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[ Upstream commit d48c8124749c9a5081fe68680f83605e272c984b ]
When the passed token is longer than 4032 bytes, the remaining part
of the token must be copied from the rqstp->rq_arg.pages. But the
copy must make sure it happens in a consecutive way.
With the existing code, the first memcpy copies 'length' bytes from
argv->iobase, but since the header is in front, this never fills the
whole first page of in_token->pages.
The mecpy in the loop copies the following bytes, but starts writing at
the next page of in_token->pages. This leaves the last bytes of page 0
unwritten.
Symptoms were that users with many groups were not able to access NFS
exports, when using Active Directory as the KDC.
Signed-off-by: Martijn de Gouw <martijn.de.gouw@prodrive-technologies.com>
Fixes: 5866efa8cbfb "SUNRPC: Fix svcauth_gss_proxy_init()"
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit c327a310ec4d6ecbea13185ed56c11def441d9ab ]
This was discovered using O_DIRECT at the client side, with small
unaligned file offsets or IOs that span multiple file pages.
Fixes: e248aa7be86 ("svcrdma: Remove max_sge check at connect time")
Signed-off-by: Dan Aloni <dan@kernelim.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 0d9826bc18ce356e8909919ad681ad65d0a6061e ]
Dump vlan tag and proto for the usual vlan offload case if the
NF_LOG_MACDECODE flag is set on. Without this information the logging is
misleading as there is no reference to the VLAN header.
[12716.993704] test: IN=veth0 OUT= MACSRC=86:6c:92:ea:d6:73 MACDST=0e:3b:eb:86:73:76 VPROTO=8100 VID=10 MACPROTO=0800 SRC=192.168.10.2 DST=172.217.168.163 LEN=52 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=64 ID=2548 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=55848 DPT=80 WINDOW=501 RES=0x00 ACK FIN URGP=0
[12721.157643] test: IN=veth0 OUT= MACSRC=86:6c:92:ea:d6:73 MACDST=0e:3b:eb:86:73:76 VPROTO=8100 VID=10 MACPROTO=0806 ARP HTYPE=1 PTYPE=0x0800 OPCODE=2 MACSRC=86:6c:92:ea:d6:73 IPSRC=192.168.10.2 MACDST=0e:3b:eb:86:73:76 IPDST=192.168.10.1
Fixes: 83e96d443b37 ("netfilter: log: split family specific code to nf_log_{ip,ip6,common}.c files")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 7980d2eabde82be86c5be18aa3d07e88ec13c6a1 ]
fq qdisc requires tstamp to be cleared in forwarding path
Reported-by: Evgeny B <abt-admin@mail.ru>
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=209427
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Fixes: 8203e2d844d3 ("net: clear skb->tstamp in forwarding paths")
Fixes: fb420d5d91c1 ("tcp/fq: move back to CLOCK_MONOTONIC")
Fixes: 80b14dee2bea ("net: Add a new socket option for a future transmit time.")
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit ab10c22bc3b2024f0c9eafa463899a071eac8d97 ]
When dumping wiphy information, we try to split the data into
many submessages, but for old userspace we still support the
old mode where this doesn't happen.
However, in this case we were not resetting our state correctly
and dumping multiple messages for each wiphy, which would have
broken such older userspace.
This was broken pretty much immediately afterwards because it
only worked in the original commit where non-split dumps didn't
have any more data than split dumps...
Fixes: fe1abafd942f ("nl80211: re-add channel width and extended capa advertising")
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200928130717.3e6d9c6bada2.Ie0f151a8d0d00a8e1e18f6a8c9244dd02496af67@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 6c8b6e4a5f745ec49286ac0a3f1d591a34818f82 ]
The SRG min and max offset won't present when SRG Information Present of
SR control field of Spatial Reuse Parameter Set element set to 0. Per
spec. IEEE802.11ax D7.0, SRG OBSS PD Min Offset ≤ SRG OBSS PD Max
Offset. Hence fix the constrain check to allow same values in both
offset and also call appropriate nla_get function to read the values.
Fixes: 796e90f42b7e ("cfg80211: add support for parsing OBBS_PD attributes")
Signed-off-by: Rajkumar Manoharan <rmanohar@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1601278091-20313-1-git-send-email-rmanohar@codeaurora.org
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit b38e7819cae946e2edf869e604af1e65a5d241c5 ]
Keyu Man reported that the ICMP rate limiter could be used
by attackers to get useful signal. Details will be provided
in an upcoming academic publication.
Our solution is to add some noise, so that the attackers
no longer can get help from the predictable token bucket limiter.
