68229 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
M A Ramdhan
5b55f2d6ef net/sched: cls_fw: Fix improper refcount update leads to use-after-free
[ Upstream commit 0323bce598eea038714f941ce2b22541c46d488f ]

In the event of a failure in tcf_change_indev(), fw_set_parms() will
immediately return an error after incrementing or decrementing
reference counter in tcf_bind_filter().  If attacker can control
reference counter to zero and make reference freed, leading to
use after free.

In order to prevent this, move the point of possible failure above the
point where the TC_FW_CLASSID is handled.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: M A Ramdhan <ramdhan@starlabs.sg>
Signed-off-by: M A Ramdhan <ramdhan@starlabs.sg>
Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Reviewed-by: Pedro Tammela <pctammela@mojatatu.com>
Message-ID: <20230705161530.52003-1-ramdhan@starlabs.sg>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-07-23 13:47:41 +02:00
Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
870dcc31c0 netfilter: nf_tables: prevent OOB access in nft_byteorder_eval
commit caf3ef7468f7534771b5c44cd8dbd6f7f87c2cbd upstream.

When evaluating byteorder expressions with size 2, a union with 32-bit and
16-bit members is used. Since the 16-bit members are aligned to 32-bit,
the array accesses will be out-of-bounds.

It may lead to a stack-out-of-bounds access like the one below:

[   23.095215] ==================================================================
[   23.095625] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in nft_byteorder_eval+0x13c/0x320
[   23.096020] Read of size 2 at addr ffffc90000007948 by task ping/115
[   23.096358]
[   23.096456] CPU: 0 PID: 115 Comm: ping Not tainted 6.4.0+ #413
[   23.096770] Call Trace:
[   23.096910]  <IRQ>
[   23.097030]  dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0xc0
[   23.097218]  print_report+0xcf/0x630
[   23.097388]  ? nft_byteorder_eval+0x13c/0x320
[   23.097577]  ? kasan_addr_to_slab+0xd/0xc0
[   23.097760]  ? nft_byteorder_eval+0x13c/0x320
[   23.097949]  kasan_report+0xc9/0x110
[   23.098106]  ? nft_byteorder_eval+0x13c/0x320
[   23.098298]  __asan_load2+0x83/0xd0
[   23.098453]  nft_byteorder_eval+0x13c/0x320
[   23.098659]  nft_do_chain+0x1c8/0xc50
[   23.098852]  ? __pfx_nft_do_chain+0x10/0x10
[   23.099078]  ? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
[   23.099295]  ? __pfx___lock_acquire+0x10/0x10
[   23.099535]  ? __pfx___lock_acquire+0x10/0x10
[   23.099745]  ? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
[   23.099929]  nft_do_chain_ipv4+0xfe/0x140
[   23.100105]  ? __pfx_nft_do_chain_ipv4+0x10/0x10
[   23.100327]  ? lock_release+0x204/0x400
[   23.100515]  ? nf_hook.constprop.0+0x340/0x550
[   23.100779]  nf_hook_slow+0x6c/0x100
[   23.100977]  ? __pfx_nft_do_chain_ipv4+0x10/0x10
[   23.101223]  nf_hook.constprop.0+0x334/0x550
[   23.101443]  ? __pfx_ip_local_deliver_finish+0x10/0x10
[   23.101677]  ? __pfx_nf_hook.constprop.0+0x10/0x10
[   23.101882]  ? __pfx_ip_rcv_finish+0x10/0x10
[   23.102071]  ? __pfx_ip_local_deliver_finish+0x10/0x10
[   23.102291]  ? rcu_read_lock_held+0x4b/0x70
[   23.102481]  ip_local_deliver+0xbb/0x110
[   23.102665]  ? __pfx_ip_rcv+0x10/0x10
[   23.102839]  ip_rcv+0x199/0x2a0
[   23.102980]  ? __pfx_ip_rcv+0x10/0x10
[   23.103140]  __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x13e/0x150
[   23.103362]  ? __pfx___netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x10/0x10
[   23.103647]  ? mark_held_locks+0x48/0xa0
[   23.103819]  ? process_backlog+0x36c/0x380
[   23.103999]  __netif_receive_skb+0x23/0xc0
[   23.104179]  process_backlog+0x91/0x380
[   23.104350]  __napi_poll.constprop.0+0x66/0x360
[   23.104589]  ? net_rx_action+0x1cb/0x610
[   23.104811]  net_rx_action+0x33e/0x610
[   23.105024]  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x23/0x50
[   23.105257]  ? __pfx_net_rx_action+0x10/0x10
[   23.105485]  ? mark_held_locks+0x48/0xa0
[   23.105741]  __do_softirq+0xfa/0x5ab
[   23.105956]  ? __dev_queue_xmit+0x765/0x1c00
[   23.106193]  do_softirq.part.0+0x49/0xc0
[   23.106423]  </IRQ>
[   23.106547]  <TASK>
[   23.106670]  __local_bh_enable_ip+0xf5/0x120
[   23.106903]  __dev_queue_xmit+0x789/0x1c00
[   23.107131]  ? __pfx___dev_queue_xmit+0x10/0x10
[   23.107381]  ? find_held_lock+0x8e/0xb0
[   23.107585]  ? lock_release+0x204/0x400
[   23.107798]  ? neigh_resolve_output+0x185/0x350
[   23.108049]  ? mark_held_locks+0x48/0xa0
[   23.108265]  ? neigh_resolve_output+0x185/0x350
[   23.108514]  neigh_resolve_output+0x246/0x350
[   23.108753]  ? neigh_resolve_output+0x246/0x350
[   23.109003]  ip_finish_output2+0x3c3/0x10b0
[   23.109250]  ? __pfx_ip_finish_output2+0x10/0x10
[   23.109510]  ? __pfx_nf_hook+0x10/0x10
[   23.109732]  __ip_finish_output+0x217/0x390
[   23.109978]  ip_finish_output+0x2f/0x130
[   23.110207]  ip_output+0xc9/0x170
[   23.110404]  ip_push_pending_frames+0x1a0/0x240
[   23.110652]  raw_sendmsg+0x102e/0x19e0
[   23.110871]  ? __pfx_raw_sendmsg+0x10/0x10
[   23.111093]  ? lock_release+0x204/0x400
[   23.111304]  ? __mod_lruvec_page_state+0x148/0x330
[   23.111567]  ? find_held_lock+0x8e/0xb0
[   23.111777]  ? find_held_lock+0x8e/0xb0
[   23.111993]  ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x7c/0x2f0
[   23.112225]  ? aa_sk_perm+0x18a/0x550
[   23.112431]  ? filemap_map_pages+0x4f1/0x900
[   23.112665]  ? __pfx_aa_sk_perm+0x10/0x10
[   23.112880]  ? find_held_lock+0x8e/0xb0
[   23.113098]  inet_sendmsg+0xa0/0xb0
[   23.113297]  ? inet_sendmsg+0xa0/0xb0
[   23.113500]  ? __pfx_inet_sendmsg+0x10/0x10
[   23.113727]  sock_sendmsg+0xf4/0x100
[   23.113924]  ? move_addr_to_kernel.part.0+0x4f/0xa0
[   23.114190]  __sys_sendto+0x1d4/0x290
[   23.114391]  ? __pfx___sys_sendto+0x10/0x10
[   23.114621]  ? __pfx_mark_lock.part.0+0x10/0x10
[   23.114869]  ? lock_release+0x204/0x400
[   23.115076]  ? find_held_lock+0x8e/0xb0
[   23.115287]  ? rcu_is_watching+0x23/0x60
[   23.115503]  ? __rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x6e2/0x860
[   23.115778]  ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30
[   23.116008]  ? blkcg_maybe_throttle_current+0x8d/0x770
[   23.116285]  ? mark_held_locks+0x28/0xa0
[   23.116503]  ? do_syscall_64+0x37/0x90
[   23.116713]  __x64_sys_sendto+0x7f/0xb0
[   23.116924]  do_syscall_64+0x59/0x90
[   23.117123]  ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x25/0x30
[   23.117387]  ? irqentry_exit+0x77/0xb0
[   23.117593]  ? exc_page_fault+0x92/0x140
[   23.117806]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8
[   23.118081] RIP: 0033:0x7f744aee2bba
[   23.118282] Code: d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b8 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 41 89 ca 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 15 b8 2c 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 7e c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 48 83 ec 30 44 89
[   23.119237] RSP: 002b:00007ffd04a7c9f8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
[   23.119644] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffd04a7e0a0 RCX: 00007f744aee2bba
[   23.120023] RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 000056488e9e6300 RDI: 0000000000000003
[   23.120413] RBP: 000056488e9e6300 R08: 00007ffd04a80320 R09: 0000000000000010
[   23.120809] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000040
[   23.121219] R13: 00007ffd04a7dc38 R14: 00007ffd04a7ca00 R15: 00007ffd04a7e0a0
[   23.121617]  </TASK>
[   23.121749]
[   23.121845] The buggy address belongs to the virtual mapping at
[   23.121845]  [ffffc90000000000, ffffc90000009000) created by:
[   23.121845]  irq_init_percpu_irqstack+0x1cf/0x270
[   23.122707]
[   23.122803] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
[   23.123104] page:0000000072ac19f0 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x24a09
[   23.123609] flags: 0xfffffc0001000(reserved|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
[   23.123998] page_type: 0xffffffff()
[   23.124194] raw: 000fffffc0001000 ffffea0000928248 ffffea0000928248 0000000000000000
[   23.124610] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[   23.125023] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[   23.125326]
[   23.125421] Memory state around the buggy address:
[   23.125682]  ffffc90000007800: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[   23.126072]  ffffc90000007880: 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 f2 f2 00
[   23.126455] >ffffc90000007900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00
[   23.126840]                                               ^
[   23.127138]  ffffc90000007980: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f3 f3 f3
[   23.127522]  ffffc90000007a00: f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1
[   23.127906] ==================================================================
[   23.128324] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint

Using simple s16 pointers for the 16-bit accesses fixes the problem. For
the 32-bit accesses, src and dst can be used directly.

Fixes: 96518518cc41 ("netfilter: add nftables")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Tanguy DUBROCA (@SidewayRE) from @Synacktiv working with ZDI
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-07-23 13:47:37 +02:00
Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
041e2ac88c netfilter: nf_tables: do not ignore genmask when looking up chain by id
commit 515ad530795c118f012539ed76d02bacfd426d89 upstream.

When adding a rule to a chain referring to its ID, if that chain had been
deleted on the same batch, the rule might end up referring to a deleted
chain.

