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commit f4e3634a3b642225a530c292fdb1e8a4007507f5 upstream.
UBIFS may occur some problems with concurrent xattr_{set|get} and
listxattr operations, such as assertion failure, memory corruption,
stale xattr value[1].
Fix it by importing a new rw-lock in @ubifs_inode to serilize write
operations on xattr, concurrent read operations are still effective,
just like ext4.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mtd/20200630130438.141649-1-houtao1@huawei.com
Fixes: 1e51764a3c2ac05a23 ("UBIFS: add new flash file system")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6+
Signed-off-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 77f30bfcfcf484da7208affd6a9e63406420bf91 upstream.
When initializing a no-key name, fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr() sets the
minor_hash to 0 if the (major) hash is 0.
This doesn't make sense because 0 is a valid hash code, so we shouldn't
ignore the filesystem-provided minor_hash in that case. Fix this by
removing the special case for 'hash == 0'.
This is an old bug that appears to have originated when the encryption
code in ext4 and f2fs was moved into fs/crypto/. The original ext4 and
f2fs code passed the hash by pointer instead of by value. So
'if (hash)' actually made sense then, as it was checking whether a
pointer was NULL. But now the hashes are passed by value, and
filesystems just pass 0 for any hashes they don't have. There is no
need to handle this any differently from the hashes actually being 0.
It is difficult to reproduce this bug, as it only made a difference in
the case where a filename's 32-bit major hash happened to be 0.
However, it probably had the largest chance of causing problems on
ubifs, since ubifs uses minor_hash to do lookups of no-key names, in
addition to using it as a readdir cookie. ext4 only uses minor_hash as
a readdir cookie, and f2fs doesn't use minor_hash at all.
Fixes: 0b81d0779072 ("fs crypto: move per-file encryption from f2fs tree to fs/crypto")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.6+
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210527235236.2376556-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit fa236c2b2d4436d9f19ee4e5d5924e90ffd7bb43 ]
In function udf_symlink, epos.bh is assigned with the value returned
by udf_tgetblk. The function udf_tgetblk is defined in udf/misc.c
and returns the value of sb_getblk function that could be NULL.
Then, epos.bh is used without any check, causing a possible
NULL pointer dereference when sb_getblk fails.
This fix adds a check to validate the value of epos.bh.
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=213083
Signed-off-by: Arturo Giusti <koredump@protonmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit a149127be52fa7eaf5b3681a0317a2bbb772d5a9 ]
syzbot reported divide error in reiserfs.
The problem was in incorrect journal 1st block.
Syzbot's reproducer manualy generated wrong superblock
with incorrect 1st block. In journal_init() wasn't
any checks about this particular case.
For example, if 1st journal block is before superblock
1st block, it can cause zeroing important superblock members
in do_journal_end().
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210517121545.29645-1-paskripkin@gmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+0ba9909df31c6a36974d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 3c252b087de08d3cb32468b54a158bd7ad0ae2f7 ]
When reading binary attributes in progress, buffer->bin_buffer is setup in
configfs_read_bin_file() but never freed.
Fixes: 03607ace807b4 ("configfs: implement binary attributes")
Signed-off-by: Chung-Chiang Cheng <cccheng@synology.com>
[hch: move the vfree rather than duplicating it]
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 8b0ed8443ae6458786580d36b7d5f8125535c5d4 ]
The caller of wb_get_create() should pin the memcg, because
wb_get_create() relies on this guarantee. The rcu read lock
only can guarantee that the memcg css returned by css_from_id()
cannot be released, but the reference of the memcg can be zero.
rcu_read_lock()
memcg_css = css_from_id()
wb_get_create(memcg_css)
cgwb_create(memcg_css)
// css_get can change the ref counter from 0 back to 1
css_get(memcg_css)
rcu_read_unlock()
Fix it by holding a reference to the css before calling
wb_get_create(). This is not a problem I encountered in the
real world. Just the result of a code review.
