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commit 5b0db51215e895a361bc63132caa7cca36a53d6a upstream.
There is a wrong case of link() on overlay:
$ mkdir /lower /fuse /merge
$ mount -t fuse /fuse
$ mkdir /fuse/upper /fuse/work
$ mount -t overlay /merge -o lowerdir=/lower,upperdir=/fuse/upper,\
workdir=work
$ touch /merge/file
$ chown bin.bin /merge/file // the file's caller becomes "bin"
$ ln /merge/file /merge/lnkfile
Then we will get an error(EACCES) because fuse daemon checks the link()'s
caller is "bin", it denied this request.
In the changing history of ovl_link(), there are two key commits:
The first is commit bb0d2b8ad296 ("ovl: fix sgid on directory") which
overrides the cred's fsuid/fsgid using the new inode. The new inode's
owner is initialized by inode_init_owner(), and inode->fsuid is
assigned to the current user. So the override fsuid becomes the
current user. We know link() is actually modifying the directory, so
the caller must have the MAY_WRITE permission on the directory. The
current caller may should have this permission. This is acceptable
to use the caller's fsuid.
The second is commit 51f7e52dc943 ("ovl: share inode for hard link")
which removed the inode creation in ovl_link(). This commit move
inode_init_owner() into ovl_create_object(), so the ovl_link() just
give the old inode to ovl_create_or_link(). Then the override fsuid
becomes the old inode's fsuid, neither the caller nor the overlay's
mounter! So this is incorrect.
Fix this bug by using ovl mounter's fsuid/fsgid to do underlying
fs's link().
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220817102952.xnvesg3a7rbv576x@wittgenstein/T
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220825130552.29587-1-zhangtianci.1997@bytedance.com/t
Signed-off-by: Zhang Tianci <zhangtianci.1997@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiachen Zhang <zhangjiachen.jaycee@bytedance.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Fixes: 51f7e52dc943 ("ovl: share inode for hard link")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.8
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9f2b5debc07073e6dfdd774e3594d0224b991927 upstream.
Despite specifying UID and GID in mount command, the specified UID and GID
were not being assigned. This patch fixes this issue.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/C0264BF5-059C-45CF-B8DA-3A3BD2C803A2@live.com
Signed-off-by: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@live.com>
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit f7f291e14dde32a07b1f0aa06921d28f875a7b54 ]
When running xfstests against Azure the following oops occurred on an
arm64 system
Unable to handle kernel write to read-only memory at virtual address
ffff0001221cf000
Mem abort info:
ESR = 0x9600004f
EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
SET = 0, FnV = 0
EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
FSC = 0x0f: level 3 permission fault
Data abort info:
ISV = 0, ISS = 0x0000004f
CM = 0, WnR = 1
swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00000000294f3000
[ffff0001221cf000] pgd=18000001ffff8003, p4d=18000001ffff8003,
pud=18000001ff82e003, pmd=18000001ff71d003, pte=00600001221cf787
Internal error: Oops: 9600004f [#1] PREEMPT SMP
...
pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)
pc : __memcpy+0x40/0x230
lr : scatterwalk_copychunks+0xe0/0x200
sp : ffff800014e92de0
x29: ffff800014e92de0 x28: ffff000114f9de80 x27: 0000000000000008
x26: 0000000000000008 x25: ffff800014e92e78 x24: 0000000000000008
x23: 0000000000000001 x22: 0000040000000000 x21: ffff000000000000
x20: 0000000000000001 x19: ffff0001037c4488 x18: 0000000000000014
x17: 235e1c0d6efa9661 x16: a435f9576b6edd6c x15: 0000000000000058
x14: 0000000000000001 x13: 0000000000000008 x12: ffff000114f2e590
x11: ffffffffffffffff x10: 0000040000000000 x9 : ffff8000105c3580
x8 : 2e9413b10000001a x7 : 534b4410fb86b005 x6 : 534b4410fb86b005
x5 : ffff0001221cf008 x4 : ffff0001037c4490 x3 : 0000000000000001
x2 : 0000000000000008 x1 : ffff0001037c4488 x0 : ffff0001221cf000
Call trace:
__memcpy+0x40/0x230
scatterwalk_map_and_copy+0x98/0x100
crypto_ccm_encrypt+0x150/0x180
crypto_aead_encrypt+0x2c/0x40
crypt_message+0x750/0x880
smb3_init_transform_rq+0x298/0x340
smb_send_rqst.part.11+0xd8/0x180
smb_send_rqst+0x3c/0x100
compound_send_recv+0x534/0xbc0
smb2_query_info_compound+0x32c/0x440
smb2_set_ea+0x438/0x4c0
cifs_xattr_set+0x5d4/0x7c0
This is because in scatterwalk_copychunks(), we attempted to write to
a buffer (@sign) that was allocated in the stack (vmalloc area) by
crypt_message() and thus accessing its remaining 8 (x2) bytes ended up
crossing a page boundary.
To simply fix it, we could just pass @sign kmalloc'd from
crypt_message() and then we're done. Luckily, we don't seem to pass
any other vmalloc'd buffers in smb_rqst::rq_iov...
Instead, let's map the correct pages and offsets from vmalloc buffers
as well in cifs_sg_set_buf() and then avoiding such oopses.
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc@cjr.nz>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 572302af1258459e124437b8f3369357447afac7 upstream.
Commit 57fe60df6241 ("reiserfs: add atomic addition of selinux attributes
during inode creation") defined reiserfs_security_free() to free the name
and value of a security xattr allocated by the active LSM through
security_old_inode_init_security(). However, this function is not called
in the reiserfs code.
