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commit 11052589cf5c0bab3b4884d423d5f60c38fcf25d upstream.
Commit e21145a9871a ("ipv4: namespacify ip_early_demux sysctl knob") made
it possible to enable/disable early_demux on a per-netns basis. Then, we
introduced two knobs, tcp_early_demux and udp_early_demux, to switch it for
TCP/UDP in commit dddb64bcb346 ("net: Add sysctl to toggle early demux for
tcp and udp"). However, the .proc_handler() was wrong and actually
disabled us from changing the behaviour in each netns.
We can execute early_demux if net.ipv4.ip_early_demux is on and each proto
.early_demux() handler is not NULL. When we toggle (tcp|udp)_early_demux,
the change itself is saved in each netns variable, but the .early_demux()
handler is a global variable, so the handler is switched based on the
init_net's sysctl variable. Thus, netns (tcp|udp)_early_demux knobs have
nothing to do with the logic. Whether we CAN execute proto .early_demux()
is always decided by init_net's sysctl knob, and whether we DO it or not is
by each netns ip_early_demux knob.
This patch namespacifies (tcp|udp)_early_demux again. For now, the users
of the .early_demux() handler are TCP and UDP only, and they are called
directly to avoid retpoline. So, we can remove the .early_demux() handler
from inet6?_protos and need not dereference them in ip6?_rcv_finish_core().
If another proto needs .early_demux(), we can restore it at that time.
Fixes: dddb64bcb346 ("net: Add sysctl to toggle early demux for tcp and udp")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220713175207.7727-1-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 768b3c745fe5789f2430bdab02f35a9ad1148d97 ]
During the initialization of ip6_route_net_init_late(), if file
ipv6_route or rt6_stats fails to be created, the initialization is
successful by default. Therefore, the ipv6_route or rt6_stats file
doesn't be found during the remove in ip6_route_net_exit_late(). It
will cause WRNING.
The following is the stack information:
name 'rt6_stats'
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 9 at fs/proc/generic.c:712 remove_proc_entry+0x389/0x460
Modules linked in:
Workqueue: netns cleanup_net
RIP: 0010:remove_proc_entry+0x389/0x460
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
ops_exit_list+0xb0/0x170
cleanup_net+0x4ea/0xb00
process_one_work+0x9bf/0x1710
worker_thread+0x665/0x1080
kthread+0x2e4/0x3a0
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
</TASK>
Fixes: cdb1876192db ("[NETNS][IPV6] route6 - create route6 proc files for the namespace")
Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221102020610.351330-1-shaozhengchao@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 69421bf98482d089e50799f45e48b25ce4a8d154 ]
When we call connect() for a UDP socket in a reuseport group, we have
to update sk->sk_reuseport_cb->has_conns to 1. Otherwise, the kernel
could select a unconnected socket wrongly for packets sent to the
connected socket.
However, the current way to set has_conns is illegal and possible to
trigger that problem. reuseport_has_conns() changes has_conns under
rcu_read_lock(), which upgrades the RCU reader to the updater. Then,
it must do the update under the updater's lock, reuseport_lock, but
it doesn't for now.
For this reason, there is a race below where we fail to set has_conns
resulting in the wrong socket selection. To avoid the race, let's split
the reader and updater with proper locking.
cpu1 cpu2
+----+ +----+
__ip[46]_datagram_connect() reuseport_grow()
. .
|- reuseport_has_conns(sk, true) |- more_reuse = __reuseport_alloc(more_socks_size)
| . |
| |- rcu_read_lock()
| |- reuse = rcu_dereference(sk->sk_reuseport_cb)
| |
| | | /* reuse->has_conns == 0 here */
| | |- more_reuse->has_conns = reuse->has_conns
| |- reuse->has_conns = 1 | /* more_reuse->has_conns SHOULD BE 1 HERE */
| | |
| | |- rcu_assign_pointer(reuse->socks[i]->sk_reuseport_cb,
| | | more_reuse)
| `- rcu_read_unlock() `- kfree_rcu(reuse, rcu)
|
|- sk->sk_state = TCP_ESTABLISHED
Note the likely(reuse) in reuseport_has_conns_set() is always true,
but we put the test there for ease of review. [0]
For the record, usually, sk_reuseport_cb is changed under lock_sock().
The only exception is reuseport_grow() & TCP reqsk migration case.
1) shutdown() TCP listener, which is moved into the latter part of
reuse->socks[] to migrate reqsk.
2) New listen() overflows reuse->socks[] and call reuseport_grow().
3) reuse->max_socks overflows u16 with the new listener.
4) reuseport_grow() pops the old shutdown()ed listener from the array
and update its sk->sk_reuseport_cb as NULL without lock_sock().
shutdown()ed TCP sk->sk_reuseport_cb can be changed without lock_sock(),
but, reuseport_has_conns_set() is called only for UDP under lock_sock(),
so likely(reuse) never be false in reuseport_has_conns_set().
[0]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CANn89iLja=eQHbsM_Ta2sQF0tOGU8vAGrh_izRuuHjuO1ouUag@mail.gmail.com/
Fixes: acdcecc61285 ("udp: correct reuseport selection with connected sockets")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221014182625.89913-1-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit e22aa14866684f77b4f6b6cae98539e520ddb731 upstream.
If we set XFRM security policy by calling setsockopt with option
IPV6_XFRM_POLICY, the policy will be stored in 'sock_policy' in 'sock'
struct. However tcp_v6_send_response doesn't look up dst_entry with the
actual socket but looks up with tcp control socket. This may cause a
problem that a RST packet is sent without ESP encryption & peer's TCP
socket can't receive it.