This will lead to a WARNING like following:

[   33.098431] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[   33.098678] WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 69 at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:2037 nf_tables_chain_destroy+0x23d/0x260
[   33.099217] Modules linked in:
[   33.099388] CPU: 5 PID: 69 Comm: kworker/5:1 Not tainted 6.4.0+ #409
[   33.099726] Workqueue: events nf_tables_trans_destroy_work
[   33.100018] RIP: 0010:nf_tables_chain_destroy+0x23d/0x260
[   33.100306] Code: 8b 7c 24 68 e8 64 9c ed fe 4c 89 e7 e8 5c 9c ed fe 48 83 c4 08 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d 31 c0 89 c6 89 c7 c3 cc cc cc cc <0f> 0b 48 83 c4 08 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d 31 c0 89 c6 89 c7
[   33.101271] RSP: 0018:ffffc900004ffc48 EFLAGS: 00010202
[   33.101546] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff888006fc0a28 RCX: 0000000000000000
[   33.101920] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
[   33.102649] RBP: ffffc900004ffc78 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[   33.103018] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8880135ef500
[   33.103385] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: dead000000000122 R15: ffff888006fc0a10
[   33.103762] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888024c80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   33.104184] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   33.104493] CR2: 00007fe863b56a50 CR3: 00000000124b0001 CR4: 0000000000770ee0
[   33.104872] PKRU: 55555554
[   33.104999] Call Trace:
[   33.105113]  <TASK>
[   33.105214]  ? show_regs+0x72/0x90
[   33.105371]  ? __warn+0xa5/0x210
[   33.105520]  ? nf_tables_chain_destroy+0x23d/0x260
[   33.105732]  ? report_bug+0x1f2/0x200
[   33.105902]  ? handle_bug+0x46/0x90
[   33.106546]  ? exc_invalid_op+0x19/0x50
[   33.106762]  ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20
[   33.106995]  ? nf_tables_chain_destroy+0x23d/0x260
[   33.107249]  ? nf_tables_chain_destroy+0x30/0x260
[   33.107506]  nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x669/0x680
[   33.107782]  ? mark_held_locks+0x28/0xa0
[   33.107996]  ? __pfx_nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x10/0x10
[   33.108294]  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x28/0x70
[   33.108538]  process_one_work+0x68c/0xb70
[   33.108755]  ? lock_acquire+0x17f/0x420
[   33.108977]  ? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10
[   33.109218]  ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x128/0x1d0
[   33.109435]  ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x71/0x80
[   33.109634]  worker_thread+0x2bd/0x700
[   33.109817]  ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[   33.110254]  kthread+0x18b/0x1d0
[   33.110410]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[   33.110581]  ret_from_fork+0x29/0x50
[   33.110757]  </TASK>
[   33.110866] irq event stamp: 1651
[   33.111017] hardirqs last  enabled at (1659): [<ffffffffa206a209>] __up_console_sem+0x79/0xa0
[   33.111379] hardirqs last disabled at (1666): [<ffffffffa206a1ee>] __up_console_sem+0x5e/0xa0
[   33.111740] softirqs last  enabled at (1616): [<ffffffffa1f5d40e>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x9e/0xe0
[   33.112094] softirqs last disabled at (1367): [<ffffffffa1f5d40e>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x9e/0xe0
[   33.112453] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

This is due to the nft_chain_lookup_byid ignoring the genmask. After this
change, adding the new rule will fail as it will not find the chain.

Fixes: 837830a4b439 ("netfilter: nf_tables: add NFTA_RULE_CHAIN_ID attribute")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Mingi Cho of Theori working with ZDI
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-07-23 13:47:37 +02:00
Florent Revest
6f03ce2f1a netfilter: conntrack: Avoid nf_ct_helper_hash uses after free
commit 6eef7a2b933885a17679eb8ed0796ddf0ee5309b upstream.

If nf_conntrack_init_start() fails (for example due to a
register_nf_conntrack_bpf() failure), the nf_conntrack_helper_fini()
clean-up path frees the nf_ct_helper_hash map.

When built with NF_CONNTRACK=y, further netfilter modules (e.g:
netfilter_conntrack_ftp) can still be loaded and call
nf_conntrack_helpers_register(), independently of whether nf_conntrack
initialized correctly. This accesses the nf_ct_helper_hash dangling
pointer and causes a uaf, possibly leading to random memory corruption.

This patch guards nf_conntrack_helper_register() from accessing a freed
or uninitialized nf_ct_helper_hash pointer and fixes possible
uses-after-free when loading a conntrack module.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 12f7a505331e ("netfilter: add user-space connection tracking helper infrastructure")
Signed-off-by: Florent Revest <revest@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-07-23 13:47:37 +02:00
Pablo Neira Ayuso
2bd6f13734 netfilter: nf_tables: unbind non-anonymous set if rule construction fails
commit 3e70489721b6c870252c9082c496703677240f53 upstream.

Otherwise a dangling reference to a rule object that is gone remains
in the set binding list.

Fixes: 26b5a5712eb8 ("netfilter: nf_tables: add NFT_TRANS_PREPARE_ERROR to deal with bound set/chain")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-07-23 13:47:36 +02:00
Abhijeet Rastogi
5ca021be52 ipvs: increase ip_vs_conn_tab_bits range for 64BIT
commit 04292c695f82b6cf0d25dd5ae494f16ddbb621f6 upstream.

Current range [8, 20] is set purely due to historical reasons
because at the time, ~1M (2^20) was considered sufficient.
With this change, 27 is the upper limit for 64-bit, 20 otherwise.

Previous change regarding this limit is here.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/86eabeb9dd62aebf1e2533926fdd13fed48bab1f.1631289960.git.aclaudi@redhat.com/T/#u

Signed-off-by: Abhijeet Rastogi <abhijeet.1989@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Acked-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Cc: Allen Pais <apais@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-07-23 13:47:34 +02:00
Vladimir Oltean
deee40944a net: dsa: tag_sja1105: fix MAC DA patching from meta frames
[ Upstream commit 1dcf6efd5f0c1f4496b3ef7ec5a7db104a53b38c ]

The SJA1105 manual says that at offset 4 into the meta frame payload we
have "MAC destination byte 2" and at offset 5 we have "MAC destination
byte 1". These are counted from the LSB, so byte 1 is h_dest[ETH_HLEN-2]
aka h_dest[4] and byte 2 is h_dest[ETH_HLEN-3] aka h_dest[3].

The sja1105_meta_unpack() function decodes these the other way around,
so a frame with MAC DA 01:80:c2:11:22:33 is received by the network
stack as having 01:80:c2:22:11:33.

Fixes: e53e18a6fe4d ("net: dsa: sja1105: Receive and decode meta frames")
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <florian.fainelli@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-07-23 13:47:30 +02:00
Lin Ma
ae682149bc net/sched: act_pedit: Add size check for TCA_PEDIT_PARMS_EX
[ Upstream commit 30c45b5361d39b4b793780ffac5538090b9e2eb1 ]

The attribute TCA_PEDIT_PARMS_EX is not be included in pedit_policy and
one malicious user could fake a TCA_PEDIT_PARMS_EX whose length is
smaller than the intended sizeof(struct tc_pedit). Hence, the
dereference in tcf_pedit_init() could access dirty heap data.

static int tcf_pedit_init(...)
{
  // ...
  pattr = tb[TCA_PEDIT_PARMS]; // TCA_PEDIT_PARMS is included
  if (!pattr)
    pattr = tb[TCA_PEDIT_PARMS_EX]; // but this is not

  // ...
  parm = nla_data(pattr);

  index = parm->index; // parm is able to be smaller than 4 bytes
                       // and this dereference gets dirty skb_buff
                       // data created in netlink_sendmsg
}

This commit adds TCA_PEDIT_PARMS_EX length in pedit_policy which avoid
the above case, just like the TCA_PEDIT_PARMS.

Fixes: 71d0ed7079df ("net/act_pedit: Support using offset relative to the conventional network headers")
Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn>
Reviewed-by: Pedro Tammela <pctammela@mojatatu.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230703110842.590282-1-linma@zju.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-07-23 13:47:29 +02:00
Ilya Maximets
edd944b70a xsk: Honor SO_BINDTODEVICE on bind
[ Upstream commit f7306acec9aae9893d15e745c8791124d42ab10a ]

Initial creation of an AF_XDP socket requires CAP_NET_RAW capability. A
privileged process might create the socket and pass it to a non-privileged
process for later use. However, that process will be able to bind the socket
to any network interface. Even though it will not be able to receive any
traffic without modification of the BPF map, the situation is not ideal.

Sockets already have a mechanism that can be used to restrict what interface
they can be attached to. That is SO_BINDTODEVICE.

To change the SO_BINDTODEVICE binding the process will need CAP_NET_RAW.

Make xsk_bind() honor the SO_BINDTODEVICE in order to allow safer workflow
when non-privileged process is using AF_XDP.

The intended workflow is following:

  1. First process creates a bare socket with socket(AF_XDP, ...).
  2. First process loads the XSK program to the interface.
  3. First process adds the socket fd to a BPF map.
  4. First process ties socket fd to a particular interface using
     SO_BINDTODEVICE.
  5. First process sends socket fd to a second process.
  6. Second process allocates UMEM.
  7. Second process binds socket to the interface with bind(...).
  8. Second process sends/receives the traffic.

All the steps above are possible today if the first process is privileged
and the second one has sufficient RLIMIT_MEMLOCK and no capabilities.
However, the second process will be able to bind the socket to any interface
it wants on step 7 and send traffic from it. With the proposed change, the
second process will be able to bind the socket only to a specific interface
chosen by the first process at step 4.

Fixes: 965a99098443 ("xsk: add support for bind for Rx")
Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets <i.maximets@ovn.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Magnus Karlsson <magnus.karlsson@intel.com>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230703175329.3259672-1-i.maximets@ovn.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-07-23 13:47:29 +02:00
Eric Dumazet
428ccde924 tcp: annotate data races in __tcp_oow_rate_limited()
[ Upstream commit 998127cdb4699b9d470a9348ffe9f1154346be5f ]

request sockets are lockless, __tcp_oow_rate_limited() could be called
on the same object from different cpus. This is harmless.

Add READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() annotations to avoid a KCSAN report.

Fixes: 4ce7e93cb3fe ("tcp: rate limit ACK sent by SYN_RECV request sockets")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-07-23 13:47:29 +02:00
Vladimir Oltean
0dad52a840 net: bridge: keep ports without IFF_UNICAST_FLT in BR_PROMISC mode
[ Upstream commit 6ca3c005d0604e8d2b439366e3923ea58db99641 ]

According to the synchronization rules for .ndo_get_stats() as seen in
Documentation/networking/netdevices.rst, acquiring a plain spin_lock()
should not be illegal, but the bridge driver implementation makes it so.

