74578 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Namjae Jeon
6b64974e02 exfat: check if filename entries exceeds max filename length
commit d42334578eba1390859012ebb91e1e556d51db49 upstream.

exfat_extract_uni_name copies characters from a given file name entry into
the 'uniname' variable. This variable is actually defined on the stack of
the exfat_readdir() function. According to the definition of
the 'exfat_uni_name' type, the file name should be limited 255 characters
(+ null teminator space), but the exfat_get_uniname_from_ext_entry()
function can write more characters because there is no check if filename
entries exceeds max filename length. This patch add the check not to copy
filename characters when exceeding max filename length.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Yuezhang Mo <Yuezhang.Mo@sony.com>
Reported-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sungjong Seo <sj1557.seo@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[Harshit: backport to 5.15.y]
Signed-off-by: Harshit Mogalapalli <harshit.m.mogalapalli@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-08-26 14:23:37 +02:00
Russell Harmon via samba-technical
961f7ce162 cifs: Release folio lock on fscache read hit.
commit 69513dd669e243928f7450893190915a88f84a2b upstream.

Under the current code, when cifs_readpage_worker is called, the call
contract is that the callee should unlock the page. This is documented
in the read_folio section of Documentation/filesystems/vfs.rst as:

> The filesystem should unlock the folio once the read has completed,
> whether it was successful or not.

Without this change, when fscache is in use and cache hit occurs during
a read, the page lock is leaked, producing the following stack on
subsequent reads (via mmap) to the page:

$ cat /proc/3890/task/12864/stack
[<0>] folio_wait_bit_common+0x124/0x350
[<0>] filemap_read_folio+0xad/0xf0
[<0>] filemap_fault+0x8b1/0xab0
[<0>] __do_fault+0x39/0x150
[<0>] do_fault+0x25c/0x3e0
[<0>] __handle_mm_fault+0x6ca/0xc70
[<0>] handle_mm_fault+0xe9/0x350
[<0>] do_user_addr_fault+0x225/0x6c0
[<0>] exc_page_fault+0x84/0x1b0
[<0>] asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30

This requires a reboot to resolve; it is a deadlock.

Note however that the call to cifs_readpage_from_fscache does mark the
page clean, but does not free the folio lock. This happens in
__cifs_readpage_from_fscache on success. Releasing the lock at that
point however is not appropriate as cifs_readahead also calls
cifs_readpage_from_fscache and *does* unconditionally release the lock
after its return. This change therefore effectively makes
cifs_readpage_worker work like cifs_readahead.

Signed-off-by: Russell Harmon <russ@har.mn>
Acked-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc@manguebit.com>
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-08-26 14:23:36 +02:00
xiaoshoukui
b966e9e1e2 btrfs: fix BUG_ON condition in btrfs_cancel_balance
commit 29eefa6d0d07e185f7bfe9576f91e6dba98189c2 upstream.

Pausing and canceling balance can race to interrupt balance lead to BUG_ON
panic in btrfs_cancel_balance. The BUG_ON condition in btrfs_cancel_balance
does not take this race scenario into account.

However, the race condition has no other side effects. We can fix that.

Reproducing it with panic trace like this:

  kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4618!
  RIP: 0010:btrfs_cancel_balance+0x5cf/0x6a0
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   ? do_nanosleep+0x60/0x120
   ? hrtimer_nanosleep+0xb7/0x1a0
   ? sched_core_clone_cookie+0x70/0x70
   btrfs_ioctl_balance_ctl+0x55/0x70
   btrfs_ioctl+0xa46/0xd20
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x7d/0xa0
   do_syscall_64+0x38/0x80
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

  Race scenario as follows:
  > mutex_unlock(&fs_info->balance_mutex);
  > --------------------
  > .......issue pause and cancel req in another thread
  > --------------------
  > ret = __btrfs_balance(fs_info);
  >
  > mutex_lock(&fs_info->balance_mutex);
  > if (ret == -ECANCELED && atomic_read(&fs_info->balance_pause_req)) {
  >         btrfs_info(fs_info, "balance: paused");
  >         btrfs_exclop_balance(fs_info, BTRFS_EXCLOP_BALANCE_PAUSED);
  > }

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+
Signed-off-by: xiaoshoukui <xiaoshoukui@ruijie.com.cn>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-08-26 14:23:31 +02:00
Steve French
b99f490ea8 cifs: fix potential oops in cifs_oplock_break
[ Upstream commit e8f5f849ffce24490eb9449e98312b66c0dba76f ]

With deferred close we can have closes that race with lease breaks,
and so with the current checks for whether to send the lease response,
oplock_response(), this can mean that an unmount (kill_sb) can occur
just before we were checking if the tcon->ses is valid.  See below:

[Fri Aug  4 04:12:50 2023] RIP: 0010:cifs_oplock_break+0x1f7/0x5b0 [cifs]
[Fri Aug  4 04:12:50 2023] Code: 7d a8 48 8b 7d c0 c0 e9 02 48 89 45 b8 41 89 cf e8 3e f5 ff ff 4c 89 f7 41 83 e7 01 e8 82 b3 03 f2 49 8b 45 50 48 85 c0 74 5e <48> 83 78 60 00 74 57 45 84 ff 75 52 48 8b 43 98 48 83 eb 68 48 39
[Fri Aug  4 04:12:50 2023] RSP: 0018:ffffb30607ddbdf8 EFLAGS: 00010206
[Fri Aug  4 04:12:50 2023] RAX: 632d223d32612022 RBX: ffff97136944b1e0 RCX: 0000000080100009
[Fri Aug  4 04:12:50 2023] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000080100009 RDI: ffff97136944b188
[Fri Aug  4 04:12:50 2023] RBP: ffffb30607ddbe58 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffffffc08e0900
[Fri Aug  4 04:12:50 2023] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 000000000000000f R12: ffff97136944b138
[Fri Aug  4 04:12:50 2023] R13: ffff97149147c000 R14: ffff97136944b188 R15: 0000000000000000
[Fri Aug  4 04:12:50 2023] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9714f7c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[Fri Aug  4 04:12:50 2023] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[Fri Aug  4 04:12:50 2023] CR2: 00007fd8de9c7590 CR3: 000000011228e000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
[Fri Aug  4 04:12:50 2023] Call Trace:
[Fri Aug  4 04:12:50 2023]  <TASK>
[Fri Aug  4 04:12:50 2023]  process_one_work+0x225/0x3d0
[Fri Aug  4 04:12:50 2023]  worker_thread+0x4d/0x3e0
[Fri Aug  4 04:12:50 2023]  ? process_one_work+0x3d0/0x3d0
[Fri Aug  4 04:12:50 2023]  kthread+0x12a/0x150
[Fri Aug  4 04:12:50 2023]  ? set_kthread_struct+0x50/0x50
[Fri Aug  4 04:12:50 2023]  ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[Fri Aug  4 04:12:50 2023]  </TASK>

To fix this change the ordering of the checks before sending the oplock_response
to first check if the openFileList is empty.

Fixes: da787d5b7498 ("SMB3: Do not send lease break acknowledgment if all file handles have been closed")
Suggested-by: Bharath SM <bharathsm@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Bharath SM <bharathsm@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc@manguebit.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-08-26 14:23:30 +02:00
Naohiro Aota
edf3b5aadb btrfs: move out now unused BG from the reclaim list
[ Upstream commit a9f189716cf15913c453299d72f69c51a9b0f86b ]

An unused block group is easy to remove to free up space and should be
reclaimed fast. Such block group can often already be a target of the
reclaim process. As we check list_empty(&bg->bg_list), we keep it in the
reclaim list. That block group is never reclaimed until the file system
is filled e.g. up to 75%.

