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commit 823e670f7ed616d0ce993075c8afe0217885f79d upstream.
With the new osnoise tracer, we are seeing the below splat:
Kernel attempted to read user page (c7d880000) - exploit attempt? (uid: 0)
BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access on read at 0xc7d880000
Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000002ffa10
Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
...
NIP [c0000000002ffa10] __trace_array_vprintk.part.0+0x70/0x2f0
LR [c0000000002ff9fc] __trace_array_vprintk.part.0+0x5c/0x2f0
Call Trace:
[c0000008bdd73b80] [c0000000001c49cc] put_prev_task_fair+0x3c/0x60 (unreliable)
[c0000008bdd73be0] [c000000000301430] trace_array_printk_buf+0x70/0x90
[c0000008bdd73c00] [c0000000003178b0] trace_sched_switch_callback+0x250/0x290
[c0000008bdd73c90] [c000000000e70d60] __schedule+0x410/0x710
[c0000008bdd73d40] [c000000000e710c0] schedule+0x60/0x130
[c0000008bdd73d70] [c000000000030614] interrupt_exit_user_prepare_main+0x264/0x270
[c0000008bdd73de0] [c000000000030a70] syscall_exit_prepare+0x150/0x180
[c0000008bdd73e10] [c00000000000c174] system_call_vectored_common+0xf4/0x278
osnoise tracer on ppc64le is triggering osnoise_taint() for negative
duration in get_int_safe_duration() called from
trace_sched_switch_callback()->thread_exit().
The problem though is that the check for a valid trace_percpu_buffer is
incorrect in get_trace_buf(). The check is being done after calculating
the pointer for the current cpu, rather than on the main percpu pointer.
Fix the check to be against trace_percpu_buffer.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/a920e4272e0b0635cf20c444707cbce1b2c8973d.1640255304.git.naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: e2ace001176dc9 ("tracing: Choose static tp_printk buffer by explicit nesting count")
Signed-off-by: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2431774f04d1050292054c763070021bade7b151 upstream.
This commit marks accesses to the rcu_state.n_force_qs. These data
races are hard to make happen, but syzkaller was equal to the task.
Reported-by: syzbot+e08a83a1940ec3846cd5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4e8c11b6b3f0b6a283e898344f154641eda94266 upstream.
Even after commit e1d7ba873555 ("time: Always make sure wall_to_monotonic
isn't positive") it is still possible to make wall_to_monotonic positive
by running the following code:
int main(void)
{
struct timespec time;
clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &time);
time.tv_nsec = 0;
clock_settime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &time);
return 0;
}
The reason is that the second parameter of timespec64_compare(), ts_delta,
may be unnormalized because the delta is calculated with an open coded
substraction which causes the comparison of tv_sec to yield the wrong
result:
wall_to_monotonic = { .tv_sec = -10, .tv_nsec = 900000000 }
ts_delta = { .tv_sec = -9, .tv_nsec = -900000000 }
That makes timespec64_compare() claim that wall_to_monotonic < ts_delta,
but actually the result should be wall_to_monotonic > ts_delta.
After normalization, the result of timespec64_compare() is correct because
the tv_sec comparison is not longer misleading:
wall_to_monotonic = { .tv_sec = -10, .tv_nsec = 900000000 }
ts_delta = { .tv_sec = -10, .tv_nsec = 100000000 }
Use timespec64_sub() to ensure that ts_delta is normalized, which fixes the
issue.
Fixes: e1d7ba873555 ("time: Always make sure wall_to_monotonic isn't positive")
Signed-off-by: Yu Liao <liaoyu15@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211213135727.1656662-1-liaoyu15@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f4b3ee3c85551d2d343a3ba159304066523f730f upstream.
If the audit daemon were ever to get stuck in a stopped state the
kernel's kauditd_thread() could get blocked attempting to send audit
records to the userspace audit daemon. With the kernel thread
blocked it is possible that the audit queue could grow unbounded as
certain audit record generating events must be exempt from the queue
limits else the system enter a deadlock state.
This patch resolves this problem by lowering the kernel thread's
socket sending timeout from MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT to HZ/10 and tweaks
the kauditd_send_queue() function to better manage the various audit
queues when connection problems occur between the kernel and the
audit daemon. With this patch, the backlog may temporarily grow
beyond the defined limits when the audit daemon is stopped and the
system is under heavy audit pressure, but kauditd_thread() will
continue to make progress and drain the queues as it would for other
connection problems. For example, with the audit daemon put into a
stopped state and the system configured to audit every syscall it
was still possible to shutdown the system without a kernel panic,
deadlock, etc.; granted, the system was slow to shutdown but that is
to be expected given the extreme pressure of recording every syscall.
The timeout value of HZ/10 was chosen primarily through
experimentation and this developer's "gut feeling". There is likely
no one perfect value, but as this scenario is limited in scope (root
privileges would be needed to send SIGSTOP to the audit daemon), it
is likely not worth exposing this as a tunable at present. This can
always be done at a later date if it proves necessary.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5b52330bbfe63 ("audit: fix auditd/kernel connection state tracking")
Reported-by: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 7dd5d437c258bbf4cc15b35229e5208b87b8b4e0 upstream.
In 32-bit architecture, the result of sizeof() is a 32-bit integer so
the expression becomes the multiplication between 2 32-bit integer which
can potentially leads to integer overflow. As a result,
bpf_map_area_alloc() allocates less memory than needed.
Fix this by casting 1 operand to u64.
Fixes: 0d2c4f964050 ("bpf: Eliminate rlimit-based memory accounting for sockmap and sockhash maps")
Fixes: 99c51064fb06 ("devmap: Use bpf_map_area_alloc() for allocating hash buckets")
Fixes: 546ac1ffb70d ("bpf: add devmap, a map for storing net device references")
Signed-off-by: Bui Quang Minh <minhquangbui99@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210613143440.71975-1-minhquangbui99@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Connor O'Brien <connoro@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 42288cb44c4b5fff7653bc392b583a2b8bd6a8c0 upstream.
Several ->poll() implementations are special in that they use a
waitqueue whose lifetime is the current task, rather than the struct
file as is normally the case. This is okay for blocking polls, since a
blocking poll occurs within one task; however, non-blocking polls
require another solution. This solution is for the queue to be cleared
before it is freed, using 'wake_up_poll(wq, EPOLLHUP | POLLFREE);'.
However, that has a bug: wake_up_poll() calls __wake_up() with
nr_exclusive=1. Therefore, if there are multiple "exclusive" waiters,
and the wakeup function for the first one returns a positive value, only
that one will be called. That's *not* what's needed for POLLFREE;
POLLFREE is special in that it really needs to wake up everyone.
Considering the three non-blocking poll systems:
- io_uring poll doesn't handle POLLFREE at all, so it is broken anyway.
- aio poll is unaffected, since it doesn't support exclusive waits.
However, that's fragile, as someone could add this feature later.
- epoll doesn't appear to be broken by this, since its wakeup function
returns 0 when it sees POLLFREE. But this is fragile.
Although there is a workaround (see epoll), it's better to define a
function which always sends POLLFREE to all waiters. Add such a
function. Also make it verify that the queue really becomes empty after
all waiters have been woken up.
Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211209010455.42744-2-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2fa7d94afc1afbb4d702760c058dc2d7ed30f226 upstream.