This patch will make the function look up dest_entry with actual socket,
if the socket has XFRM policy(sock_policy), so that the TCP response
packet via this function can be encrypted, & aligned on the encrypted
TCP socket.
Tested: We encountered this problem when a TCP socket which is encrypted
in ESP transport mode encryption, receives challenge ACK at SYN_SENT
state. After receiving challenge ACK, TCP needs to send RST to
establish the socket at next SYN try. But the RST was not encrypted &
peer TCP socket still remains on ESTABLISHED state.
So we verified this with test step as below.
[Test step]
1. Making a TCP state mismatch between client(IDLE) & server(ESTABLISHED).
2. Client tries a new connection on the same TCP ports(src & dst).
3. Server will return challenge ACK instead of SYN,ACK.
4. Client will send RST to server to clear the SOCKET.
5. Client will retransmit SYN to server on the same TCP ports.
[Expected result]
The TCP connection should be established.
Cc: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: Sehee Lee <seheele@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sewook Seo <sewookseo@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 84a53580c5d2138c7361c7c3eea5b31827e63b35 ]
The SRv6 layer allows defining HMAC data that can later be used to sign IPv6
Segment Routing Headers. This configuration is realised via netlink through
four attributes: SEG6_ATTR_HMACKEYID, SEG6_ATTR_SECRET, SEG6_ATTR_SECRETLEN and
SEG6_ATTR_ALGID. Because the SECRETLEN attribute is decoupled from the actual
length of the SECRET attribute, it is possible to provide invalid combinations
(e.g., secret = "", secretlen = 64). This case is not checked in the code and
with an appropriately crafted netlink message, an out-of-bounds read of up
to 64 bytes (max secret length) can occur past the skb end pointer and into
skb_shared_info:
Breakpoint 1, seg6_genl_sethmac (skb=<optimized out>, info=<optimized out>) at net/ipv6/seg6.c:208
208 memcpy(hinfo->secret, secret, slen);
(gdb) bt
#0 seg6_genl_sethmac (skb=<optimized out>, info=<optimized out>) at net/ipv6/seg6.c:208
#1 0xffffffff81e012e9 in genl_family_rcv_msg_doit (skb=skb@entry=0xffff88800b1f9f00, nlh=nlh@entry=0xffff88800b1b7600,
extack=extack@entry=0xffffc90000ba7af0, ops=ops@entry=0xffffc90000ba7a80, hdrlen=4, net=0xffffffff84237580 <init_net>, family=<optimized out>,
family=<optimized out>) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:731
#2 0xffffffff81e01435 in genl_family_rcv_msg (extack=0xffffc90000ba7af0, nlh=0xffff88800b1b7600, skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00,
family=0xffffffff82fef6c0 <seg6_genl_family>) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:775
#3 genl_rcv_msg (skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00, nlh=0xffff88800b1b7600, extack=0xffffc90000ba7af0) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:792
#4 0xffffffff81dfffc3 in netlink_rcv_skb (skb=skb@entry=0xffff88800b1f9f00, cb=cb@entry=0xffffffff81e01350 <genl_rcv_msg>)
at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2501
#5 0xffffffff81e00919 in genl_rcv (skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:803
#6 0xffffffff81dff6ae in netlink_unicast_kernel (ssk=0xffff888010eec800, skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00, sk=0xffff888004aed000)
at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319
#7 netlink_unicast (ssk=ssk@entry=0xffff888010eec800, skb=skb@entry=0xffff88800b1f9f00, portid=portid@entry=0, nonblock=<optimized out>)
at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1345
#8 0xffffffff81dff9a4 in netlink_sendmsg (sock=<optimized out>, msg=0xffffc90000ba7e48, len=<optimized out>) at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1921
...
(gdb) p/x ((struct sk_buff *)0xffff88800b1f9f00)->head + ((struct sk_buff *)0xffff88800b1f9f00)->end
$1 = 0xffff88800b1b76c0
(gdb) p/x secret
$2 = 0xffff88800b1b76c0
(gdb) p slen
$3 = 64 '@'
The OOB data can then be read back from userspace by dumping HMAC state. This
commit fixes this by ensuring SECRETLEN cannot exceed the actual length of
SECRET.
Reported-by: Lucas Leong <wmliang.tw@gmail.com>
Tested: verified that EINVAL is correctly returned when secretlen > len(secret)
Fixes: 4f4853dc1c9c1 ("ipv6: sr: implement API to control SR HMAC structure")
Signed-off-by: David Lebrun <dlebrun@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit ac56a0b48da86fd1b4389632fb7c4c8a5d86eefa ]
Because rxrpc pretends to be a tunnel on top of a UDP/UDP6 socket, allowing
it to siphon off UDP packets early in the handling of received UDP packets
thereby avoiding the packet going through the UDP receive queue, it doesn't
get ICMP packets through the UDP ->sk_error_report() callback. In fact, it
doesn't appear that there's any usable option for getting hold of ICMP
packets.
Fix this by adding a new UDP encap hook to distribute error messages for
UDP tunnels. If the hook is set, then the tunnel driver will be able to
see ICMP packets. The hook provides the offset into the packet of the UDP
header of the original packet that caused the notification.
An alternative would be to call the ->error_handler() hook - but that
requires that the skbuff be cloned (as ip_icmp_error() or ipv6_cmp_error()
do, though isn't really necessary or desirable in rxrpc's case is we want
to parse them there and then, not queue them).