Instead, we can move unused block group to the unused list and delete it
fast.

Fixes: 18bb8bbf13c1 ("btrfs: zoned: automatically reclaim zones")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.15+
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Naohiro Aota <naohiro.aota@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-08-26 14:23:30 +02:00
Konstantin Komarov
c7d8b5f46f fs/ntfs3: Mark ntfs dirty when on-disk struct is corrupted
[ Upstream commit e0f363a98830e8d7d70fbaf91c07ae0b7c57aafe ]

Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-08-26 14:23:25 +02:00
Jia-Ju Bai
3a00ec562f fs: ntfs3: Fix possible null-pointer dereferences in mi_read()
[ Upstream commit 97498cd610c0d030a7bd49a7efad974790661162 ]

In a previous commit 2681631c2973 ("fs/ntfs3: Add null pointer check to
attr_load_runs_vcn"), ni can be NULL in attr_load_runs_vcn(), and thus it
should be checked before being used.

However, in the call stack of this commit, mft_ni in mi_read() is
aliased with ni in attr_load_runs_vcn(), and it is also used in
mi_read() at two places:

mi_read()
  rw_lock = &mft_ni->file.run_lock -> No check
  attr_load_runs_vcn(mft_ni, ...)
    ni (namely mft_ni) is checked in the previous commit
  attr_load_runs_vcn(..., &mft_ni->file.run) -> No check

Thus, to avoid possible null-pointer dereferences, the related checks
should be added.

These bugs are reported by a static analysis tool implemented by myself,
and they are found by extending a known bug fixed in the previous commit.
Thus, they could be theoretical bugs.

Signed-off-by: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju@buaa.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-08-26 14:23:25 +02:00
Edward Lo
e7799bb4db fs/ntfs3: Enhance sanity check while generating attr_list
[ Upstream commit fdec309c7672cbee4dc0229ee4cbb33c948a1bdd ]

ni_create_attr_list uses WARN_ON to catch error cases while generating
attribute list, which only prints out stack trace and may not be enough.
This repalces them with more proper error handling flow.

[   59.666332] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000000e
[   59.673268] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[   59.678354] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[   59.682831] PGD 8000000005ff1067 P4D 8000000005ff1067 PUD 7dee067 PMD 0
[   59.688556] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
[   59.692642] CPU: 0 PID: 198 Comm: poc Tainted: G    B   W          6.2.0-rc1+ #4
[   59.698868] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[   59.708795] RIP: 0010:ni_create_attr_list+0x505/0x860
[   59.713657] Code: 7e 10 e8 5e d0 d0 ff 45 0f b7 76 10 48 8d 7b 16 e8 00 d1 d0 ff 66 44 89 73 16 4d 8d 75 0e 4c 89 f7 e8 3f d0 d0 ff 4c 8d8
[   59.731559] RSP: 0018:ffff88800a56f1e0 EFLAGS: 00010282
[   59.735691] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff88800b7b5088 RCX: ffffffffb83079fe
[   59.741792] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffffffbb7f9fc0
[   59.748423] RBP: ffff88800a56f3a8 R08: ffff88800b7b50a0 R09: fffffbfff76ff3f9
[   59.754654] R10: ffffffffbb7f9fc7 R11: fffffbfff76ff3f8 R12: ffff88800b756180
[   59.761552] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000000000000000e R15: 0000000000000050
[   59.768323] FS:  00007feaa8c96440(0000) GS:ffff88806d400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   59.776027] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   59.781395] CR2: 00007f3a2e0b1000 CR3: 000000000a5bc000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[   59.787607] Call Trace:
[   59.790271]  <TASK>
[   59.792488]  ? __pfx_ni_create_attr_list+0x10/0x10
[   59.797235]  ? kernel_text_address+0xd3/0xe0
[   59.800856]  ? unwind_get_return_address+0x3e/0x60
[   59.805101]  ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x20
[   59.809296]  ? preempt_count_sub+0x1c/0xd0
[   59.813421]  ni_ins_attr_ext+0x52c/0x5c0
[   59.817034]  ? __pfx_ni_ins_attr_ext+0x10/0x10
[   59.821926]  ? __vfs_setxattr+0x121/0x170
[   59.825718]  ? __vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x97/0x300
[   59.829562]  ? __vfs_setxattr_locked+0x145/0x170
[   59.833987]  ? vfs_setxattr+0x137/0x2a0
[   59.836732]  ? do_setxattr+0xce/0x150
[   59.839807]  ? setxattr+0x126/0x140
[   59.842353]  ? path_setxattr+0x164/0x180
[   59.845275]  ? __x64_sys_setxattr+0x71/0x90
[   59.848838]  ? do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90
[   59.851898]  ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
[   59.857046]  ? stack_depot_save+0x17/0x20
[   59.860299]  ni_insert_attr+0x1ba/0x420
[   59.863104]  ? __pfx_ni_insert_attr+0x10/0x10
[   59.867069]  ? preempt_count_sub+0x1c/0xd0
[   59.869897]  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x2b/0x50
[   59.874088]  ? __create_object+0x3ae/0x5d0
[   59.877865]  ni_insert_resident+0xc4/0x1c0
[   59.881430]  ? __pfx_ni_insert_resident+0x10/0x10
[   59.886355]  ? kasan_save_alloc_info+0x1f/0x30
[   59.891117]  ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x8b/0xa0
[   59.894383]  ntfs_set_ea+0x90d/0xbf0
[   59.897703]  ? __pfx_ntfs_set_ea+0x10/0x10
[   59.901011]  ? kernel_text_address+0xd3/0xe0
[   59.905308]  ? __kernel_text_address+0x16/0x50
[   59.909811]  ? unwind_get_return_address+0x3e/0x60
[   59.914898]  ? __pfx_stack_trace_consume_entry+0x10/0x10
[   59.920250]  ? arch_stack_walk+0xa2/0x100
[   59.924560]  ? filter_irq_stacks+0x27/0x80
[   59.928722]  ntfs_setxattr+0x405/0x440
[   59.932512]  ? __pfx_ntfs_setxattr+0x10/0x10
[   59.936634]  ? kvmalloc_node+0x2d/0x120
[   59.940378]  ? kasan_save_stack+0x41/0x60
[   59.943870]  ? kasan_save_stack+0x2a/0x60
[   59.947719]  ? kasan_set_track+0x29/0x40
[   59.951417]  ? kasan_save_alloc_info+0x1f/0x30
[   59.955733]  ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x8b/0xa0
[   59.959598]  ? __kmalloc_node+0x68/0x150
[   59.963163]  ? kvmalloc_node+0x2d/0x120
[   59.966490]  ? vmemdup_user+0x2b/0xa0
[   59.969060]  __vfs_setxattr+0x121/0x170
[   59.972456]  ? __pfx___vfs_setxattr+0x10/0x10
[   59.976008]  __vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x97/0x300
[   59.981562]  __vfs_setxattr_locked+0x145/0x170
[   59.986100]  vfs_setxattr+0x137/0x2a0
[   59.989964]  ? __pfx_vfs_setxattr+0x10/0x10
[   59.993616]  ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x20
[   59.997425]  do_setxattr+0xce/0x150
[   60.000304]  setxattr+0x126/0x140
[   60.002967]  ? __pfx_setxattr+0x10/0x10
[   60.006471]  ? __virt_addr_valid+0xcb/0x140
[   60.010461]  ? __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x1c7/0x330
[   60.016037]  ? debug_smp_processor_id+0x1b/0x30
[   60.021008]  ? kasan_quarantine_put+0x5b/0x190
[   60.025545]  ? putname+0x84/0xa0
[   60.027910]  ? __kasan_slab_free+0x11e/0x1b0
[   60.031483]  ? putname+0x84/0xa0
[   60.033986]  ? preempt_count_sub+0x1c/0xd0
[   60.036876]  ? __mnt_want_write+0xae/0x100
[   60.040738]  ? mnt_want_write+0x8f/0x150
[   60.044317]  path_setxattr+0x164/0x180
[   60.048096]  ? __pfx_path_setxattr+0x10/0x10
[   60.052096]  ? strncpy_from_user+0x175/0x1c0
[   60.056482]  ? debug_smp_processor_id+0x1b/0x30
[   60.059848]  ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x6b/0x80
[   60.064557]  __x64_sys_setxattr+0x71/0x90
[   60.068892]  do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90
[   60.072868]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
[   60.077523] RIP: 0033:0x7feaa86e4469
[   60.080915] Code: 00 f3 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 088
[   60.097353] RSP: 002b:00007ffdbd8311e8 EFLAGS: 00000286 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000bc
[   60.103386] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 9461c5e290baac00 RCX: 00007feaa86e4469
[   60.110322] RDX: 00007ffdbd831fe0 RSI: 00007ffdbd831305 RDI: 00007ffdbd831263
[   60.116808] RBP: 00007ffdbd836180 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00007ffdbd836268
[   60.123879] R10: 000000000000007d R11: 0000000000000286 R12: 0000000000400500
[   60.130540] R13: 00007ffdbd836260 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[   60.136553]  </TASK>
[   60.138818] Modules linked in:
[   60.141839] CR2: 000000000000000e
[   60.144831] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[   60.149058] RIP: 0010:ni_create_attr_list+0x505/0x860
[   60.153975] Code: 7e 10 e8 5e d0 d0 ff 45 0f b7 76 10 48 8d 7b 16 e8 00 d1 d0 ff 66 44 89 73 16 4d 8d 75 0e 4c 89 f7 e8 3f d0 d0 ff 4c 8d8
[   60.172443] RSP: 0018:ffff88800a56f1e0 EFLAGS: 00010282
[   60.176246] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff88800b7b5088 RCX: ffffffffb83079fe
[   60.182752] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffffffbb7f9fc0
[   60.189949] RBP: ffff88800a56f3a8 R08: ffff88800b7b50a0 R09: fffffbfff76ff3f9
[   60.196950] R10: ffffffffbb7f9fc7 R11: fffffbfff76ff3f8 R12: ffff88800b756180
[   60.203671] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000000000000000e R15: 0000000000000050
[   60.209595] FS:  00007feaa8c96440(0000) GS:ffff88806d400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   60.216299] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   60.222276] CR2: 00007f3a2e0b1000 CR3: 000000000a5bc000 CR4: 00000000000006f0