Fixes: 4cdf507d5452 ("icmp: add a global rate limitation")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Keyu Man <kman001@ucr.edu>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 18ded910b589839e38a51623a179837ab4cc3789 ]
In the header prediction fast path for a bulk data receiver, if no
data is newly acknowledged then we do not call tcp_ack() and do not
call tcp_ack_update_window(). This means that a bulk receiver that
receives large amounts of data can have the incoming sequence numbers
wrap, so that the check in tcp_may_update_window fails:
after(ack_seq, tp->snd_wl1)
If the incoming receive windows are zero in this state, and then the
connection that was a bulk data receiver later wants to send data,
that connection can find itself persistently rejecting the window
updates in incoming ACKs. This means the connection can persistently
fail to discover that the receive window has opened, which in turn
means that the connection is unable to send anything, and the
connection's sending process can get permanently "stuck".
The fix is to update snd_wl1 in the header prediction fast path for a
bulk data receiver, so that it keeps up and does not see wrapping
problems.
This fix is based on a very nice and thorough analysis and diagnosis
by Apollon Oikonomopoulos (see link below).
This is a stable candidate but there is no Fixes tag here since the
bug predates current git history. Just for fun: looks like the bug
dates back to when header prediction was added in Linux v2.1.8 in Nov
1996. In that version tcp_rcv_established() was added, and the code
only updates snd_wl1 in tcp_ack(), and in the new "Bulk data transfer:
receiver" code path it does not call tcp_ack(). This fix seems to
apply cleanly at least as far back as v3.2.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Reported-by: Apollon Oikonomopoulos <apoikos@dmesg.gr>
Tested-by: Apollon Oikonomopoulos <apoikos@dmesg.gr>
Link: https://www.spinics.net/lists/netdev/msg692430.html
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201022143331.1887495-1-ncardwell.kernel@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 280e3ebdafb863b3cb50d5842f056267e15bf40c ]
Check that the NFC_ATTR_FIRMWARE_NAME attributes are provided by
the netlink client prior to accessing them.This prevents potential
unhandled NULL pointer dereference exceptions which can be triggered
by malicious user-mode programs, if they omit one or both of these
attributes.
Similar to commit a0323b979f81 ("nfc: Ensure presence of required attributes in the activate_target handler").
Fixes: 9674da8759df ("NFC: Add firmware upload netlink command")
Signed-off-by: Defang Bo <bodefang@126.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1603107538-4744-1-git-send-email-bodefang@126.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit df6afe2f7c19349de2ee560dc62ea4d9ad3ff889 ]
While insertion of 16k nexthops all using the same netdev ('dummy10')
takes less than a second, deletion takes about 130 seconds:
# time -p ip -b nexthop.batch
real 0.29
user 0.01
sys 0.15
# time -p ip link set dev dummy10 down
real 131.03
user 0.06
sys 0.52
This is because of repeated calls to synchronize_rcu() whenever a
nexthop is removed from a nexthop group:
# /usr/share/bcc/tools/offcputime -p `pgrep -nx ip` -K
...
b'finish_task_switch'
b'schedule'
b'schedule_timeout'
b'wait_for_completion'
b'__wait_rcu_gp'
b'synchronize_rcu.part.0'
b'synchronize_rcu'
b'__remove_nexthop'
b'remove_nexthop'
b'nexthop_flush_dev'
b'nh_netdev_event'
b'raw_notifier_call_chain'
b'call_netdevice_notifiers_info'
b'__dev_notify_flags'
b'dev_change_flags'
b'do_setlink'
b'__rtnl_newlink'
b'rtnl_newlink'
b'rtnetlink_rcv_msg'
b'netlink_rcv_skb'
b'rtnetlink_rcv'
b'netlink_unicast'
b'netlink_sendmsg'
b'____sys_sendmsg'
b'___sys_sendmsg'
b'__sys_sendmsg'
b'__x64_sys_sendmsg'
b'do_syscall_64'
b'entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe'
- ip (277)
126554955
Since nexthops are always deleted under RTNL, synchronize_net() can be
used instead. It will call synchronize_rcu_expedited() which only blocks
for several microseconds as opposed to multiple milliseconds like
synchronize_rcu().
With this patch deletion of 16k nexthops takes less than a second:
# time -p ip link set dev dummy10 down
real 0.12
user 0.00
sys 0.04
Tested with fib_nexthops.sh which includes torture tests that prompted
the initial change:
# ./fib_nexthops.sh
...