Thus, add a call to reiserfs_security_free() whenever
reiserfs_security_init() is called, and initialize value to NULL, to avoid
to call kfree() on an uninitialized pointer.
Finally, remove the kfree() for the xattr name, as it is not allocated
anymore.
Fixes: 57fe60df6241 ("reiserfs: add atomic addition of selinux attributes during inode creation")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reported-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 2f4fec5943407318b9523f01ce1f5d668c028332 ]
In commit 76d62f24db07 ("pstore: Switch pmsg_lock to an rt_mutex
to avoid priority inversion") I changed a lock to an rt_mutex.
However, its possible that CONFIG_RT_MUTEXES is not enabled,
which then results in a build failure, as the 0day bot detected:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/202212211244.TwzWZD3H-lkp@intel.com/
Thus this patch changes CONFIG_PSTORE_PMSG to select
CONFIG_RT_MUTEXES, which ensures the build will not fail.
Cc: Wei Wang <wvw@google.com>
Cc: Midas Chien<midaschieh@google.com>
Cc: Connor O'Brien <connoro@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Anton Vorontsov <anton@enomsg.org>
Cc: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Cc: kernel-team@android.com
Fixes: 76d62f24db07 ("pstore: Switch pmsg_lock to an rt_mutex to avoid priority inversion")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: John Stultz <jstultz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221221051855.15761-1-jstultz@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 76d62f24db07f22ccf9bc18ca793c27d4ebef721 ]
Wei Wang reported seeing priority inversion caused latencies
caused by contention on pmsg_lock, and suggested it be switched
to a rt_mutex.
I was initially hesitant this would help, as the tasks in that
trace all seemed to be SCHED_NORMAL, so the benefit would be
limited to only nice boosting.
However, another similar issue was raised where the priority
inversion was seen did involve a blocked RT task so it is clear
this would be helpful in that case.
Cc: Wei Wang <wvw@google.com>
Cc: Midas Chien<midaschieh@google.com>
Cc: Connor O'Brien <connoro@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Anton Vorontsov <anton@enomsg.org>
Cc: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: kernel-team@android.com
Fixes: 9d5438f462ab ("pstore: Add pmsg - user-space accessible pstore object")
Reported-by: Wei Wang <wvw@google.com>
Signed-off-by: John Stultz <jstultz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221214231834.3711880-1-jstultz@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 26215b7ee923b9251f7bb12c4e5f09dc465d35f2 ]
Syzkaller reports a null-ptr-deref bug as follows:
======================================================
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
RIP: 0010:hugetlbfs_parse_param+0x1dd/0x8e0 fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c:1380
[...]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
vfs_parse_fs_param fs/fs_context.c:148 [inline]
vfs_parse_fs_param+0x1f9/0x3c0 fs/fs_context.c:129
vfs_parse_fs_string+0xdb/0x170 fs/fs_context.c:191
generic_parse_monolithic+0x16f/0x1f0 fs/fs_context.c:231
do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:3036 [inline]
path_mount+0x12de/0x1e20 fs/namespace.c:3370
do_mount fs/namespace.c:3383 [inline]
__do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3591 [inline]
__se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3568 [inline]
__x64_sys_mount+0x27f/0x300 fs/namespace.c:3568
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[...]
</TASK>
======================================================
According to commit "vfs: parse: deal with zero length string value",
kernel will set the param->string to null pointer in vfs_parse_fs_string()
if fs string has zero length.
Yet the problem is that, hugetlbfs_parse_param() will dereference the
param->string, without checking whether it is a null pointer. To be more
specific, if hugetlbfs_parse_param() parses an illegal mount parameter,
such as "size=,", kernel will constructs struct fs_parameter with null
pointer in vfs_parse_fs_string(), then passes this struct fs_parameter to
hugetlbfs_parse_param(), which triggers the above null-ptr-deref bug.
This patch solves it by adding sanity check on param->string
in hugetlbfs_parse_param().
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221020231609.4810-1-yin31149@gmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+a3e6acd85ded5c16a709@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Tested-by: syzbot+a3e6acd85ded5c16a709@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/0000000000005ad00405eb7148c6@google.com/
Signed-off-by: Hawkins Jiawei <yin31149@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Hawkins Jiawei <yin31149@gmail.com>
Cc: Muchun Song <songmuchun@bytedance.com>
Cc: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 8d824e69d9f3fa3121b2dda25053bae71e2460d2 ]
Syzbot reported a OOB read bug:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in hfs_strcmp+0x117/0x190
fs/hfs/string.c:84
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88807eb62c4e by task kworker/u4:1/11
CPU: 1 PID: 11 Comm: kworker/u4:1 Not tainted
6.1.0-rc6-syzkaller-00308-g644e9524388a #0
Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-7:0)
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x1b1/0x28e lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description+0x74/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:284
print_report+0x107/0x1f0 mm/kasan/report.c:395
kasan_report+0xcd/0x100 mm/kasan/report.c:495
hfs_strcmp+0x117/0x190 fs/hfs/string.c:84
__hfs_brec_find+0x213/0x5c0 fs/hfs/bfind.c:75
hfs_brec_find+0x276/0x520 fs/hfs/bfind.c:138
hfs_write_inode+0x34c/0xb40 fs/hfs/inode.c:462
write_inode fs/fs-writeback.c:1440 [inline]
If the input inode of hfs_write_inode() is incorrect:
struct inode
struct hfs_inode_info
struct hfs_cat_key
struct hfs_name
u8 len # len is greater than HFS_NAMELEN(31) which is the
maximum length of an HFS filename
OOB read occurred:
hfs_write_inode()
hfs_brec_find()
__hfs_brec_find()
hfs_cat_keycmp()
hfs_strcmp() # OOB read occurred due to len is too large
Fix this by adding a Check on len in hfs_write_inode() before calling
hfs_brec_find().