Signed-off-by: Edward Lo <loyuantsung@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-08-26 14:23:25 +02:00
Tuo Li
85e8881500 gfs2: Fix possible data races in gfs2_show_options()
[ Upstream commit 6fa0a72cbbe45db4ed967a51f9e6f4e3afe61d20 ]

Some fields such as gt_logd_secs of the struct gfs2_tune are accessed
without holding the lock gt_spin in gfs2_show_options():

  val = sdp->sd_tune.gt_logd_secs;
  if (val != 30)
    seq_printf(s, ",commit=%d", val);

And thus can cause data races when gfs2_show_options() and other functions
such as gfs2_reconfigure() are concurrently executed:

  spin_lock(&gt->gt_spin);
  gt->gt_logd_secs = newargs->ar_commit;

To fix these possible data races, the lock sdp->sd_tune.gt_spin is
acquired before accessing the fields of gfs2_tune and released after these
accesses.

Further changes by Andreas:

- Don't hold the spin lock over the seq_printf operations.

Reported-by: BassCheck <bass@buaa.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Tuo Li <islituo@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-08-26 14:23:24 +02:00
Paulo Alcantara
9850867042 smb: client: fix warning in cifs_smb3_do_mount()
[ Upstream commit 12c30f33cc6769bf411088a2872843c4f9ea32f9 ]

This fixes the following warning reported by kernel test robot

  fs/smb/client/cifsfs.c:982 cifs_smb3_do_mount() warn: possible
  memory leak of 'cifs_sb'

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/202306170124.CtQqzf0I-lkp@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc@manguebit.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-08-26 14:23:23 +02:00
Christian Brauner
a3f252436e ovl: check type and offset of struct vfsmount in ovl_entry
[ Upstream commit f723edb8a532cd26e1ff0a2b271d73762d48f762 ]

Porting overlayfs to the new amount api I started experiencing random
crashes that couldn't be explained easily. So after much debugging and
reasoning it became clear that struct ovl_entry requires the point to
struct vfsmount to be the first member and of type struct vfsmount.

During the port I added a new member at the beginning of struct
ovl_entry which broke all over the place in the form of random crashes
and cache corruptions. While there's a comment in ovl_free_fs() to the
effect of "Hack! Reuse ofs->layers as a vfsmount array before freeing
it" there's no such comment on struct ovl_entry which makes this easy to
trip over.

Add a comment and two static asserts for both the offset and the type of
pointer in struct ovl_entry.

Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-08-26 14:23:23 +02:00
Josef Bacik
ae6e21f8bb btrfs: set cache_block_group_error if we find an error
commit 92fb94b69c6accf1e49fff699640fa0ce03dc910 upstream.

We set cache_block_group_error if btrfs_cache_block_group() returns an
error, this is because we could end up not finding space to allocate and
mistakenly return -ENOSPC, and which could then abort the transaction
with the incorrect errno, and in the case of ENOSPC result in a
WARN_ON() that will trip up tests like generic/475.

However there's the case where multiple threads can be racing, one
thread gets the proper error, and the other thread doesn't actually call
btrfs_cache_block_group(), it instead sees ->cached ==
BTRFS_CACHE_ERROR.  Again the result is the same, we fail to allocate
our space and return -ENOSPC.  Instead we need to set
cache_block_group_error to -EIO in this case to make sure that if we do
not make our allocation we get the appropriate error returned back to
the caller.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-08-16 18:22:03 +02:00
Qu Wenruo
314135b7ba btrfs: reject invalid reloc tree root keys with stack dump
commit 6ebcd021c92b8e4b904552e4d87283032100796d upstream.

[BUG]
Syzbot reported a crash that an ASSERT() got triggered inside
prepare_to_merge().

That ASSERT() makes sure the reloc tree is properly pointed back by its
subvolume tree.

[CAUSE]
After more debugging output, it turns out we had an invalid reloc tree:

  BTRFS error (device loop1): reloc tree mismatch, root 8 has no reloc root, expect reloc root key (-8, 132, 8) gen 17

Note the above root key is (TREE_RELOC_OBJECTID, ROOT_ITEM,
QUOTA_TREE_OBJECTID), meaning it's a reloc tree for quota tree.

But reloc trees can only exist for subvolumes, as for non-subvolume
trees, we just COW the involved tree block, no need to create a reloc
tree since those tree blocks won't be shared with other trees.