Tests passed: 134
Tests failed: 0
Fixes: 90f33bffa382 ("nexthops: don't modify published nexthop groups")
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Jesse Brandeburg <jesse.brandeburg@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@nvidia.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201016172914.643282-1-idosch@idosch.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit a7a12b5a0f950bc6b9f7153390634ea798738db9 ]
the following command
# tc action add action tunnel_key \
> set src_ip 2001:db8::1 dst_ip 2001:db8::2 id 10 erspan_opts 1:6789:0:0
generates the following splat:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in tunnel_key_copy_opts+0xcc9/0x1010 [act_tunnel_key]
Write of size 4 at addr ffff88813f5f1cc8 by task tc/873
CPU: 2 PID: 873 Comm: tc Not tainted 5.9.0+ #282
Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x99/0xcb
print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1e/0x230
kasan_report.cold.13+0x37/0x7c
tunnel_key_copy_opts+0xcc9/0x1010 [act_tunnel_key]
tunnel_key_init+0x160c/0x1f40 [act_tunnel_key]
tcf_action_init_1+0x5b5/0x850
tcf_action_init+0x15d/0x370
tcf_action_add+0xd9/0x2f0
tc_ctl_action+0x29b/0x3a0
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x341/0x8d0
netlink_rcv_skb+0x120/0x380
netlink_unicast+0x439/0x630
netlink_sendmsg+0x719/0xbf0
sock_sendmsg+0xe2/0x110
____sys_sendmsg+0x5ba/0x890
___sys_sendmsg+0xe9/0x160
__sys_sendmsg+0xd3/0x170
do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x7f872a96b338
Code: 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b5 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 8d 05 25 43 2c 00 8b 00 85 c0 75 17 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 58 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 41 54 41 89 d4 55
RSP: 002b:00007ffffe367518 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000005f8f5aed RCX: 00007f872a96b338
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffffe367580 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 000000000000001c
R10: 000000000000000b R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: 0000000000686760 R14: 0000000000000601 R15: 0000000000000000
Allocated by task 873:
kasan_save_stack+0x19/0x40
__kasan_kmalloc.constprop.7+0xc1/0xd0
__kmalloc+0x151/0x310
metadata_dst_alloc+0x20/0x40
tunnel_key_init+0xfff/0x1f40 [act_tunnel_key]
tcf_action_init_1+0x5b5/0x850
tcf_action_init+0x15d/0x370
tcf_action_add+0xd9/0x2f0
tc_ctl_action+0x29b/0x3a0
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x341/0x8d0
netlink_rcv_skb+0x120/0x380
netlink_unicast+0x439/0x630
netlink_sendmsg+0x719/0xbf0
sock_sendmsg+0xe2/0x110
____sys_sendmsg+0x5ba/0x890
___sys_sendmsg+0xe9/0x160
__sys_sendmsg+0xd3/0x170
do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88813f5f1c00
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-256 of size 256
The buggy address is located 200 bytes inside of
256-byte region [ffff88813f5f1c00, ffff88813f5f1d00)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:0000000011b48a19 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x13f5f0
head:0000000011b48a19 order:1 compound_mapcount:0
flags: 0x17ffffc0010200(slab|head)
raw: 0017ffffc0010200 0000000000000000 0000000d00000001 ffff888107c43400
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff88813f5f1b80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff88813f5f1c00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>ffff88813f5f1c80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
^
ffff88813f5f1d00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff88813f5f1d80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
using IPv6 tunnels, act_tunnel_key allocates a fixed amount of memory for
the tunnel metadata, but then it expects additional bytes to store tunnel
specific metadata with tunnel_key_copy_opts().
Fix the arguments of __ipv6_tun_set_dst(), so that 'md_size' contains the
size previously computed by tunnel_key_get_opts_len(), like it's done for
IPv4 tunnels.
Fixes: 0ed5269f9e41 ("net/sched: add tunnel option support to act_tunnel_key")
Reported-by: Shuang Li <shuali@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/36ebe969f6d13ff59912d6464a4356fe6f103766.1603231100.git.dcaratti@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 700465fd338fe5df08a1b2e27fa16981f562547f ]
In setsockopt(SO_MAX_PACING_RATE) on 64bit systems, sk_max_pacing_rate,
after extended from 'u32' to 'unsigned long', takes unintentionally
hiked value whenever assigned from an 'int' value with MSB=1, due to
binary sign extension in promoting s32 to u64, e.g. 0x80000000 becomes
0xFFFFFFFF80000000.
Thus inflated sk_max_pacing_rate causes subsequent getsockopt to return
~0U unexpectedly. It may also result in increased pacing rate.
Fix by explicitly casting the 'int' value to 'unsigned int' before
assigning it to sk_max_pacing_rate, for zero extension to happen.
Fixes: 76a9ebe811fb ("net: extend sk_pacing_rate to unsigned long")
Signed-off-by: Ji Li <jli@akamai.com>
Signed-off-by: Ke Li <keli@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201022064146.79873-1-keli@akamai.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 13ba4c434422837d7c8c163f9c8d854e67bf3c99 ]
This patch add the initialization of skbcnt, similar to:
e009f95b1543 can: j1935: j1939_tp_tx_dat_new(): fix missing initialization of skbcnt
Let's play save and initialize this skbcnt as well.