Fixes: 682aa8e1a6a1 ("writeback: implement unlocked_inode_to_wb transaction and use it for stat updates")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210402091145.80635-1-songmuchun@bytedance.com
Signed-off-by: Muchun Song <songmuchun@bytedance.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 1a14e3779dd58c16b30e56558146e5cc850ba8b0 ]
grab_mapping_entry() has a bug in handling of ENOMEM condition. Suppose
we have a PMD entry at index i which we are downgrading to a PTE entry.
grab_mapping_entry() will set pmd_downgrade to true, lock the entry, clear
the entry in xarray, and decrement mapping->nrpages. The it will call:
entry = dax_make_entry(pfn_to_pfn_t(0), flags);
dax_lock_entry(xas, entry);
which inserts new PTE entry into xarray. However this may fail allocating
the new node. We handle this by:
if (xas_nomem(xas, mapping_gfp_mask(mapping) & ~__GFP_HIGHMEM))
goto retry;
however pmd_downgrade stays set to true even though 'entry' returned from
get_unlocked_entry() will be NULL now. And we will go again through the
downgrade branch. This is mostly harmless except that mapping->nrpages is
decremented again and we temporarily have an invalid entry stored in
xarray. Fix the problem by setting pmd_downgrade to false each time we
lookup the entry we work with so that it matches the entry we found.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210622160015.18004-1-jack@suse.cz
Fixes: b15cd800682f ("dax: Convert page fault handlers to XArray")
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 54e948c60cc843b6e84dc44496edc91f51d2a28e ]
The snprintf() function returns the number of bytes which would have been
printed if the buffer was large enough. In other words it can return ">=
remain" but this code assumes it returns "== remain".
The run time impact of this bug is not very severe. The next iteration
through the loop would trigger a WARN() when we pass a negative limit to
snprintf(). We would then return success instead of -E2BIG.
The kernel implementation of snprintf() will never return negatives so
there is no need to check and I have deleted that dead code.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210511135350.GV1955@kadam
Fixes: a860f6eb4c6a ("ocfs2: sysfile interfaces for online file check")
Fixes: 74ae4e104dfc ("ocfs2: Create stack glue sysfs files.")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 1aeb6b563aea18cd55c73cf666d1d3245a00f08c ]
When a log recovery is in progress, lots of operations have to take that
into account, so we keep this status per tree during the operation. Long
time ago error handling revamp patch 79787eaab461 ("btrfs: replace many
BUG_ONs with proper error handling") removed clearing of the status in
an error branch. Add it back as was intended in e02119d5a7b4 ("Btrfs:
Add a write ahead tree log to optimize synchronous operations").
There are probably no visible effects, log replay is done only during
mount and if it fails all structures are cleared so the stale status
won't be kept.
Fixes: 79787eaab461 ("btrfs: replace many BUG_ONs with proper error handling")
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 8826ee4fe75051f8cbfa5d4a9aa70565938e724c ]
isw_nr_in_flight is used to determine whether the inode switch queue
should be flushed from the umount path. Currently it's increased after
grabbing an inode and even scheduling the switch work. It means the
umount path can walk past cleanup_offline_cgwb() with active inode
references, which can result in a "Busy inodes after unmount." message and
use-after-free issues (with inode->i_sb which gets freed).
Fix it by incrementing isw_nr_in_flight before doing anything with the
inode and decrementing in the case when switching wasn't scheduled.
The problem hasn't yet been seen in the real life and was discovered by
Jan Kara by looking into the code.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210608230225.2078447-4-guro@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Suggested-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Cc: Dennis Zhou <dennis@kernel.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 0060a4f28a9ef45ae8163c0805e944a2b1546762 ]
In the other places where we update ses->status we protect the
updates via GlobalMid_Lock. So to be consistent add the same
locking around it in cifs_put_smb_ses where it was missing.
Addresses-Coverity: 1268904 ("Data race condition")
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit c6aa00e3d20c2767ba3f57b64eb862572b9744b3 ]
These rx tx flags arguments are for signaling close_connection() from
which worker they are called. Obviously the receive worker cannot cancel
itself and vice versa for swork. For the othercon the receive worker
should only be used, however to avoid deadlocks we should pass the same
flags as the original close_connection() was called.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Aring <aahringo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Teigland <teigland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 12e0613715e1cf305fffafaf0e89d810d9a85cc0 ]
block_dump is an old debugging interface, one of it's functions is used
to print the information about who write which file on disk. If we
enable block_dump through /proc/sys/vm/block_dump and turn on debug log
level, we can gather information about write process name, target file
name and disk from kernel message. This feature is realized in
block_dump___mark_inode_dirty(), it print above information into kernel
message directly when marking inode dirty, so it is noisy and can easily
trigger log storm. At the same time, get the dentry refcount is also not
safe, we found it will lead to deadlock on ext4 file system with
data=journal mode.