Only subvolumes tree can share tree blocks with other trees (thus they
have BTRFS_ROOT_SHAREABLE flag).

Thus this new debug output proves my previous assumption that corrupted
on-disk data can trigger that ASSERT().

[FIX]
Besides the dedicated fix and the graceful exit, also let tree-checker to
check such root keys, to make sure reloc trees can only exist for subvolumes.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.15+
Reported-by: syzbot+ae97a827ae1c3336bbb4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-08-16 18:22:02 +02:00
Qu Wenruo
69dd147de4 btrfs: exit gracefully if reloc roots don't match
commit 05d7ce504545f7874529701664c90814ca645c5d upstream.

[BUG]
Syzbot reported a crash that an ASSERT() got triggered inside
prepare_to_merge().

[CAUSE]
The root cause of the triggered ASSERT() is we can have a race between
quota tree creation and relocation.

This leads us to create a duplicated quota tree in the
btrfs_read_fs_root() path, and since it's treated as fs tree, it would
have ROOT_SHAREABLE flag, causing us to create a reloc tree for it.

The bug itself is fixed by a dedicated patch for it, but this already
taught us the ASSERT() is not something straightforward for
developers.

[ENHANCEMENT]
Instead of using an ASSERT(), let's handle it gracefully and output
extra info about the mismatch reloc roots to help debug.

Also with the above ASSERT() removed, we can trigger ASSERT(0)s inside
merge_reloc_roots() later.
Also replace those ASSERT(0)s with WARN_ON()s.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.15+
Reported-by: syzbot+ae97a827ae1c3336bbb4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-08-16 18:22:02 +02:00
Christoph Hellwig
c40d4b60c5 btrfs: don't stop integrity writeback too early
commit effa24f689ce0948f68c754991a445a8d697d3a8 upstream.

extent_write_cache_pages stops writing pages as soon as nr_to_write hits
zero.  That is the right thing for opportunistic writeback, but incorrect
for data integrity writeback, which needs to ensure that no dirty pages
are left in the range.  Thus only stop the writeback for WB_SYNC_NONE
if nr_to_write hits 0.

This is a port of write_cache_pages changes in commit 05fe478dd04e
("mm: write_cache_pages integrity fix").

Note that I've only trigger the problem with other changes to the btrfs
writeback code, but this condition seems worthwhile fixing anyway.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[ updated comment ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-08-16 18:22:02 +02:00
Ryusuke Konishi
3645510cf9 nilfs2: fix use-after-free of nilfs_root in dirtying inodes via iput
commit f8654743a0e6909dc634cbfad6db6816f10f3399 upstream.

During unmount process of nilfs2, nothing holds nilfs_root structure after
nilfs2 detaches its writer in nilfs_detach_log_writer().  Previously,
nilfs_evict_inode() could cause use-after-free read for nilfs_root if
inodes are left in "garbage_list" and released by nilfs_dispose_list at
the end of nilfs_detach_log_writer(), and this bug was fixed by commit
9b5a04ac3ad9 ("nilfs2: fix use-after-free bug of nilfs_root in
nilfs_evict_inode()").

However, it turned out that there is another possibility of UAF in the
call path where mark_inode_dirty_sync() is called from iput():

nilfs_detach_log_writer()
  nilfs_dispose_list()
    iput()
      mark_inode_dirty_sync()
        __mark_inode_dirty()
          nilfs_dirty_inode()
            __nilfs_mark_inode_dirty()
              nilfs_load_inode_block() --> causes UAF of nilfs_root struct

This can happen after commit 0ae45f63d4ef ("vfs: add support for a
lazytime mount option"), which changed iput() to call
mark_inode_dirty_sync() on its final reference if i_state has I_DIRTY_TIME
flag and i_nlink is non-zero.

This issue appears after commit 28a65b49eb53 ("nilfs2: do not write dirty
data after degenerating to read-only") when using the syzbot reproducer,
but the issue has potentially existed before.

Fix this issue by adding a "purging flag" to the nilfs structure, setting
that flag while disposing the "garbage_list" and checking it in
__nilfs_mark_inode_dirty().

Unlike commit 9b5a04ac3ad9 ("nilfs2: fix use-after-free bug of nilfs_root
in nilfs_evict_inode()"), this patch does not rely on ns_writer to
determine whether to skip operations, so as not to break recovery on
mount.  The nilfs_salvage_orphan_logs routine dirties the buffer of
salvaged data before attaching the log writer, so changing
__nilfs_mark_inode_dirty() to skip the operation when ns_writer is NULL
will cause recovery write to fail.  The purpose of using the cleanup-only
flag is to allow for narrowing of such conditions.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230728191318.33047-1-konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+74db8b3087f293d3a13a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/000000000000b4e906060113fd63@google.com
Fixes: 0ae45f63d4ef ("vfs: add support for a lazytime mount option")
Tested-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.0+
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-08-16 18:21:58 +02:00
Namjae Jeon
aeb9749076 ksmbd: fix wrong next length validation of ea buffer in smb2_set_ea()
commit 79ed288cef201f1f212dfb934bcaac75572fb8f6 upstream.

There are multiple smb2_ea_info buffers in FILE_FULL_EA_INFORMATION request
from client. ksmbd find next smb2_ea_info using ->NextEntryOffset of
current smb2_ea_info. ksmbd need to validate buffer length Before
accessing the next ea. ksmbd should check buffer length using buf_len,
not next variable. next is the start offset of current ea that got from
previous ea.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com # ZDI-CAN-21598
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-08-16 18:21:57 +02:00
Long Li
595679098b ksmbd: validate command request size
commit 5aa4fda5aa9c2a5a7bac67b4a12b089ab81fee3c upstream.

In commit 2b9b8f3b68ed ("ksmbd: validate command payload size"), except
for SMB2_OPLOCK_BREAK_HE command, the request size of other commands
is not checked, it's not expected. Fix it by add check for request
size of other commands.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 2b9b8f3b68ed ("ksmbd: validate command payload size")
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Long Li <leo.lilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-08-16 18:21:57 +02:00
Jan Kara
596be6716b ext2: Drop fragment support
commit 404615d7f1dcd4cca200e9a7a9df3a1dcae1dd62 upstream.

Ext2 has fields in superblock reserved for subblock allocation support.
However that never landed. Drop the many years dead code.

Reported-by: syzbot+af5e10f73dbff48f70af@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-08-11 15:13:58 +02:00
Jan Kara
0ccfe21949 fs: Protect reconfiguration of sb read-write from racing writes
commit c541dce86c537714b6761a79a969c1623dfa222b upstream.

The reconfigure / remount code takes a lot of effort to protect
filesystem's reconfiguration code from racing writes on remounting
read-only. However during remounting read-only filesystem to read-write
mode userspace writes can start immediately once we clear SB_RDONLY
flag. This is inconvenient for example for ext4 because we need to do
some writes to the filesystem (such as preparation of quota files)
before we can take userspace writes so we are clearing SB_RDONLY flag
before we are fully ready to accept userpace writes and syzbot has found
a way to exploit this [1]. Also as far as I'm reading the code
the filesystem remount code was protected from racing writes in the
legacy mount path by the mount's MNT_READONLY flag so this is relatively
new problem. It is actually fairly easy to protect remount read-write
from racing writes using sb->s_readonly_remount flag so let's just do
that instead of having to workaround these races in the filesystem code.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/00000000000006a0df05f6667499@google.com/T/

Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Message-Id: <20230615113848.8439-1-jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-08-11 15:13:58 +02:00
Prince Kumar Maurya
afd9a31b5a fs/sysv: Null check to prevent null-ptr-deref bug
commit ea2b62f305893992156a798f665847e0663c9f41 upstream.

sb_getblk(inode->i_sb, parent) return a null ptr and taking lock on
that leads to the null-ptr-deref bug.