After running these commands, I am being faced with the following
lockdep splat:

$ ip link add link swp0 name macsec0 type macsec encrypt on && ip link set swp0 up
$ ip link add dev br0 type bridge vlan_filtering 1 && ip link set br0 up
$ ip link set macsec0 master br0 && ip link set macsec0 up

  ========================================================
  WARNING: possible irq lock inversion dependency detected
  6.4.0-04295-g31b577b4bd4a #603 Not tainted
  --------------------------------------------------------
  swapper/1/0 just changed the state of lock:
  ffff6bd348724cd8 (&br->lock){+.-.}-{3:3}, at: br_forward_delay_timer_expired+0x34/0x198
  but this lock took another, SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock in the past:
   (&ocelot->stats_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}

  and interrupts could create inverse lock ordering between them.

  other info that might help us debug this:
  Chain exists of:
    &br->lock --> &br->hash_lock --> &ocelot->stats_lock

   Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario:

         CPU0                    CPU1
         ----                    ----
    lock(&ocelot->stats_lock);
                                 local_irq_disable();
                                 lock(&br->lock);
                                 lock(&br->hash_lock);
    <Interrupt>
      lock(&br->lock);

   *** DEADLOCK ***

(details about the 3 locks skipped)

swp0 is instantiated by drivers/net/dsa/ocelot/felix.c, and this
only matters to the extent that its .ndo_get_stats64() method calls
spin_lock(&ocelot->stats_lock).

Documentation/locking/lockdep-design.rst says:

| A lock is irq-safe means it was ever used in an irq context, while a lock
| is irq-unsafe means it was ever acquired with irq enabled.

(...)

| Furthermore, the following usage based lock dependencies are not allowed
| between any two lock-classes::
|
|    <hardirq-safe>   ->  <hardirq-unsafe>
|    <softirq-safe>   ->  <softirq-unsafe>

Lockdep marks br->hash_lock as softirq-safe, because it is sometimes
taken in softirq context (for example br_fdb_update() which runs in
NET_RX softirq), and when it's not in softirq context it blocks softirqs
by using spin_lock_bh().

Lockdep marks ocelot->stats_lock as softirq-unsafe, because it never
blocks softirqs from running, and it is never taken from softirq
context. So it can always be interrupted by softirqs.

There is a call path through which a function that holds br->hash_lock:
fdb_add_hw_addr() will call a function that acquires ocelot->stats_lock:
ocelot_port_get_stats64(). This can be seen below:

ocelot_port_get_stats64+0x3c/0x1e0
felix_get_stats64+0x20/0x38
dsa_slave_get_stats64+0x3c/0x60
dev_get_stats+0x74/0x2c8
rtnl_fill_stats+0x4c/0x150
rtnl_fill_ifinfo+0x5cc/0x7b8
rtmsg_ifinfo_build_skb+0xe4/0x150
rtmsg_ifinfo+0x5c/0xb0
__dev_notify_flags+0x58/0x200
__dev_set_promiscuity+0xa0/0x1f8
dev_set_promiscuity+0x30/0x70
macsec_dev_change_rx_flags+0x68/0x88
__dev_set_promiscuity+0x1a8/0x1f8
__dev_set_rx_mode+0x74/0xa8
dev_uc_add+0x74/0xa0
fdb_add_hw_addr+0x68/0xd8
fdb_add_local+0xc4/0x110
br_fdb_add_local+0x54/0x88
br_add_if+0x338/0x4a0
br_add_slave+0x20/0x38
do_setlink+0x3a4/0xcb8
rtnl_newlink+0x758/0x9d0
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x2f0/0x550
netlink_rcv_skb+0x128/0x148
rtnetlink_rcv+0x24/0x38

the plain English explanation for it is:

The macsec0 bridge port is created without p->flags & BR_PROMISC,
because it is what br_manage_promisc() decides for a VLAN filtering
bridge with a single auto port.

As part of the br_add_if() procedure, br_fdb_add_local() is called for
the MAC address of the device, and this results in a call to
dev_uc_add() for macsec0 while the softirq-safe br->hash_lock is taken.

Because macsec0 does not have IFF_UNICAST_FLT, dev_uc_add() ends up
calling __dev_set_promiscuity() for macsec0, which is propagated by its
implementation, macsec_dev_change_rx_flags(), to the lower device: swp0.
This triggers the call path:

dev_set_promiscuity(swp0)
-> rtmsg_ifinfo()
   -> dev_get_stats()
      -> ocelot_port_get_stats64()

with a calling context that lockdep doesn't like (br->hash_lock held).

Normally we don't see this, because even though many drivers that can be
bridge ports don't support IFF_UNICAST_FLT, we need a driver that

(a) doesn't support IFF_UNICAST_FLT, *and*
(b) it forwards the IFF_PROMISC flag to another driver, and
(c) *that* driver implements ndo_get_stats64() using a softirq-unsafe
    spinlock.

Condition (b) is necessary because the first __dev_set_rx_mode() calls
__dev_set_promiscuity() with "bool notify=false", and thus, the
rtmsg_ifinfo() code path won't be entered.

The same criteria also hold true for DSA switches which don't report
IFF_UNICAST_FLT. When the DSA master uses a spin_lock() in its
ndo_get_stats64() method, the same lockdep splat can be seen.

I think the deadlock possibility is real, even though I didn't reproduce
it, and I'm thinking of the following situation to support that claim:

fdb_add_hw_addr() runs on a CPU A, in a context with softirqs locally
disabled and br->hash_lock held, and may end up attempting to acquire
ocelot->stats_lock.

In parallel, ocelot->stats_lock is currently held by a thread B (say,
ocelot_check_stats_work()), which is interrupted while holding it by a
softirq which attempts to lock br->hash_lock.

Thread B cannot make progress because br->hash_lock is held by A. Whereas
thread A cannot make progress because ocelot->stats_lock is held by B.

When taking the issue at face value, the bridge can avoid that problem
by simply making the ports promiscuous from a code path with a saner
calling context (br->hash_lock not held). A bridge port without
IFF_UNICAST_FLT is going to become promiscuous as soon as we call
dev_uc_add() on it (which we do unconditionally), so why not be
preemptive and make it promiscuous right from the beginning, so as to
not be taken by surprise.

With this, we've broken the links between code that holds br->hash_lock
or br->lock and code that calls into the ndo_change_rx_flags() or
ndo_get_stats64() ops of the bridge port.

Fixes: 2796d0c648c9 ("bridge: Automatically manage port promiscuous mode.")
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-07-23 13:47:29 +02:00
Florian Westphal
a6527128fe net/sched: act_ipt: add sanity checks on table name and hook locations
[ Upstream commit b4ee93380b3c891fea996af8d1d3ca0e36ad31f0 ]

Looks like "tc" hard-codes "mangle" as the only supported table
name, but on kernel side there are no checks.

This is wrong.  Not all xtables targets are safe to call from tc.
E.g. "nat" targets assume skb has a conntrack object assigned to it.
Normally those get called from netfilter nat core which consults the
nat table to obtain the address mapping.

"tc" userspace either sets PRE or POSTROUTING as hook number, but there
is no validation of this on kernel side, so update netlink policy to
reject bogus numbers.  Some targets may assume skb_dst is set for
input/forward hooks, so prevent those from being used.

act_ipt uses the hook number in two places:
1. the state hook number, this is fine as-is
2. to set par.hook_mask

The latter is a bit mask, so update the assignment to make
xt_check_target() to the right thing.

Followup patch adds required checks for the skb/packet headers before
calling the targets evaluation function.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-07-23 13:47:28 +02:00
Chengfeng Ye
1fba2510b5 sctp: fix potential deadlock on &net->sctp.addr_wq_lock
[ Upstream commit 6feb37b3b06e9049e20dcf7e23998f92c9c5be9a ]

As &net->sctp.addr_wq_lock is also acquired by the timer
sctp_addr_wq_timeout_handler() in protocal.c, the same lock acquisition
at sctp_auto_asconf_init() seems should disable irq since it is called
from sctp_accept() under process context.

Possible deadlock scenario:
sctp_accept()
    -> sctp_sock_migrate()
    -> sctp_auto_asconf_init()
    -> spin_lock(&net->sctp.addr_wq_lock)
        <timer interrupt>
        -> sctp_addr_wq_timeout_handler()
        -> spin_lock_bh(&net->sctp.addr_wq_lock); (deadlock here)

This flaw was found using an experimental static analysis tool we are
developing for irq-related deadlock.

The tentative patch fix the potential deadlock by spin_lock_bh().

Signed-off-by: Chengfeng Ye <dg573847474@gmail.com>
Fixes: 34e5b0118685 ("sctp: delay auto_asconf init until binding the first addr")
Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230627120340.19432-1-dg573847474@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-07-23 13:47:27 +02:00
Ding Hui
fbf4ace39b SUNRPC: Fix UAF in svc_tcp_listen_data_ready()
commit fc80fc2d4e39137869da3150ee169b40bf879287 upstream.

After the listener svc_sock is freed, and before invoking svc_tcp_accept()
for the established child sock, there is a window that the newsock
retaining a freed listener svc_sock in sk_user_data which cloning from
parent. In the race window, if data is received on the newsock, we will
observe use-after-free report in svc_tcp_listen_data_ready().