After tracepoints has been introduced into the kernel, we got a
tracepoint in __mark_inode_dirty(), which is a better replacement of
block_dump___mark_inode_dirty(). The only downside is that it only trace
the inode number and not a file name, but it probably doesn't matter
because the original printed file name in block_dump is not accurate in
some cases, and we can still find it through the inode number and device
id. So this patch delete the dirting inode part of block_dump feature.
Signed-off-by: zhangyi (F) <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210313030146.2882027-2-yi.zhang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit b05fbcc36be1f8597a1febef4892053a0b2f3f60 ]
With a config having PAGE_SIZE set to 256K, BTRFS build fails
with the following message
include/linux/compiler_types.h:326:38: error: call to
'__compiletime_assert_791' declared with attribute error:
BUILD_BUG_ON failed: (BTRFS_MAX_COMPRESSED % PAGE_SIZE) != 0
BTRFS_MAX_COMPRESSED being 128K, BTRFS cannot support platforms with
256K pages at the time being.
There are two platforms that can select 256K pages:
- hexagon
- powerpc
Disable BTRFS when 256K page size is selected. Supporting this would
require changes to the subpage mode that's currently being developed.
Given that 256K is many times larger than page sizes commonly used and
for what the algorithms and structures have been tuned, it's out of
scope and disabling build is a reasonable option.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
[ update changelog ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 04587ad9bef6ce9d510325b4ba9852b6129eebdb ]
If we fail to update the delayed inode we need to abort the transaction,
because we could leave an inode with the improper counts or some other
such corruption behind.
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit bb385bedded3ccbd794559600de4a09448810f4a ]
If we get an error while looking up the inode item we'll simply bail
without cleaning up the delayed node. This results in this style of
warning happening on commit:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 76403 at fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1365 btrfs_assert_delayed_root_empty+0x5b/0x90
CPU: 0 PID: 76403 Comm: fsstress Tainted: G W 5.13.0-rc1+ #373
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:btrfs_assert_delayed_root_empty+0x5b/0x90
RSP: 0018:ffffb8bb815a7e50 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff95d6d07e1888 RCX: ffff95d6c0fa3000
RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 000000000029e91c RDI: ffff95d6c0fc8060
RBP: ffff95d6c0fc8060 R08: 00008d6d701a2c1d R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff95d6d1760ea0 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff95d6c15a4d00
R13: ffff95d6c0fa3000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffb8bb815a7e90
FS: 00007f490e8dbb80(0000) GS:ffff95d73bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f6e75555cb0 CR3: 00000001101ce001 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
Call Trace:
btrfs_commit_transaction+0x43c/0xb00
? finish_wait+0x80/0x80
? vfs_fsync_range+0x90/0x90
iterate_supers+0x8c/0x100
ksys_sync+0x50/0x90
__do_sys_sync+0xa/0x10
do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Because the iref isn't dropped and this leaves an elevated node->count,
so any release just re-queues it onto the delayed inodes list. Fix this
by going to the out label to handle the proper cleanup of the delayed
node.
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 80ef08670d4c28a06a3de954bd350368780bcfef upstream.
A request could end up on the fpq->io list after fuse_abort_conn() has
reset fpq->connected and aborted requests on that list:
Thread-1 Thread-2
======== ========
->fuse_simple_request() ->shutdown
->__fuse_request_send()
->queue_request() ->fuse_abort_conn()
->fuse_dev_do_read() ->acquire(fpq->lock)
->wait_for(fpq->lock) ->set err to all req's in fpq->io
->release(fpq->lock)
->acquire(fpq->lock)
->add req to fpq->io
After the userspace copy is done the request will be ended, but
req->out.h.error will remain uninitialized. Also the copy might block
despite being already aborted.
Fix both issues by not allowing the request to be queued on the fpq->io
list after fuse_abort_conn() has processed this list.
Reported-by: Pradeep P V K <pragalla@codeaurora.org>
Fixes: fd22d62ed0c3 ("fuse: no fc->lock for iqueue parts")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.2
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b89ecd60d38ec042d63bdb376c722a16f92bcb88 upstream.
Fix the "fuse: trying to steal weird page" warning.
Description from Johannes Weiner:
"Think of it as similar to PG_active. It's just another usage/heat
indicator of file and anon pages on the reclaim LRU that, unlike
PG_active, persists across deactivation and even reclaim (we store it in
the page cache / swapper cache tree until the page refaults).
So if fuse accepts pages that can legally have PG_active set,
PG_workingset is fine too."