Reported-by: syzbot+aad58150cbc64ba41bdc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=aad58150cbc64ba41bdc
Signed-off-by: Prince Kumar Maurya <princekumarmaurya06@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20230531013141.19487-1-princekumarmaurya06@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-08-11 15:13:58 +02:00
Tetsuo Handa
80ec112c19 fs/ntfs3: Use __GFP_NOWARN allocation at ntfs_load_attr_list()
commit ea303f72d70ce2f0b0aa94ab127085289768c5a6 upstream.

syzbot is reporting too large allocation at ntfs_load_attr_list(), for
a crafted filesystem can have huge data_size.

Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+89dbb3a789a5b9711793@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=89dbb3a789a5b9711793
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-08-11 15:13:58 +02:00
Linus Torvalds
0d6f639f1d file: reinstate f_pos locking optimization for regular files
commit 797964253d358cf8d705614dda394dbe30120223 upstream.

In commit 20ea1e7d13c1 ("file: always lock position for
FMODE_ATOMIC_POS") we ended up always taking the file pos lock, because
pidfd_getfd() could get a reference to the file even when it didn't have
an elevated file count due to threading of other sharing cases.

But Mateusz Guzik reports that the extra locking is actually measurable,
so let's re-introduce the optimization, and only force the locking for
directory traversal.

Directories need the lock for correctness reasons, while regular files
only need it for "POSIX semantics".  Since pidfd_getfd() is about
debuggers etc special things that are _way_ outside of POSIX, we can
relax the rules for that case.

Reported-by: Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/20230803095311.ijpvhx3fyrbkasul@f/
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-08-11 15:13:58 +02:00
Aleksa Sarai
ef0d07c668 open: make RESOLVE_CACHED correctly test for O_TMPFILE
commit a0fc452a5d7fed986205539259df1d60546f536c upstream.

O_TMPFILE is actually __O_TMPFILE|O_DIRECTORY. This means that the old
fast-path check for RESOLVE_CACHED would reject all users passing
O_DIRECTORY with -EAGAIN, when in fact the intended test was to check
for __O_TMPFILE.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.12+
Fixes: 99668f618062 ("fs: expose LOOKUP_CACHED through openat2() RESOLVE_CACHED")
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Message-Id: <20230806-resolve_cached-o_tmpfile-v1-1-7ba16308465e@cyphar.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-08-11 15:13:57 +02:00
Sungjong Seo
1c33ca1e19 exfat: release s_lock before calling dir_emit()
commit ff84772fd45d486e4fc78c82e2f70ce5333543e6 upstream.

There is a potential deadlock reported by syzbot as below:

======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.4.0-next-20230707-syzkaller #0 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
syz-executor330/5073 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff8880218527a0 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: mmap_read_lock_killable include/linux/mmap_lock.h:151 [inline]
ffff8880218527a0 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: get_mmap_lock_carefully mm/memory.c:5293 [inline]
ffff8880218527a0 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: lock_mm_and_find_vma+0x369/0x510 mm/memory.c:5344
but task is already holding lock:
ffff888019f760e0 (&sbi->s_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: exfat_iterate+0x117/0xb50 fs/exfat/dir.c:232

which lock already depends on the new lock.

Chain exists of:
  &mm->mmap_lock --> mapping.invalidate_lock#3 --> &sbi->s_lock

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(&sbi->s_lock);
                               lock(mapping.invalidate_lock#3);
                               lock(&sbi->s_lock);
  rlock(&mm->mmap_lock);

Let's try to avoid above potential deadlock condition by moving dir_emit*()
out of sbi->s_lock coverage.

Fixes: ca06197382bd ("exfat: add directory operations")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org #v5.7+
Reported-by: syzbot+1741a5d9b79989c10bdc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/00000000000078ee7e060066270b@google.com/T/#u
Tested-by: syzbot+1741a5d9b79989c10bdc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sungjong Seo <sj1557.seo@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-08-11 15:13:56 +02:00
gaoming
8a34a242cf exfat: use kvmalloc_array/kvfree instead of kmalloc_array/kfree
commit daf60d6cca26e50d65dac374db92e58de745ad26 upstream.

The call stack shown below is a scenario in the Linux 4.19 kernel.
Allocating memory failed where exfat fs use kmalloc_array due to
system memory fragmentation, while the u-disk was inserted without
recognition.
Devices such as u-disk using the exfat file system are pluggable and
may be insert into the system at any time.
However, long-term running systems cannot guarantee the continuity of
physical memory. Therefore, it's necessary to address this issue.

Binder:2632_6: page allocation failure: order:4,
 mode:0x6040c0(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_COMP), nodemask=(null)
Call trace:
[242178.097582]  dump_backtrace+0x0/0x4
[242178.097589]  dump_stack+0xf4/0x134
[242178.097598]  warn_alloc+0xd8/0x144
[242178.097603]  __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x1364/0x1384
[242178.097608]  kmalloc_order+0x2c/0x510
[242178.097612]  kmalloc_order_trace+0x40/0x16c
[242178.097618]  __kmalloc+0x360/0x408
[242178.097624]  load_alloc_bitmap+0x160/0x284
[242178.097628]  exfat_fill_super+0xa3c/0xe7c
[242178.097635]  mount_bdev+0x2e8/0x3a0
[242178.097638]  exfat_fs_mount+0x40/0x50
[242178.097643]  mount_fs+0x138/0x2e8
[242178.097649]  vfs_kern_mount+0x90/0x270
[242178.097655]  do_mount+0x798/0x173c
[242178.097659]  ksys_mount+0x114/0x1ac
[242178.097665]  __arm64_sys_mount+0x24/0x34
[242178.097671]  el0_svc_common+0xb8/0x1b8
[242178.097676]  el0_svc_handler+0x74/0x90
[242178.097681]  el0_svc+0x8/0x340

By analyzing the exfat code,we found that continuous physical memory
is not required here,so kvmalloc_array is used can solve this problem.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: gaoming <gaoming20@hihonor.com>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-08-11 15:13:56 +02:00
Xiubo Li
287c2c8677 ceph: defer stopping mdsc delayed_work
commit e7e607bd00481745550389a29ecabe33e13d67cf upstream.

Flushing the dirty buffer may take a long time if the cluster is
overloaded or if there is network issue. So we should ping the
MDSs periodically to keep alive, else the MDS will blocklist
the kclient.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/61843
Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Milind Changire <mchangir@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-08-11 15:13:56 +02:00
Xiubo Li
7c9b8cca49 ceph: never send metrics if disable_send_metrics is set
commit 50164507f6b7b7ed85d8c3ac0266849fbd908db7 upstream.

Even the 'disable_send_metrics' is true so when the session is
being opened it will always trigger to send the metric for the
first time.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Venky Shankar <vshankar@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-08-03 10:22:46 +02:00
Trond Myklebust
8130c32b4a nfsd: Remove incorrect check in nfsd4_validate_stateid
commit f75546f58a70da5cfdcec5a45ffc377885ccbee8 upstream.

If the client is calling TEST_STATEID, then it is because some event
occurred that requires it to check all the stateids for validity and
call FREE_STATEID on the ones that have been revoked. In this case,
either the stateid exists in the list of stateids associated with that
nfs4_client, in which case it should be tested, or it does not. There
are no additional conditions to be considered.