The first commit cited below attempts to fix the off-by-one error that
appeared in some comparisons with an open range. Due to this error,
arithmetically equivalent pieces of code could get different verdicts
from the verifier, for example (pseudocode):
// 1. Passes the verifier:
if (data + 8 > data_end)
return early
read *(u64 *)data, i.e. [data; data+7]
// 2. Rejected by the verifier (should still pass):
if (data + 7 >= data_end)
return early
read *(u64 *)data, i.e. [data; data+7]
The attempted fix, however, shifts the range by one in a wrong
direction, so the bug not only remains, but also such piece of code
starts failing in the verifier:
// 3. Rejected by the verifier, but the check is stricter than in #1.
if (data + 8 >= data_end)
return early
read *(u64 *)data, i.e. [data; data+7]
The change performed by that fix converted an off-by-one bug into
off-by-two. The second commit cited below added the BPF selftests
written to ensure than code chunks like #3 are rejected, however,
they should be accepted.
This commit fixes the off-by-two error by adjusting new_range in the
right direction and fixes the tests by changing the range into the
one that should actually fail.
Fixes: fb2a311a31d3 ("bpf: fix off by one for range markings with L{T, E} patterns")
Fixes: b37242c773b2 ("bpf: add test cases to bpf selftests to cover all access tests")
Signed-off-by: Maxim Mikityanskiy <maximmi@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20211130181607.593149-1-maximmi@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 315c4f884800c45cb6bd8c90422fad554a8b9588 ]
Commit d81ae8aac85c ("sched/uclamp: Fix initialization of struct
uclamp_rq") introduced a bug where uclamp_max of the rq is not reset to
match the woken up task's uclamp_max when the rq is idle.
The code was relying on rq->uclamp_max initialized to zero, so on first
enqueue
static inline void uclamp_rq_inc_id(struct rq *rq, struct task_struct *p,
enum uclamp_id clamp_id)
{
...
if (uc_se->value > READ_ONCE(uc_rq->value))
WRITE_ONCE(uc_rq->value, uc_se->value);
}
was actually resetting it. But since commit d81ae8aac85c changed the
default to 1024, this no longer works. And since rq->uclamp_flags is
also initialized to 0, neither above code path nor uclamp_idle_reset()
update the rq->uclamp_max on first wake up from idle.
This is only visible from first wake up(s) until the first dequeue to
idle after enabling the static key. And it only matters if the
uclamp_max of this task is < 1024 since only then its uclamp_max will be
effectively ignored.
Fix it by properly initializing rq->uclamp_flags = UCLAMP_FLAG_IDLE to
ensure uclamp_idle_reset() is called which then will update the rq
uclamp_max value as expected.
Fixes: d81ae8aac85c ("sched/uclamp: Fix initialization of struct uclamp_rq")
Signed-off-by: Qais Yousef <qais.yousef@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Valentin Schneider <Valentin.Schneider@arm.com>
Tested-by: Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211202112033.1705279-1-qais.yousef@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 6bbfa44116689469267f1a6e3d233b52114139d2 upstream.
The 'kprobe::data_size' is unsigned, thus it can not be negative. But if
user sets it enough big number (e.g. (size_t)-8), the result of 'data_size
+ sizeof(struct kretprobe_instance)' becomes smaller than sizeof(struct
kretprobe_instance) or zero. In result, the kretprobe_instance are
allocated without enough memory, and kretprobe accesses outside of
allocated memory.
To avoid this issue, introduce a max limitation of the
kretprobe::data_size. 4KB per instance should be OK.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/163836995040.432120.10322772773821182925.stgit@devnote2
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: f47cd9b553aa ("kprobes: kretprobe user entry-handler")
Reported-by: zhangyue <zhangyue1@kylinos.cn>
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6cb206508b621a9a0a2c35b60540e399225c8243 upstream.
When pid filtering is activated in an instance, all of the events trace
files for that instance has the PID_FILTER flag set. This determines
whether or not pid filtering needs to be done on the event, otherwise the
event is executed as normal.
If pid filtering is enabled when an event is created (via a dynamic event
or modules), its flag is not updated to reflect the current state, and the
events are not filtered properly.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 3fdaf80f4a836 ("tracing: Implement event pid filtering")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit cefcf24b4d351daf70ecd945324e200d3736821e ]
Commit 39fbef4b0f77 ("PM: hibernate: Get block device exclusively in
swsusp_check()") changed the opening mode of the block device to
(FMODE_READ | FMODE_EXCL).
In the corresponding calls to swsusp_close(), the mode is still just
FMODE_READ which triggers the warning in blkdev_flush_mapping() on
resume from hibernate.
So, use the mode (FMODE_READ | FMODE_EXCL) also when closing the
device.
Fixes: 39fbef4b0f77 ("PM: hibernate: Get block device exclusively in swsusp_check()")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Zeitlhofer <thomas.zeitlhofer+lkml@ze-it.at>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit a55f224ff5f238013de8762c4287117e47b86e22 upstream.
If a event is filtered by pid and a trigger that requires processing of
the event to happen is a attached to the event, the discard portion does
not take the pid filtering into account, and the event will then be
recorded when it should not have been.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 3fdaf80f4a836 ("tracing: Implement event pid filtering")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4716023a8f6a0f4a28047f14dd7ebdc319606b84 upstream.
PEBS PERF_SAMPLE_PHYS_ADDR events use perf_virt_to_phys() to convert PMU
sampled virtual addresses to physical using get_user_page_fast_only()
and page_to_phys().
Some get_user_page_fast_only() error cases return false, indicating no
page reference, but still initialize the output page pointer with an
unreferenced page. In these error cases perf_virt_to_phys() calls
put_page(). This causes page reference count underflow, which can lead
to unintentional page sharing.
Fix perf_virt_to_phys() to only put_page() if get_user_page_fast_only()
returns a referenced page.
Fixes: fc7ce9c74c3ad ("perf/core, x86: Add PERF_SAMPLE_PHYS_ADDR")
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211111021814.757086-1-gthelen@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 63f84ae6b82bb4dff672f76f30c6fd7b9d3766bc ]
Do not copy the fixed-size char array field of the events over
the field size. The histogram treats char array as a string and
there are 2 types of char array in the event, fixed-size and
dynamic string. The dynamic string (__data_loc) field must be
null terminated, but the fixed-size char array field may not
be null terminated (not a string, but just a data).
In that case, histogram can copy the data after the field.
This uses the original field size for fixed-size char array
field to restrict the histogram not to access over the original
field size.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/163673292822.195747.3696966210526410250.stgit@devnote2
Fixes: 02205a6752f2 (tracing: Add support for 'field variables')
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 63a1e5de3006f4ad713e4d72bcb404d0301e853d ]
String variables created as field variables and save variables are
already handled properly by having their values copied when set. The
same isn't done for normal variables, but needs to be - simply saving
a pointer to a string contained in an old event isn't sufficient,
since that event's data may quickly become overwritten and therefore a
string pointer to it could yield garbage.