Changes
=======
ver #3)
- Fixed an uninitialised variable.
ver #2)
- Fixed some missing CONFIG_AF_RXRPC_IPV6 conditionals.
Fixes: 5271953cad31 ("rxrpc: Use the UDP encap_rcv hook")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit a5612ca10d1aa05624ebe72633e0c8c792970833 ]
While reading sysctl_devconf_inherit_init_net, it can be changed
concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers.
Fixes: 856c395cfa63 ("net: introduce a knob to control whether to inherit devconf config")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 7de6d09f51917c829af2b835aba8bb5040f8e86a ]
While reading sysctl_optmem_max, it can be changed concurrently.
Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 7396ba87f1edf549284869451665c7c4e74ecd4f upstream.
The issue happens on specific paths in the function. After both the
object `rt` and `neigh` are grabbed successfully, when `lifetime` is
nonzero but the metric needs change, the function just deletes the
route and set `rt` to NULL. Then, it may try grabbing `rt` and `neigh`
again if above conditions hold. The function simply overwrite `neigh`
if succeeds or returns if fails, without decreasing the reference
count of previous `neigh`. This may result in memory leaks.
Fix it by decrementing the reference count of `neigh` in place.
Fixes: 6b2e04bc240f ("net: allow user to set metric on default route learned via Router Advertisement")
Signed-off-by: Xin Xiong <xiongx18@fudan.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Xin Tan <tanxin.ctf@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ab7e2e0dfa5d37540ab1dc5376e9a2cb9188925d upstream.
According to Guillaume Nault RT_TOS should never be used for IPv6.
Quote:
RT_TOS() is an old macro used to interprete IPv4 TOS as described in
the obsolete RFC 1349. It's conceptually wrong to use it even in IPv4
code, although, given the current state of the code, most of the
existing calls have no consequence.
But using RT_TOS() in IPv6 code is always a bug: IPv6 never had a "TOS"
field to be interpreted the RFC 1349 way. There's no historical
compatibility to worry about.
Fixes: 571912c69f0e ("net: UDP tunnel encapsulation module for tunnelling different protocols like MPLS, IP, NSH etc.")
Acked-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthias May <matthias.may@westermo.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 5d368f03280d3678433a7f119efe15dfbbb87bc8 ]
INET6_MATCH() runs without holding a lock on the socket.
We probably need to annotate most reads.
This patch makes INET6_MATCH() an inline function
to ease our changes.
v2: inline function only defined if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
Change the name to inet6_match(), this is no longer a macro.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 870e3a634b6a6cb1543b359007aca73fe6a03ac5 ]
While reading sysctl_tcp_reflect_tos, it can be changed concurrently.
Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers.
Fixes: ac8f1710c12b ("tcp: reflect tos value received in SYN to the socket")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Acked-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 3e7d18b9dca388940a19cae30bfc1f76dccd8c28 ]
mld_{query | report}_work() processes queued events.
If there are too many events in the queue, it re-queue a work.
And then, it returns without in6_dev_put().
But if queuing is failed, it should call in6_dev_put(), but it doesn't.
So, a reference count leak would occur.
THREAD0 THREAD1
mld_report_work()
spin_lock_bh()
if (!mod_delayed_work())
in6_dev_hold();
spin_unlock_bh()
spin_lock_bh()
schedule_delayed_work()
spin_unlock_bh()
Script to reproduce(by Hangbin Liu):
ip netns add ns1
ip netns add ns2
ip netns exec ns1 sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.all.force_mld_version=1
ip netns exec ns2 sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.all.force_mld_version=1
ip -n ns1 link add veth0 type veth peer name veth0 netns ns2
ip -n ns1 link set veth0 up
ip -n ns2 link set veth0 up
for i in `seq 50`; do
for j in `seq 100`; do
ip -n ns1 addr add 2021:${i}::${j}/64 dev veth0
ip -n ns2 addr add 2022:${i}::${j}/64 dev veth0
done
done
modprobe -r veth
ip -a netns del
splat looks like:
unregister_netdevice: waiting for veth0 to become free. Usage count = 2
leaked reference.
ipv6_add_dev+0x324/0xec0
addrconf_notify+0x481/0xd10
raw_notifier_call_chain+0xe3/0x120
call_netdevice_notifiers+0x106/0x160
register_netdevice+0x114c/0x16b0
veth_newlink+0x48b/0xa50 [veth]
rtnl_newlink+0x11a2/0x1a40
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x63f/0xc00
netlink_rcv_skb+0x1df/0x3e0
netlink_unicast+0x5de/0x850
netlink_sendmsg+0x6c9/0xa90
____sys_sendmsg+0x76a/0x780
__sys_sendmsg+0x27c/0x340
do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
Tested-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
Fixes: f185de28d9ae ("mld: add new workqueues for process mld events")
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit e27326009a3d247b831eda38878c777f6f4eb3d1 upstream.
When we close ping6 sockets, some resources are left unfreed because
pingv6_prot is missing sk->sk_prot->destroy(). As reported by
syzbot [0], just three syscalls leak 96 bytes and easily cause OOM.
struct ipv6_sr_hdr *hdr;
char data[24] = {0};
int fd;
hdr = (struct ipv6_sr_hdr *)data;
hdr->hdrlen = 2;
hdr->type = IPV6_SRCRT_TYPE_4;
fd = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_DGRAM, NEXTHDR_ICMP);
setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_RTHDR, data, 24);
close(fd);
To fix memory leaks, let's add a destroy function.