Reported-by: "Frank Ch. Eigler" <fche@redhat.com>
Fixes: 7df302f75ee2 ("NFSD: TEST_STATEID should not return NFS4ERR_STALE_STATEID")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.7+
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-08-03 10:22:44 +02:00
Christian Brauner
9b8a31a231 file: always lock position for FMODE_ATOMIC_POS
commit 20ea1e7d13c1b544fe67c4a8dc3943bb1ab33e6f upstream.

The pidfd_getfd() system call allows a caller with ptrace_may_access()
abilities on another process to steal a file descriptor from this
process. This system call is used by debuggers, container runtimes,
system call supervisors, networking proxies etc. So while it is a
special interest system call it is used in common tools.

That ability ends up breaking our long-time optimization in fdget_pos(),
which "knew" that if we had exclusive access to the file descriptor
nobody else could access it, and we didn't need the lock for the file
position.

That check for file_count(file) was always fairly subtle - it depended
on __fdget() not incrementing the file count for single-threaded
processes and thus included that as part of the rule - but it did mean
that we didn't need to take the lock in all those traditional unix
process contexts.

So it's sad to see this go, and I'd love to have some way to re-instate
the optimization. At the same time, the lock obviously isn't ever
contended in the case we optimized, so all we were optimizing away is
the atomics and the cacheline dirtying. Let's see if anybody even
notices that the optimization is gone.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/20230724-vfs-fdget_pos-v1-1-a4abfd7103f3@kernel.org/
Fixes: 8649c322f75c ("pid: Implement pidfd_getfd syscall")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-08-03 10:22:44 +02:00
Filipe Manana
1f5ea62a0f btrfs: check for commit error at btrfs_attach_transaction_barrier()
commit b28ff3a7d7e97456fd86b68d24caa32e1cfa7064 upstream.

btrfs_attach_transaction_barrier() is used to get a handle pointing to the
current running transaction if the transaction has not started its commit
yet (its state is < TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_START). If the transaction commit
has started, then we wait for the transaction to commit and finish before
returning - however we completely ignore if the transaction was aborted
due to some error during its commit, we simply return ERR_PT(-ENOENT),
which makes the caller assume everything is fine and no errors happened.

This could make an fsync return success (0) to user space when in fact we
had a transaction abort and the target inode changes were therefore not
persisted.

Fix this by checking for the return value from btrfs_wait_for_commit(),
and if it returned an error, return it back to the caller.

Fixes: d4edf39bd5db ("Btrfs: fix uncompleted transaction")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-08-03 10:22:44 +02:00
Filipe Manana
883c3ed9a1 btrfs: check if the transaction was aborted at btrfs_wait_for_commit()
commit bf7ecbe9875061bf3fce1883e3b26b77f847d1e8 upstream.

At btrfs_wait_for_commit() we wait for a transaction to finish and then
always return 0 (success) without checking if it was aborted, in which
case the transaction didn't happen due to some critical error. Fix this
by checking if the transaction was aborted.

Fixes: 462045928bda ("Btrfs: add START_SYNC, WAIT_SYNC ioctls")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-08-03 10:22:44 +02:00
Bharath SM
5cb0349cfc cifs: if deferred close is disabled then close files immediately
[ Upstream commit df9d70c18616760c6504b97fec66b6379c172dbb ]

If defer close timeout value is set to 0, then there is no
need to include files in the deferred close list and utilize
the delayed worker for closing. Instead, we can close them
immediately.

Signed-off-by: Bharath SM <bharathsm@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-08-03 10:22:30 +02:00
Namjae Jeon
c600e23fbc ksmbd: remove internal.h include
[ Upstream commit 211db0ac9e3dc6c46f2dd53395b34d76af929faf ]

Since vfs_path_lookup is exported, It should not be internal.
Move vfs_path_lookup prototype in internal.h to linux/namei.h.

Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Stable-dep-of: df9d70c18616 ("cifs: if deferred close is disabled then close files immediately")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-08-03 10:22:30 +02:00
Paulo Alcantara
c8117ac423 cifs: use fs_context for automounts
[ Upstream commit 9fd29a5bae6e8f94b410374099a6fddb253d2d5f ]

Use filesystem context support to handle dfs links.

Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc@cjr.nz>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Stable-dep-of: df9d70c18616 ("cifs: if deferred close is disabled then close files immediately")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-08-03 10:22:29 +02:00
Alexander Aring
354cdda79a fs: dlm: interrupt posix locks only when process is killed
[ Upstream commit 59e45c758ca1b9893ac923dd63536da946ac333b ]

If a posix lock request is waiting for a result from user space
(dlm_controld), do not let it be interrupted unless the process
is killed. This reverts commit a6b1533e9a57 ("dlm: make posix locks
interruptible"). The problem with the interruptible change is
that all locks were cleared on any signal interrupt. If a signal
was received that did not terminate the process, the process
could continue running after all its dlm posix locks had been
cleared. A future patch will add cancelation to allow proper
interruption.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: a6b1533e9a57 ("dlm: make posix locks interruptible")
Signed-off-by: Alexander Aring <aahringo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Teigland <teigland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-08-03 10:22:28 +02:00
Alexander Aring
97e7a0f8de dlm: rearrange async condition return
[ Upstream commit a800ba77fd285c6391a82819867ac64e9ab3af46 ]

This patch moves the return of FILE_LOCK_DEFERRED a little bit earlier
than checking afterwards again if the request was an asynchronous request.

Signed-off-by: Alexander Aring <aahringo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Teigland <teigland@redhat.com>
Stable-dep-of: 59e45c758ca1 ("fs: dlm: interrupt posix locks only when process is killed")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-08-03 10:22:28 +02:00
Alexander Aring
75ce95abc6 dlm: cleanup plock_op vs plock_xop
[ Upstream commit bcbb4ba6c9ba81e6975b642a2cade68044cd8a66 ]

Lately the different casting between plock_op and plock_xop and list
holders which was involved showed some issues which were hard to see.
This patch removes the "plock_xop" structure and introduces a
"struct plock_async_data". This structure will be set in "struct plock_op"
in case of asynchronous lock handling as the original "plock_xop" was
made for. There is no need anymore to cast pointers around for
additional fields in case of asynchronous lock handling.  As disadvantage
another allocation was introduces but only needed in the asynchronous
case which is currently only used in combination with nfs lockd.

Signed-off-by: Alexander Aring <aahringo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Teigland <teigland@redhat.com>
Stable-dep-of: 59e45c758ca1 ("fs: dlm: interrupt posix locks only when process is killed")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-08-03 10:22:28 +02:00
Filipe Manana
89eae1f0aa btrfs: fix race between quota disable and relocation
[ Upstream commit 8a4a0b2a3eaf75ca8854f856ef29690c12b2f531 ]

If we disable quotas while we have a relocation of a metadata block group
that has extents belonging to the quota root, we can cause the relocation
to fail with -ENOENT. This is because relocation builds backref nodes for
extents of the quota root and later needs to walk the backrefs and access
the quota root - however if in between a task disables quotas, it results
in deleting the quota root from the root tree (with btrfs_del_root(),
called from btrfs_quota_disable().