This change uses the same mechanism as field variables and simply
appends the new strings to the existing per-element field_var_str[]
array allocated for that purpose.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1c1a03798b02e67307412a0c719d1bfb69b13007.1601848695.git.zanussi@kernel.org
Fixes: 02205a6752f2 (tracing: Add support for 'field variables')
Signed-off-by: Tom Zanussi <zanussi@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 42dc938a590c96eeb429e1830123fef2366d9c80 ]
Nothing protects the access to the per_cpu variable sd_llc_id. When testing
the same CPU (i.e. this_cpu == that_cpu), a race condition exists with
update_top_cache_domain(). One scenario being:
CPU1 CPU2
==================================================================
per_cpu(sd_llc_id, CPUX) => 0
partition_sched_domains_locked()
detach_destroy_domains()
cpus_share_cache(CPUX, CPUX) update_top_cache_domain(CPUX)
per_cpu(sd_llc_id, CPUX) => 0
per_cpu(sd_llc_id, CPUX) = CPUX
per_cpu(sd_llc_id, CPUX) => CPUX
return false
ttwu_queue_cond() wouldn't catch smp_processor_id() == cpu and the result
is a warning triggered from ttwu_queue_wakelist().
Avoid a such race in cpus_share_cache() by always returning true when
this_cpu == that_cpu.
Fixes: 518cd6234178 ("sched: Only queue remote wakeups when crossing cache boundaries")
Reported-by: Jing-Ting Wu <jing-ting.wu@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Vincent Donnefort <vincent.donnefort@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Valentin Schneider <valentin.schneider@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211104175120.857087-1-vincent.donnefort@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 01de5fcd8b1ac0ca28d2bb0921226a54fdd62684 ]
When building the kernel with sparse enabled 'C=1' the following
warnings shows up:
kernel/power/swap.c:390:29: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types)
kernel/power/swap.c:390:29: expected int ret
kernel/power/swap.c:390:29: got restricted blk_status_t
This is due to function hib_wait_io() returns a 'blk_status_t' which is
a bitwise u8. Commit 5416da01ff6e ("PM: hibernate: Remove
blk_status_to_errno in hib_wait_io") seemed to have mixed up the return
type. However, the 4e4cbee93d56 ("block: switch bios to blk_status_t")
actually broke the behaviour by returning the wrong type.
Rework so function hib_wait_io() returns a 'int' instead of
'blk_status_t' and make sure to call function
blk_status_to_errno(hb->error)' when returning from function
hib_wait_io() a int gets returned.
Fixes: 4e4cbee93d56 ("block: switch bios to blk_status_t")
Fixes: 5416da01ff6e ("PM: hibernate: Remove blk_status_to_errno in hib_wait_io")
Signed-off-by: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 8f7262cd66699a4b02eb7549b35c81b2116aad95 ]
debugfs_create_file() takes a pointer argument that can be used during
file operation callbacks (accessible via i_private in the inode
structure). An obvious requirement is for the pointer to refer to
valid memory when used.
When creating the debugfs file to dynamically enable / disable
kprobes, a pointer to local variable is passed to
debugfs_create_file(); which will go out of scope when the init
function returns. The reason this hasn't triggered random memory
corruption is because the pointer is not accessed during the debugfs
file callbacks.
Since the enabled state is managed by the kprobes_all_disabled global
variable, the local variable is not needed. Fix the incorrect (and
unnecessary) usage of local variable during debugfs_file_create() by
passing NULL instead.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/163163031686.489837.4476867635937014973.stgit@devnote2
Fixes: bf8f6e5b3e51 ("Kprobes: The ON/OFF knob thru debugfs")
Signed-off-by: Punit Agrawal <punitagrawal@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 7ee285395b211cad474b2b989db52666e0430daf ]
It was found that the following warning was displayed when remounting
controllers from cgroup v2 to v1:
[ 8042.997778] WARNING: CPU: 88 PID: 80682 at kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:3130 cgroup_apply_control_disable+0x158/0x190
:
[ 8043.091109] RIP: 0010:cgroup_apply_control_disable+0x158/0x190
[ 8043.096946] Code: ff f6 45 54 01 74 39 48 8d 7d 10 48 c7 c6 e0 46 5a a4 e8 7b 67 33 00 e9 41 ff ff ff 49 8b 84 24 e8 01 00 00 0f b7 40 08 eb 95 <0f> 0b e9 5f ff ff ff 48 83 c4 08 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3
[ 8043.115692] RSP: 0018:ffffba8a47c23d28 EFLAGS: 00010202
[ 8043.120916] RAX: 0000000000000036 RBX: ffffffffa624ce40 RCX: 000000000000181a
[ 8043.128047] RDX: ffffffffa63c43e0 RSI: ffffffffa63c43e0 RDI: ffff9d7284ee1000
[ 8043.135180] RBP: ffff9d72874c5800 R08: ffffffffa624b090 R09: 0000000000000004
[ 8043.142314] R10: ffffffffa624b080 R11: 0000000000002000 R12: ffff9d7284ee1000
[ 8043.149447] R13: ffff9d7284ee1000 R14: ffffffffa624ce70 R15: ffffffffa6269e20
[ 8043.156576] FS: 00007f7747cff740(0000) GS:ffff9d7a5fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 8043.164663] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 8043.170409] CR2: 00007f7747e96680 CR3: 0000000887d60001 CR4: 00000000007706e0
[ 8043.177539] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 8043.184673] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 8043.191804] PKRU: 55555554
[ 8043.194517] Call Trace:
[ 8043.196970] rebind_subsystems+0x18c/0x470
[ 8043.201070] cgroup_setup_root+0x16c/0x2f0
[ 8043.205177] cgroup1_root_to_use+0x204/0x2a0
[ 8043.209456] cgroup1_get_tree+0x3e/0x120
[ 8043.213384] vfs_get_tree+0x22/0xb0
[ 8043.216883] do_new_mount+0x176/0x2d0
[ 8043.220550] __x64_sys_mount+0x103/0x140
[ 8043.224474] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
[ 8043.228063] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
It was caused by the fact that rebind_subsystem() disables
controllers to be rebound one by one. If more than one disabled
controllers are originally from the default hierarchy, it means that
cgroup_apply_control_disable() will be called multiple times for the
same default hierarchy. A controller may be killed by css_kill() in
the first round. In the second round, the killed controller may not be
completely dead yet leading to the warning.
To avoid this problem, we collect all the ssid's of controllers that
needed to be disabled from the default hierarchy and then disable them
in one go instead of one by one.
Fixes: 334c3679ec4b ("cgroup: reimplement rebind_subsystems() using cgroup_apply_control() and friends")
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit f0b2b2df5423fb369ac762c77900bc7765496d58 ]
The sync_sched_exp_online_cleanup() checks to see if RCU needs
an expedited quiescent state from the incoming CPU, sending it
an IPI if so. Before sending IPI, it checks whether expedited
qs need has been already requested for the incoming CPU, by
checking rcu_data.cpu_no_qs.b.exp for the current cpu, on which
sync_sched_exp_online_cleanup() is running. This works for the
case where incoming CPU is same as self. However, for the case
where incoming CPU is different from self, expedited request
won't get marked, which can potentially delay reporting of
expedited quiescent state for the incoming CPU.
Fixes: e015a3411220 ("rcu: Avoid self-IPI in sync_sched_exp_online_cleanup()")
Signed-off-by: Neeraj Upadhyay <neeraju@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 7ce1bb83a14019f8c396d57ec704d19478747716 ]
If CONFIG_CFI_CLANG=y, attempting to read an event histogram will cause
the kernel to panic due to failed CFI check.