Reported-by: Thomas Lindroth <thomas.lindroth@gmail.com>
Fixes: 1899ad18c607 ("mm: workingset: tell cache transitions from workingset thrashing")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.20
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit cd84bbbac12a173a381a64c6ec8b76a5277b87b5 upstream.
Commit 5d1b1b3f492f ("ext4: fix BUG when calling ext4_error with locked
block group") introduces ext4_grp_locked_error to handle unlocking a
group in error cases. Otherwise, there is a possibility of a sleep while
atomic. However, since 43c73221b3b1 ("ext4: replace BUG_ON with WARN_ON
in mb_find_extent()"), mb_find_extent() has contained a ext4_error()
call while a group spinlock is held. Replace this with
ext4_grp_locked_error.
Fixes: 43c73221b3b1 ("ext4: replace BUG_ON with WARN_ON in mb_find_extent()")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.14+
Signed-off-by: Stephen Brennan <stephen.s.brennan@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Lukas Czerner <lczerner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210623232114.34457-1-stephen.s.brennan@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c89849cc0259f3d33624cc3bd127685c3c0fa25d upstream.
The avefreec should be average free clusters instead
of average free blocks, otherwize Orlov's allocator
will not work properly when bigalloc enabled.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Pan Dong <pandong.peter@bytedance.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210525073656.31594-1-pandong.peter@bytedance.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e5e7010e5444d923e4091cafff61d05f2d19cada upstream.
After converting fs shrinkers to new scan/count API, we are no longer
pass zero nr_to_scan parameter to detect the number of objects to free,
just remove this check.
Fixes: 1ab6c4997e04 ("fs: convert fs shrinkers to new scan/count API")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.12+
Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210522103045.690103-2-yi.zhang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4fb7c70a889ead2e91e184895ac6e5354b759135 upstream.
The cache_cnt parameter of tracepoint ext4_es_shrink_exit means the
remaining cache count after shrink, but now it is the cache count before
shrink, fix it by read sbi->s_extent_cache_cnt again.
Fixes: 1ab6c4997e04 ("fs: convert fs shrinkers to new scan/count API")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.12+
Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210522103045.690103-3-yi.zhang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 8f6840c4fd1e7bd715e403074fb161c1a04cda73 upstream.
After commit c89128a00838 ("ext4: handle errors on
ext4_commit_super"), 'ret' may be set to 0 before calling
ext4_fill_flex_info(), if ext4_fill_flex_info() fails ext4_mount()
doesn't return error code, it makes 'root' is null which causes crash
in legacy_get_tree().
Fixes: c89128a00838 ("ext4: handle errors on ext4_commit_super")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.18+
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210510111051.55650-1-yangyingliang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b9a037b7f3c401d3c63e0423e56aef606b1ffaaf upstream.
In ext4_orphan_cleanup(), if ext4_truncate() failed to get a transaction
handle, it didn't remove the inode from the in-core orphan list, which
may probably trigger below error dump in ext4_destroy_inode() during the
final iput() and could lead to memory corruption on the later orphan
list changes.
EXT4-fs (sda): Inode 6291467 (00000000b8247c67): orphan list check failed!
00000000b8247c67: 0001f30a 00000004 00000000 00000023 ............#...
00000000e24cde71: 00000006 014082a3 00000000 00000000 ......@.........
0000000072c6a5ee: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 ................
...
This patch fix this by cleanup in-core orphan list manually if
ext4_truncate() return error.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210507071904.160808-1-yi.zhang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6819703f5a365c95488b07066a8744841bf14231 upstream.
The defrag loop processes leaves in batches and starting transaction for
each. The whole defragmentation on a given root is protected by a bit
but in case the transaction fails, the bit is not cleared
In case the transaction fails the bit would prevent starting
defragmentation again, so make sure it's cleared.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d8ac76cdd1755b21e8c008c28d0b7251c0b14986 upstream.
During an incremental send operation, when processing the new references
for the current inode, we might send an unlink operation for another inode
that has a conflicting path and has more than one hard link. However this
path was computed and cached before we processed previous new references
for the current inode. We may have orphanized a directory of that path
while processing a previous new reference, in which case the path will
be invalid and cause the receiver process to fail.