This can be sporadically triggered by test case btrfs/255 from fstests:

  $ ./check btrfs/255
  FSTYP         -- btrfs
  PLATFORM      -- Linux/x86_64 debian0 6.4.0-rc6-btrfs-next-134+ #1 SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC Thu Jun 15 11:59:28 WEST 2023
  MKFS_OPTIONS  -- /dev/sdc
  MOUNT_OPTIONS -- /dev/sdc /home/fdmanana/btrfs-tests/scratch_1

  btrfs/255 6s ... _check_dmesg: something found in dmesg (see /home/fdmanana/git/hub/xfstests/results//btrfs/255.dmesg)
  - output mismatch (see /home/fdmanana/git/hub/xfstests/results//btrfs/255.out.bad)
#      --- tests/btrfs/255.out	2023-03-02 21:47:53.876609426 +0000
#      +++ /home/fdmanana/git/hub/xfstests/results//btrfs/255.out.bad	2023-06-16 10:20:39.267563212 +0100
#      @@ -1,2 +1,4 @@
#       QA output created by 255
#      +ERROR: error during balancing '/home/fdmanana/btrfs-tests/scratch_1': No such file or directory
#      +There may be more info in syslog - try dmesg | tail
#       Silence is golden
#      ...
      (Run 'diff -u /home/fdmanana/git/hub/xfstests/tests/btrfs/255.out /home/fdmanana/git/hub/xfstests/results//btrfs/255.out.bad'  to see the entire diff)
  Ran: btrfs/255
  Failures: btrfs/255
  Failed 1 of 1 tests

To fix this make the quota disable operation take the cleaner mutex, as
relocation of a block group also takes this mutex. This is also what we
do when deleting a subvolume/snapshot, we take the cleaner mutex in the
cleaner kthread (at cleaner_kthread()) and then we call btrfs_del_root()
at btrfs_drop_snapshot() while under the protection of the cleaner mutex.

Fixes: bed92eae26cc ("Btrfs: qgroup implementation and prototypes")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-08-03 10:22:26 +02:00
Zhihao Cheng
fee1e6a735 jbd2: Fix wrongly judgement for buffer head removing while doing checkpoint
[ Upstream commit e34c8dd238d0c9368b746480f313055f5bab5040 ]

Following process,

jbd2_journal_commit_transaction
// there are several dirty buffer heads in transaction->t_checkpoint_list
          P1                   wb_workfn
jbd2_log_do_checkpoint
 if (buffer_locked(bh)) // false
                            __block_write_full_page
                             trylock_buffer(bh)
                             test_clear_buffer_dirty(bh)
 if (!buffer_dirty(bh))
  __jbd2_journal_remove_checkpoint(jh)
   if (buffer_write_io_error(bh)) // false
                             >> bh IO error occurs <<
 jbd2_cleanup_journal_tail
  __jbd2_update_log_tail
   jbd2_write_superblock
   // The bh won't be replayed in next mount.
, which could corrupt the ext4 image, fetch a reproducer in [Link].

Since writeback process clears buffer dirty after locking buffer head,
we can fix it by try locking buffer and check dirtiness while buffer is
locked, the buffer head can be removed if it is neither dirty nor locked.

Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=217490
Fixes: 470decc613ab ("[PATCH] jbd2: initial copy of files from jbd")
Signed-off-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230606135928.434610-5-yi.zhang@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-08-03 10:22:25 +02:00
Zhang Yi
78471c3ad3 jbd2: recheck chechpointing non-dirty buffer
commit c2d6fd9d6f35079f1669f0100f05b46708c74b7f upstream.

There is a long-standing metadata corruption issue that happens from
time to time, but it's very difficult to reproduce and analyse, benefit
from the JBD2_CYCLE_RECORD option, we found out that the problem is the
checkpointing process miss to write out some buffers which are raced by
another do_get_write_access(). Looks below for detail.

jbd2_log_do_checkpoint() //transaction X
 //buffer A is dirty and not belones to any transaction
 __buffer_relink_io() //move it to the IO list
 __flush_batch()
  write_dirty_buffer()
                             do_get_write_access()
                             clear_buffer_dirty
                             __jbd2_journal_file_buffer()
                             //add buffer A to a new transaction Y
   lock_buffer(bh)
   //doesn't write out
 __jbd2_journal_remove_checkpoint()
 //finish checkpoint except buffer A
 //filesystem corrupt if the new transaction Y isn't fully write out.

Due to the t_checkpoint_list walking loop in jbd2_log_do_checkpoint()
have already handles waiting for buffers under IO and re-added new
transaction to complete commit, and it also removing cleaned buffers,
this makes sure the list will eventually get empty. So it's fine to
leave buffers on the t_checkpoint_list while flushing out and completely
stop using the t_checkpoint_io_list.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230606135928.434610-2-yi.zhang@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-07-27 08:47:04 +02:00
Immad Mir
2febd5f81e FS: JFS: Check for read-only mounted filesystem in txBegin
[ Upstream commit 95e2b352c03b0a86c5717ba1d24ea20969abcacc ]

 This patch adds a check for read-only mounted filesystem
 in txBegin before starting a transaction potentially saving
 from NULL pointer deref.

Signed-off-by: Immad Mir <mirimmad17@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-07-27 08:46:58 +02:00
Immad Mir
3e94d0d378 FS: JFS: Fix null-ptr-deref Read in txBegin
[ Upstream commit 47cfdc338d674d38f4b2f22b7612cc6a2763ba27 ]

 Syzkaller reported an issue where txBegin may be called
 on a superblock in a read-only mounted filesystem which leads
 to NULL pointer deref. This could be solved by checking if
 the filesystem is read-only before calling txBegin, and returning
 with appropiate error code.

Reported-By: syzbot+f1faa20eec55e0c8644c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=be7e52c50c5182cc09a09ea6fc456446b2039de3

Signed-off-by: Immad Mir <mirimmad17@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-07-27 08:46:58 +02:00
Yogesh
39f6292d75 fs: jfs: Fix UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in dbAllocDmapLev
[ Upstream commit 4e302336d5ca1767a06beee7596a72d3bdc8d983 ]

Syzkaller reported the following issue:

UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:1965:6
index -84 is out of range for type 's8[341]' (aka 'signed char[341]')
CPU: 1 PID: 4995 Comm: syz-executor146 Not tainted 6.4.0-rc6-syzkaller-00037-gb6dad5178cea #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/27/2023
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0x1e7/0x2d0 lib/dump_stack.c:106
 ubsan_epilogue lib/ubsan.c:217 [inline]
 __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0x11c/0x150 lib/ubsan.c:348
 dbAllocDmapLev+0x3e5/0x430 fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:1965
 dbAllocCtl+0x113/0x920 fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:1809
 dbAllocAG+0x28f/0x10b0 fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:1350
 dbAlloc+0x658/0xca0 fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:874
 dtSplitUp fs/jfs/jfs_dtree.c:974 [inline]
 dtInsert+0xda7/0x6b00 fs/jfs/jfs_dtree.c:863
 jfs_create+0x7b6/0xbb0 fs/jfs/namei.c:137
 lookup_open fs/namei.c:3492 [inline]
 open_last_lookups fs/namei.c:3560 [inline]
 path_openat+0x13df/0x3170 fs/namei.c:3788
 do_filp_open+0x234/0x490 fs/namei.c:3818
 do_sys_openat2+0x13f/0x500 fs/open.c:1356
 do_sys_open fs/open.c:1372 [inline]
 __do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1388 [inline]
 __se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1383 [inline]
 __x64_sys_openat+0x247/0x290 fs/open.c:1383
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x7f1f4e33f7e9
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 51 14 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 c0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffc21129578 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f1f4e33f7e9
RDX: 000000000000275a RSI: 0000000020000040 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c
RBP: 00007f1f4e2ff080 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f1f4e2ff110
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
 </TASK>

The bug occurs when the dbAllocDmapLev()function attempts to access
dp->tree.stree[leafidx + LEAFIND] while the leafidx value is negative.