Reproduce by two tasks:

1. while :; do rpc.nfsd 0 ; rpc.nfsd; done
2. while :; do echo "" | ncat -4 127.0.0.1 2049 ; done

KASAN report:

  ==================================================================
  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in svc_tcp_listen_data_ready+0x1cf/0x1f0 [sunrpc]
  Read of size 8 at addr ffff888139d96228 by task nc/102553
  CPU: 7 PID: 102553 Comm: nc Not tainted 6.3.0+ #18
  Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 11/12/2020
  Call Trace:
   <IRQ>
   dump_stack_lvl+0x33/0x50
   print_address_description.constprop.0+0x27/0x310
   print_report+0x3e/0x70
   kasan_report+0xae/0xe0
   svc_tcp_listen_data_ready+0x1cf/0x1f0 [sunrpc]
   tcp_data_queue+0x9f4/0x20e0
   tcp_rcv_established+0x666/0x1f60
   tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x51c/0x850
   tcp_v4_rcv+0x23fc/0x2e80
   ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x62/0x300
   ip_local_deliver_finish+0x267/0x350
   ip_local_deliver+0x18b/0x2d0
   ip_rcv+0x2fb/0x370
   __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x166/0x1b0
   process_backlog+0x24c/0x5e0
   __napi_poll+0xa2/0x500
   net_rx_action+0x854/0xc90
   __do_softirq+0x1bb/0x5de
   do_softirq+0xcb/0x100
   </IRQ>
   <TASK>
   ...
   </TASK>

  Allocated by task 102371:
   kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
   kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30
   __kasan_kmalloc+0x7b/0x90
   svc_setup_socket+0x52/0x4f0 [sunrpc]
   svc_addsock+0x20d/0x400 [sunrpc]
   __write_ports_addfd+0x209/0x390 [nfsd]
   write_ports+0x239/0x2c0 [nfsd]
   nfsctl_transaction_write+0xac/0x110 [nfsd]
   vfs_write+0x1c3/0xae0
   ksys_write+0xed/0x1c0
   do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc

  Freed by task 102551:
   kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
   kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30
   kasan_save_free_info+0x2a/0x50
   __kasan_slab_free+0x106/0x190
   __kmem_cache_free+0x133/0x270
   svc_xprt_free+0x1e2/0x350 [sunrpc]
   svc_xprt_destroy_all+0x25a/0x440 [sunrpc]
   nfsd_put+0x125/0x240 [nfsd]
   nfsd_svc+0x2cb/0x3c0 [nfsd]
   write_threads+0x1ac/0x2a0 [nfsd]
   nfsctl_transaction_write+0xac/0x110 [nfsd]
   vfs_write+0x1c3/0xae0
   ksys_write+0xed/0x1c0
   do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc

Fix the UAF by simply doing nothing in svc_tcp_listen_data_ready()
if state != TCP_LISTEN, that will avoid dereferencing svsk for all
child socket.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230507091131.23540-1-dinghui@sangfor.com.cn/
Fixes: fa9251afc33c ("SUNRPC: Call the default socket callbacks instead of open coding")
Signed-off-by: Ding Hui <dinghui@sangfor.com.cn>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-07-23 13:47:20 +02:00
Kuniyuki Iwashima
a4b0164fc1 netlink: Add __sock_i_ino() for __netlink_diag_dump().
[ Upstream commit 25a9c8a4431c364f97f75558cb346d2ad3f53fbb ]

syzbot reported a warning in __local_bh_enable_ip(). [0]

Commit 8d61f926d420 ("netlink: fix potential deadlock in
netlink_set_err()") converted read_lock(&nl_table_lock) to
read_lock_irqsave() in __netlink_diag_dump() to prevent a deadlock.

However, __netlink_diag_dump() calls sock_i_ino() that uses
read_lock_bh() and read_unlock_bh().  If CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS=y,
read_unlock_bh() finally enables IRQ even though it should stay
disabled until the following read_unlock_irqrestore().

Using read_lock() in sock_i_ino() would trigger a lockdep splat
in another place that was fixed in commit f064af1e500a ("net: fix
a lockdep splat"), so let's add __sock_i_ino() that would be safe
to use under BH disabled.

[0]:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5012 at kernel/softirq.c:376 __local_bh_enable_ip+0xbe/0x130 kernel/softirq.c:376
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 5012 Comm: syz-executor487 Not tainted 6.4.0-rc7-syzkaller-00202-g6f68fc395f49 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/27/2023
RIP: 0010:__local_bh_enable_ip+0xbe/0x130 kernel/softirq.c:376
Code: 45 bf 01 00 00 00 e8 91 5b 0a 00 e8 3c 15 3d 00 fb 65 8b 05 ec e9 b5 7e 85 c0 74 58 5b 5d c3 65 8b 05 b2 b6 b4 7e 85 c0 75 a2 <0f> 0b eb 9e e8 89 15 3d 00 eb 9f 48 89 ef e8 6f 49 18 00 eb a8 0f
RSP: 0018:ffffc90003a1f3d0 EFLAGS: 00010046
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000201 RCX: 1ffffffff1cf5996
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000201 RDI: ffffffff8805c6f3
RBP: ffffffff8805c6f3 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff8880152b03a3
R10: ffffed1002a56074 R11: 0000000000000005 R12: 00000000000073e4
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: 0000000000000000
FS:  0000555556726300(0000) GS:ffff8880b9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000000000045ad50 CR3: 000000007c646000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 sock_i_ino+0x83/0xa0 net/core/sock.c:2559
 __netlink_diag_dump+0x45c/0x790 net/netlink/diag.c:171
 netlink_diag_dump+0xd6/0x230 net/netlink/diag.c:207
 netlink_dump+0x570/0xc50 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2269
 __netlink_dump_start+0x64b/0x910 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2374
 netlink_dump_start include/linux/netlink.h:329 [inline]
 netlink_diag_handler_dump+0x1ae/0x250 net/netlink/diag.c:238
 __sock_diag_cmd net/core/sock_diag.c:238 [inline]
 sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x31e/0x440 net/core/sock_diag.c:269
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x165/0x440 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2547
 sock_diag_rcv+0x2a/0x40 net/core/sock_diag.c:280
 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1339 [inline]
 netlink_unicast+0x547/0x7f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1365
 netlink_sendmsg+0x925/0xe30 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1914
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:724 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0xde/0x190 net/socket.c:747
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x71c/0x900 net/socket.c:2503
 ___sys_sendmsg+0x110/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2557
 __sys_sendmsg+0xf7/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2586
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x7f5303aaabb9
Code: 28 c3 e8 2a 14 00 00 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 c0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffc7506e548 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f5303aaabb9
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000180 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f5303a6ed60 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f5303a6edf0
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
 </TASK>

Fixes: 8d61f926d420 ("netlink: fix potential deadlock in netlink_set_err()")
Reported-by: syzbot+5da61cf6a9bc1902d422@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=5da61cf6a9bc1902d422
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230626164313.52528-1-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-07-23 13:46:56 +02:00
Ilia.Gavrilov
eb720f669b netfilter: nf_conntrack_sip: fix the ct_sip_parse_numerical_param() return value.
[ Upstream commit f188d30087480eab421cd8ca552fb15f55d57f4d ]

ct_sip_parse_numerical_param() returns only 0 or 1 now.
But process_register_request() and process_register_response() imply
checking for a negative value if parsing of a numerical header parameter
failed.
The invocation in nf_nat_sip() looks correct:
 	if (ct_sip_parse_numerical_param(...) > 0 &&
 	    ...) { ... }

Make the return value of the function ct_sip_parse_numerical_param()
a tristate to fix all the cases
a) return 1 if value is found; *val is set
b) return 0 if value is not found; *val is unchanged
c) return -1 on error; *val is undefined

Found by InfoTeCS on behalf of Linux Verification Center
(linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.

Fixes: 0f32a40fc91a ("[NETFILTER]: nf_conntrack_sip: create signalling expectations")
Signed-off-by: Ilia.Gavrilov <Ilia.Gavrilov@infotecs.ru>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-07-23 13:46:56 +02:00
Florian Westphal
c052797ac3 netfilter: conntrack: dccp: copy entire header to stack buffer, not just basic one
[ Upstream commit ff0a3a7d52ff7282dbd183e7fc29a1fe386b0c30 ]

Eric Dumazet says:
  nf_conntrack_dccp_packet() has an unique:

  dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, dataoff, sizeof(_dh), &_dh);

  And nothing more is 'pulled' from the packet, depending on the content.
  dh->dccph_doff, and/or dh->dccph_x ...)
  So dccp_ack_seq() is happily reading stuff past the _dh buffer.

BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in nf_conntrack_dccp_packet+0x1134/0x11c0
Read of size 4 at addr ffff000128f66e0c by task syz-executor.2/29371
[..]

Fix this by increasing the stack buffer to also include room for
the extra sequence numbers and all the known dccp packet type headers,
then pull again after the initial validation of the basic header.

While at it, mark packets invalid that lack 48bit sequence bit but
where RFC says the type MUST use them.

Compile tested only.

v2: first skb_header_pointer() now needs to adjust the size to
    only pull the generic header. (Eric)

Heads-up: I intend to remove dccp conntrack support later this year.

Fixes: 2bc780499aa3 ("[NETFILTER]: nf_conntrack: add DCCP protocol support")
Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-07-23 13:46:56 +02:00
Lin Ma
fc8429f8d8 net: nfc: Fix use-after-free caused by nfc_llcp_find_local
[ Upstream commit 6709d4b7bc2e079241fdef15d1160581c5261c10 ]

This commit fixes several use-after-free that caused by function
nfc_llcp_find_local(). For example, one UAF can happen when below buggy
time window occurs.

// nfc_genl_llc_get_params   | // nfc_unregister_device
                             |
dev = nfc_get_device(idx);   | device_lock(...)
if (!dev)                    | dev->shutting_down = true;
    return -ENODEV;          | device_unlock(...);
                             |
device_lock(...);            |   // nfc_llcp_unregister_device
                             |   nfc_llcp_find_local()
nfc_llcp_find_local(...);    |
                             |   local_cleanup()
if (!local) {                |
    rc = -ENODEV;            |     // nfc_llcp_local_put
    goto exit;               |     kref_put(.., local_release)
}                            |
                             |       // local_release
                             |       list_del(&local->list)
  // nfc_genl_send_params    |       kfree()
  local->dev->idx !!!UAF!!!  |
                             |

and the crash trace for the one of the discussed UAF like:

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in nfc_genl_llc_get_params+0x72f/0x780  net/nfc/netlink.c:1045
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888105b0e410 by task 20114

Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __dump_stack  lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0x72/0xa0  lib/dump_stack.c:106
 print_address_description  mm/kasan/report.c:319 [inline]
 print_report+0xcc/0x620  mm/kasan/report.c:430
 kasan_report+0xb2/0xe0  mm/kasan/report.c:536
 nfc_genl_send_params  net/nfc/netlink.c:999 [inline]
 nfc_genl_llc_get_params+0x72f/0x780  net/nfc/netlink.c:1045
 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.0+0x1ee/0x2e0  net/netlink/genetlink.c:968
 genl_family_rcv_msg  net/netlink/genetlink.c:1048 [inline]
 genl_rcv_msg+0x503/0x7d0  net/netlink/genetlink.c:1065
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x161/0x430  net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2548
 genl_rcv+0x28/0x40  net/netlink/genetlink.c:1076
 netlink_unicast_kernel  net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1339 [inline]
 netlink_unicast+0x644/0x900  net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1365
 netlink_sendmsg+0x934/0xe70  net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1913
 sock_sendmsg_nosec  net/socket.c:724 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0x1b6/0x200  net/socket.c:747
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x6e9/0x890  net/socket.c:2501
 ___sys_sendmsg+0x110/0x1b0  net/socket.c:2555
 __sys_sendmsg+0xf7/0x1d0  net/socket.c:2584
 do_syscall_x64  arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90  arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
RIP: 0033:0x7f34640a2389
RSP: 002b:00007f3463415168 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f34641c1f80 RCX: 00007f34640a2389
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000240 RDI: 0000000000000006
RBP: 00007f34640ed493 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007ffe38449ecf R14: 00007f3463415300 R15: 0000000000022000
 </TASK>