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221130065959.2168236-1-zhangpeng362@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: ZhangPeng <zhangpeng362@huawei.com>
Reported-by: <syzbot+e836ff7133ac02be825f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Cc: Damien Le Moal <damien.lemoal@opensource.wdc.com>
Cc: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Cc: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Nanyong Sun <sunnanyong@huawei.com>
Cc: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 610a2a3d7d8be3537458a378ec69396a76c385b6 ]
Patch series "nilfs2: fix UBSAN shift-out-of-bounds warnings on mount
time".
The first patch fixes a bug reported by syzbot, and the second one fixes
the remaining bug of the same kind. Although they are triggered by the
same super block data anomaly, I divided it into the above two because the
details of the issues and how to fix it are different.
Both are required to eliminate the shift-out-of-bounds issues at mount
time.
This patch (of 2):
If the block size exponent information written in an on-disk superblock is
corrupted, nilfs_sb2_bad_offset helper function can trigger
shift-out-of-bounds warning followed by a kernel panic (if panic_on_warn
is set):
shift exponent 38983 is too large for 64-bit type 'unsigned long long'
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x1b1/0x28e lib/dump_stack.c:106
ubsan_epilogue lib/ubsan.c:151 [inline]
__ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x33d/0x3b0 lib/ubsan.c:322
nilfs_sb2_bad_offset fs/nilfs2/the_nilfs.c:449 [inline]
nilfs_load_super_block+0xdf5/0xe00 fs/nilfs2/the_nilfs.c:523
init_nilfs+0xb7/0x7d0 fs/nilfs2/the_nilfs.c:577
nilfs_fill_super+0xb1/0x5d0 fs/nilfs2/super.c:1047
nilfs_mount+0x613/0x9b0 fs/nilfs2/super.c:1317
...
In addition, since nilfs_sb2_bad_offset() performs multiplication without
considering the upper bound, the computation may overflow if the disk
layout parameters are not normal.
This fixes these issues by inserting preliminary sanity checks for those
parameters and by converting the comparison from one involving
multiplication and left bit-shifting to one using division and right
bit-shifting.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221027044306.42774-1-konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221027044306.42774-2-konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+e91619dd4c11c4960706@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Tested-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 25e70c6162f207828dd405b432d8f2a98dbf7082 ]
This should be applied to most URSAN bugs found recently by syzbot,
by guarding the dbMount. As syzbot feeding rubbish into the bmap
descriptor.
Signed-off-by: Hoi Pok Wu <wuhoipok@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit c791730f2554a9ebb8f18df9368dc27d4ebc38c2 ]
syzbot reported a warning like below [1]:
VFS: brelse: Trying to free free buffer
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 7301 at fs/buffer.c:1145 __brelse+0x67/0xa0
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
invalidate_bh_lru+0x99/0x150
smp_call_function_many_cond+0xe2a/0x10c0
? generic_remap_file_range_prep+0x50/0x50
? __brelse+0xa0/0xa0
? __mutex_lock+0x21c/0x12d0
? smp_call_on_cpu+0x250/0x250
? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xb/0x60
? lock_release+0x587/0x810
? __brelse+0xa0/0xa0
? generic_remap_file_range_prep+0x50/0x50
on_each_cpu_cond_mask+0x3c/0x80
blkdev_flush_mapping+0x13a/0x2f0
blkdev_put_whole+0xd3/0xf0
blkdev_put+0x222/0x760
deactivate_locked_super+0x96/0x160
deactivate_super+0xda/0x100
cleanup_mnt+0x222/0x3d0
task_work_run+0x149/0x240
? task_work_cancel+0x30/0x30
do_exit+0xb29/0x2a40
? reacquire_held_locks+0x4a0/0x4a0
? do_raw_spin_lock+0x12a/0x2b0
? mm_update_next_owner+0x7c0/0x7c0
? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x90/0x90
? zap_other_threads+0x234/0x2d0
do_group_exit+0xd0/0x2a0
__x64_sys_exit_group+0x3a/0x50
do_syscall_64+0x34/0xb0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
The cause of the issue is that brelse() is called on both ofibh.sbh
and ofibh.ebh by udf_find_entry() when it returns NULL. However,
brelse() is called by udf_rename(), too. So, b_count on buffer_head
becomes unbalanced.
This patch fixes the issue by not calling brelse() by udf_rename()
when udf_find_entry() returns NULL.
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=8297f45698159c6bca8a1f87dc983667c1a1c851 [1]
Reported-by: syzbot+7902cd7684bc35306224@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Shigeru Yoshida <syoshida@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221023095741.271430-1-syoshida@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 898f706695682b9954f280d95e49fa86ffa55d08 ]
Syzbot found a crash : UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in dbAllocAG. The
underlying bug is the missing check of bmp->db_agl2size. The field can
be greater than 64 and trigger the shift-out-of-bounds.
Fix this bug by adding a check of bmp->db_agl2size in dbMount since this
field is used in many following functions. The upper bound for this
field is L2MAXL2SIZE - L2MAXAG, thanks for the help of Dave Kleikamp.