Suggested-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Fixes: 9d71dd0c7009 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol")
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit e009f95b1543e26606dca2f7e6e9f0f9174538e5 ]
This fixes an uninit-value warning:
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in can_receive+0x26b/0x630 net/can/af_can.c:650
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+3f3837e61a48d32b495f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 9d71dd0c7009 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol")
Cc: Robin van der Gracht <robin@protonic.nl>
Cc: Oleksij Rempel <linux@rempel-privat.de>
Cc: Pengutronix Kernel Team <kernel@pengutronix.de>
Cc: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
Cc: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201008061821.24663-1-xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 59e611a566e7cd48cf54b6777a11fe3f9c2f9db5 ]
The comparison of optname with SO_TIMESTAMPING_NEW is wrong way around,
so SOCK_TSTAMP_NEW will first be set and than reset again. Additionally
move it out of the test for SOF_TIMESTAMPING_RX_SOFTWARE as this seems
unrelated.
This problem happens on 32 bit platforms were the libc has already
switched to struct timespec64 (from SO_TIMExxx_OLD to SO_TIMExxx_NEW
socket options). ptp4l complains with "missing timestamp on transmitted
peer delay request" because the wrong format is received (and
discarded).
Fixes: 9718475e6908 ("socket: Add SO_TIMESTAMPING_NEW")
Signed-off-by: Christian Eggers <ceggers@arri.de>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Deepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Acked-by: Deepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit ed42989eab57d619667d7e87dfbd8fe207db54fe ]
skb_unshare() drops a reference count on the old skb unconditionally,
so in the failure case, we end up freeing the skb twice here.
And because the skb is allocated in fclone and cloned by caller
tipc_msg_reassemble(), the consequence is actually freeing the
original skb too, thus triggered the UAF by syzbot.
Fix this by replacing this skb_unshare() with skb_cloned()+skb_copy().
Fixes: ff48b6222e65 ("tipc: use skb_unshare() instead in tipc_buf_append()")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+e96a7ba46281824cc46a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
Cc: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit ea1dd3e9d080c961b9a451130b61c72dc9a5397b ]
At first when sendpage gets called, if there is more data, 'more' in
tls_push_data() gets set which later sets pending_open_record_frags, but
when there is no more data in file left, and last time tls_push_data()
gets called, pending_open_record_frags doesn't get reset. And later when
2 bytes of encrypted alert comes as sendmsg, it first checks for
pending_open_record_frags, and since this is set, it creates a record with
0 data bytes to encrypt, meaning record length is prepend_size + tag_size
only, which causes problem.
We should set/reset pending_open_record_frags based on more bit.
Fixes: e8f69799810c ("net/tls: Add generic NIC offload infrastructure")
Signed-off-by: Rohit Maheshwari <rohitm@chelsio.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit ef12ad45880b696eb993d86c481ca891836ab593 ]
The SMCD_DMBE_SIZES should include all valid DMBE buffer sizes, so the
correct value is 6 which means 1MB. With 7 the registration of an ISM
buffer would always fail because of the invalid size requested.
Fix that and set the value to 6.
Fixes: c6ba7c9ba43d ("net/smc: add base infrastructure for SMC-D and ISM")
Signed-off-by: Karsten Graul <kgraul@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 6617dfd440149e42ce4d2be615eb31a4755f4d30 ]
Commit 4fc427e05158 ("ipv6_route_seq_next should increase position index")
tried to fix the issue where seq_file pos is not increased
if a NULL element is returned with seq_ops->next(). See bug
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206283
The commit effectively does:
- increase pos for all seq_ops->start()
- increase pos for all seq_ops->next()
For ipv6_route, increasing pos for all seq_ops->next() is correct.
But increasing pos for seq_ops->start() is not correct
since pos is used to determine how many items to skip during
seq_ops->start():
iter->skip = *pos;
seq_ops->start() just fetches the *current* pos item.
The item can be skipped only after seq_ops->show() which essentially
is the beginning of seq_ops->next().
For example, I have 7 ipv6 route entries,
root@arch-fb-vm1:~/net-next dd if=/proc/net/ipv6_route bs=4096
00000000000000000000000000000000 40 00000000000000000000000000000000 00 00000000000000000000000000000000 00000400 00000001 00000000 00000001 eth0
fe800000000000000000000000000000 40 00000000000000000000000000000000 00 00000000000000000000000000000000 00000100 00000001 00000000 00000001 eth0
00000000000000000000000000000000 00 00000000000000000000000000000000 00 00000000000000000000000000000000 ffffffff 00000001 00000000 00200200 lo
00000000000000000000000000000001 80 00000000000000000000000000000000 00 00000000000000000000000000000000 00000000 00000003 00000000 80200001 lo
fe800000000000002050e3fffebd3be8 80 00000000000000000000000000000000 00 00000000000000000000000000000000 00000000 00000002 00000000 80200001 eth0
ff000000000000000000000000000000 08 00000000000000000000000000000000 00 00000000000000000000000000000000 00000100 00000004 00000000 00000001 eth0
00000000000000000000000000000000 00 00000000000000000000000000000000 00 00000000000000000000000000000000 ffffffff 00000001 00000000 00200200 lo
0+1 records in
0+1 records out
1050 bytes (1.0 kB, 1.0 KiB) copied, 0.00707908 s, 148 kB/s
root@arch-fb-vm1:~/net-next
In the above, I specify buffer size 4096, so all records can be returned
to user space with a single trip to the kernel.