1. echo 'hist:keys=common_pid' >> events/sched/sched_switch/trigger
2. cat events/sched/sched_switch/hist
3. kernel panics on attempting to read hist
This happens because the sort() function expects a generic
int (*)(const void *, const void *) pointer for the compare function.
To prevent this CFI failure, change tracing map cmp_entries_* function
signatures to match this.
Also, fix the build error reported by the kernel test robot [1].
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/202110141140.zzi4dRh4-lkp@intel.com/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211014045217.3265162-1-kaleshsingh@google.com
Signed-off-by: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit d25302e46592c97d29f70ccb1be558df31a9a360 ]
Some unfriendly component, such as dpdk, write the same mask to
unbound kworker cpumask again and again. Every time it write to
this interface some work is queue to cpu, even though the mask
is same with the original mask.
So, fix it by return success and do nothing if the cpumask is
equal with the old one.
Signed-off-by: Mengen Sun <mengensun@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Menglong Dong <imagedong@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 7d613f9f72ec8f90ddefcae038fdae5adb8404b3 upstream.
The existence of sigkill_pending is a little silly as it is
functionally a duplicate of fatal_signal_pending that is used in
exactly one place.
Checking for pending fatal signals and returning early in ptrace_stop
is actively harmful. It casues the ptrace_stop called by
ptrace_signal to return early before setting current->exit_code.
Later when ptrace_signal reads the signal number from
current->exit_code is undefined, making it unpredictable what will
happen.
Instead rely on the fact that schedule will not sleep if there is a
pending signal that can awaken a task.
Removing the explict sigkill_pending test fixes fixes ptrace_signal
when ptrace_stop does not stop because current->exit_code is always
set to to signr.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 3d749b9e676b ("ptrace: simplify ptrace_stop()->sigkill_pending() path")
Fixes: 1a669c2f16d4 ("Add arch_ptrace_stop")
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87pmsyx29t.fsf@disp2133
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3cffa06aeef7ece30f6b5ac0ea51f264e8fea4d0 upstream.
The commit 48021f98130880dd74 ("printk: handle blank console arguments
passed in.") prevented crash caused by empty console= parameter value.
Unfortunately, this value is widely used on Chromebooks to disable
the console output. The above commit caused performance regression
because the messages were pushed on slow console even though nobody
was watching it.
Use ttynull driver explicitly for console="" and console=null
parameters. It has been created for exactly this purpose.
It causes that preferred_console is set. As a result, ttySX and ttyX
are not used as a fallback. And only ttynull console gets registered by
default.
It still allows to register other consoles either by additional console=
parameters or SPCR. It prevents regression because it worked this way even
before. Also it is a sane semantic. Preventing output on all consoles
should be done another way, for example, by introducing mute_console
parameter.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201006025935.GA597@jagdpanzerIV.localdomain
Suggested-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Acked-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201111135450.11214-3-pmladek@suse.com
Cc: Yi Fan <yfa@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ed65df63a39a3f6ed04f7258de8b6789e5021c18 upstream.
While writing an email explaining the "bit = 0" logic for a discussion on
making ftrace_test_recursion_trylock() disable preemption, I discovered a
path that makes the "not do the logic if bit is zero" unsafe.
The recursion logic is done in hot paths like the function tracer. Thus,
any code executed causes noticeable overhead. Thus, tricks are done to try
to limit the amount of code executed. This included the recursion testing
logic.
Having recursion testing is important, as there are many paths that can
end up in an infinite recursion cycle when tracing every function in the
kernel. Thus protection is needed to prevent that from happening.
Because it is OK to recurse due to different running context levels (e.g.
an interrupt preempts a trace, and then a trace occurs in the interrupt
handler), a set of bits are used to know which context one is in (normal,
softirq, irq and NMI). If a recursion occurs in the same level, it is
prevented*.
Then there are infrastructure levels of recursion as well. When more than
one callback is attached to the same function to trace, it calls a loop
function to iterate over all the callbacks. Both the callbacks and the
loop function have recursion protection. The callbacks use the
"ftrace_test_recursion_trylock()" which has a "function" set of context
bits to test, and the loop function calls the internal
trace_test_and_set_recursion() directly, with an "internal" set of bits.
If an architecture does not implement all the features supported by ftrace
then the callbacks are never called directly, and the loop function is
called instead, which will implement the features of ftrace.
Since both the loop function and the callbacks do recursion protection, it
was seemed unnecessary to do it in both locations. Thus, a trick was made
to have the internal set of recursion bits at a more significant bit
location than the function bits. Then, if any of the higher bits were set,
the logic of the function bits could be skipped, as any new recursion
would first have to go through the loop function.
This is true for architectures that do not support all the ftrace
features, because all functions being traced must first go through the
loop function before going to the callbacks. But this is not true for
architectures that support all the ftrace features. That's because the
loop function could be called due to two callbacks attached to the same
function, but then a recursion function inside the callback could be
called that does not share any other callback, and it will be called
directly.
i.e.
traced_function_1: [ more than one callback tracing it ]
call loop_func
loop_func:
trace_recursion set internal bit
call callback
callback:
trace_recursion [ skipped because internal bit is set, return 0 ]
call traced_function_2
traced_function_2: [ only traced by above callback ]
call callback
callback:
trace_recursion [ skipped because internal bit is set, return 0 ]
call traced_function_2
[ wash, rinse, repeat, BOOM! out of shampoo! ]
Thus, the "bit == 0 skip" trick is not safe, unless the loop function is
call for all functions.
Since we want to encourage architectures to implement all ftrace features,
having them slow down due to this extra logic may encourage the
maintainers to update to the latest ftrace features. And because this
logic is only safe for them, remove it completely.
[*] There is on layer of recursion that is allowed, and that is to allow
for the transition between interrupt context (normal -> softirq ->
irq -> NMI), because a trace may occur before the context update is
visible to the trace recursion logic.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/609b565a-ed6e-a1da-f025-166691b5d994@linux.alibaba.com/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211018154412.09fcad3c@gandalf.local.home
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>
Cc: Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Cc: Joe Lawrence <joe.lawrence@redhat.com>
Cc: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: Jisheng Zhang <jszhang@kernel.org>
Cc: =?utf-8?b?546L6LSH?= <yun.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: edc15cafcbfa3 ("tracing: Avoid unnecessary multiple recursion checks")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6e3ee990c90494561921c756481d0e2125d8b895 upstream.
Fix possible null-pointer dereference in audit_filter_rules.
audit_filter_rules() error: we previously assumed 'ctx' could be null
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: bf361231c295 ("audit: add saddr_fam filter field")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 293d92cbbd2418ca2ba43fed07f1b92e884d1c77 ]
The following warning occurred sporadically on s390:
DMA-API: nvme 0006:00:00.0: device driver maps memory from kernel text or rodata [addr=0000000048cc5e2f] [len=131072]
WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 825 at kernel/dma/debug.c:1083 check_for_illegal_area+0xa8/0x138
It is a false-positive warning, due to broken logic in debug_dma_map_sg().
check_for_illegal_area() checks for overlay of sg elements with kernel text
or rodata. It is called with sg_dma_len(s) instead of s->length as
parameter. After the call to ->map_sg(), sg_dma_len() will contain the
length of possibly combined sg elements in the DMA address space, and not
the individual sg element length, which would be s->length.