Note the socket() syscall checks if the GID is within the range of
net.ipv4.ping_group_range. The default value is [1, 0] so that no
GID meets the condition (1 <= GID <= 0). Thus, the local DoS does
not succeed until we change the default value. However, at least
Ubuntu/Fedora/RHEL loosen it.
$ cat /usr/lib/sysctl.d/50-default.conf
...
-net.ipv4.ping_group_range = 0 2147483647
Also, there could be another path reported with these options, and
some of them require CAP_NET_RAW.
setsockopt
IPV6_ADDRFORM (inet6_sk(sk)->pktoptions)
IPV6_RECVPATHMTU (inet6_sk(sk)->rxpmtu)
IPV6_HOPOPTS (inet6_sk(sk)->opt)
IPV6_RTHDRDSTOPTS (inet6_sk(sk)->opt)
IPV6_RTHDR (inet6_sk(sk)->opt)
IPV6_DSTOPTS (inet6_sk(sk)->opt)
IPV6_2292PKTOPTIONS (inet6_sk(sk)->opt)
getsockopt
IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MGR (inet6_sk(sk)->ipv6_fl_list)
For the record, I left a different splat with syzbot's one.
unreferenced object 0xffff888006270c60 (size 96):
comm "repro2", pid 231, jiffies 4294696626 (age 13.118s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
01 00 00 00 44 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....D...........
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<00000000f6bc7ea9>] sock_kmalloc (net/core/sock.c:2564 net/core/sock.c:2554)
[<000000006d699550>] do_ipv6_setsockopt.constprop.0 (net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:715)
[<00000000c3c3b1f5>] ipv6_setsockopt (net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:1024)
[<000000007096a025>] __sys_setsockopt (net/socket.c:2254)
[<000000003a8ff47b>] __x64_sys_setsockopt (net/socket.c:2265 net/socket.c:2262 net/socket.c:2262)
[<000000007c409dcb>] do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80)
[<00000000e939c4a9>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120)
[0]: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=a8430774139ec3ab7176
Fixes: 6d0bfe226116 ("net: ipv6: Add IPv6 support to the ping socket.")
Reported-by: syzbot+a8430774139ec3ab7176@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: Ayushman Dutta <ayudutta@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220728012220.46918-1-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit f2e383b5bb6bbc60a0b94b87b3e49a2b1aefd11e ]
While reading sysctl_tcp_syncookies, it can be changed concurrently.
Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 0968d2a441bf6afb551fd99e60fa65ed67068963 ]
While reading sysctl_ip_no_pmtu_disc, it can be changed concurrently.
Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit f048880fc77058d864aff5c674af7918b30f312a ]
The SRv6 End.B6 and End.B6.Encaps behaviors rely on functions
seg6_do_srh_{encap,inline}() to, respectively: i) encapsulate the
packet within an outer IPv6 header with the specified Segment Routing
Header (SRH); ii) insert the specified SRH directly after the IPv6
header of the packet.
This patch removes the initialization of the IPv6 header payload length
from the input_action_end_b6{_encap}() functions, as it is now handled
properly by seg6_do_srh_{encap,inline}() to avoid corruption of the skb
checksum.
Fixes: 140f04c33bbc ("ipv6: sr: implement several seg6local actions")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Mayer <andrea.mayer@uniroma2.it>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit df8386d13ea280d55beee1b95f61a59234a3798b ]
Support for SRH encapsulation and insertion was introduced with
commit 6c8702c60b88 ("ipv6: sr: add support for SRH encapsulation and
injection with lwtunnels"), through the seg6_do_srh_encap() and
seg6_do_srh_inline() functions, respectively.
The former encapsulates the packet in an outer IPv6 header along with
the SRH, while the latter inserts the SRH between the IPv6 header and
the payload. Then, the headers are initialized/updated according to the
operating mode (i.e., encap/inline).
Finally, the skb checksum is calculated to reflect the changes applied
to the headers.
The IPv6 payload length ('payload_len') is not initialized
within seg6_do_srh_{inline,encap}() but is deferred in seg6_do_srh(), i.e.
the caller of seg6_do_srh_{inline,encap}().
However, this operation invalidates the skb checksum, since the
'payload_len' is updated only after the checksum is evaluated.
To solve this issue, the initialization of the IPv6 payload length is
moved from seg6_do_srh() directly into the seg6_do_srh_{inline,encap}()
functions and before the skb checksum update takes place.
Fixes: 6c8702c60b88 ("ipv6: sr: add support for SRH encapsulation and injection with lwtunnels")
Reported-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220705190727.69d532417be7438b15404ee1@uniroma2.it
Signed-off-by: Andrea Mayer <andrea.mayer@uniroma2.it>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit bdf00bf24bef9be1ca641a6390fd5487873e0d2e ]
While reading nexthop_compat_mode, it can be changed concurrently.
Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers.
Fixes: 4f80116d3df3 ("net: ipv4: add sysctl for nexthop api compatibility mode")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 4a2f7083cc6cb72dade9a63699ca352fad26d1cd ]
While reading sysctl_icmp_echo_enable_probe, it can be changed
concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers.
Fixes: d329ea5bd884 ("icmp: add response to RFC 8335 PROBE messages")
Fixes: 1fd07f33c3ea ("ipv6: ICMPV6: add response to ICMPV6 RFC 8335 PROBE messages")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 53ad46169fe2996fe1b623ba6c9c4fa33847876f upstream.
As of commit 5801f064e351 ("net: ipv6: unexport __init-annotated seg6_hmac_init()"),
EXPORT_SYMBOL and __init is a bad combination because the .init.text
section is freed up after the initialization. Hence, modules cannot
use symbols annotated __init. The access to a freed symbol may end up
with kernel panic.