The following reproducer triggers the problem and explains how/why it
happens in its comments:
$ cat test-send-unlink.sh
#!/bin/bash
DEV=/dev/sdi
MNT=/mnt/sdi
mkfs.btrfs -f $DEV >/dev/null
mount $DEV $MNT
# Create our test files and directory. Inode 259 (file3) has two hard
# links.
touch $MNT/file1
touch $MNT/file2
touch $MNT/file3
mkdir $MNT/A
ln $MNT/file3 $MNT/A/hard_link
# Filesystem looks like:
#
# . (ino 256)
# |----- file1 (ino 257)
# |----- file2 (ino 258)
# |----- file3 (ino 259)
# |----- A/ (ino 260)
# |---- hard_link (ino 259)
#
# Now create the base snapshot, which is going to be the parent snapshot
# for a later incremental send.
btrfs subvolume snapshot -r $MNT $MNT/snap1
btrfs send -f /tmp/snap1.send $MNT/snap1
# Move inode 257 into directory inode 260. This results in computing the
# path for inode 260 as "/A" and caching it.
mv $MNT/file1 $MNT/A/file1
# Move inode 258 (file2) into directory inode 260, with a name of
# "hard_link", moving first inode 259 away since it currently has that
# location and name.
mv $MNT/A/hard_link $MNT/tmp
mv $MNT/file2 $MNT/A/hard_link
# Now rename inode 260 to something else (B for example) and then create
# a hard link for inode 258 that has the old name and location of inode
# 260 ("/A").
mv $MNT/A $MNT/B
ln $MNT/B/hard_link $MNT/A
# Filesystem now looks like:
#
# . (ino 256)
# |----- tmp (ino 259)
# |----- file3 (ino 259)
# |----- B/ (ino 260)
# | |---- file1 (ino 257)
# | |---- hard_link (ino 258)
# |
# |----- A (ino 258)
# Create another snapshot of our subvolume and use it for an incremental
# send.
btrfs subvolume snapshot -r $MNT $MNT/snap2
btrfs send -f /tmp/snap2.send -p $MNT/snap1 $MNT/snap2
# Now unmount the filesystem, create a new one, mount it and try to
# apply both send streams to recreate both snapshots.
umount $DEV
mkfs.btrfs -f $DEV >/dev/null
mount $DEV $MNT
# First add the first snapshot to the new filesystem by applying the
# first send stream.
btrfs receive -f /tmp/snap1.send $MNT
# The incremental receive operation below used to fail with the
# following error:
#
# ERROR: unlink A/hard_link failed: No such file or directory
#
# This is because when send is processing inode 257, it generates the
# path for inode 260 as "/A", since that inode is its parent in the send
# snapshot, and caches that path.
#
# Later when processing inode 258, it first processes its new reference
# that has the path of "/A", which results in orphanizing inode 260
# because there is a a path collision. This results in issuing a rename
# operation from "/A" to "/o260-6-0".
#
# Finally when processing the new reference "B/hard_link" for inode 258,
# it notices that it collides with inode 259 (not yet processed, because
# it has a higher inode number), since that inode has the name
# "hard_link" under the directory inode 260. It also checks that inode
# 259 has two hardlinks, so it decides to issue a unlink operation for
# the name "hard_link" for inode 259. However the path passed to the
# unlink operation is "/A/hard_link", which is incorrect since currently
# "/A" does not exists, due to the orphanization of inode 260 mentioned
# before. The path is incorrect because it was computed and cached
# before the orphanization. This results in the receiver to fail with
# the above error.
btrfs receive -f /tmp/snap2.send $MNT
umount $MNT
When running the test, it fails like this:
$ ./test-send-unlink.sh
Create a readonly snapshot of '/mnt/sdi' in '/mnt/sdi/snap1'
At subvol /mnt/sdi/snap1
Create a readonly snapshot of '/mnt/sdi' in '/mnt/sdi/snap2'
At subvol /mnt/sdi/snap2
At subvol snap1
At snapshot snap2
ERROR: unlink A/hard_link failed: No such file or directory
Fix this by recomputing a path before issuing an unlink operation when
processing the new references for the current inode if we previously
have orphanized a directory.
A test case for fstests will follow soon.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d98e4d95411bbde2220a7afa38dcc9c14d71acbe upstream.
When checking the file name attribute, we want to ensure that it fits
within the bounds of ATTR_RECORD. To do this, we should check that (attr
record + file name offset + file name length) < (attr record + attr record
length).
However, the original check did not include the file name offset in the
calculation. This means that corrupted on-disk metadata might not caught
by the incorrect file name check, and lead to an invalid memory access.