The check will then use the physical start address of an sg element, and
add the DMA length for the overlap check, which could result in the false
warning, because the DMA length can be larger than the actual single sg
element length.
In addition, the call to check_for_illegal_area() happens in the iteration
over mapped_ents, which will not include all individual sg elements if
any of them were combined in ->map_sg().
Fix this by using s->length instead of sg_dma_len(s). Also put the call to
check_for_illegal_area() in a separate loop, iterating over all the
individual sg elements ("nents" instead of "mapped_ents").
While at it, as suggested by Robin Murphy, also move check_for_stack()
inside the new loop, as it is similarly concerned with validating the
individual sg elements.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210705185252.4074653-1-gerald.schaefer@linux.ibm.com
Fixes: 884d05970bfb ("dma-debug: use sg_dma_len accessor")
Signed-off-by: Gerald Schaefer <gerald.schaefer@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 30e29a9a2bc6a4888335a6ede968b75cd329657a ]
In prealloc_elems_and_freelist(), the multiplication to calculate the
size passed to bpf_map_area_alloc() could lead to an integer overflow.
As a result, out-of-bounds write could occur in pcpu_freelist_populate()
as reported by KASAN:
[...]
[ 16.968613] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in pcpu_freelist_populate+0xd9/0x100
[ 16.969408] Write of size 8 at addr ffff888104fc6ea0 by task crash/78
[ 16.970038]
[ 16.970195] CPU: 0 PID: 78 Comm: crash Not tainted 5.15.0-rc2+ #1
[ 16.970878] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
[ 16.972026] Call Trace:
[ 16.972306] dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x44
[ 16.972687] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x21/0x140
[ 16.973297] ? pcpu_freelist_populate+0xd9/0x100
[ 16.973777] ? pcpu_freelist_populate+0xd9/0x100
[ 16.974257] kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x11b
[ 16.974681] ? pcpu_freelist_populate+0xd9/0x100
[ 16.975190] pcpu_freelist_populate+0xd9/0x100
[ 16.975669] stack_map_alloc+0x209/0x2a0
[ 16.976106] __sys_bpf+0xd83/0x2ce0
[...]
The possibility of this overflow was originally discussed in [0], but
was overlooked.
Fix the integer overflow by changing elem_size to u64 from u32.
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/728b238e-a481-eb50-98e9-b0f430ab01e7@gmail.com/
Fixes: 557c0c6e7df8 ("bpf: convert stackmap to pre-allocation")
Signed-off-by: Tatsuhiko Yasumatsu <th.yasumatsu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210930135545.173698-1-th.yasumatsu@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 2d186afd04d669fe9c48b994c41a7405a3c9f16d upstream.
Syzbot reported shift-out-of-bounds bug in profile_init().
The problem was in incorrect prof_shift. Since prof_shift value comes from
userspace we need to clamp this value into [0, BITS_PER_LONG -1]
boundaries.
Second possible shiht-out-of-bounds was found by Tetsuo:
sample_step local variable in read_profile() had "unsigned int" type,
but prof_shift allows to make a BITS_PER_LONG shift. So, to prevent
possible shiht-out-of-bounds sample_step type was changed to
"unsigned long".
Also, "unsigned short int" will be sufficient for storing
[0, BITS_PER_LONG] value, that's why there is no need for
"unsigned long" prof_shift.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210813140022.5011-1-paskripkin@gmail.com
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+e68c89a9510c159d9684@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Suggested-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e1fbbd073137a9d63279f6bf363151a938347640 upstream.
Keno Fischer reported that when a binray loaded via ld-linux-x the
prctl(PR_SET_MM_MAP) doesn't allow to setup brk value because it lays
before mm:end_data.
For example a test program shows
| # ~/t
|
| start_code 401000
| end_code 401a15
| start_stack 7ffce4577dd0
| start_data 403e10
| end_data 40408c
| start_brk b5b000
| sbrk(0) b5b000
and when executed via ld-linux
| # /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 ~/t
|
| start_code 7fc25b0a4000
| end_code 7fc25b0c4524
| start_stack 7fffcc6b2400
| start_data 7fc25b0ce4c0
| end_data 7fc25b0cff98
| start_brk 55555710c000
| sbrk(0) 55555710c000
This of course prevent criu from restoring such programs. Looking into
how kernel operates with brk/start_brk inside brk() syscall I don't see
any problem if we allow to setup brk/start_brk without checking for
end_data. Even if someone pass some weird address here on a purpose then
the worst possible result will be an unexpected unmapping of existing vma
(own vma, since prctl works with the callers memory) but test for
RLIMIT_DATA is still valid and a user won't be able to gain more memory in
case of expanding VMAs via new values shipped with prctl call.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210121221207.GB2174@grain
Fixes: bbdc6076d2e5 ("binfmt_elf: move brk out of mmap when doing direct loader exec")
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Keno Fischer <keno@juliacomputing.com>
Acked-by: Andrey Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>
Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Mikhalitsyn <alexander.mikhalitsyn@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 8e242060c6a4947e8ae7d29794af6a581db08841 ]
Since kprobe_events and uprobe_events only check whether the
other same-type probe event has the same name or not, if the
user gives the same name of the existing tracepoint event (or
the other type of probe events), it silently fails to create
the tracefs entry (but registered.) as below.
/sys/kernel/tracing # ls events/task/task_rename
enable filter format hist id trigger
/sys/kernel/tracing # echo p:task/task_rename vfs_read >> kprobe_events
[ 113.048508] Could not create tracefs 'task_rename' directory
/sys/kernel/tracing # cat kprobe_events
p:task/task_rename vfs_read
To fix this issue, check whether the existing events have the
same name or not in trace_probe_register_event_call(). If exists,
it rejects to register the new event.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/162936876189.187130.17558311387542061930.stgit@devnote2
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit b89a05b21f46150ac10a962aa50109250b56b03b upstream.
In perf_event_addr_filters_apply, the task associated with
the event (event->ctx->task) is read using READ_ONCE at the beginning
of the function, checked, and then re-read from event->ctx->task,
voiding all guarantees of the checks. Reuse the value that was read by
READ_ONCE to ensure the consistency of the task struct throughout the
function.
Fixes: 375637bc52495 ("perf/core: Introduce address range filtering")
Signed-off-by: Baptiste Lepers <baptiste.lepers@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210906015310.12802-1-baptiste.lepers@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit fab827dbee8c2e06ca4ba000fa6c48bcf9054aba upstream.
Commit 5d097056c9a0 ("kmemcg: account certain kmem allocations to memcg")
enabled memcg accounting for pids allocated from init_pid_ns.pid_cachep,
but forgot to adjust the setting for nested pid namespaces. As a result,
pid memory is not accounted exactly where it is really needed, inside
memcg-limited containers with their own pid namespaces.
Pid was one the first kernel objects enabled for memcg accounting.
init_pid_ns.pid_cachep marked by SLAB_ACCOUNT and we can expect that any
new pids in the system are memcg-accounted.