If I use buffer size 128, since each record size is 149, internally
kernel seq_read() will read 149 into its internal buffer and return the data
to user space in two read() syscalls. Then user read() syscall will trigger
next seq_ops->start(). Since the current implementation increased pos even
for seq_ops->start(), it will skip record #2, #4 and #6, assuming the first
record is #1.
root@arch-fb-vm1:~/net-next dd if=/proc/net/ipv6_route bs=128
00000000000000000000000000000000 40 00000000000000000000000000000000 00 00000000000000000000000000000000 00000400 00000001 00000000 00000001 eth0
00000000000000000000000000000000 00 00000000000000000000000000000000 00 00000000000000000000000000000000 ffffffff 00000001 00000000 00200200 lo
fe800000000000002050e3fffebd3be8 80 00000000000000000000000000000000 00 00000000000000000000000000000000 00000000 00000002 00000000 80200001 eth0
00000000000000000000000000000000 00 00000000000000000000000000000000 00 00000000000000000000000000000000 ffffffff 00000001 00000000 00200200 lo
4+1 records in
4+1 records out
600 bytes copied, 0.00127758 s, 470 kB/s
To fix the problem, create a fake pos pointer so seq_ops->start()
won't actually increase seq_file pos. With this fix, the
above `dd` command with `bs=128` will show correct result.
Fixes: 4fc427e05158 ("ipv6_route_seq_next should increase position index")
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 874fb9e2ca949b443cc419a4f2227cafd4381d39 ]
Tobias reported regressions in IPsec tests following the patch
referenced by the Fixes tag below. The root cause is dropping the
reset of the flowi4_oif after the fib_lookup. Apparently it is
needed for xfrm cases, so restore the oif update to ip_route_output_flow
right before the call to xfrm_lookup_route.
Fixes: 2fbc6e89b2f1 ("ipv4: Update exception handling for multipath routes via same device")
Reported-by: Tobias Brunner <tobias@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3ca44c16b0dcc764b641ee4ac226909f5c421aa3 upstream.
This makes hci_encrypt_cfm calls hci_connect_cfm in case the connection
state is BT_CONFIG so callers don't have to check the state.
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Hans-Christian Noren Egtvedt <hegtvedt@cisco.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b560a208cda0297fef6ff85bbfd58a8f0a52a543 upstream.
This checks if BT_HS is enabled relecting it on MGMT_SETTING_HS instead
of always reporting it as supported.
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f19425641cb2572a33cb074d5e30283720bd4d22 upstream.
Only sockets will have the chan->data set to an actual sk, channels
like A2MP would have its own data which would likely cause a crash when
calling sk_filter, in order to fix this a new callback has been
introduced so channels can implement their own filtering if necessary.
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit eddb7732119d53400f48a02536a84c509692faa8 upstream.
This fixes various places where a stack variable is used uninitialized.
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0fedc63fadf0404a729e73a35349481c8009c02f upstream.
syzbot is able to trigger a failure case inside the loop in
tcf_action_init(), and when this happens we clean up with
tcf_action_destroy(). But, as these actions are already inserted
into the global IDR, other parallel process could free them
before tcf_action_destroy(), then we will trigger a use-after-free.
Fix this by deferring the insertions even later, after the loop,
and committing all the insertions in a separate loop, so we will
never fail in the middle of the insertions any more.
One side effect is that the window between alloction and final
insertion becomes larger, now it is more likely that the loop in
tcf_del_walker() sees the placeholder -EBUSY pointer. So we have
to check for error pointer in tcf_del_walker().
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+2287853d392e4b42374a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 0190c1d452a9 ("net: sched: atomically check-allocate action")
Cc: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@mellanox.com>
Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e49d8c22f1261c43a986a7fdbf677ac309682a07 upstream.
All TC actions call tcf_idr_insert() for new action at the end
of their ->init(), so we can actually move it to a central place
in tcf_action_init_1().
And once the action is inserted into the global IDR, other parallel
process could free it immediately as its refcnt is still 1, so we can
not fail after this, we need to move it after the goto action
validation to avoid handling the failure case after insertion.
This is found during code review, is not directly triggered by syzbot.
And this prepares for the next patch.
Cc: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@mellanox.com>
Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4296adc3e32f5d544a95061160fe7e127be1b9ff upstream.
Openvswitch allows to drop a packet's Ethernet header, therefore
skb_mpls_push() and skb_mpls_pop() might be called with ethernet=true
and mac_len=0. In that case the pointer passed to skb_mod_eth_type()
doesn't point to an Ethernet header and the new Ethertype is written at
unexpected locations.
Fix this by verifying that mac_len is big enough to contain an Ethernet
header.