An example can be seen in the crash report of a memory corruption error
found by Syzbot:
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=a1a1e379b225812688566745c3e2f7242bffc246
Adding the file name offset to the validity check fixes this error and
passes the Syzbot reproducer test.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210614050540.289494-1-desmondcheongzx@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi <desmondcheongzx@gmail.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+213ac8bb98f7f4420840@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Tested-by: syzbot+213ac8bb98f7f4420840@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Acked-by: Anton Altaparmakov <anton@tuxera.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 1ab19c5de4c537ec0d9b21020395a5b5a6c059b2 ]
The GLF_LRU flag is checked under lru_lock in gfs2_glock_remove_from_lru() to
remove the glock from the lru list in __gfs2_glock_put().
On the shrink scan path, the same flag is cleared under lru_lock but because
of cond_resched_lock(&lru_lock) in gfs2_dispose_glock_lru(), progress on the
put side can be made without deleting the glock from the lru list.
Keep GLF_LRU across the race window opened by cond_resched_lock(&lru_lock) to
ensure correct behavior on both sides - clear GLF_LRU after list_del under
lru_lock.
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+34ba7ddbf3021981a228@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 43a511c44e58e357a687d61a20cf5ef1dc9e5a7c ]
When a direct I/O write falls entirely and falls back to buffered I/O and the
buffered I/O fails, the write failed with return value 0 instead of the error
number reported by the buffered I/O. Fix that.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 94f0b2d4a1d0c52035aef425da5e022bd2cb1c71 upstream.
Commit 591a22c14d3f ("proc: Track /proc/$pid/attr/ opener mm_struct") we
started using __mem_open() to track the mm_struct at open-time, so that
we could then check it for writes.
But that also ended up making the permission checks at open time much
stricter - and not just for writes, but for reads too. And that in turn
caused a regression for at least Fedora 29, where NIC interfaces fail to
start when using NetworkManager.
Since only the write side wanted the mm_struct test, ignore any failures
by __mem_open() at open time, leaving reads unaffected. The write()
time verification of the mm_struct pointer will then catch the failure
case because a NULL pointer will not match a valid 'current->mm'.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/YMjTlp2FSJYvoyFa@unreal/
Fixes: 591a22c14d3f ("proc: Track /proc/$pid/attr/ opener mm_struct")
Reported-and-tested-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f8849e206ef52b584cd9227255f4724f0cc900bb upstream.
Currently if __nfs4_proc_set_acl fails with NFS4ERR_BADOWNER it
re-enables the idmapper by clearing NFS_CAP_UIDGID_NOMAP before
retrying again. The NFS_CAP_UIDGID_NOMAP remains cleared even if
the retry fails. This causes problem for subsequent setattr
requests for v4 server that does not have idmapping configured.
This patch modifies nfs4_proc_set_acl to detect NFS4ERR_BADOWNER
and NFS4ERR_BADNAME and skips the retry, since the kernel isn't
involved in encoding the ACEs, and return -EINVAL.
Steps to reproduce the problem:
# mount -o vers=4.1,sec=sys server:/export/test /tmp/mnt
# touch /tmp/mnt/file1
# chown 99 /tmp/mnt/file1
# nfs4_setfacl -a A::unknown.user@xyz.com:wrtncy /tmp/mnt/file1
Failed setxattr operation: Invalid argument
# chown 99 /tmp/mnt/file1
chown: changing ownership of ‘/tmp/mnt/file1’: Invalid argument
# umount /tmp/mnt
# mount -o vers=4.1,sec=sys server:/export/test /tmp/mnt
# chown 99 /tmp/mnt/file1
#
v2: detect NFS4ERR_BADOWNER and NFS4ERR_BADNAME and skip retry
in nfs4_proc_set_acl.
Signed-off-by: Dai Ngo <dai.ngo@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c3aba897c6e67fa464ec02b1f17911577d619713 upstream.
If the inode is being evicted but has to return a layout first, then
that too can cause a deadlock in the corner case where the server
reboots.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 476bdb04c501fc64bf3b8464ffddefc8dbe01577 upstream.
KASAN reports a use-after-free when attempting to mount two different
exports through two different NICs that belong to the same server.
Olga was able to hit this with kernels starting somewhere between 5.7
and 5.10, but I traced the patch that introduced the clear_bit() call to
4.13. So something must have changed in the refcounting of the clp
pointer to make this call to nfs_put_client() the very last one.