Though recently I've noticed that it is wrong. nested pid namespaces
creates own slab caches for pid objects, nested pids have increased size
because contain id both for all parent and for own pid namespaces. The
problem is that these slab caches are _NOT_ marked by SLAB_ACCOUNT, as a
result any pids allocated in nested pid namespaces are not
memcg-accounted.
Pid struct in nested pid namespace consumes up to 500 bytes memory, 100000
such objects gives us up to ~50Mb unaccounted memory, this allow container
to exceed assigned memcg limits.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/8b6de616-fd1a-02c6-cbdb-976ecdcfa604@virtuozzo.com
Fixes: 5d097056c9a0 ("kmemcg: account certain kmem allocations to memcg")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Koutný <mkoutny@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 13db8c50477d83ad3e3b9b0ae247e5cd833a7ae4 upstream.
After fork, the child process will get incorrect (2x) hugetlb_usage. If
a process uses 5 2MB hugetlb pages in an anonymous mapping,
HugetlbPages: 10240 kB
and then forks, the child will show,
HugetlbPages: 20480 kB
The reason for double the amount is because hugetlb_usage will be copied
from the parent and then increased when we copy page tables from parent
to child. Child will have 2x actual usage.
Fix this by adding hugetlb_count_init in mm_init.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210826071742.877-1-liuzixian4@huawei.com
Fixes: 5d317b2b6536 ("mm: hugetlb: proc: add HugetlbPages field to /proc/PID/status")
Signed-off-by: Liu Zixian <liuzixian4@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit f728c4a9e8405caae69d4bc1232c54ff57b5d20f ]
In error handling branch "if (WARN_ON(node == NUMA_NO_NODE))", the
previously allocated memories are not released. Doing this before
allocating memory eliminates memory leaks.
tj: Note that the condition only occurs when the arch code is pretty broken
and the WARN_ON might as well be BUG_ON().
Signed-off-by: Zhen Lei <thunder.leizhen@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 173735c346c412d9f084825ecb04f24ada0e2986 ]
Due to link order, dma_debug_init is called before debugfs has a chance
to initialize (via debugfs_init which also happens in the core initcall
stage), so the directories for dma-debug are never created.
Decouple dma_debug_fs_init from dma_debug_init and defer its init until
core_initcall_sync (after debugfs has been initialized) while letting
dma-debug initialization occur as soon as possible to catch any early
mappings, as suggested in [1].
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-iommu/YIgGa6yF%2Fadg8OSN@kroah.com/
Fixes: 15b28bbcd567 ("dma-debug: move initialization to common code")
Signed-off-by: Anthony Iliopoulos <ailiop@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
This reverts commit c322a963d522e9a4273e18c9d7bd6fd40a25160f which is
commit 406dd42bd1ba0c01babf9cde169bb319e52f6147 upstream.
It is reported to cause regressions. A proposed fix has been posted,
but it is not in a released kernel yet. So just revert this from the
stable release so that the bug is fixed. If it's really needed we can
add it back in in a future release.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87ilz1pwaq.fsf@wylie.me.uk
Reported-by: "Alan J. Wylie" <alan@wylie.me.uk>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e042aa532c84d18ff13291d00620502ce7a38dda upstream.
In 7fedb63a8307 ("bpf: Tighten speculative pointer arithmetic mask") we
narrowed the offset mask for unprivileged pointer arithmetic in order to
mitigate a corner case where in the speculative domain it is possible to
advance, for example, the map value pointer by up to value_size-1 out-of-
bounds in order to leak kernel memory via side-channel to user space.
The verifier's state pruning for scalars leaves one corner case open
where in the first verification path R_x holds an unknown scalar with an
aux->alu_limit of e.g. 7, and in a second verification path that same
register R_x, here denoted as R_x', holds an unknown scalar which has
tighter bounds and would thus satisfy range_within(R_x, R_x') as well as
tnum_in(R_x, R_x') for state pruning, yielding an aux->alu_limit of 3:
Given the second path fits the register constraints for pruning, the final
generated mask from aux->alu_limit will remain at 7. While technically
not wrong for the non-speculative domain, it would however be possible
to craft similar cases where the mask would be too wide as in 7fedb63a8307.
One way to fix it is to detect the presence of unknown scalar map pointer
arithmetic and force a deeper search on unknown scalars to ensure that
we do not run into a masking mismatch.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[OP: adjusted context in include/linux/bpf_verifier.h for 5.4]
Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c9e73e3d2b1eb1ea7ff068e05007eec3bd8ef1c9 upstream.
func_states_equal makes a very short lived allocation for idmap,
probably because it's too large to fit on the stack. However the
function is called quite often, leading to a lot of alloc / free
churn. Replace the temporary allocation with dedicated scratch
space in struct bpf_verifier_env.
Signed-off-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Edward Cree <ecree.xilinx@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210429134656.122225-4-lmb@cloudflare.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[OP: adjusted context for 5.4]
Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2039f26f3aca5b0e419b98f65dd36481337b86ee upstream.
Spectre v4 gadgets make use of memory disambiguation, which is a set of
techniques that execute memory access instructions, that is, loads and
stores, out of program order; Intel's optimization manual, section 2.4.4.5:
A load instruction micro-op may depend on a preceding store. Many
microarchitectures block loads until all preceding store addresses are
known. The memory disambiguator predicts which loads will not depend on
any previous stores. When the disambiguator predicts that a load does
not have such a dependency, the load takes its data from the L1 data
cache. Eventually, the prediction is verified. If an actual conflict is
detected, the load and all succeeding instructions are re-executed.
af86ca4e3088 ("bpf: Prevent memory disambiguation attack") tried to mitigate
this attack by sanitizing the memory locations through preemptive "fast"
(low latency) stores of zero prior to the actual "slow" (high latency) store
of a pointer value such that upon dependency misprediction the CPU then
speculatively executes the load of the pointer value and retrieves the zero
value instead of the attacker controlled scalar value previously stored at
that location, meaning, subsequent access in the speculative domain is then
redirected to the "zero page".
The sanitized preemptive store of zero prior to the actual "slow" store is
done through a simple ST instruction based on r10 (frame pointer) with
relative offset to the stack location that the verifier has been tracking
on the original used register for STX, which does not have to be r10. Thus,
there are no memory dependencies for this store, since it's only using r10
and immediate constant of zero; hence af86ca4e3088 /assumed/ a low latency
operation.
However, a recent attack demonstrated that this mitigation is not sufficient
since the preemptive store of zero could also be turned into a "slow" store
and is thus bypassed as well:
[...]
// r2 = oob address (e.g. scalar)
// r7 = pointer to map value
31: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r2
// r9 will remain "fast" register, r10 will become "slow" register below
32: (bf) r9 = r10
// JIT maps BPF reg to x86 reg:
// r9 -> r15 (callee saved)
// r10 -> rbp
// train store forward prediction to break dependency link between both r9
// and r10 by evicting them from the predictor's LRU table.
33: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +24576)
34: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29696) = r0
35: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +24580)
36: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29700) = r0
37: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +24584)
38: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29704) = r0
39: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +24588)
40: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29708) = r0
[...]