Fixes: fa4e0f8855fc ("net/sched: fix corrupted L2 header with MPLS 'push' and 'pop' actions")
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 86bccd0367130f481ca99ba91de1c6a5aa1c78c1 upstream.
We got reports from GKE customers flows being reset by netfilter
conntrack unless nf_conntrack_tcp_be_liberal is set to 1.
Traces seemed to suggest ACK packet being dropped by the
packet capture, or more likely that ACK were received in the
wrong order.
wscale=7, SYN and SYNACK not shown here.
This ACK allows the sender to send 1871*128 bytes from seq 51359321 :
New right edge of the window -> 51359321+1871*128=51598809
09:17:23.389210 IP A > B: Flags [.], ack 51359321, win 1871, options [nop,nop,TS val 10 ecr 999], length 0
09:17:23.389212 IP B > A: Flags [.], seq 51422681:51424089, ack 1577, win 268, options [nop,nop,TS val 999 ecr 10], length 1408
09:17:23.389214 IP A > B: Flags [.], ack 51422681, win 1376, options [nop,nop,TS val 10 ecr 999], length 0
09:17:23.389253 IP B > A: Flags [.], seq 51424089:51488857, ack 1577, win 268, options [nop,nop,TS val 999 ecr 10], length 64768
09:17:23.389272 IP A > B: Flags [.], ack 51488857, win 859, options [nop,nop,TS val 10 ecr 999], length 0
09:17:23.389275 IP B > A: Flags [.], seq 51488857:51521241, ack 1577, win 268, options [nop,nop,TS val 999 ecr 10], length 32384
Receiver now allows to send 606*128=77568 from seq 51521241 :
New right edge of the window -> 51521241+606*128=51598809
09:17:23.389296 IP A > B: Flags [.], ack 51521241, win 606, options [nop,nop,TS val 10 ecr 999], length 0
09:17:23.389308 IP B > A: Flags [.], seq 51521241:51553625, ack 1577, win 268, options [nop,nop,TS val 999 ecr 10], length 32384
It seems the sender exceeds RWIN allowance, since 51611353 > 51598809
09:17:23.389346 IP B > A: Flags [.], seq 51553625:51611353, ack 1577, win 268, options [nop,nop,TS val 999 ecr 10], length 57728
09:17:23.389356 IP B > A: Flags [.], seq 51611353:51618393, ack 1577, win 268, options [nop,nop,TS val 999 ecr 10], length 7040
09:17:23.389367 IP A > B: Flags [.], ack 51611353, win 0, options [nop,nop,TS val 10 ecr 999], length 0
netfilter conntrack is not happy and sends RST
09:17:23.389389 IP A > B: Flags [R], seq 92176528, win 0, length 0
09:17:23.389488 IP B > A: Flags [R], seq 174478967, win 0, length 0
Now imagine ACK were delivered out of order and tcp_add_backlog() sets window based on wrong packet.
New right edge of the window -> 51521241+859*128=51631193
Normally TCP stack handles OOO packets just fine, but it
turns out tcp_add_backlog() does not. It can update the window
field of the aggregated packet even if the ACK sequence
of the last received packet is too old.
Many thanks to Alexandre Ferrieux for independently reporting the issue
and suggesting a fix.
Fixes: 4f693b55c3d2 ("tcp: implement coalescing on backlog queue")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Alexandre Ferrieux <alexandre.ferrieux@orange.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 38b1dc47a35ba14c3f4472138ea56d014c2d609b ]
If someone calls setsockopt() twice to set a server key keyring, the first
keyring is leaked.
Fix it to return an error instead if the server key keyring is already set.
Fixes: 17926a79320a ("[AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit fea99111244bae44e7d82a973744d27ea1567814 ]
The keyring containing the server's tokens isn't network-namespaced, so it
shouldn't be looked up with a network namespace. It is expected to be
owned specifically by the server, so namespacing is unnecessary.
Fixes: a58946c158a0 ("keys: Pass the network namespace into request_key mechanism")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit fa1d113a0f96f9ab7e4fe4f8825753ba1e34a9d3 ]
conn->state_lock may be taken in softirq mode, but a previous patch
replaced an outer lock in the response-packet event handling code, and lost
the _bh from that when doing so.
Fix this by applying the _bh annotation to the state_lock locking.
Fixes: a1399f8bb033 ("rxrpc: Call channels should have separate call number spaces")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 9a059cd5ca7d9c5c4ca5a6e755cf72f230176b6a ]
If rxrpc_read() (which allows KEYCTL_READ to read a key), sees a token of a
type it doesn't recognise, it can BUG in a couple of places, which is
unnecessary as it can easily get back to userspace.
Fix this to print an error message instead.
Fixes: 99455153d067 ("RxRPC: Parse security index 5 keys (Kerberos 5)")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 56305118e05b2db8d0395bba640ac9a3aee92624 ]
The session key should be encoded with just the 8 data bytes and
no length; ENCODE_DATA precedes it with a 4 byte length, which
confuses some existing tools that try to parse this format.