Fixes: 8dcbec6d20 ("NFSv41: Handle EXCHID4_FLAG_CONFIRMED_R during NFSv4.1 migration")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.13+
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit dfe1fe75e00e4c724ede7b9e593f6f680e446c5f ]
If the inode is being evicted, but has to return a delegation first,
then it can cause a deadlock in the corner case where the server reboots
before the delegreturn completes, but while the call to iget5_locked() in
nfs4_opendata_get_inode() is waiting for the inode free to complete.
Since the open call still holds a session slot, the reboot recovery
cannot proceed.
In order to break the logjam, we can turn the delegation return into a
privileged operation for the case where we're evicting the inode. We
know that in that case, there can be no other state recovery operation
that conflicts.
Reported-by: zhangxiaoxu (A) <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com>
Fixes: 5fcdfacc01f3 ("NFSv4: Return delegations synchronously in evict_inode")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 09226e8303beeec10f2ff844d2e46d1371dc58e0 ]
None of the callers are expecting NULL returns from nfs_get_client() so
this code will lead to an Oops. It's better to return an error
pointer. I expect that this is dead code so hopefully no one is
affected.
Fixes: 31434f496abb ("nfs: check hostname in nfs_get_client")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit aefd7f7065567a4666f42c0fc8cdb379d2e036bf upstream.
Syzbot managed to trigger this assert while performing its fuzzing.
Turns out it's better to have those asserts turned into full-fledged
checks so that in case buggy btrfs images are mounted the users gets
an error and mounting is stopped. Alternatively with CONFIG_BTRFS_ASSERT
disabled such image would have been erroneously allowed to be mounted.
Reported-by: syzbot+a6bf271c02e4fe66b4e4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[ add uuids to the messages ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e7b2ec3d3d4ebeb4cff7ae45cf430182fa6a49fb upstream.
We always return 0 even in case of an error in btrfs_mark_extent_written().
Fix it to return proper error value in case of a failure. All callers
handle it.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Ritesh Harjani <riteshh@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 591a22c14d3f45cc38bd1931c593c221df2f1881 upstream.
Commit bfb819ea20ce ("proc: Check /proc/$pid/attr/ writes against file opener")
tried to make sure that there could not be a confusion between the opener of
a /proc/$pid/attr/ file and the writer. It used struct cred to make sure
the privileges didn't change. However, there were existing cases where a more
privileged thread was passing the opened fd to a differently privileged thread
(during container setup). Instead, use mm_struct to track whether the opener
and writer are still the same process. (This is what several other proc files
already do, though for different reasons.)
Reported-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Reported-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
Tested-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
Fixes: bfb819ea20ce ("proc: Check /proc/$pid/attr/ writes against file opener")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 5e753a817b2d5991dfe8a801b7b1e8e79a1c5a20 upstream.
The following test case reproduces an issue of wrongly freeing in-use
blocks on the readonly seed device when fstrim is called on the rw sprout
device. As shown below.
Create a seed device and add a sprout device to it:
$ mkfs.btrfs -fq -dsingle -msingle /dev/loop0
$ btrfstune -S 1 /dev/loop0
$ mount /dev/loop0 /btrfs
$ btrfs dev add -f /dev/loop1 /btrfs
BTRFS info (device loop0): relocating block group 290455552 flags system
BTRFS info (device loop0): relocating block group 1048576 flags system
BTRFS info (device loop0): disk added /dev/loop1
$ umount /btrfs
Mount the sprout device and run fstrim:
$ mount /dev/loop1 /btrfs
$ fstrim /btrfs
$ umount /btrfs
Now try to mount the seed device, and it fails:
$ mount /dev/loop0 /btrfs
mount: /btrfs: wrong fs type, bad option, bad superblock on /dev/loop0, missing codepage or helper program, or other error.
Block 5292032 is missing on the readonly seed device:
$ dmesg -kt | tail
<snip>
BTRFS error (device loop0): bad tree block start, want 5292032 have 0
BTRFS warning (device loop0): couldn't read-tree root
BTRFS error (device loop0): open_ctree failed
>From the dump-tree of the seed device (taken before the fstrim). Block
5292032 belonged to the block group starting at 5242880:
$ btrfs inspect dump-tree -e /dev/loop0 | grep -A1 BLOCK_GROUP
<snip>
item 3 key (5242880 BLOCK_GROUP_ITEM 8388608) itemoff 16169 itemsize 24
block group used 114688 chunk_objectid 256 flags METADATA
<snip>
>From the dump-tree of the sprout device (taken before the fstrim).