Note that, for maintenance, I reorganized error handling code of dbMount.
Reported-by: syzbot+15342c1aa6a00fb7a438@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Dongliang Mu <mudongliangabcd@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 6a46bf558803dd2b959ca7435a5c143efe837217 ]
UBSAN reported a shift-out-of-bounds warning:
left shift of 1 by 31 places cannot be represented in type 'int'
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x8d/0xcf lib/dump_stack.c:106
ubsan_epilogue+0xa/0x44 lib/ubsan.c:151
__ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x1e7/0x208 lib/ubsan.c:322
check_special_flags fs/binfmt_misc.c:241 [inline]
create_entry fs/binfmt_misc.c:456 [inline]
bm_register_write+0x9d3/0xa20 fs/binfmt_misc.c:654
vfs_write+0x11e/0x580 fs/read_write.c:582
ksys_write+0xcf/0x120 fs/read_write.c:637
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x34/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x4194e1
Since the type of Node's flags is unsigned long, we should define these
macros with same type too.
Signed-off-by: Liu Shixin <liushixin2@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221102025123.1117184-1-liushixin2@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 0b175b18648ebedfe255b11a7792f1d76848a8f7 ]
Try to capture DRC failures.
Two additional clean-ups:
- Introduce Doxygen-style comments for the main entry points
- Remove a dprintk that fires for an allocation failure. This was
the only dprintk in the REPCACHE class.
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
[ cel: force typecast for display of checksum values ]
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Stable-dep-of: 3bc8edc98bd4 ("nfsd: under NFSv4.1, fix double svc_xprt_put on rpc_create failure")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 11fa7fefe3d8fac7da56bc9aa3dd5fb3081ca797 ]
While doing fault injection test, I got the following report:
------------[ cut here ]------------
kobject: '(null)' (0000000039956980): is not initialized, yet kobject_put() is being called.
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 6306 at kobject_put+0x23d/0x4e0
CPU: 3 PID: 6306 Comm: 283 Tainted: G W 6.1.0-rc2-00005-g307c1086d7c9 #1253
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:kobject_put+0x23d/0x4e0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
cdev_device_add+0x15e/0x1b0
__iio_device_register+0x13b4/0x1af0 [industrialio]
__devm_iio_device_register+0x22/0x90 [industrialio]
max517_probe+0x3d8/0x6b4 [max517]
i2c_device_probe+0xa81/0xc00
When device_add() is injected fault and returns error, if dev->devt is not set,
cdev_add() is not called, cdev_del() is not needed. Fix this by checking dev->devt
in error path.
Fixes: 233ed09d7fda ("chardev: add helper function to register char devs with a struct device")
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221202030237.520280-1-yangyingliang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit ea60a4ad0cf88b411cde6888b8c890935686ecd7 ]
When the dev init failed, should cleanup the sysfs, otherwise, the
module will never be loaded since can not create duplicate sysfs
directory:
sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/fs/orangefs'
CPU: 1 PID: 6549 Comm: insmod Tainted: G W 6.0.0+ #44
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-1.fc33 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x44
sysfs_warn_dup.cold+0x17/0x24
sysfs_create_dir_ns+0x16d/0x180
kobject_add_internal+0x156/0x3a0
kobject_init_and_add+0xcf/0x120
orangefs_sysfs_init+0x7e/0x3a0 [orangefs]
orangefs_init+0xfe/0x1000 [orangefs]
do_one_initcall+0x87/0x2a0
do_init_module+0xdf/0x320
load_module+0x2f98/0x3330
__do_sys_finit_module+0x113/0x1b0
do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
kobject_add_internal failed for orangefs with -EEXIST, don't try to register things with the same name in the same directory.
Fixes: 2f83ace37181 ("orangefs: put register_chrdev immediately before register_filesystem")
Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit e219aecfd4b766c4e878a3769057e9809f7fcadc ]
When f2fs chooses GC victim in large section & LFS mode,
next_victim_seg[gc_type] is referenced first. After segment is freed,
next_victim_seg[gc_type] has the next segment number.
However, next_victim_seg[gc_type] still has the last segment number
even after the last segment of section is freed. In this case, when f2fs
chooses a victim for the next GC round, the last segment of previous victim
section is chosen as a victim.
Initialize next_victim_seg[gc_type] to NULL_SEGNO for the last segment in
large section.
Fixes: e3080b0120a1 ("f2fs: support subsectional garbage collection")
Signed-off-by: Yonggil Song <yonggil.song@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit b5f1a218ae5e4339130d6e733f0e63d623e09a2c ]
In the DPOLICY_BG mode, there is a conflict between
the two conditions "i + 1 < dpolicy->granularity" and
"i < DEFAULT_DISCARD_GRANULARITY". If i = 15, the first
condition is false, it will enter the second condition
and dispatch all small granularity discards in function
__issue_discard_cmd_orderly. The restrictive effect
of the first condition to small discards will be
invalidated. These two conditions should align.
Fixes: 20ee4382322c ("f2fs: issue small discard by LBA order")
Signed-off-by: Dongdong Zhang <zhangdongdong1@oppo.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit b4e4f66901658fae0614dea5bf91062a5387eda7 ]
If the state manager thread fails to start, then we should just mark the
client initialisation as failed so that other processes or threads don't
get stuck in nfs_wait_client_init_complete().