Allocated by task 20116:
 kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50  mm/kasan/common.c:45
 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30  mm/kasan/common.c:52
 ____kasan_kmalloc  mm/kasan/common.c:374 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc+0x7f/0x90  mm/kasan/common.c:383
 kmalloc  include/linux/slab.h:580 [inline]
 kzalloc  include/linux/slab.h:720 [inline]
 nfc_llcp_register_device+0x49/0xa40  net/nfc/llcp_core.c:1567
 nfc_register_device+0x61/0x260  net/nfc/core.c:1124
 nci_register_device+0x776/0xb20  net/nfc/nci/core.c:1257
 virtual_ncidev_open+0x147/0x230  drivers/nfc/virtual_ncidev.c:148
 misc_open+0x379/0x4a0  drivers/char/misc.c:165
 chrdev_open+0x26c/0x780  fs/char_dev.c:414
 do_dentry_open+0x6c4/0x12a0  fs/open.c:920
 do_open  fs/namei.c:3560 [inline]
 path_openat+0x24fe/0x37e0  fs/namei.c:3715
 do_filp_open+0x1ba/0x410  fs/namei.c:3742
 do_sys_openat2+0x171/0x4c0  fs/open.c:1356
 do_sys_open  fs/open.c:1372 [inline]
 __do_sys_openat  fs/open.c:1388 [inline]
 __se_sys_openat  fs/open.c:1383 [inline]
 __x64_sys_openat+0x143/0x200  fs/open.c:1383
 do_syscall_x64  arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90  arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc

Freed by task 20115:
 kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50  mm/kasan/common.c:45
 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30  mm/kasan/common.c:52
 kasan_save_free_info+0x2e/0x50  mm/kasan/generic.c:521
 ____kasan_slab_free  mm/kasan/common.c:236 [inline]
 ____kasan_slab_free  mm/kasan/common.c:200 [inline]
 __kasan_slab_free+0x10a/0x190  mm/kasan/common.c:244
 kasan_slab_free  include/linux/kasan.h:162 [inline]
 slab_free_hook  mm/slub.c:1781 [inline]
 slab_free_freelist_hook  mm/slub.c:1807 [inline]
 slab_free  mm/slub.c:3787 [inline]
 __kmem_cache_free+0x7a/0x190  mm/slub.c:3800
 local_release  net/nfc/llcp_core.c:174 [inline]
 kref_put  include/linux/kref.h:65 [inline]
 nfc_llcp_local_put  net/nfc/llcp_core.c:182 [inline]
 nfc_llcp_local_put  net/nfc/llcp_core.c:177 [inline]
 nfc_llcp_unregister_device+0x206/0x290  net/nfc/llcp_core.c:1620
 nfc_unregister_device+0x160/0x1d0  net/nfc/core.c:1179
 virtual_ncidev_close+0x52/0xa0  drivers/nfc/virtual_ncidev.c:163
 __fput+0x252/0xa20  fs/file_table.c:321
 task_work_run+0x174/0x270  kernel/task_work.c:179
 resume_user_mode_work  include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:49 [inline]
 exit_to_user_mode_loop  kernel/entry/common.c:171 [inline]
 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x108/0x110  kernel/entry/common.c:204
 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work  kernel/entry/common.c:286 [inline]
 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x21/0x50  kernel/entry/common.c:297
 do_syscall_64+0x4c/0x90  arch/x86/entry/common.c:86
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc

Last potentially related work creation:
 kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50  mm/kasan/common.c:45
 __kasan_record_aux_stack+0x95/0xb0  mm/kasan/generic.c:491
 kvfree_call_rcu+0x29/0xa80  kernel/rcu/tree.c:3328
 drop_sysctl_table+0x3be/0x4e0  fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:1735
 unregister_sysctl_table.part.0+0x9c/0x190  fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:1773
 unregister_sysctl_table+0x24/0x30  fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:1753
 neigh_sysctl_unregister+0x5f/0x80  net/core/neighbour.c:3895
 addrconf_notify+0x140/0x17b0  net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3684
 notifier_call_chain+0xbe/0x210  kernel/notifier.c:87
 call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0xb5/0x150  net/core/dev.c:1937
 call_netdevice_notifiers_extack  net/core/dev.c:1975 [inline]
 call_netdevice_notifiers  net/core/dev.c:1989 [inline]
 dev_change_name+0x3c3/0x870  net/core/dev.c:1211
 dev_ifsioc+0x800/0xf70  net/core/dev_ioctl.c:376
 dev_ioctl+0x3d9/0xf80  net/core/dev_ioctl.c:542
 sock_do_ioctl+0x160/0x260  net/socket.c:1213
 sock_ioctl+0x3f9/0x670  net/socket.c:1316
 vfs_ioctl  fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
 __do_sys_ioctl  fs/ioctl.c:870 [inline]
 __se_sys_ioctl  fs/ioctl.c:856 [inline]
 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x19e/0x210  fs/ioctl.c:856
 do_syscall_x64  arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90  arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888105b0e400
 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024
The buggy address is located 16 bytes inside of
 freed 1024-byte region [ffff888105b0e400, ffff888105b0e800)

The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
head:ffffea000416c200 order:3 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0
flags: 0x200000000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=2)
raw: 0200000000010200 ffff8881000430c0 ffffea00044c7010 ffffea0004510e10
raw: 0000000000000000 00000000000a000a 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff888105b0e300: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ffff888105b0e380: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff888105b0e400: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                         ^
 ffff888105b0e480: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
 ffff888105b0e500: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb

In summary, this patch solves those use-after-free by

1. Re-implement the nfc_llcp_find_local(). The current version does not
grab the reference when getting the local from the linked list.  For
example, the llcp_sock_bind() gets the reference like below:

// llcp_sock_bind()

    local = nfc_llcp_find_local(dev); // A
    ..... \
           | raceable
    ..... /
    llcp_sock->local = nfc_llcp_local_get(local); // B

There is an apparent race window that one can  drop the reference
and free the local object fetched in (A) before (B) gets the reference.

2. Some callers of the nfc_llcp_find_local() do not grab the reference
at all. For example, the nfc_genl_llc_{{get/set}_params/sdreq} functions.
We add the nfc_llcp_local_put() for them. Moreover, we add the necessary
error handling function to put the reference.

3. Add the nfc_llcp_remove_local() helper. The local object is removed
from the linked list in local_release() when all reference is gone. This
patch removes it when nfc_llcp_unregister_device() is called.

Therefore, every caller of nfc_llcp_find_local() will get a reference
even when the nfc_llcp_unregister_device() is called. This promises no
use-after-free for the local object is ever possible.

Fixes: 52feb444a903 ("NFC: Extend netlink interface for LTO, RW, and MIUX parameters support")
Fixes: c7aa12252f51 ("NFC: Take a reference on the LLCP local pointer when creating a socket")
Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-07-23 13:46:56 +02:00
Krzysztof Kozlowski
60ec0058c7 nfc: llcp: simplify llcp_sock_connect() error paths
[ Upstream commit ec10fd154d934cc4195da3cbd017a12817b41d51 ]

The llcp_sock_connect() error paths were using a mixed way of central
exit (goto) and cleanup

Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Stable-dep-of: 6709d4b7bc2e ("net: nfc: Fix use-after-free caused by nfc_llcp_find_local")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-07-23 13:46:56 +02:00
Eric Dumazet
619384319b netlink: do not hard code device address lenth in fdb dumps
[ Upstream commit aa5406950726e336c5c9585b09799a734b6e77bf ]

syzbot reports that some netdev devices do not have a six bytes
address [1]

Replace ETH_ALEN by dev->addr_len.

[1] (Case of a device where dev->addr_len = 4)

BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:114 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in copyout+0xb8/0x100 lib/iov_iter.c:169
instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:114 [inline]
copyout+0xb8/0x100 lib/iov_iter.c:169
_copy_to_iter+0x6d8/0x1d00 lib/iov_iter.c:536
copy_to_iter include/linux/uio.h:206 [inline]
simple_copy_to_iter+0x68/0xa0 net/core/datagram.c:513
__skb_datagram_iter+0x123/0xdc0 net/core/datagram.c:419
skb_copy_datagram_iter+0x5c/0x200 net/core/datagram.c:527
skb_copy_datagram_msg include/linux/skbuff.h:3960 [inline]
netlink_recvmsg+0x4ae/0x15a0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1970
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1019 [inline]
sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:1040 [inline]
____sys_recvmsg+0x283/0x7f0 net/socket.c:2722
___sys_recvmsg+0x223/0x840 net/socket.c:2764
do_recvmmsg+0x4f9/0xfd0 net/socket.c:2858
__sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2937 [inline]
__do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2960 [inline]
__se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2953 [inline]
__x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x397/0x490 net/socket.c:2953
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Uninit was stored to memory at:
__nla_put lib/nlattr.c:1009 [inline]
nla_put+0x1c6/0x230 lib/nlattr.c:1067
nlmsg_populate_fdb_fill+0x2b8/0x600 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4071
nlmsg_populate_fdb net/core/rtnetlink.c:4418 [inline]
ndo_dflt_fdb_dump+0x616/0x840 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4456
rtnl_fdb_dump+0x14ff/0x1fc0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4629
netlink_dump+0x9d1/0x1310 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2268
netlink_recvmsg+0xc5c/0x15a0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1995
sock_recvmsg_nosec+0x7a/0x120 net/socket.c:1019
____sys_recvmsg+0x664/0x7f0 net/socket.c:2720
___sys_recvmsg+0x223/0x840 net/socket.c:2764
do_recvmmsg+0x4f9/0xfd0 net/socket.c:2858
__sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2937 [inline]
__do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2960 [inline]
__se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2953 [inline]
__x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x397/0x490 net/socket.c:2953
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Uninit was created at:
slab_post_alloc_hook+0x12d/0xb60 mm/slab.h:716
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3451 [inline]
__kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x4ff/0x8b0 mm/slub.c:3490
kmalloc_trace+0x51/0x200 mm/slab_common.c:1057
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:559 [inline]
__hw_addr_create net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:60 [inline]
__hw_addr_add_ex+0x2e5/0x9e0 net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:118
__dev_mc_add net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:867 [inline]
dev_mc_add+0x9a/0x130 net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:885
igmp6_group_added+0x267/0xbc0 net/ipv6/mcast.c:680
ipv6_mc_up+0x296/0x3b0 net/ipv6/mcast.c:2754
ipv6_mc_remap+0x1e/0x30 net/ipv6/mcast.c:2708
addrconf_type_change net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3731 [inline]
addrconf_notify+0x4d3/0x1d90 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3699
notifier_call_chain kernel/notifier.c:93 [inline]
raw_notifier_call_chain+0xe4/0x430 kernel/notifier.c:461
call_netdevice_notifiers_info net/core/dev.c:1935 [inline]
call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:1973 [inline]
call_netdevice_notifiers+0x1ee/0x2d0 net/core/dev.c:1987
bond_enslave+0xccd/0x53f0 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:1906
do_set_master net/core/rtnetlink.c:2626 [inline]
rtnl_newlink_create net/core/rtnetlink.c:3460 [inline]
__rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3660 [inline]
rtnl_newlink+0x378c/0x40e0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3673
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x16a6/0x1840 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6395
netlink_rcv_skb+0x371/0x650 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2546
rtnetlink_rcv+0x34/0x40 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6413
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1339 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0xf28/0x1230 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1365
netlink_sendmsg+0x122f/0x13d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1913
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:724 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:747 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x999/0xd50 net/socket.c:2503
___sys_sendmsg+0x28d/0x3c0 net/socket.c:2557
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2586 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2595 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2593 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x304/0x490 net/socket.c:2593
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Bytes 2856-2857 of 3500 are uninitialized
Memory access of size 3500 starts at ffff888018d99104
Data copied to user address 0000000020000480