Add an ENCODE_BYTES macro that does not include a length, and use
it for the key. Also adjust the expected length.
Note that commit 774521f353e1d ("rxrpc: Fix an assertion in
rxrpc_read()") had fixed a BUG by changing the length rather than
fixing the encoding. The original length was correct.
Fixes: 99455153d067 ("RxRPC: Parse security index 5 keys (Kerberos 5)")
Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit e94ee171349db84c7cfdc5fefbebe414054d0924 ]
The struct flowi must never be interpreted by itself as its size
depends on the address family. Therefore it must always be grouped
with its original family value.
In this particular instance, the original family value is lost in
the function xfrm_state_find. Therefore we get a bogus read when
it's coupled with the wrong family which would occur with inter-
family xfrm states.
This patch fixes it by keeping the original family value.
Note that the same bug could potentially occur in LSM through
the xfrm_state_pol_flow_match hook. I checked the current code
there and it seems to be safe for now as only secid is used which
is part of struct flowi_common. But that API should be changed
so that so that we don't get new bugs in the future. We could
do that by replacing fl with just secid or adding a family field.
Reported-by: syzbot+577fbac3145a6eb2e7a5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 48b8d78315bf ("[XFRM]: State selection update to use inner...")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 8366685b2883e523f91e9816d7be371eb1144749 ]
When we clone state only add_time was cloned. It missed values like
bytes, packets. Now clone the all members of the structure.
v1->v3:
- use memcpy to copy the entire structure
Fixes: 80c9abaabf42 ("[XFRM]: Extension for dynamic update of endpoint address(es)")
Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 7aa05d304785204703a67a6aa7f1db402889a172 ]
XFRMA_SEC_CTX was not cloned from the old to the new.
Migrate this attribute during XFRMA_MSG_MIGRATE
v1->v2:
- return -ENOMEM on error
v2->v3:
- fix return type to int
Fixes: 80c9abaabf42 ("[XFRM]: Extension for dynamic update of endpoint address(es)")
Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 545e5c571662b1cd79d9588f9d3b6e36985b8007 ]
XFRMA_SET_MARK and XFRMA_SET_MARK_MASK was not cloned from the old
to the new. Migrate these two attributes during XFRMA_MSG_MIGRATE
Fixes: 9b42c1f179a6 ("xfrm: Extend the output_mark to support input direction and masking.")
Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 8aa7b526dc0b5dbf40c1b834d76a667ad672a410 upstream.
With multiple DNAT rules it's possible that after destination
translation the resulting tuples collide.
For example, two openvswitch flows:
nw_dst=10.0.0.10,tp_dst=10, actions=ct(commit,table=2,nat(dst=20.0.0.1:20))
nw_dst=10.0.0.20,tp_dst=10, actions=ct(commit,table=2,nat(dst=20.0.0.1:20))
Assuming two TCP clients initiating the following connections:
10.0.0.10:5000->10.0.0.10:10
10.0.0.10:5000->10.0.0.20:10
Both tuples would translate to 10.0.0.10:5000->20.0.0.1:20 causing
nf_conntrack_confirm() to fail because of tuple collision.
Netfilter handles this case by allocating a null binding for SNAT at
egress by default. Perform the same operation in openvswitch for DNAT
if no explicit SNAT is requested by the user and allocate a null binding
for SNAT for packets in the "original" direction.
Reported-at: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/1877128
Suggested-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Fixes: 05752523e565 ("openvswitch: Interface with NAT.")
Signed-off-by: Dumitru Ceara <dceara@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 45a36a18d01907710bad5258d81f76c18882ad88 upstream.
xfrm interfaces currently test for !skb->ignore_df when deciding
whether to update the pmtu on the skb's dst. Because of this, no pmtu
exception is created when we do something like:
ping -s 1438 <dest>
By dropping this check, the pmtu exception will be created and the
next ping attempt will work.
Fixes: f203b76d7809 ("xfrm: Add virtual xfrm interfaces")
Reported-by: Xiumei Mu <xmu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit cf83a17edeeb36195596d2dae060a7c381db35f1 upstream.
commit a10674bf2406 ("tcp: detecting the misuse of .sendpage for Slab
objects") adds the checks for Slab pages, but the pages don't have
page_count are still missing from the check.
Network layer's sendpage method is not designed to send page_count 0
pages neither, therefore both PageSlab() and page_count() should be
both checked for the sending page. This is exactly what sendpage_ok()
does.
This patch uses sendpage_ok() in do_tcp_sendpages() to detect misused
.sendpage, to make the code more robust.
Fixes: a10674bf2406 ("tcp: detecting the misuse of .sendpage for Slab objects")
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Cc: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3dc289f8f139997f4e9d3cfccf8738f20d23e47b upstream.
In nl80211_parse_key(), key.idx is first initialized as -1.
If this value of key.idx remains unmodified and gets returned, and
nl80211_key_allowed() also returns 0, then rdev_del_key() gets called
with key.idx = -1.