Reported-by: ChenXiaoSong <chenxiaosong2@huawei.com>
Fixes: 4697bd5e9419 ("NFSv4: Fix a race in the net namespace mount notification")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 51069e4aef6257b0454057359faed0ab0c9af083 ]
If we're asked to recover open state while a delegation return is
outstanding, then the state manager thread cannot use a cached open, so
if the server returns a delegation, we can end up deadlocked behind the
pending delegreturn.
To avoid this problem, let's just ask the server not to give us a
delegation unless we're explicitly reclaiming one.
Fixes: be36e185bd26 ("NFSv4: nfs4_open_recover_helper() must set share access")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 43c1031f7110967c240cb6e922adcfc4b8899183 ]
We must not change the value of label->len if it is zero, since that
indicates we stored a label.
Fixes: b4487b935452 ("nfs: Fix getxattr kernel panic and memory overflow")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit eef7314caf2d73a94b68ba293cd105154d3a664e ]
We need to clear the FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL bitmap flag
irrespective of whether or not the label is too long.
Fixes: aa9c2669626c ("NFS: Client implementation of Labeled-NFS")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit c53ed55cb275344086e32a7080a6b19cb183650b ]
Syzbot reported a OOB Write bug:
loop0: detected capacity change from 0 to 64
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in hfs_asc2mac+0x467/0x9a0
fs/hfs/trans.c:133
Write of size 1 at addr ffff88801848314e by task syz-executor391/3632
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x1b1/0x28e lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description+0x74/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:284
print_report+0x107/0x1f0 mm/kasan/report.c:395
kasan_report+0xcd/0x100 mm/kasan/report.c:495
hfs_asc2mac+0x467/0x9a0 fs/hfs/trans.c:133
hfs_cat_build_key+0x92/0x170 fs/hfs/catalog.c:28
hfs_lookup+0x1ab/0x2c0 fs/hfs/dir.c:31
lookup_open fs/namei.c:3391 [inline]
open_last_lookups fs/namei.c:3481 [inline]
path_openat+0x10e6/0x2df0 fs/namei.c:3710
do_filp_open+0x264/0x4f0 fs/namei.c:3740
If in->len is much larger than HFS_NAMELEN(31) which is the maximum
length of an HFS filename, a OOB write could occur in hfs_asc2mac(). In
that case, when the dst reaches the boundary, the srclen is still
greater than 0, which causes a OOB write.
Fix this by adding a check on dstlen in while() before writing to dst
address.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221202030038.1391945-1-zhangpeng362@huawei.com
Fixes: 328b92278650 ("[PATCH] hfs: NLS support")
Signed-off-by: ZhangPeng <zhangpeng362@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Reported-by: <syzbot+dc3b1cf9111ab5fe98e7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit e0c49bd2b4d3cd1751491eb2d940bce968ac65e9 ]
sysv_nblocks() returns 'blocks' rather than 'res', which only counting
the number of triple-indirect blocks and causing sysv_getattr() gets a
wrong result.
[AV: this is actually a sysv counterpart of minixfs fix -
0fcd426de9d0 "[PATCH] minix block usage counting fix" in
historical tree; mea culpa, should've thought to check
fs/sysv back then...]
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Chen Zhongjin <chenzhongjin@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit ce2fcf1516d674a174d9b34d1e1024d64de9fba3 ]
There is a memory leak reported by kmemleak:
unreferenced object 0xffff88810cc65e60 (size 32):
comm "mount.ocfs2", pid 23753, jiffies 4302528942 (age 34735.105s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 ................
01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<ffffffff8170f73d>] __kmalloc+0x4d/0x150
[<ffffffffa0ac3f51>] ocfs2_compute_replay_slots+0x121/0x330 [ocfs2]
[<ffffffffa0b65165>] ocfs2_check_volume+0x485/0x900 [ocfs2]
[<ffffffffa0b68129>] ocfs2_mount_volume.isra.0+0x1e9/0x650 [ocfs2]
[<ffffffffa0b7160b>] ocfs2_fill_super+0xe0b/0x1740 [ocfs2]
[<ffffffff818e1fe2>] mount_bdev+0x312/0x400
[<ffffffff819a086d>] legacy_get_tree+0xed/0x1d0
[<ffffffff818de82d>] vfs_get_tree+0x7d/0x230
[<ffffffff81957f92>] path_mount+0xd62/0x1760
[<ffffffff81958a5a>] do_mount+0xca/0xe0
[<ffffffff81958d3c>] __x64_sys_mount+0x12c/0x1a0
[<ffffffff82f26f15>] do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
[<ffffffff8300006a>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
This call stack is related to two problems. Firstly, the ocfs2 super uses
"replay_map" to trace online/offline slots, in order to recover offline
slots during recovery and mount. But when ocfs2_truncate_log_init()
returns an error in ocfs2_mount_volume(), the memory of "replay_map" will
not be freed in error handling path. Secondly, the memory of "replay_map"
will not be freed if d_make_root() returns an error in ocfs2_fill_super().
But the memory of "replay_map" will be freed normally when completing
recovery and mount in ocfs2_complete_mount_recovery().