Fixes: d83b06036048 ("net: add fdb generic dump routine")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@nvidia.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230621174720.1845040-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-07-23 13:46:55 +02:00
Eric Dumazet
a641240b7e netlink: fix potential deadlock in netlink_set_err()
[ Upstream commit 8d61f926d42045961e6b65191c09e3678d86a9cf ]

syzbot reported a possible deadlock in netlink_set_err() [1]

A similar issue was fixed in commit 1d482e666b8e ("netlink: disable IRQs
for netlink_lock_table()") in netlink_lock_table()

This patch adds IRQ safety to netlink_set_err() and __netlink_diag_dump()
which were not covered by cited commit.

[1]

WARNING: possible irq lock inversion dependency detected
6.4.0-rc6-syzkaller-00240-g4e9f0ec38852 #0 Not tainted

syz-executor.2/23011 just changed the state of lock:
ffffffff8e1a7a58 (nl_table_lock){.+.?}-{2:2}, at: netlink_set_err+0x2e/0x3a0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1612
but this lock was taken by another, SOFTIRQ-safe lock in the past:
 (&local->queue_stop_reason_lock){..-.}-{2:2}

and interrupts could create inverse lock ordering between them.

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(nl_table_lock);
                               local_irq_disable();
                               lock(&local->queue_stop_reason_lock);
                               lock(nl_table_lock);
  <Interrupt>
    lock(&local->queue_stop_reason_lock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

Fixes: 1d482e666b8e ("netlink: disable IRQs for netlink_lock_table()")
Reported-by: syzbot+a7d200a347f912723e5c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=a7d200a347f912723e5c
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/000000000000e38d1605fea5747e@google.com/T/#u
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230621154337.1668594-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-07-23 13:46:55 +02:00
Gilad Sever
4bc4797017 bpf: Fix bpf socket lookup from tc/xdp to respect socket VRF bindings
[ Upstream commit 9a5cb79762e0eda17ca15c2a6eaca4622383c21c ]

When calling bpf_sk_lookup_tcp(), bpf_sk_lookup_udp() or
bpf_skc_lookup_tcp() from tc/xdp ingress, VRF socket bindings aren't
respoected, i.e. unbound sockets are returned, and bound sockets aren't
found.

VRF binding is determined by the sdif argument to sk_lookup(), however
when called from tc the IP SKB control block isn't initialized and thus
inet{,6}_sdif() always returns 0.

Fix by calculating sdif for the tc/xdp flows by observing the device's
l3 enslaved state.

The cg/sk_skb hooking points which are expected to support
inet{,6}_sdif() pass sdif=-1 which makes __bpf_skc_lookup() use the
existing logic.

Fixes: 6acc9b432e67 ("bpf: Add helper to retrieve socket in BPF")
Signed-off-by: Gilad Sever <gilad9366@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Shmulik Ladkani <shmulik.ladkani@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Eyal Birger <eyal.birger@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230621104211.301902-4-gilad9366@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-07-23 13:46:54 +02:00
Gilad Sever
a254e029b7 bpf: Call __bpf_sk_lookup()/__bpf_skc_lookup() directly via TC hookpoint
[ Upstream commit 97fbfeb86917bdbe9c41d5143e335a929147f405 ]

skb->dev always exists in the tc flow. There is no need to use
bpf_skc_lookup(), bpf_sk_lookup() from this code path.

This change facilitates fixing the tc flow to be VRF aware.

Signed-off-by: Gilad Sever <gilad9366@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Shmulik Ladkani <shmulik.ladkani@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Eyal Birger <eyal.birger@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230621104211.301902-3-gilad9366@gmail.com
Stable-dep-of: 9a5cb79762e0 ("bpf: Fix bpf socket lookup from tc/xdp to respect socket VRF bindings")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-07-23 13:46:54 +02:00
Gilad Sever
9eb2651c67 bpf: Factor out socket lookup functions for the TC hookpoint.
[ Upstream commit 6e98730bc0b44acaf86eccc75f823128aa9c9e79 ]

Change BPF helper socket lookup functions to use TC specific variants:
bpf_tc_sk_lookup_tcp() / bpf_tc_sk_lookup_udp() / bpf_tc_skc_lookup_tcp()
instead of sharing implementation with the cg / sk_skb hooking points.
This allows introducing a separate logic for the TC flow.

The tc functions are identical to the original code.

Signed-off-by: Gilad Sever <gilad9366@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Shmulik Ladkani <shmulik.ladkani@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Eyal Birger <eyal.birger@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230621104211.301902-2-gilad9366@gmail.com
Stable-dep-of: 9a5cb79762e0 ("bpf: Fix bpf socket lookup from tc/xdp to respect socket VRF bindings")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-07-23 13:46:54 +02:00
Tobias Klauser
a66cce0339 bpf: Omit superfluous address family check in __bpf_skc_lookup
[ Upstream commit 2064a132c0de3426d5ba43023200994e0c77e652 ]

family is only set to either AF_INET or AF_INET6 based on len. In all
other cases we return early. Thus the check against AF_UNSPEC can be
omitted.

Signed-off-by: Tobias Klauser <tklauser@distanz.ch>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220630082618.15649-1-tklauser@distanz.ch
Stable-dep-of: 9a5cb79762e0 ("bpf: Fix bpf socket lookup from tc/xdp to respect socket VRF bindings")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-07-23 13:46:54 +02:00
Benjamin Berg
365cd15e8f wifi: cfg80211: rewrite merging of inherited elements
[ Upstream commit dfd9aa3e7a456d57b18021d66472ab7ff8373ab7 ]

The cfg80211_gen_new_ie function merges the IEs using inheritance rules.
Rewrite this function to fix issues around inheritance rules. In
particular, vendor elements do not require any special handling, as they
are either all inherited or overridden by the subprofile.
Also, add fragmentation handling as this may be needed in some cases.

This also changes the function to not require making a copy. The new
version could be optimized a bit by explicitly tracking which IEs have
been handled already rather than looking that up again every time.

Note that a small behavioural change is the removal of the SSID special
handling. This should be fine for the MBSSID element, as the SSID must
be included in the subelement.

Fixes: 0b8fb8235be8 ("cfg80211: Parsing of Multiple BSSID information in scanning")
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Berg <benjamin.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gregory Greenman <gregory.greenman@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230616094949.bc6152e146db.I2b5f3bc45085e1901e5b5192a674436adaf94748@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-07-23 13:46:53 +02:00
Edwin Peer
a572c6852b rtnetlink: extend RTEXT_FILTER_SKIP_STATS to IFLA_VF_INFO
[ Upstream commit fa0e21fa44438a0e856d42224bfa24641d37b979 ]

This filter already exists for excluding IPv6 SNMP stats. Extend its
definition to also exclude IFLA_VF_INFO stats in RTM_GETLINK.

This patch constitutes a partial fix for a netlink attribute nesting
overflow bug in IFLA_VFINFO_LIST. By excluding the stats when the
requester doesn't need them, the truncation of the VF list is avoided.

While it was technically only the stats added in commit c5a9f6f0ab40
("net/core: Add drop counters to VF statistics") breaking the camel's
back, the appreciable size of the stats data should never have been
included without due consideration for the maximum number of VFs
supported by PCI.

Fixes: 3b766cd83232 ("net/core: Add reading VF statistics through the PF netdevice")
Fixes: c5a9f6f0ab40 ("net/core: Add drop counters to VF statistics")
Signed-off-by: Edwin Peer <edwin.peer@broadcom.com>
Cc: Edwin Peer <espeer@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Gal Pressman <gal@nvidia.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230611105108.122586-1-gal@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-07-23 13:46:53 +02:00
Krzysztof Kozlowski
e7e0b6e066 nfc: llcp: fix possible use of uninitialized variable in nfc_llcp_send_connect()
[ Upstream commit 0d9b41daa5907756a31772d8af8ac5ff25cf17c1 ]

If sock->service_name is NULL, the local variable
service_name_tlv_length will not be assigned by nfc_llcp_build_tlv(),
later leading to using value frmo the stack.  Smatch warning:

  net/nfc/llcp_commands.c:442 nfc_llcp_send_connect() error: uninitialized symbol 'service_name_tlv_length'.

Fixes: de9e5aeb4f40 ("NFC: llcp: Fix usage of llcp_add_tlv()")
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-07-23 13:46:50 +02:00
Alexander Mikhalitsyn
3e7ee33b95 sctp: add bpf_bypass_getsockopt proto callback
[ Upstream commit 2598619e012cee5273a2821441b9a051ad931249 ]

Implement ->bpf_bypass_getsockopt proto callback and filter out
SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF, SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF_FLAGS and SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX3
socket options from running eBPF hook on them.

SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF and SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF_FLAGS options do fd_install(),
and if BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_GETSOCKOPT hook returns an error after success of
the original handler sctp_getsockopt(...), userspace will receive an error
from getsockopt syscall and will be not aware that fd was successfully
installed into a fdtable.

As pointed by Marcelo Ricardo Leitner it seems reasonable to skip
bpf getsockopt hook for SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX3 sockopt too.
Because internaly, it triggers connect() and if error is masked
then userspace will be confused.