This causes an out-of-bounds array access.
Handle this issue by checking if the value of key.idx after
nl80211_parse_key() is called and return -EINVAL if key.idx < 0.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: syzbot+b1bb342d1d097516cbda@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Tested-by: syzbot+b1bb342d1d097516cbda@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Anant Thazhemadam <anant.thazhemadam@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201007035401.9522-1-anant.thazhemadam@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 1cc5ef91d2ff94d2bf2de3b3585423e8a1051cb6 upstream.
The indexes to the nf_nat_l[34]protos arrays come from userspace. So
check the tuple's family, e.g. l3num, when creating the conntrack in
order to prevent an OOB memory access during setup. Here is an example
kernel panic on 4.14.180 when userspace passes in an index greater than
NFPROTO_NUMPROTO.
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in:...
Process poc (pid: 5614, stack limit = 0x00000000a3933121)
CPU: 4 PID: 5614 Comm: poc Tainted: G S W O 4.14.180-g051355490483
Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. SM8150 V2 PM8150 Google Inc. MSM
task: 000000002a3dfffe task.stack: 00000000a3933121
pc : __cfi_check_fail+0x1c/0x24
lr : __cfi_check_fail+0x1c/0x24
...
Call trace:
__cfi_check_fail+0x1c/0x24
name_to_dev_t+0x0/0x468
nfnetlink_parse_nat_setup+0x234/0x258
ctnetlink_parse_nat_setup+0x4c/0x228
ctnetlink_new_conntrack+0x590/0xc40
nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x31c/0x4d4
netlink_rcv_skb+0x100/0x184
nfnetlink_rcv+0xf4/0x180
netlink_unicast+0x360/0x770
netlink_sendmsg+0x5a0/0x6a4
___sys_sendmsg+0x314/0x46c
SyS_sendmsg+0xb4/0x108
el0_svc_naked+0x34/0x38
This crash is not happening since 5.4+, however, ctnetlink still
allows for creating entries with unsupported layer 3 protocol number.
Fixes: c1d10adb4a521 ("[NETFILTER]: Add ctnetlink port for nf_conntrack")
Signed-off-by: Will McVicker <willmcvicker@google.com>
[pablo@netfilter.org: rebased original patch on top of nf.git]
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 412a84b5714af56f3eb648bba155107b5edddfdf ]
Radiotap header field 'Channel flags' has '2 GHz spectrum' set to
'true' for 6GHz packet.
Change it to 5GHz as there isn't a separate option available for 6GHz.
Signed-off-by: Aloka Dixit <alokad@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/010101747ab7b703-1d7c9851-1594-43bf-81f7-f79ce7a67cc6-000000@us-west-2.amazonses.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit df12eb6d6cd920ab2f0e0a43cd6e1c23a05cea91 ]
Whenever the vsock backend on the host sends a packet through the RX
queue, it expects an answer on the TX queue. Unfortunately, there is one
case where the host side will hang waiting for the answer and might
effectively never recover if no timeout mechanism was implemented.
This issue happens when the guest side starts binding to the socket,
which insert a new bound socket into the list of already bound sockets.
At this time, we expect the guest to also start listening, which will
trigger the sk_state to move from TCP_CLOSE to TCP_LISTEN. The problem
occurs if the host side queued a RX packet and triggered an interrupt
right between the end of the binding process and the beginning of the
listening process. In this specific case, the function processing the
packet virtio_transport_recv_pkt() will find a bound socket, which means
it will hit the switch statement checking for the sk_state, but the
state won't be changed into TCP_LISTEN yet, which leads the code to pick
the default statement. This default statement will only free the buffer,
while it should also respond to the host side, by sending a packet on
its TX queue.
In order to simply fix this unfortunate chain of events, it is important
that in case the default statement is entered, and because at this stage
we know the host side is waiting for an answer, we must send back a
packet containing the operation VIRTIO_VSOCK_OP_RST.
One could say that a proper timeout mechanism on the host side will be
enough to avoid the backend to hang. But the point of this patch is to
ensure the normal use case will be provided with proper responsiveness
when it comes to establishing the connection.
Signed-off-by: Sebastien Boeuf <sebastien.boeuf@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 4c7246dc45e2706770d5233f7ce1597a07e069ba ]
We are going to add 'struct vsock_sock *' parameter to
virtio_transport_get_ops().
In some cases, like in the virtio_transport_reset_no_sock(),
we don't have any socket assigned to the packet received,
so we can't use the virtio_transport_get_ops().
In order to allow virtio_transport_reset_no_sock() to use the
'.send_pkt' callback from the 'vhost_transport' or 'virtio_transport',
we add the 'struct virtio_transport *' to it and to its caller:
virtio_transport_recv_pkt().
We moved the 'vhost_transport' and 'virtio_transport' definition,
to pass their address to the virtio_transport_recv_pkt().
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