Fix the first problem by adding error handling path to free "replay_map"
when ocfs2_truncate_log_init() fails. And fix the second problem by
calling ocfs2_free_replay_slots(osb) in the error handling path
"out_dismount". In addition, since ocfs2_free_replay_slots() is static,
it is necessary to remove its static attribute and declare it in header
file.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221109074627.2303950-1-lizetao1@huawei.com
Fixes: 9140db04ef18 ("ocfs2: recover orphans in offline slots during recovery and mount")
Signed-off-by: Li Zetao <lizetao1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit f1e75d128b46e3b066e7b2e7cfca10491109d44d ]
Current ocfs2_fill_super() uses one goto label "read_super_error" to
handle all error cases. And with previous serial patches, the error
handling should fork more branches to handle different error cases. This
patch rewrite the error handling of ocfs2_fill_super.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220424130952.2436-6-heming.zhao@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Stable-dep-of: ce2fcf1516d6 ("ocfs2: fix memory leak in ocfs2_mount_volume()")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 0737e01de9c411e4db87dcedf4a9789d41b1c5c1 ]
After this patch, when error, ocfs2_fill_super doesn't take care to
release resources which are allocated in ocfs2_mount_volume.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220424130952.2436-5-heming.zhao@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Stable-dep-of: ce2fcf1516d6 ("ocfs2: fix memory leak in ocfs2_mount_volume()")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit d472cf797c4e268613dbce5ec9b95d0bcae19ecb ]
The simple attribute files do not accept a negative value since the commit
488dac0c9237 ("libfs: fix error cast of negative value in
simple_attr_write()"), so we have to use a 64-bit value to write a
negative value for a debugfs file created by debugfs_create_atomic_t().
This restores the previous behaviour by introducing
DEFINE_DEBUGFS_ATTRIBUTE_SIGNED for a signed value.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220919172418.45257-4-akinobu.mita@gmail.com
Fixes: 488dac0c9237 ("libfs: fix error cast of negative value in simple_attr_write()")
Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Zhao Gongyi <zhaogongyi@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael@kernel.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Cc: Yicong Yang <yangyicong@hisilicon.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 2e41f274f9aa71cdcc69dc1f26a3f9304a651804 ]
Patch series "fix error when writing negative value to simple attribute
files".
The simple attribute files do not accept a negative value since the commit
488dac0c9237 ("libfs: fix error cast of negative value in
simple_attr_write()"), but some attribute files want to accept a negative
value.
This patch (of 3):
The simple attribute files do not accept a negative value since the commit
488dac0c9237 ("libfs: fix error cast of negative value in
simple_attr_write()"), so we have to use a 64-bit value to write a
negative value.
This adds DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE_SIGNED for a signed value.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220919172418.45257-1-akinobu.mita@gmail.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220919172418.45257-2-akinobu.mita@gmail.com
Fixes: 488dac0c9237 ("libfs: fix error cast of negative value in simple_attr_write()")
Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Zhao Gongyi <zhaogongyi@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael@kernel.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Cc: Yicong Yang <yangyicong@hisilicon.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit e0aa651068bfd520afcd357af8ecd2de005fc83d ]
We had a report of this:
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at fs/nfsd/filecache.c:440
...with a stack trace showing nfsd_file_put being called from
nfs4_show_open. This code has always tried to call fput while holding a
spinlock, but we recently changed this to use the filecache, and that
started triggering the might_sleep() in nfsd_file_put.
states_start takes and holds the cl_lock while iterating over the
client's states, and we can't sleep with that held.
Have the various nfs4_show_* functions instead hold the fi_lock instead
of taking a nfsd_file reference.
Fixes: 78599c42ae3c ("nfsd4: add file to display list of client's opens")
Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2138357
Reported-by: Zhi Li <yieli@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit e7eda157c4071cd1e69f4b1687b0fbe1ae5e6f46 ]
The check being unconditional may lead to unwanted denials reported by
LSMs when a process has the capability granted by DAC, but denied by an
LSM. In the case of SELinux such denials are a problem, since they can't
be effectively filtered out via the policy and when not silenced, they
produce noise that may hide a true problem or an attack.
Checking for the capability only if any trusted xattr is actually
present wouldn't really address the issue, since calling listxattr(2) on
such node on its own doesn't indicate an explicit attempt to see the
trusted xattrs. Additionally, it could potentially leak the presence of
trusted xattrs to an unprivileged user if they can check for the denials
(e.g. through dmesg).
Therefore, it's best (and simplest) to keep the check unconditional and
instead use ns_capable_noaudit() that will silence any associated LSM
denials.
Fixes: 38f38657444d ("xattr: extract simple_xattr code from tmpfs")
Reported-by: Martin Pitt <mpitt@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit e6b842741b4f39007215fd7e545cb55aa3d358a2 ]
An oops can be induced by running 'cat /proc/kcore > /dev/null' on
devices using pstore with the ram backend because kmap_atomic() assumes
lowmem pages are accessible with __va().