This patch was born as a result of discussion around a new SCM_PIDFD interface:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230413133355.350571-3-aleksandr.mikhalitsyn@canonical.com/

Fixes: 0d01da6afc54 ("bpf: implement getsockopt and setsockopt hooks")
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Cc: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Cc: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
Acked-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Mikhalitsyn <aleksandr.mikhalitsyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-07-23 13:46:49 +02:00
Chuck Lever
f222873711 svcrdma: Prevent page release when nothing was received
[ Upstream commit baf6d18b116b7dc84ed5e212c3a89f17cdc3f28c ]

I noticed that svc_rqst_release_pages() was still unnecessarily
releasing a page when svc_rdma_recvfrom() returns zero.

Fixes: a53d5cb0646a ("svcrdma: Avoid releasing a page in svc_xprt_release()")
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-07-23 13:46:45 +02:00
Pablo Neira Ayuso
25aa2ad37c netfilter: nf_tables: drop map element references from preparation phase
commit 628bd3e49cba1c066228e23d71a852c23e26da73 upstream.

set .destroy callback releases the references to other objects in maps.
This is very late and it results in spurious EBUSY errors. Drop refcount
from the preparation phase instead, update set backend not to drop
reference counter from set .destroy path.

Exceptions: NFT_TRANS_PREPARE_ERROR does not require to drop the
reference counter because the transaction abort path releases the map
references for each element since the set is unbound. The abort path
also deals with releasing reference counter for new elements added to
unbound sets.

Fixes: 591054469b3e ("netfilter: nf_tables: revisit chain/object refcounting from elements")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-07-23 13:46:44 +02:00
Oliver Hartkopp
d874cf9799 can: isotp: isotp_sendmsg(): fix return error fix on TX path
commit e38910c0072b541a91954682c8b074a93e57c09b upstream.

With commit d674a8f123b4 ("can: isotp: isotp_sendmsg(): fix return
error on FC timeout on TX path") the missing correct return value in
the case of a protocol error was introduced.

But the way the error value has been read and sent to the user space
does not follow the common scheme to clear the error after reading
which is provided by the sock_error() function. This leads to an error
report at the following write() attempt although everything should be
working.

Fixes: d674a8f123b4 ("can: isotp: isotp_sendmsg(): fix return error on FC timeout on TX path")
Reported-by: Carsten Schmidt <carsten.schmidt-achim@t-online.de>
Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230607072708.38809-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-07-05 18:25:05 +01:00
Paolo Abeni
b46021ab83 mptcp: consolidate fallback and non fallback state machine
commit 81c1d029016001f994ce1c46849c5e9900d8eab8 upstream.

An orphaned msk releases the used resources via the worker,
when the latter first see the msk in CLOSED status.

If the msk status transitions to TCP_CLOSE in the release callback
invoked by the worker's final release_sock(), such instance of the
workqueue will not take any action.

Additionally the MPTCP code prevents scheduling the worker once the
socket reaches the CLOSE status: such msk resources will be leaked.

The only code path that can trigger the above scenario is the
__mptcp_check_send_data_fin() in fallback mode.

Address the issue removing the special handling of fallback socket
in __mptcp_check_send_data_fin(), consolidating the state machine
for fallback and non fallback socket.

Since non-fallback sockets do not send and do not receive data_fin,
the mptcp code can update the msk internal status to match the next
step in the SM every time data fin (ack) should be generated or
received.

As a consequence we can remove a bunch of checks for fallback from
the fastpath.

Fixes: 6e628cd3a8f7 ("mptcp: use mptcp release_cb for delayed tasks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mat Martineau <martineau@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-07-05 18:25:04 +01:00
Paolo Abeni
42ff95b4bd mptcp: fix possible divide by zero in recvmsg()
commit 0ad529d9fd2bfa3fc619552a8d2fb2f2ef0bce2e upstream.

Christoph reported a divide by zero bug in mptcp_recvmsg():

divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
CPU: 1 PID: 19978 Comm: syz-executor.6 Not tainted 6.4.0-rc2-gffcc7899081b #20
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-2.el7 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:__tcp_select_window+0x30e/0x420 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:3018
Code: 11 ff 0f b7 cd c1 e9 0c b8 ff ff ff ff d3 e0 89 c1 f7 d1 01 cb 21 c3 eb 17 e8 2e 83 11 ff 31 db eb 0e e8 25 83 11 ff 89 d8 99 <f7> 7c 24 04 29 d3 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 3b 44 24 10 75 60
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000a07a18 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 000000000000ffd7 RBX: 000000000000ffd7 RCX: 0000000000040000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000003ffff RDI: 0000000000040000
RBP: 000000000000ffd7 R08: ffffffff820cf297 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff8103d1a0 R12: 0000000000003f00
R13: 0000000000300000 R14: ffff888101cf3540 R15: 0000000000180000
FS:  00007f9af4c09640(0000) GS:ffff88813bd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000001b33824000 CR3: 000000012f241001 CR4: 0000000000170ee0
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __tcp_cleanup_rbuf+0x138/0x1d0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1611
 mptcp_recvmsg+0xcb8/0xdd0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2034
 inet_recvmsg+0x127/0x1f0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:861
 ____sys_recvmsg+0x269/0x2b0 net/socket.c:1019
 ___sys_recvmsg+0xe6/0x260 net/socket.c:2764
 do_recvmmsg+0x1a5/0x470 net/socket.c:2858
 __do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2937 [inline]
 __se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2953 [inline]
 __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0xa6/0x130 net/socket.c:2953
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x47/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
RIP: 0033:0x7f9af58fc6a9
Code: 5c c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 4f 37 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f9af4c08cd8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000012b
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000006bc050 RCX: 00007f9af58fc6a9
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020000140 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000f00 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000006bc05c
R13: fffffffffffffea8 R14: 00000000006bc050 R15: 000000000001fe40
 </TASK>

mptcp_recvmsg is allowed to release the msk socket lock when
blocking, and before re-acquiring it another thread could have
switched the sock to TCP_LISTEN status - with a prior
connect(AF_UNSPEC) - also clearing icsk_ack.rcv_mss.

Address the issue preventing the disconnect if some other process is
concurrently performing a blocking syscall on the same socket, alike
commit 4faeee0cf8a5 ("tcp: deny tcp_disconnect() when threads are waiting").

Fixes: a6b118febbab ("mptcp: add receive buffer auto-tuning")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@apple.com>
Closes: https://github.com/multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next/issues/404
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@apple.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-07-05 18:25:04 +01:00
Eric Dumazet
c1a2b52d99 sch_netem: acquire qdisc lock in netem_change()
[ Upstream commit 2174a08db80d1efeea382e25ac41c4e7511eb6d6 ]

syzbot managed to trigger a divide error [1] in netem.

It could happen if q->rate changes while netem_enqueue()
is running, since q->rate is read twice.

It turns out netem_change() always lacked proper synchronization.

[1]
divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
CPU: 1 PID: 7867 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 6.1.30-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/25/2023
RIP: 0010:div64_u64 include/linux/math64.h:69 [inline]
RIP: 0010:packet_time_ns net/sched/sch_netem.c:357 [inline]
RIP: 0010:netem_enqueue+0x2067/0x36d0 net/sched/sch_netem.c:576
Code: 89 e2 48 69 da 00 ca 9a 3b 42 80 3c 28 00 4c 8b a4 24 88 00 00 00 74 0d 4c 89 e7 e8 c3 4f 3b fd 48 8b 4c 24 18 48 89 d8 31 d2 <49> f7 34 24 49 01 c7 4c 8b 64 24 48 4d 01 f7 4c 89 e3 48 c1 eb 03
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000dccea60 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 000001a442624200 RBX: 000001a442624200 RCX: ffff888108a4f000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000070d RDI: 000000000000070d
RBP: ffffc9000dcceb90 R08: ffffffff849c5e26 R09: fffffbfff10e1297
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: dffffc0000000001 R12: ffff888108a4f358
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: 0000001a8cd9a7ec R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007fa73fe18700(0000) GS:ffff8881f6b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fa73fdf7718 CR3: 000000011d36e000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
[<ffffffff84714385>] __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3931 [inline]
[<ffffffff84714385>] __dev_queue_xmit+0xcf5/0x3370 net/core/dev.c:4290
[<ffffffff84d22df2>] dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3030 [inline]
[<ffffffff84d22df2>] neigh_hh_output include/net/neighbour.h:531 [inline]
[<ffffffff84d22df2>] neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:545 [inline]
[<ffffffff84d22df2>] ip_finish_output2+0xb92/0x10d0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:235
[<ffffffff84d21e63>] __ip_finish_output+0xc3/0x2b0
[<ffffffff84d10a81>] ip_finish_output+0x31/0x2a0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:323
[<ffffffff84d10f14>] NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:298 [inline]
[<ffffffff84d10f14>] ip_output+0x224/0x2a0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:437
[<ffffffff84d123b5>] dst_output include/net/dst.h:444 [inline]
[<ffffffff84d123b5>] ip_local_out net/ipv4/ip_output.c:127 [inline]
[<ffffffff84d123b5>] __ip_queue_xmit+0x1425/0x2000 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:542
[<ffffffff84d12fdc>] ip_queue_xmit+0x4c/0x70 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:556

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Cc: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Reviewed-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230620184425.1179809-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-06-28 10:29:50 +02:00
Pablo Neira Ayuso
57130334da netfilter: nfnetlink_osf: fix module autoload
[ Upstream commit 62f9a68a36d4441a6c412b81faed102594bc6670 ]

Move the alias from xt_osf to nfnetlink_osf.

Fixes: f9324952088f ("netfilter: nfnetlink_osf: extract nfnetlink_subsystem code from xt_osf.c")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-06-28 10:29:49 +02:00
Pablo Neira Ayuso
53defc6ecf netfilter: nf_tables: disallow updates of anonymous sets
[ Upstream commit b770283c98e0eee9133c47bc03b6cc625dc94723 ]

Disallow updates of set timeout and garbage collection parameters for
anonymous sets.

Fixes: 123b99619cca ("netfilter: nf_tables: honor set timeout and garbage collection updates")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-06-28 10:29:49 +02:00
Pablo Neira Ayuso
2f2f9eaa6d netfilter: nf_tables: reject unbound chain set before commit phase
[ Upstream commit 62e1e94b246e685d89c3163aaef4b160e42ceb02 ]

Use binding list to track set transaction and to check for unbound
chains before entering the commit phase.

Bail out if chain binding remain unused before entering the commit
step.

Fixes: d0e2c7de92c7 ("netfilter: nf_tables: add NFT_CHAIN_BINDING")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-06-28 10:29:49 +02:00
Pablo Neira Ayuso
2938e7d582 netfilter: nf_tables: reject unbound anonymous set before commit phase
[ Upstream commit 938154b93be8cd611ddfd7bafc1849f3c4355201 ]

Add a new list to track set transaction and to check for unbound
anonymous sets before entering the commit phase.