543: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +25596)
544: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +30716) = r0
// prepare call to bpf_ringbuf_output() helper. the latter will cause rbp
// to spill to stack memory while r13/r14/r15 (all callee saved regs) remain
// in hardware registers. rbp becomes slow due to push/pop latency. below is
// disasm of bpf_ringbuf_output() helper for better visual context:
//
// ffffffff8117ee20: 41 54 push r12
// ffffffff8117ee22: 55 push rbp
// ffffffff8117ee23: 53 push rbx
// ffffffff8117ee24: 48 f7 c1 fc ff ff ff test rcx,0xfffffffffffffffc
// ffffffff8117ee2b: 0f 85 af 00 00 00 jne ffffffff8117eee0 <-- jump taken
// [...]
// ffffffff8117eee0: 49 c7 c4 ea ff ff ff mov r12,0xffffffffffffffea
// ffffffff8117eee7: 5b pop rbx
// ffffffff8117eee8: 5d pop rbp
// ffffffff8117eee9: 4c 89 e0 mov rax,r12
// ffffffff8117eeec: 41 5c pop r12
// ffffffff8117eeee: c3 ret
545: (18) r1 = map[id:4]
547: (bf) r2 = r7
548: (b7) r3 = 0
549: (b7) r4 = 4
550: (85) call bpf_ringbuf_output#194288
// instruction 551 inserted by verifier \
551: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = 0 | /both/ are now slow stores here
// storing map value pointer r7 at fp-16 | since value of r10 is "slow".
552: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r7 /
// following "fast" read to the same memory location, but due to dependency
// misprediction it will speculatively execute before insn 551/552 completes.
553: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r9 -16)
// in speculative domain contains attacker controlled r2. in non-speculative
// domain this contains r7, and thus accesses r7 +0 below.
554: (71) r3 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0)
// leak r3
As can be seen, the current speculative store bypass mitigation which the
verifier inserts at line 551 is insufficient since /both/, the write of
the zero sanitation as well as the map value pointer are a high latency
instruction due to prior memory access via push/pop of r10 (rbp) in contrast
to the low latency read in line 553 as r9 (r15) which stays in hardware
registers. Thus, architecturally, fp-16 is r7, however, microarchitecturally,
fp-16 can still be r2.
Initial thoughts to address this issue was to track spilled pointer loads
from stack and enforce their load via LDX through r10 as well so that /both/
the preemptive store of zero /as well as/ the load use the /same/ register
such that a dependency is created between the store and load. However, this
option is not sufficient either since it can be bypassed as well under
speculation. An updated attack with pointer spill/fills now _all_ based on
r10 would look as follows:
[...]
// r2 = oob address (e.g. scalar)
// r7 = pointer to map value
[...]
// longer store forward prediction training sequence than before.
2062: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +25588)
2063: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +30708) = r0
2064: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +25592)
2065: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +30712) = r0
2066: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +25596)
2067: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +30716) = r0
// store the speculative load address (scalar) this time after the store
// forward prediction training.
2068: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r2
// preoccupy the CPU store port by running sequence of dummy stores.
2069: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29696) = r0
2070: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29700) = r0
2071: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29704) = r0
2072: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29708) = r0
2073: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29712) = r0
2074: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29716) = r0
2075: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29720) = r0
2076: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29724) = r0
2077: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29728) = r0
2078: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29732) = r0
2079: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29736) = r0
2080: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29740) = r0
2081: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29744) = r0
2082: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29748) = r0
2083: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29752) = r0
2084: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29756) = r0
2085: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29760) = r0
2086: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29764) = r0
2087: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29768) = r0
2088: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29772) = r0
2089: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29776) = r0
2090: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29780) = r0
2091: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29784) = r0
2092: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29788) = r0
2093: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29792) = r0
2094: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29796) = r0
2095: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29800) = r0
2096: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29804) = r0
2097: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29808) = r0
2098: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29812) = r0
// overwrite scalar with dummy pointer; same as before, also including the
// sanitation store with 0 from the current mitigation by the verifier.
2099: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = 0 | /both/ are now slow stores here
2100: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r7 | since store unit is still busy.
// load from stack intended to bypass stores.
2101: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16)
2102: (71) r3 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0)
// leak r3
[...]
Looking at the CPU microarchitecture, the scheduler might issue loads (such
as seen in line 2101) before stores (line 2099,2100) because the load execution
units become available while the store execution unit is still busy with the
sequence of dummy stores (line 2069-2098). And so the load may use the prior
stored scalar from r2 at address r10 -16 for speculation. The updated attack
may work less reliable on CPU microarchitectures where loads and stores share
execution resources.
This concludes that the sanitizing with zero stores from af86ca4e3088 ("bpf:
Prevent memory disambiguation attack") is insufficient. Moreover, the detection
of stack reuse from af86ca4e3088 where previously data (STACK_MISC) has been
written to a given stack slot where a pointer value is now to be stored does
not have sufficient coverage as precondition for the mitigation either; for
several reasons outlined as follows:
1) Stack content from prior program runs could still be preserved and is
therefore not "random", best example is to split a speculative store
bypass attack between tail calls, program A would prepare and store the
oob address at a given stack slot and then tail call into program B which
does the "slow" store of a pointer to the stack with subsequent "fast"
read. From program B PoV such stack slot type is STACK_INVALID, and
therefore also must be subject to mitigation.
2) The STACK_SPILL must not be coupled to register_is_const(&stack->spilled_ptr)
condition, for example, the previous content of that memory location could
also be a pointer to map or map value. Without the fix, a speculative
store bypass is not mitigated in such precondition and can then lead to
a type confusion in the speculative domain leaking kernel memory near
these pointer types.
While brainstorming on various alternative mitigation possibilities, we also
stumbled upon a retrospective from Chrome developers [0]:
[...] For variant 4, we implemented a mitigation to zero the unused memory
of the heap prior to allocation, which cost about 1% when done concurrently
and 4% for scavenging. Variant 4 defeats everything we could think of. We
explored more mitigations for variant 4 but the threat proved to be more
pervasive and dangerous than we anticipated. For example, stack slots used
by the register allocator in the optimizing compiler could be subject to
type confusion, leading to pointer crafting. Mitigating type confusion for
stack slots alone would have required a complete redesign of the backend of
the optimizing compiler, perhaps man years of work, without a guarantee of
completeness. [...]
>From BPF side, the problem space is reduced, however, options are rather
limited. One idea that has been explored was to xor-obfuscate pointer spills
to the BPF stack:
[...]
// preoccupy the CPU store port by running sequence of dummy stores.
[...]
2106: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29796) = r0
2107: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29800) = r0
2108: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29804) = r0
2109: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29808) = r0
2110: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29812) = r0
// overwrite scalar with dummy pointer; xored with random 'secret' value
// of 943576462 before store ...
2111: (b4) w11 = 943576462
2112: (af) r11 ^= r7
2113: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r11
2114: (79) r11 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16)
2115: (b4) w2 = 943576462
2116: (af) r2 ^= r11
// ... and restored with the same 'secret' value with the help of AX reg.
2117: (71) r3 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0)
[...]
While the above would not prevent speculation, it would make data leakage
infeasible by directing it to random locations. In order to be effective
and prevent type confusion under speculation, such random secret would have
to be regenerated for each store. The additional complexity involved for a
tracking mechanism that prevents jumps such that restoring spilled pointers
would not get corrupted is not worth the gain for unprivileged. Hence, the
fix in here eventually opted for emitting a non-public BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC
instruction which the x86 JIT translates into a lfence opcode. Inserting the
latter in between the store and load instruction is one of the mitigations
options [1]. The x86 instruction manual notes:
[...] An LFENCE that follows an instruction that stores to memory might
complete before the data being stored have become globally visible. [...]