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffffff807ff2b000
Mem abort info:
ESR = 0x96000006
EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
SET = 0, FnV = 0
EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
FSC = 0x06: level 2 translation fault
Data abort info:
ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000006
CM = 0, WnR = 0
swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 39-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000081d87000
[ffffff807ff2b000] pgd=180000017fe18003, p4d=180000017fe18003, pud=180000017fe18003, pmd=0000000000000000
Internal error: Oops: 96000006 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in: dm_integrity
CPU: 7 PID: 21179 Comm: perf Not tainted 5.15.67-10882-ge4eb2eb988cd #1 baa443fb8e8477896a370b31a821eb2009f9bfba
Hardware name: Google Lazor (rev3 - 8) (DT)
pstate: a0400009 (NzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : __memcpy+0x110/0x260
lr : vread+0x194/0x294
sp : ffffffc013ee39d0
x29: ffffffc013ee39f0 x28: 0000000000001000 x27: ffffff807ff2b000
x26: 0000000000001000 x25: ffffffc0085a2000 x24: ffffff802d4b3000
x23: ffffff80f8a60000 x22: ffffff802d4b3000 x21: ffffffc0085a2000
x20: ffffff8080b7bc68 x19: 0000000000001000 x18: 0000000000000000
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: ffffffd3073f2e60
x14: ffffffffad588000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000001
x11: 00000000000001a2 x10: 00680000fff2bf0b x9 : 03fffffff807ff2b
x8 : 0000000000000001 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000
x5 : ffffff802d4b4000 x4 : ffffff807ff2c000 x3 : ffffffc013ee3a78
x2 : 0000000000001000 x1 : ffffff807ff2b000 x0 : ffffff802d4b3000
Call trace:
__memcpy+0x110/0x260
read_kcore+0x584/0x778
proc_reg_read+0xb4/0xe4
During early boot, memblock reserves the pages for the ramoops reserved
memory node in DT that would otherwise be part of the direct lowmem
mapping. Pstore's ram backend reuses those reserved pages to change the
memory type (writeback or non-cached) by passing the pages to vmap()
(see pfn_to_page() usage in persistent_ram_vmap() for more details) with
specific flags. When read_kcore() starts iterating over the vmalloc
region, it runs over the virtual address that vmap() returned for
ramoops. In aligned_vread() the virtual address is passed to
vmalloc_to_page() which returns the page struct for the reserved lowmem
area. That lowmem page is passed to kmap_atomic(), which effectively
calls page_to_virt() that assumes a lowmem page struct must be directly
accessible with __va() and friends. These pages are mapped via vmap()
though, and the lowmem mapping was never made, so accessing them via the
lowmem virtual address oopses like above.
Let's side-step this problem by passing VM_IOREMAP to vmap(). This will
tell vread() to not include the ramoops region in the kcore. Instead the
area will look like a bunch of zeros. The alternative is to teach kmap()
about vmalloc areas that intersect with lowmem. Presumably such a change
isn't a one-liner, and there isn't much interest in inspecting the
ramoops region in kcore files anyway, so the most expedient route is
taken for now.
Cc: Brian Geffon <bgeffon@google.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Fixes: 404a6043385d ("staging: android: persistent_ram: handle reserving and mapping memory")
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221205233136.3420802-1-swboyd@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit e1fce564900f8734edf15b87f028c57e14f6e28d ]
In the if (dev_of_node(dev) && !pdata) path, the "err" may be assigned a
value of 0, so the error return code -EINVAL may be incorrectly set
to 0. To fix set valid return code before calling to goto.
Fixes: 35da60941e44 ("pstore/ram: add Device Tree bindings")
Signed-off-by: Wang Yufen <wangyufen@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1669969374-46582-1-git-send-email-wangyufen@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 1f3868f06855c97a4954c99b36f3fc9eb8f60326 upstream.
When extending file within last block it can happen that the extent is
already rounded to the blocksize and thus contains the offset we want to
grow up to. In such case we would mistakenly expand the last extent and
make it one block longer than it should be, exposing unallocated block
in a file and causing data corruption. Fix the problem by properly
detecting this case and bailing out.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6ad53f0f71c52871202a7bf096feb2c59db33fc5 upstream.
If rounded block-rounded i_lenExtents matches block rounded i_size,
there are no preallocation extents. Do not bother walking extent linked
list.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit cfe4c1b25dd6d2f056afc00b7c98bcb3dd0b1fc3 upstream.
When preallocation extent is the first one in the extent block, the
code would corrupt extent tree header instead. Fix the problem and use
udf_delete_aext() for deleting extent to avoid some code duplication.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 16d0556568148bdcaa45d077cac9f8f7077cf70a upstream.
When extending file with a hole, we tried to preserve existing
preallocation for the file. However that is not very useful and
complicates code because the previous extent may need to be rounded to
block boundary as well (which we forgot to do thus causing data
corruption for sequence like:
xfs_io -f -c "pwrite 0x75e63 11008" -c "truncate 0x7b24b" \
-c "truncate 0xabaa3" -c "pwrite 0xac70b 22954" \
-c "pwrite 0x93a43 11358" -c "pwrite 0xb8e65 52211" file
with 512-byte block size. Just discard preallocation before extending
file to simplify things and also fix this data corruption.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit a11452a3709e217492798cf3686ac2cc8eb3fb51 ]
When trying to see if we can clone a file range, there are cases where we
end up sending two write operations in case the inode from the source root
has an i_size that is not sector size aligned and the length from the
current offset to its i_size is less than the remaining length we are
trying to clone.
Issuing two write operations when we could instead issue a single write
operation is not incorrect. However it is not optimal, specially if the
extents are compressed and the flag BTRFS_SEND_FLAG_COMPRESSED was passed
to the send ioctl. In that case we can end up sending an encoded write
with an offset that is not sector size aligned, which makes the receiver
fallback to decompressing the data and writing it using regular buffered
IO (so re-compressing the data in case the fs is mounted with compression
enabled), because encoded writes fail with -EINVAL when an offset is not
sector size aligned.