Bail out at the end of the transaction handling if an anonymous set
remains unbound.

Fixes: 96518518cc41 ("netfilter: add nftables")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-06-28 10:29:49 +02:00
Pablo Neira Ayuso
baa3ec1b31 netfilter: nf_tables: disallow element updates of bound anonymous sets
[ Upstream commit c88c535b592d3baeee74009f3eceeeaf0fdd5e1b ]

Anonymous sets come with NFT_SET_CONSTANT from userspace. Although API
allows to create anonymous sets without NFT_SET_CONSTANT, it makes no
sense to allow to add and to delete elements for bound anonymous sets.

Fixes: 96518518cc41 ("netfilter: add nftables")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-06-28 10:29:49 +02:00
Pablo Neira Ayuso
45eb6944d0 netfilter: nft_set_pipapo: .walk does not deal with generations
[ Upstream commit 2b84e215f87443c74ac0aa7f76bb172d43a87033 ]

The .walk callback iterates over the current active set, but it might be
useful to iterate over the next generation set. Use the generation mask
to determine what set view (either current or next generation) is use
for the walk iteration.

Fixes: 3c4287f62044 ("nf_tables: Add set type for arbitrary concatenation of ranges")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-06-28 10:29:48 +02:00
Pablo Neira Ayuso
4004f12aac netfilter: nf_tables: add NFT_TRANS_PREPARE_ERROR to deal with bound set/chain
[ Upstream commit 26b5a5712eb85e253724e56a54c17f8519bd8e4e ]

Add a new state to deal with rule expressions deactivation from the
newrule error path, otherwise the anonymous set remains in the list in
inactive state for the next generation. Mark the set/chain transaction
as unbound so the abort path releases this object, set it as inactive in
the next generation so it is not reachable anymore from this transaction
and reference counter is dropped.

Fixes: 1240eb93f061 ("netfilter: nf_tables: incorrect error path handling with NFT_MSG_NEWRULE")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-06-28 10:29:48 +02:00
Pablo Neira Ayuso
314a8697d0 netfilter: nf_tables: fix chain binding transaction logic
[ Upstream commit 4bedf9eee016286c835e3d8fa981ddece5338795 ]

Add bound flag to rule and chain transactions as in 6a0a8d10a366
("netfilter: nf_tables: use-after-free in failing rule with bound set")
to skip them in case that the chain is already bound from the abort
path.

This patch fixes an imbalance in the chain use refcnt that triggers a
WARN_ON on the table and chain destroy path.

This patch also disallows nested chain bindings, which is not
supported from userspace.

The logic to deal with chain binding in nft_data_hold() and
nft_data_release() is not correct. The NFT_TRANS_PREPARE state needs a
special handling in case a chain is bound but next expressions in the
same rule fail to initialize as described by 1240eb93f061 ("netfilter:
nf_tables: incorrect error path handling with NFT_MSG_NEWRULE").

The chain is left bound if rule construction fails, so the objects
stored in this chain (and the chain itself) are released by the
transaction records from the abort path, follow up patch ("netfilter:
nf_tables: add NFT_TRANS_PREPARE_ERROR to deal with bound set/chain")
completes this error handling.

When deleting an existing rule, chain bound flag is set off so the
rule expression .destroy path releases the objects.

Fixes: d0e2c7de92c7 ("netfilter: nf_tables: add NFT_CHAIN_BINDING")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-06-28 10:29:48 +02:00
Terin Stock
efea112a87 ipvs: align inner_mac_header for encapsulation
[ Upstream commit d7fce52fdf96663ddc2eb21afecff3775588612a ]

When using encapsulation the original packet's headers are copied to the
inner headers. This preserves the space for an inner mac header, which
is not used by the inner payloads for the encapsulation types supported
by IPVS. If a packet is using GUE or GRE encapsulation and needs to be
segmented, flow can be passed to __skb_udp_tunnel_segment() which
calculates a negative tunnel header length. A negative tunnel header
length causes pskb_may_pull() to fail, dropping the packet.

This can be observed by attaching probes to ip_vs_in_hook(),
__dev_queue_xmit(), and __skb_udp_tunnel_segment():

    perf probe --add '__dev_queue_xmit skb->inner_mac_header \
    skb->inner_network_header skb->mac_header skb->network_header'
    perf probe --add '__skb_udp_tunnel_segment:7 tnl_hlen'
    perf probe -m ip_vs --add 'ip_vs_in_hook skb->inner_mac_header \
    skb->inner_network_header skb->mac_header skb->network_header'

These probes the headers and tunnel header length for packets which
traverse the IPVS encapsulation path. A TCP packet can be forced into
the segmentation path by being smaller than a calculated clamped MSS,
but larger than the advertised MSS.

    probe:ip_vs_in_hook: inner_mac_header=0x0 inner_network_header=0x0 mac_header=0x44 network_header=0x52
    probe:ip_vs_in_hook: inner_mac_header=0x44 inner_network_header=0x52 mac_header=0x44 network_header=0x32
    probe:dev_queue_xmit: inner_mac_header=0x44 inner_network_header=0x52 mac_header=0x44 network_header=0x32
    probe:__skb_udp_tunnel_segment_L7: tnl_hlen=-2

When using veth-based encapsulation, the interfaces are set to be
mac-less, which does not preserve space for an inner mac header. This
prevents this issue from occurring.

In our real-world testing of sending a 32KB file we observed operation
time increasing from ~75ms for veth-based encapsulation to over 1.5s
using IPVS encapsulation due to retries from dropped packets.

This changeset modifies the packet on the encapsulation path in
ip_vs_tunnel_xmit() and ip_vs_tunnel_xmit_v6() to remove the inner mac
header offset. This fixes UDP segmentation for both encapsulation types,
and corrects the inner headers for any IPIP flows that may use it.

Fixes: 84c0d5e96f3a ("ipvs: allow tunneling with gue encapsulation")
Signed-off-by: Terin Stock <terin@cloudflare.com>
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Acked-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-06-28 10:29:48 +02:00
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
156dd06fb3 xfrm: Linearize the skb after offloading if needed.
[ Upstream commit f015b900bc3285322029b4a7d132d6aeb0e51857 ]

With offloading enabled, esp_xmit() gets invoked very late, from within
validate_xmit_xfrm() which is after validate_xmit_skb() validates and
linearizes the skb if the underlying device does not support fragments.

esp_output_tail() may add a fragment to the skb while adding the auth
tag/ IV. Devices without the proper support will then send skb->data
points to with the correct length so the packet will have garbage at the
end. A pcap sniffer will claim that the proper data has been sent since
it parses the skb properly.

It is not affected with INET_ESP_OFFLOAD disabled.

Linearize the skb after offloading if the sending hardware requires it.
It was tested on v4, v6 has been adopted.

Fixes: 7785bba299a8d ("esp: Add a software GRO codepath")
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-06-28 10:29:46 +02:00
Maciej Żenczykowski
964cfdfd4b xfrm: fix inbound ipv4/udp/esp packets to UDPv6 dualstack sockets
[ Upstream commit 1166a530a84758bb9e6b448fc8c195ed413f5ded ]

Before Linux v5.8 an AF_INET6 SOCK_DGRAM (udp/udplite) socket
with SOL_UDP, UDP_ENCAP, UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP{,_NON_IKE} enabled
would just unconditionally use xfrm4_udp_encap_rcv(), afterwards
such a socket would use the newly added xfrm6_udp_encap_rcv()
which only handles IPv6 packets.

Cc: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Cc: Benedict Wong <benedictwong@google.com>
Cc: Yan Yan <evitayan@google.com>
Fixes: 0146dca70b87 ("xfrm: add support for UDPv6 encapsulation of ESP")
Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-06-28 10:29:46 +02:00
Benedict Wong
3229a29e95 xfrm: Ensure policies always checked on XFRM-I input path
[ Upstream commit a287f5b0cfc6804c5b12a4be13c7c9fe27869e90 ]

This change adds methods in the XFRM-I input path that ensures that
policies are checked prior to processing of the subsequent decapsulated
packet, after which the relevant policies may no longer be resolvable
(due to changing src/dst/proto/etc).

Notably, raw ESP/AH packets did not perform policy checks inherently,
whereas all other encapsulated packets (UDP, TCP encapsulated) do policy
checks after calling xfrm_input handling in the respective encapsulation
layer.

Fixes: b0355dbbf13c ("Fix XFRM-I support for nested ESP tunnels")
Test: Verified with additional Android Kernel Unit tests
Test: Verified against Android CTS
Signed-off-by: Benedict Wong <benedictwong@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-06-28 10:29:45 +02:00
Eyal Birger
d055ee18ca xfrm: interface: rename xfrm_interface.c to xfrm_interface_core.c
[ Upstream commit ee9a113ab63468137802898bcd2c598998c96938 ]

This change allows adding additional files to the xfrm_interface module.

Signed-off-by: Eyal Birger <eyal.birger@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221203084659.1837829-2-eyal.birger@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: a287f5b0cfc6 ("xfrm: Ensure policies always checked on XFRM-I input path")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-06-28 10:29:45 +02:00
Benedict Wong
491ce3c1d9 xfrm: Treat already-verified secpath entries as optional
[ Upstream commit 1f8b6df6a997a430b0c48b504638154b520781ad ]

This change allows inbound traffic through nested IPsec tunnels to
successfully match policies and templates, while retaining the secpath
stack trace as necessary for netfilter policies.

Specifically, this patch marks secpath entries that have already matched
against a relevant policy as having been verified, allowing it to be
treated as optional and skipped after a tunnel decapsulation (during
which the src/dst/proto/etc may have changed, and the correct policy
chain no long be resolvable).

This approach is taken as opposed to the iteration in b0355dbbf13c,
where the secpath was cleared, since that breaks subsequent validations
that rely on the existence of the secpath entries (netfilter policies, or
transport-in-tunnel mode, where policies remain resolvable).

Fixes: b0355dbbf13c ("Fix XFRM-I support for nested ESP tunnels")
Test: Tested against Android Kernel Unit Tests
Test: Tested against Android CTS
Signed-off-by: Benedict Wong <benedictwong@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-06-28 10:29:45 +02:00
Leon Romanovsky
84770cc54e neighbour: delete neigh_lookup_nodev as not used
commit 76b9bf965c98c9b53ef7420b3b11438dbd764f92 upstream.

neigh_lookup_nodev isn't used in the kernel after removal
of DECnet. So let's remove it.

Fixes: 1202cdd66531 ("Remove DECnet support from kernel")
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/eb5656200d7964b2d177a36b77efa3c597d6d72d.1678267343.git.leonro@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-06-21 15:59:19 +02:00