This remove the EXPORT_SYMBOL to fix modpost warning:
WARNING: modpost: vmlinux.o(___ksymtab+seg6_hmac_net_init+0x0): Section mismatch in reference from the variable __ksymtab_seg6_hmac_net_init to the function .init.text:seg6_hmac_net_init()
The symbol seg6_hmac_net_init is exported and annotated __init
Fix this by removing the __init annotation of seg6_hmac_net_init or drop the export.
Fixes: bf355b8d2c30 ("ipv6: sr: add core files for SR HMAC support")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220628033134.21088-1-yuehaibing@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3b0dc529f56b5f2328244130683210be98f16f7f upstream.
When routes corresponding to addresses are restored by
fixup_permanent_addr(), the dst_nopolicy parameter was not set.
The typical use case is a user that configures an address on a down
interface and then put this interface up.
Let's take care of this flag in addrconf_f6i_alloc(), so that every callers
benefit ont it.
CC: stable@kernel.org
CC: David Forster <dforster@brocade.com>
Fixes: df789fe75206 ("ipv6: Provide ipv6 version of "disable_policy" sysctl")
Reported-by: Siwar Zitouni <siwar.zitouni@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220623120015.32640-1-nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 5801f064e35181c71857a80ff18af4dbec3c5f5c ]
EXPORT_SYMBOL and __init is a bad combination because the .init.text
section is freed up after the initialization. Hence, modules cannot
use symbols annotated __init. The access to a freed symbol may end up
with kernel panic.
modpost used to detect it, but it has been broken for a decade.
Recently, I fixed modpost so it started to warn it again, then this
showed up in linux-next builds.
There are two ways to fix it:
- Remove __init
- Remove EXPORT_SYMBOL
I chose the latter for this case because the caller (net/ipv6/seg6.c)
and the callee (net/ipv6/seg6_hmac.c) belong to the same module.
It seems an internal function call in ipv6.ko.
Fixes: bf355b8d2c30 ("ipv6: sr: add core files for SR HMAC support")
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 40570375356c874b1578e05c1dcc3ff7c1322dbe ]
We had various bugs over the years with code
breaking the assumption that tp->snd_cwnd is greater
than zero.
Lately, syzbot reported the WARN_ON_ONCE(!tp->prior_cwnd) added
in commit 8b8a321ff72c ("tcp: fix zero cwnd in tcp_cwnd_reduction")
can trigger, and without a repro we would have to spend
considerable time finding the bug.
Instead of complaining too late, we want to catch where
and when tp->snd_cwnd is set to an illegal value.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Suggested-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220405233538.947344-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 51454ea42c1ab4e0c2828bb0d4d53957976980de ]
idev->addr_list needs to be protected by idev->lock. However, it is not
always possible to do so while iterating and performing actions on
inet6_ifaddr instances. For example, multiple functions (like
addrconf_{join,leave}_anycast) eventually call down to other functions
that acquire the idev->lock. The current code temporarily unlocked the
idev->lock during the loops, which can cause race conditions. Moving the
locks up is also not an appropriate solution as the ordering of lock
acquisition will be inconsistent with for example mc_lock.
This solution adds an additional field to inet6_ifaddr that is used
to temporarily add the instances to a temporary list while holding
idev->lock. The temporary list can then be traversed without holding
idev->lock. This change was done in two places. In addrconf_ifdown, the
list_for_each_entry_safe variant of the list loop is also no longer
necessary as there is no deletion within that specific loop.
Suggested-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Niels Dossche <dossche.niels@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220403231523.45843-1-dossche.niels@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit b2d057560b8107c633b39aabe517ff9d93f285e3 ]
SipHash replaced MD5 in secure_ipv{4,6}_port_ephemeral() via commit
7cd23e5300c1 ("secure_seq: use SipHash in place of MD5"), but the output
remained truncated to 32-bit only. In order to exploit more bits from the
hash, let's make the functions return the full 64-bit of siphash_3u32().
We also make sure the port offset calculation in __inet_hash_connect()
remains done on 32-bit to avoid the need for div_u64_rem() and an extra
cost on 32-bit systems.
Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Moshe Kol <moshe.kol@mail.huji.ac.il>
Cc: Yossi Gilad <yossi.gilad@mail.huji.ac.il>
Cc: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit a9384a4c1d250cb40cebf50e41459426d160b08e upstream.
Whenever RCU protected list replaces an object,
the pointer to the new object needs to be updated
_before_ the call to kfree_rcu() or call_rcu()
Also ip6_mc_msfilter() needs to update the pointer
before releasing the mc_lock mutex.
Note that linux-5.13 was supporting kfree_rcu(NULL, rcu),
so this fix does not need the conditional test I was
forced to use in the equivalent patch for IPv4.
Fixes: 882ba1f73c06 ("mld: convert ipv6_mc_socklist->sflist to RCU")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 8ddffdb9442a9d60b4a6e679ac48d7d21403a674 upstream.
The commit referenced below fixed packet re-routing if Netfilter mangles
a routing key property of a packet and the packet is routed in a VRF L3
domain. The fix, however, addressed IPv4 re-routing, only.
This commit applies the same behavior for IPv6. While at it, untangle
the nested ternary operator to make the code more readable.
