_tcp() and p9_fd_create_unix() will call
p9_socket_open(). If the creation of p9_trans_fd fails,
p9_fd_create_tcp() and p9_fd_create_unix() will return an
error directly instead of releasing the cscoket, which will
result in a socket leak.

This patch adds sock_release() to fix the leak issue.

Fixes: 6b18662e239a ("9p connect fixes")
Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38@huawei.com>
ACKed-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-12-08 11:28:41 +01:00
Lorenzo Bianconi
59b54f0563 wifi: mac8021: fix possible oob access in ieee80211_get_rate_duration
[ Upstream commit 3e8f7abcc3473bc9603323803aeaed4ffcc3a2ab ]

Fix possible out-of-bound access in ieee80211_get_rate_duration routine
as reported by the following UBSAN report:

UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in net/mac80211/airtime.c:455:47
index 15 is out of range for type 'u16 [12]'
CPU: 2 PID: 217 Comm: kworker/u32:10 Not tainted 6.1.0-060100rc3-generic
Hardware name: Acer Aspire TC-281/Aspire TC-281, BIOS R01-A2 07/18/2017
Workqueue: mt76 mt76u_tx_status_data [mt76_usb]
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 show_stack+0x4e/0x61
 dump_stack_lvl+0x4a/0x6f
 dump_stack+0x10/0x18
 ubsan_epilogue+0x9/0x43
 __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds.cold+0x42/0x47
ieee80211_get_rate_duration.constprop.0+0x22f/0x2a0 [mac80211]
 ? ieee80211_tx_status_ext+0x32e/0x640 [mac80211]
 ieee80211_calc_rx_airtime+0xda/0x120 [mac80211]
 ieee80211_calc_tx_airtime+0xb4/0x100 [mac80211]
 mt76x02_send_tx_status+0x266/0x480 [mt76x02_lib]
 mt76x02_tx_status_data+0x52/0x80 [mt76x02_lib]
 mt76u_tx_status_data+0x67/0xd0 [mt76_usb]
 process_one_work+0x225/0x400
 worker_thread+0x50/0x3e0
 ? process_one_work+0x400/0x400
 kthread+0xe9/0x110
 ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30

Fixes: db3e1c40cf2f ("mac80211: Import airtime calculation code from mt76")
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@toke.dk>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-12-08 11:28:40 +01:00
Johannes Berg
dc0853f8b5 wifi: cfg80211: don't allow multi-BSSID in S1G
[ Upstream commit acd3c92acc7aaec50a94d0a7faf7ccd74e952493 ]

In S1G beacon frames there shouldn't be multi-BSSID elements
since that's not supported, remove that to avoid a potential
integer underflow and/or misparsing the frames due to the
different length of the fixed part of the frame.

While at it, initialize non_tx_data so we don't send garbage
values to the user (even if it doesn't seem to matter now.)

Reported-and-tested-by: Sönke Huster <shuster@seemoo.tu-darmstadt.de>
Fixes: 9eaffe5078ca ("cfg80211: convert S1G beacon to scan results")
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-12-08 11:28:40 +01:00