The latter meaning that the preceding store instruction finished execution
and the store is at minimum guaranteed to be in the CPU's store queue, but
it's not guaranteed to be in that CPU's L1 cache at that point (globally
visible). The latter would only be guaranteed via sfence. So the load which
is guaranteed to execute after the lfence for that local CPU would have to
rely on store-to-load forwarding. [2], in section 2.3 on store buffers says:
[...] For every store operation that is added to the ROB, an entry is
allocated in the store buffer. This entry requires both the virtual and
physical address of the target. Only if there is no free entry in the store
buffer, the frontend stalls until there is an empty slot available in the
store buffer again. Otherwise, the CPU can immediately continue adding
subsequent instructions to the ROB and execute them out of order. On Intel
CPUs, the store buffer has up to 56 entries. [...]
One small upside on the fix is that it lifts constraints from af86ca4e3088
where the sanitize_stack_off relative to r10 must be the same when coming
from different paths. The BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC gets emitted after a BPF_STX
or BPF_ST instruction. This happens either when we store a pointer or data
value to the BPF stack for the first time, or upon later pointer spills.
The former needs to be enforced since otherwise stale stack data could be
leaked under speculation as outlined earlier. For non-x86 JITs the BPF_ST |
BPF_NOSPEC mapping is currently optimized away, but others could emit a
speculation barrier as well if necessary. For real-world unprivileged
programs e.g. generated by LLVM, pointer spill/fill is only generated upon
register pressure and LLVM only tries to do that for pointers which are not
used often. The program main impact will be the initial BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC
sanitation for the STACK_INVALID case when the first write to a stack slot
occurs e.g. upon map lookup. In future we might refine ways to mitigate
the latter cost.
[0] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1902.05178.pdf
[1] https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2018/05/21/analysis-and-mitigation-of-speculative-store-bypass-cve-2018-3639/
[2] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1905.05725.pdf
Fixes: af86ca4e3088 ("bpf: Prevent memory disambiguation attack")
Fixes: f7cf25b2026d ("bpf: track spill/fill of constants")
Co-developed-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[OP: - apply check_stack_write_fixed_off() changes in check_stack_write()
- replace env->bypass_spec_v4 -> env->allow_ptr_leaks]
Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f5e81d1117501546b7be050c5fbafa6efd2c722c upstream.
In case of JITs, each of the JIT backends compiles the BPF nospec instruction
/either/ to a machine instruction which emits a speculation barrier /or/ to
/no/ machine instruction in case the underlying architecture is not affected
by Speculative Store Bypass or has different mitigations in place already.
This covers both x86 and (implicitly) arm64: In case of x86, we use 'lfence'
instruction for mitigation. In case of arm64, we rely on the firmware mitigation
as controlled via the ssbd kernel parameter. Whenever the mitigation is enabled,
it works for all of the kernel code with no need to provide any additional
instructions here (hence only comment in arm64 JIT). Other archs can follow
as needed. The BPF nospec instruction is specifically targeting Spectre v4
since i) we don't use a serialization barrier for the Spectre v1 case, and
ii) mitigation instructions for v1 and v4 might be different on some archs.
The BPF nospec is required for a future commit, where the BPF verifier does
annotate intermediate BPF programs with speculation barriers.
Co-developed-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[OP: - adjusted context for 5.4
- apply riscv changes to /arch/riscv/net/bpf_jit_comp.c]
Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit d7af7e497f0308bc97809cc48b58e8e0f13887e1 ]
Fix a verifier bug found by smatch static checker in [0].
This problem has never been seen in prod to my best knowledge. Fixing it
still seems to be a good idea since it's hard to say for sure whether
it's possible or not to have a scenario where a combination of
convert_ctx_access() and a narrow load would lead to an out of bound
write.
When narrow load is handled, one or two new instructions are added to
insn_buf array, but before it was only checked that
cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)
And it's safe to add a new instruction to insn_buf[cnt++] only once. The
second try will lead to out of bound write. And this is what can happen
if `shift` is set.
Fix it by making sure that if the BPF_RSH instruction has to be added in
addition to BPF_AND then there is enough space for two more instructions
in insn_buf.
The full report [0] is below:
kernel/bpf/verifier.c:12304 convert_ctx_accesses() warn: offset 'cnt' incremented past end of array
kernel/bpf/verifier.c:12311 convert_ctx_accesses() warn: offset 'cnt' incremented past end of array
kernel/bpf/verifier.c
12282
12283 insn->off = off & ~(size_default - 1);
12284 insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | size_code;
12285 }
12286
12287 target_size = 0;
12288 cnt = convert_ctx_access(type, insn, insn_buf, env->prog,
12289 &target_size);
12290 if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf) ||
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Bounds check.
12291 (ctx_field_size && !target_size)) {
12292 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
12293 return -EINVAL;
12294 }
12295
12296 if (is_narrower_load && size < target_size) {
12297 u8 shift = bpf_ctx_narrow_access_offset(
12298 off, size, size_default) * 8;
12299 if (ctx_field_size <= 4) {
12300 if (shift)
12301 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_RSH,
^^^^^
increment beyond end of array
12302 insn->dst_reg,
12303 shift);
--> 12304 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, insn->dst_reg,
^^^^^
out of bounds write
12305 (1 << size * 8) - 1);
12306 } else {
12307 if (shift)
12308 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_RSH,
12309 insn->dst_reg,
12310 shift);
12311 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, insn->dst_reg,
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Same.
12312 (1ULL << size * 8) - 1);
12313 }
12314 }
12315
12316 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
12317 if (!new_prog)
12318 return -ENOMEM;
12319
12320 delta += cnt - 1;
12321
12322 /* keep walking new program and skip insns we just inserted */
12323 env->prog = new_prog;
12324 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
12325 }
12326
12327 return 0;
12328 }
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210817050843.GA21456@kili/
v1->v2:
- clarify that problem was only seen by static checker but not in prod;
Fixes: 46f53a65d2de ("bpf: Allow narrow loads with offset > 0")
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210820163935.1902398-1-rdna@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Naveen N. Rao
Paul E. McKenney
Yu Liao
Paul Moore
Bui Quang Minh
Chen Jun
Eric Biggers
Maxim Mikityanskiy
Qais Yousef
Masami Hiramatsu
Steven Rostedt (VMware)
Thomas Zeitlhofer
Jiri Olsa
Greg Thelen
Tom Zanussi
Vincent Donnefort
Anders Roxell
Punit Agrawal
Waiman Long
Neeraj Upadhyay
Ye Bin
Kalesh Singh
Menglong Dong
Peter Zijlstra
Eric W. Biederman
Lorenz Bauer
Petr Mladek
Gaosheng Cui
Gerald Schaefer
Tatsuhiko Yasumatsu
Kevin Hao
Bixuan Cui
Zhihao Cheng
Pavel Skripkin
Cyrill Gorcunov
Baptiste Lepers
Vasily Averin
Liu Zixian
Zhen Lei
Anthony Iliopoulos
Greg Kroah-Hartman
Daniel Borkmann
Andrey Ignatov