Fixes: 6d8b49c3a3a3 ("netfilter: Update ip_route_me_harder to consider L3 domain")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 31c417c948d7f6909cb63f0ac3298f3c38f8ce20 ]
As pointed out by Jakub Kicinski, currently using TUNNEL_SEQ in
collect_md mode is racy for [IP6]GRE[TAP] devices. Consider the
following sequence of events:
1. An [IP6]GRE[TAP] device is created in collect_md mode using "ip link
add ... external". "ip" ignores "[o]seq" if "external" is specified,
so TUNNEL_SEQ is off, and the device is marked as NETIF_F_LLTX (i.e.
it uses lockless TX);
2. Someone sets TUNNEL_SEQ on outgoing skb's, using e.g.
bpf_skb_set_tunnel_key() in an eBPF program attached to this device;
3. gre_fb_xmit() or __gre6_xmit() processes these skb's:
gre_build_header(skb, tun_hlen,
flags, protocol,
tunnel_id_to_key32(tun_info->key.tun_id),
(flags & TUNNEL_SEQ) ? htonl(tunnel->o_seqno++)
: 0); ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Since we are not using the TX lock (&txq->_xmit_lock), multiple CPUs may
try to do this tunnel->o_seqno++ in parallel, which is racy. Fix it by
making o_seqno atomic_t.
As mentioned by Eric Dumazet in commit b790e01aee74 ("ip_gre: lockless
xmit"), making o_seqno atomic_t increases "chance for packets being out
of order at receiver" when NETIF_F_LLTX is on.
Maybe a better fix would be:
1. Do not ignore "oseq" in external mode. Users MUST specify "oseq" if
they want the kernel to allow sequencing of outgoing packets;
2. Reject all outgoing TUNNEL_SEQ packets if the device was not created
with "oseq".
Unfortunately, that would break userspace.
We could now make [IP6]GRE[TAP] devices always NETIF_F_LLTX, but let us
do it in separate patches to keep this fix minimal.
Suggested-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Fixes: 77a5196a804e ("gre: add sequence number for collect md mode.")
Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye <peilin.ye@bytedance.com>
Acked-by: William Tu <u9012063@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit fde98ae91f79cab4e020f40c35ed23cbdc59661c ]
For IP6GRE and IP6GRETAP devices, currently o_seqno starts from 1 in
native mode. According to RFC 2890 2.2., "The first datagram is sent
with a sequence number of 0." Fix it.
It is worth mentioning that o_seqno already starts from 0 in collect_md
mode, see the "if (tunnel->parms.collect_md)" clause in __gre6_xmit(),
where tunnel->o_seqno is passed to gre_build_header() before getting
incremented.
Fixes: c12b395a4664 ("gre: Support GRE over IPv6")
Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye <peilin.ye@bytedance.com>
Acked-by: William Tu <u9012063@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 9cb7c013420f98fa6fd12fc6a5dc055170c108db ]
Reads and Writes to ip6_rt_gc_expire always have been racy,
as syzbot reported lately [1]
There is a possible risk of under-flow, leading
to unexpected high value passed to fib6_run_gc(),
although I have not observed this in the field.
Hosts hitting ip6_dst_gc() very hard are under pretty bad
state anyway.
[1]
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in ip6_dst_gc / ip6_dst_gc
read-write to 0xffff888102110744 of 4 bytes by task 13165 on cpu 1:
ip6_dst_gc+0x1f3/0x220 net/ipv6/route.c:3311
dst_alloc+0x9b/0x160 net/core/dst.c:86
ip6_dst_alloc net/ipv6/route.c:344 [inline]
icmp6_dst_alloc+0xb2/0x360 net/ipv6/route.c:3261
mld_sendpack+0x2b9/0x580 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1807
mld_send_cr net/ipv6/mcast.c:2119 [inline]
mld_ifc_work+0x576/0x800 net/ipv6/mcast.c:2651
process_one_work+0x3d3/0x720 kernel/workqueue.c:2289
worker_thread+0x618/0xa70 kernel/workqueue.c:2436
kthread+0x1a9/0x1e0 kernel/kthread.c:376
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
read-write to 0xffff888102110744 of 4 bytes by task 11607 on cpu 0:
ip6_dst_gc+0x1f3/0x220 net/ipv6/route.c:3311
dst_alloc+0x9b/0x160 net/core/dst.c:86
ip6_dst_alloc net/ipv6/route.c:344 [inline]
icmp6_dst_alloc+0xb2/0x360 net/ipv6/route.c:3261
mld_sendpack+0x2b9/0x580 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1807
mld_send_cr net/ipv6/mcast.c:2119 [inline]
mld_ifc_work+0x576/0x800 net/ipv6/mcast.c:2651
process_one_work+0x3d3/0x720 kernel/workqueue.c:2289
worker_thread+0x618/0xa70 kernel/workqueue.c:2436
kthread+0x1a9/0x1e0 kernel/kthread.c:376
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
value changed: 0x00000bb3 -> 0x00000ba9
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 0 PID: 11607 Comm: kworker/0:21 Not tainted 5.18.0-rc1-syzkaller-00037-g42e7a03d3bad-dirty #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Workqueue: mld mld_ifc_work
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220413181333.649424-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit ab198e1d0dd8dc4bc7575fb50758e2cbd51e14e1 ]
Feng reported an skb_under_panic BUG triggered by running
test_ip6gretap() in tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_tunnel.sh:
[ 82.492551] skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffffb268bb8e len:403 put:12 head:ffff9997c5480000 data:ffff9997c547fff8 tail:0x18b end:0x2c0 dev:ip6gretap11
<...>
[ 82.607380] Call Trace:
[ 82.609389] <TASK>
[ 82.611136] skb_push.cold.109+0x10/0x10
[ 82.614289] __gre6_xmit+0x41e/0x590
[ 82.617169] ip6gre_tunnel_xmit+0x344/0x3f0
[ 82.620526] dev_hard_start_xmit+0xf1/0x330
[ 82.623882] sch_direct_xmit+0xe4/0x250
[ 82.626961] __dev_queue_xmit+0x720/0xfe0
<...>
[ 82.633431] packet_sendmsg+0x96a/0x1cb0
[ 82.636568] sock_sendmsg+0x30/0x40
<...>
The following sequence of events caused the BUG:
1. During ip6gretap device initialization, tunnel->tun_hlen (e.g. 4) is
calculated based on old flags (see ip6gre_calc_hlen());
2. packet_snd() reserves header room for skb A, assuming
tunnel->tun_hlen is 4;
3. Later (in clsact Qdisc), the eBPF program sets a new tunnel key for
skb A using bpf_skb_set_tunnel_key() (see _ip6gretap_set_tunnel());
4. __gre6_xmit() detects the new tunnel key, and recalculates
"tun_hlen" (e.g. 12) based on new flags (e.g. TUNNEL_KEY and
TUNNEL_SEQ);
5. gre_build_header() calls skb_push() with insufficient reserved header
room, triggering the BUG.