To rectify this, the patch introduces a safeguard within the
dbAllocDmapLev() function. A check has been added to verify if leafidx is
negative. If it is, the function immediately returns an I/O error, preventing
any further execution that could potentially cause harm.

Tested via syzbot.

Reported-by: syzbot+853a6f4dfa3cf37d3aea@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=ae2f5a27a07ae44b0f17
Signed-off-by: Yogesh <yogi.kernel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-07-27 08:46:58 +02:00
Jan Kara
985f966669 udf: Fix uninitialized array access for some pathnames
[ Upstream commit 028f6055c912588e6f72722d89c30b401bbcf013 ]

For filenames that begin with . and are between 2 and 5 characters long,
UDF charset conversion code would read uninitialized memory in the
output buffer. The only practical impact is that the name may be prepended a
"unification hash" when it is not actually needed but still it is good
to fix this.

Reported-by: syzbot+cd311b1e43cc25f90d18@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/000000000000e2638a05fe9dc8f9@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-07-27 08:46:58 +02:00
Ye Bin
579d814de8 quota: fix warning in dqgrab()
[ Upstream commit d6a95db3c7ad160bc16b89e36449705309b52bcb ]

There's issue as follows when do fault injection:
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 14870 at include/linux/quotaops.h:51 dquot_disable+0x13b7/0x18c0
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 14870 Comm: fsconfig Not tainted 6.3.0-next-20230505-00006-g5107a9c821af-dirty #541
RIP: 0010:dquot_disable+0x13b7/0x18c0
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000acc79e0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff88825e41b980
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88825e41b980 RDI: 0000000000000002
RBP: ffff888179f68000 R08: ffffffff82087ca7 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed102f3ed026 R12: ffff888179f68130
R13: ffff888179f68110 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffff888179f68118
FS:  00007f450a073740(0000) GS:ffff88882fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007ffe96f2efd8 CR3: 000000025c8ad000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dquot_load_quota_sb+0xd53/0x1060
 dquot_resume+0x172/0x230
 ext4_reconfigure+0x1dc6/0x27b0
 reconfigure_super+0x515/0xa90
 __x64_sys_fsconfig+0xb19/0xd20
 do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Above issue may happens as follows:
ProcessA              ProcessB                    ProcessC
sys_fsconfig
  vfs_fsconfig_locked
   reconfigure_super
     ext4_remount
      dquot_suspend -> suspend all type quota

                 sys_fsconfig
                  vfs_fsconfig_locked
                    reconfigure_super
                     ext4_remount
                      dquot_resume
                       ret = dquot_load_quota_sb
                        add_dquot_ref
                                           do_open  -> open file O_RDWR
                                            vfs_open
                                             do_dentry_open
                                              get_write_access
                                               atomic_inc_unless_negative(&inode->i_writecount)
                                              ext4_file_open
                                               dquot_file_open
                                                dquot_initialize
                                                  __dquot_initialize
                                                   dqget
						    atomic_inc(&dquot->dq_count);

                          __dquot_initialize
                           __dquot_initialize
                            dqget
                             if (!test_bit(DQ_ACTIVE_B, &dquot->dq_flags))
                               ext4_acquire_dquot
			        -> Return error DQ_ACTIVE_B flag isn't set
                         dquot_disable
			  invalidate_dquots
			   if (atomic_read(&dquot->dq_count))
	                    dqgrab
			     WARN_ON_ONCE(!test_bit(DQ_ACTIVE_B, &dquot->dq_flags))
	                      -> Trigger warning

In the above scenario, 'dquot->dq_flags' has no DQ_ACTIVE_B is normal when
dqgrab().
To solve above issue just replace the dqgrab() use in invalidate_dquots() with
atomic_inc(&dquot->dq_count).

Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Message-Id: <20230605140731.2427629-3-yebin10@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-07-27 08:46:57 +02:00
Jan Kara
32c2f51fff quota: Properly disable quotas when add_dquot_ref() fails
[ Upstream commit 6a4e3363792e30177cc3965697e34ddcea8b900b ]

When add_dquot_ref() fails (usually due to IO error or ENOMEM), we want
to disable quotas we are trying to enable. However dquot_disable() call
was passed just the flags we are enabling so in case flags ==
DQUOT_USAGE_ENABLED dquot_disable() call will just fail with EINVAL
instead of properly disabling quotas. Fix the problem by always passing
DQUOT_LIMITS_ENABLED | DQUOT_USAGE_ENABLED to dquot_disable() in this
case.

Reported-and-tested-by: Ye Bin <yebin10@huawei.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+e633c79ceaecbf479854@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Message-Id: <20230605140731.2427629-2-yebin10@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-07-27 08:46:57 +02:00
Eric Whitney
bca9fb7a5a ext4: correct inline offset when handling xattrs in inode body
commit 6909cf5c4101214f4305a62d582a5b93c7e1eb9a upstream.

When run on a file system where the inline_data feature has been
enabled, xfstests generic/269, generic/270, and generic/476 cause ext4
to emit error messages indicating that inline directory entries are
corrupted.  This occurs because the inline offset used to locate
inline directory entries in the inode body is not updated when an
xattr in that shared region is deleted and the region is shifted in
memory to recover the space it occupied.  If the deleted xattr precedes
the system.data attribute, which points to the inline directory entries,
that attribute will be moved further up in the region.  The inline
offset continues to point to whatever is located in system.data's former
location, with unfortunate effects when used to access directory entries
or (presumably) inline data in the inode body.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Whitney <enwlinux@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230522181520.1570360-1-enwlinux@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-07-27 08:46:57 +02:00
Miklos Szeredi
62ee584032 fuse: ioctl: translate ENOSYS in outarg
commit 6a567e920fd0451bf29abc418df96c3365925770 upstream.

Fuse shouldn't return ENOSYS from its ioctl implementation. If userspace
responds with ENOSYS it should be translated to ENOTTY.

There are two ways to return an error from the IOCTL request:

 - fuse_out_header.error
 - fuse_ioctl_out.result

Commit 02c0cab8e734 ("fuse: ioctl: translate ENOSYS") already fixed this
issue for the first case, but missed the second case.  This patch fixes the
second case.

Reported-by: Jonathan Katz <jkatz@eitmlabs.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CALKgVmcC1VUV_gJVq70n--omMJZUb4HSh_FqvLTHgNBc+HCLFQ@mail.gmail.com/
Fixes: 02c0cab8e734 ("fuse: ioctl: translate ENOSYS")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-07-27 08:46:54 +02:00
Filipe Manana
ab80a901f8 btrfs: zoned: fix memory leak after finding block group with super blocks
commit f1a07c2b4e2c473ec322b8b9ece071b8c88a3512 upstream.

At exclude_super_stripes(), if we happen to find a block group that has
super blocks mapped to it and we are on a zoned filesystem, we error out
as this is not supposed to happen, indicating either a bug or maybe some
memory corruption for example. However we are exiting the function without
freeing the memory allocated for the logical address of the super blocks.
Fix this by freeing the logical address.

Fixes: 12659251ca5d ("btrfs: implement log-structured superblock for ZONED mode")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10+
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-07-27 08:46:54 +02:00