fstrim used block-group 5242880 to find the related free space to free:
$ btrfs inspect dump-tree -e /dev/loop1 | grep -A1 BLOCK_GROUP
<snip>
item 1 key (5242880 BLOCK_GROUP_ITEM 8388608) itemoff 16226 itemsize 24
block group used 32768 chunk_objectid 256 flags METADATA
<snip>
BPF kernel tracing the fstrim command finds the missing block 5292032
within the range of the discarded blocks as below:
kprobe:btrfs_discard_extent {
printf("freeing start %llu end %llu num_bytes %llu:\n",
arg1, arg1+arg2, arg2);
}
freeing start 5259264 end 5406720 num_bytes 147456
<snip>
Fix this by avoiding the discard command to the readonly seed device.
Reported-by: Chris Murphy <lists@colorremedies.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 011b28acf940eb61c000059dd9e2cfcbf52ed96b upstream.
This function has the following pattern
while (1) {
ret = whatever();
if (ret)
goto out;
}
ret = 0
out:
return ret;
However several places in this while loop we simply break; when there's
a problem, thus clearing the return value, and in one case we do a
return -EIO, and leak the memory for the path.
Fix this by re-arranging the loop to deal with ret == 1 coming from
btrfs_search_slot, and then simply delete the
ret = 0;
out:
bit so everybody can break if there is an error, which will allow for
proper error handling to occur.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 856bd270dc4db209c779ce1e9555c7641ffbc88e upstream.
We are unconditionally returning 0 in cleanup_ref_head, despite the fact
that btrfs_del_csums could fail. We need to return the error so the
transaction gets aborted properly, fix this by returning ret from
btrfs_del_csums in cleanup_ref_head.
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b86652be7c83f70bf406bed18ecf55adb9bfb91b upstream.
Error injection stress would sometimes fail with checksums on disk that
did not have a corresponding extent. This occurred because the pattern
in btrfs_del_csums was
while (1) {
ret = btrfs_search_slot();
if (ret < 0)
break;
}
ret = 0;
out:
btrfs_free_path(path);
return ret;
If we got an error from btrfs_search_slot we'd clear the error because
we were breaking instead of goto out. Instead of using goto out, simply
handle the cases where we may leave a random value in ret, and get rid
of the
ret = 0;
out:
pattern and simply allow break to have the proper error reporting. With
this fix we properly abort the transaction and do not commit thinking we
successfully deleted the csum.
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d61bec08b904cf171835db98168f82bc338e92e4 upstream.
While doing error injection testing I saw that sometimes we'd get an
abort that wouldn't stop the current transaction commit from completing.
This abort was coming from finish ordered IO, but at this point in the
transaction commit we should have gotten an error and stopped.
It turns out the abort came from finish ordered io while trying to write
out the free space cache. It occurred to me that any failure inside of
finish_ordered_io isn't actually raised to the person doing the writing,
so we could have any number of failures in this path and think the
ordered extent completed successfully and the inode was fine.
Fix this by marking the ordered extent with BTRFS_ORDERED_IOERR, and
marking the mapping of the inode with mapping_set_error, so any callers
that simply call fdatawait will also get the error.
With this we're seeing the IO error on the free space inode when we fail
to do the finish_ordered_io.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6bba4471f0cc1296fe3c2089b9e52442d3074b2e upstream.
When fallocate punches holes out of inode size, if original isize is in
the middle of last cluster, then the part from isize to the end of the
cluster will be zeroed with buffer write, at that time isize is not yet
updated to match the new size, if writeback is kicked in, it will invoke
ocfs2_writepage()->block_write_full_page() where the pages out of inode
size will be dropped. That will cause file corruption. Fix this by
zero out eof blocks when extending the inode size.
Running the following command with qemu-image 4.2.1 can get a corrupted
coverted image file easily.
qemu-img convert -p -t none -T none -f qcow2 $qcow_image \
-O qcow2 -o compat=1.1 $qcow_image.conv
The usage of fallocate in qemu is like this, it first punches holes out
of inode size, then extend the inode size.
fallocate(11, FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE|FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE, 2276196352, 65536) = 0
fallocate(11, 0, 2276196352, 65536) = 0
v1: https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-fsdevel/msg193999.html
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/20210525093034.GB4112@quack2.suse.cz/T/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210528210648.9124-1-junxiao.bi@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