As sugguested by Cong, fix it by moving the call to skb_cow_head() after
the recalculation of tun_hlen.
Reproducer:
OBJ=$LINUX/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_tunnel_kern.o
ip netns add at_ns0
ip link add veth0 type veth peer name veth1
ip link set veth0 netns at_ns0
ip netns exec at_ns0 ip addr add 172.16.1.100/24 dev veth0
ip netns exec at_ns0 ip link set dev veth0 up
ip link set dev veth1 up mtu 1500
ip addr add dev veth1 172.16.1.200/24
ip netns exec at_ns0 ip addr add ::11/96 dev veth0
ip netns exec at_ns0 ip link set dev veth0 up
ip addr add dev veth1 ::22/96
ip link set dev veth1 up
ip netns exec at_ns0 \
ip link add dev ip6gretap00 type ip6gretap seq flowlabel 0xbcdef key 2 \
local ::11 remote ::22
ip netns exec at_ns0 ip addr add dev ip6gretap00 10.1.1.100/24
ip netns exec at_ns0 ip addr add dev ip6gretap00 fc80::100/96
ip netns exec at_ns0 ip link set dev ip6gretap00 up
ip link add dev ip6gretap11 type ip6gretap external
ip addr add dev ip6gretap11 10.1.1.200/24
ip addr add dev ip6gretap11 fc80::200/24
ip link set dev ip6gretap11 up
tc qdisc add dev ip6gretap11 clsact
tc filter add dev ip6gretap11 egress bpf da obj $OBJ sec ip6gretap_set_tunnel
tc filter add dev ip6gretap11 ingress bpf da obj $OBJ sec ip6gretap_get_tunnel
ping6 -c 3 -w 10 -q ::11
Fixes: 6712abc168eb ("ip6_gre: add ip6 gre and gretap collect_md mode")
Reported-by: Feng Zhou <zhoufeng.zf@bytedance.com>
Co-developed-by: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye <peilin.ye@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit f40c064e933d7787ca7411b699504d7a2664c1f5 ]
Do not update tunnel->tun_hlen in data plane code. Use a local variable
instead, just like "tunnel_hlen" in net/ipv4/ip_gre.c:gre_fb_xmit().
Co-developed-by: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye <peilin.ye@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 5bd8baab087dff657e05387aee802e70304cc813 ]
Commit ebe48d368e97 ("esp: Fix possible buffer overflow in ESP
transformation") tried to fix skb_page_frag_refill usage in ESP by
capping allocsize to 32k, but that doesn't completely solve the issue,
as skb_page_frag_refill may return a single page. If that happens, we
will write out of bounds, despite the check introduced in the previous
patch.
This patch forces COW in cases where we would end up calling
skb_page_frag_refill with a size larger than a page (first in
esp_output_head with tailen, then in esp_output_tail with
skb->data_len).
Fixes: cac2661c53f3 ("esp4: Avoid skb_cow_data whenever possible")
Fixes: 03e2a30f6a27 ("esp6: Avoid skb_cow_data whenever possible")
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit e3fa461d8b0e185b7da8a101fe94dfe6dd500ac0 upstream.
kongweibin reported a kernel panic in ip6_forward() when input interface
has no in6 dev associated.
The following tc commands were used to reproduce this panic:
tc qdisc del dev vxlan100 root
tc qdisc add dev vxlan100 root netem corrupt 5%
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ccd27f05ae7b ("ipv6: fix 'disable_policy' for fwd packets")
Reported-by: kongweibin <kongweibin2@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 1158f79f82d437093aeed87d57df0548bdd68146 ]
VRF devices are the loopbacks for VRFs, and a loopback can not be
assigned to a VRF. Accordingly, the condition in ip6_pkt_drop should
be '||' not '&&'.
Fixes: 1d3fd8a10bed ("vrf: Use orig netdev to count Ip6InNoRoutes and a fresh route lookup when sending dest unreach")
Reported-by: Pudak, Filip <Filip.Pudak@windriver.com>
Reported-by: Xiao, Jiguang <Jiguang.Xiao@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220404150908.2937-1-dsahern@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 4f9bf2a2f5aacf988e6d5e56b961ba45c5a25248 ]
Commit
9652dc2eb9e40 ("tcp: relax listening_hash operations")
removed the need to disable bottom half while acquiring
listening_hash.lock. There are still two callers left which disable
bottom half before the lock is acquired.
On PREEMPT_RT the softirqs are preemptible and local_bh_disable() acts
as a lock to ensure that resources, that are protected by disabling
bottom halves, remain protected.
This leads to a circular locking dependency if the lock acquired with
disabled bottom halves is also acquired with enabled bottom halves
followed by disabling bottom halves. This is the reverse locking order.
It has been observed with inet_listen_hashbucket:🔒
local_bh_disable() + spin_lock(&ilb->lock):
inet_listen()
inet_csk_listen_start()
sk->sk_prot->hash() := inet_hash()
local_bh_disable()
__inet_hash()
spin_lock(&ilb->lock);
acquire(&ilb->lock);
Reverse order: spin_lock(&ilb2->lock) + local_bh_disable():
tcp_seq_next()
listening_get_next()
spin_lock(&ilb2->lock);
acquire(&ilb2->lock);
tcp4_seq_show()
get_tcp4_sock()
sock_i_ino()
read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
acquire(softirq_ctrl) // <---- whoops
acquire(&sk->sk_callback_lock)
Drop local_bh_disable() around __inet_hash() which acquires
listening_hash->lock. Split inet_unhash() and acquire the
listen_hashbucket lock without disabling bottom halves; the inet_ehash
lock with disabled bottom halves.
Reported-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/12d6f9879a97cd56c09fb53dee343cbb14f7f1f7.camel@gmx.de
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/X9CheYjuXWc75Spa@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YgQOebeZ10eNx1W6@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 145c7a793838add5e004e7d49a67654dc7eba147 ]
This fixes minor data-races in ip6_mc_input() and
batadv_mcast_mla_rtr_flags_softif_get_ipv6()
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 4ff2980b6bd2aa6b4ded3ce3b7c0ccfab29980af ]
in tunnel mode, if outer interface(ipv4) is less, it is easily to let
inner IPV6 mtu be less than 1280. If so, a Packet Too Big ICMPV6 message
is received. When send again, packets are fragmentized with 1280, they
are still rejected with ICMPV6(Packet Too Big) by xfrmi_xmit2().
According to RFC4213 Section3.2.2:
if (IPv4 path MTU - 20) is less than 1280
if packet is larger than 1280 bytes
Send ICMPv6 "packet too big" with MTU=1280
Drop packet
else
Encapsulate but do not set the Don't Fragment
flag in the IPv4 header. The resulting IPv4
packet might be fragmented by the IPv4 layer
on the encapsulator or by some router along
the IPv4 path.
endif
else
if packet is larger than (IPv4 path MTU - 20)
Send ICMPv6 "packet too big" with
MTU = (IPv4 path MTU - 20).
Drop packet.
else
Encapsulate and set the Don't Fragment flag
in the IPv4 header.
endif
endif
Packets should be fragmentized with ipv4 outer interface, so change it.
After it is fragemtized with ipv4, there will be double fragmenation.
No.48 & No.51 are ipv6 fragment packets, No.48 is double fragmentized,
then tunneled with IPv4(No.49& No.50), which obey spec. And received peer
cannot decrypt it rightly.
48 2002::10 2002::11 1296(length) IPv6 fragment (off=0 more=y ident=0xa20da5bc nxt=50)
49 0x0000 (0) 2002::10 2002::11 1304 IPv6 fragment (off=0 more=y ident=0x7448042c nxt=44)
50 0x0000 (0) 2002::10 2002::11 200 ESP (SPI=0x00035000)
51 2002::10 2002::11 180 Echo (ping) request
52 0x56dc 2002::10 2002::11 248 IPv6 fragment (off=1232 more=n ident=0xa20da5bc nxt=50)
xfrm6_noneed_fragment has fixed above issues. Finally, it acted like below:
1 0x6206 192.168.1.138 192.168.1.1 1316 Fragmented IP protocol (proto=Encap Security Payload 50, off=0, ID=6206) [Reassembled in #2]
2 0x6206 2002::10 2002::11 88 IPv6 fragment (off=0 more=y ident=0x1f440778 nxt=50)
3 0x0000 2002::10 2002::11 248 ICMPv6 Echo (ping) request
Signed-off-by: Lina Wang <lina.wang@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 4db4075f92af2b28f415fc979ab626e6b37d67b6 ]
Commit 5f9c55c8066b ("ipv6: check return value of ipv6_skip_exthdr")
introduced an incorrect check, which leads to all ESP packets over
either TCPv6 or UDPv6 encapsulation being dropped. In this particular
case, offset is negative, since skb->data points to the ESP header in
the following chain of headers, while skb->network_header points to
the IPv6 header:
IPv6 | ext | ... | ext | UDP | ESP | ...
That doesn't seem to be a problem, especially considering that if we
reach esp6_input_done2, we're guaranteed to have a full set of headers
available (otherwise the packet would have been dropped earlier in the
stack). However, it means that the return value will (intentionally)
be negative. We can make the test more specific, as the expected
return value of ipv6_skip_exthdr will be the (negated) size of either
a UDP header, or a TCP header with possible options.
In the future, we should probably either make ipv6_skip_exthdr
explicitly accept negative offsets (and adjust its return value for
error cases), or make ipv6_skip_exthdr only take non-negative
offsets (and audit all callers).
Fixes: 5f9c55c8066b ("ipv6: check return value of ipv6_skip_exthdr")
Reported-by: Xiumei Mu <xmu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