The following example, which triggered a bug in the receiver code for the
fallback logic of decompressing + regular buffer IO and is fixed by the
patchset referred in a Link at the bottom of this changelog, is an example
where we have the non-optimal behaviour due to an unaligned encoded write:
$ cat test.sh
#!/bin/bash
DEV=/dev/sdj
MNT=/mnt/sdj
mkfs.btrfs -f $DEV > /dev/null
mount -o compress $DEV $MNT
# File foo has a size of 33K, not aligned to the sector size.
xfs_io -f -c "pwrite -S 0xab 0 33K" $MNT/foo
xfs_io -f -c "pwrite -S 0xcd 0 64K" $MNT/bar
# Now clone the first 32K of file bar into foo at offset 0.
xfs_io -c "reflink $MNT/bar 0 0 32K" $MNT/foo
# Snapshot the default subvolume and create a full send stream (v2).
btrfs subvolume snapshot -r $MNT $MNT/snap
btrfs send --compressed-data -f /tmp/test.send $MNT/snap
echo -e "\nFile bar in the original filesystem:"
od -A d -t x1 $MNT/snap/bar
umount $MNT
mkfs.btrfs -f $DEV > /dev/null
mount $DEV $MNT
echo -e "\nReceiving stream in a new filesystem..."
btrfs receive -f /tmp/test.send $MNT
echo -e "\nFile bar in the new filesystem:"
od -A d -t x1 $MNT/snap/bar
umount $MNT
Before this patch, the send stream included one regular write and one
encoded write for file 'bar', with the later being not sector size aligned
and causing the receiver to fallback to decompression + buffered writes.
The output of the btrfs receive command in verbose mode (-vvv):
(...)
mkfile o258-7-0
rename o258-7-0 -> bar
utimes
clone bar - source=foo source offset=0 offset=0 length=32768
write bar - offset=32768 length=1024
encoded_write bar - offset=33792, len=4096, unencoded_offset=33792, unencoded_file_len=31744, unencoded_len=65536, compression=1, encryption=0
encoded_write bar - falling back to decompress and write due to errno 22 ("Invalid argument")
(...)
This patch avoids the regular write followed by an unaligned encoded write
so that we end up sending a single encoded write that is aligned. So after
this patch the stream content is (output of btrfs receive -vvv):
(...)
mkfile o258-7-0
rename o258-7-0 -> bar
utimes
clone bar - source=foo source offset=0 offset=0 length=32768
encoded_write bar - offset=32768, len=4096, unencoded_offset=32768, unencoded_file_len=32768, unencoded_len=65536, compression=1, encryption=0
(...)
So we get more optimal behaviour and avoid the silent data loss bug in
versions of btrfs-progs affected by the bug referred by the Link tag
below (btrfs-progs v5.19, v5.19.1, v6.0 and v6.0.1).
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/cover.1668529099.git.fdmanana@suse.com/
Reviewed-by: Boris Burkov <boris@bur.io>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 289caf5d8f6c61c6d2b7fd752a7f483cd153f182 upstream.
Patch series "simplify ep_poll".
This patch series is a followup based on the suggestions and feedback by
Linus:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAHk-=wizk=OxUyQPbO8MS41w2Pag1kniUV5WdD5qWL-gq1kjDA@mail.gmail.com
The first patch in the series is a fix for the epoll race in presence of
timeouts, so that it can be cleanly backported to all affected stable
kernels.
The rest of the patch series simplify the ep_poll() implementation. Some
of these simplifications result in minor performance enhancements as well.
We have kept these changes under self tests and internal benchmarks for a
few days, and there are minor (1-2%) performance enhancements as a result.
This patch (of 8):
After abc610e01c66 ("fs/epoll: avoid barrier after an epoll_wait(2)
timeout"), we break out of the ep_poll loop upon timeout, without checking
whether there is any new events available. Prior to that patch-series we
always called ep_events_available() after exiting the loop.
This can cause races and missed wakeups. For example, consider the
following scenario reported by Guantao Liu:
Suppose we have an eventfd added using EPOLLET to an epollfd.
Thread 1: Sleeps for just below 5ms and then writes to an eventfd.
Thread 2: Calls epoll_wait with a timeout of 5 ms. If it sees an
event of the eventfd, it will write back on that fd.
Thread 3: Calls epoll_wait with a negative timeout.
Prior to abc610e01c66, it is guaranteed that Thread 3 will wake up either
by Thread 1 or Thread 2. After abc610e01c66, Thread 3 can be blocked
indefinitely if Thread 2 sees a timeout right before the write to the
eventfd by Thread 1. Thread 2 will be woken up from
schedule_hrtimeout_range and, with evail 0, it will not call
ep_send_events().
To fix this issue:
1) Simplify the timed_out case as suggested by Linus.
2) while holding the lock, recheck whether the thread was woken up
after its time out has reached.
Note that (2) is different from Linus' original suggestion: It do not set
"eavail = ep_events_available(ep)" to avoid unnecessary contention (when
there are too many timed-out threads and a small number of events), as
well as races mentioned in the discussion thread.
This is the first patch in the series so that the backport to stable
releases is straightforward.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201106231635.3528496-1-soheil.kdev@gmail.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAHk-=wizk=OxUyQPbO8MS41w2Pag1kniUV5WdD5qWL-gq1kjDA@mail.gmail.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201106231635.3528496-2-soheil.kdev@gmail.com
Fixes: abc610e01c66 ("fs/epoll: avoid barrier after an epoll_wait(2) timeout")
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Tested-by: Guantao Liu <guantaol@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Reported-by: Guantao Liu <guantaol@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Khazhismel Kumykov <khazhy@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Rishabh Bhatnagar <risbhat@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 65759097d804d2a9ad2b687db436319704ba7019 upstream.
There is a possible race when ep_scan_ready_list() leaves ->rdllist and
->obflist empty for a short period of time although some events are
pending. It is quite likely that ep_events_available() observes empty
lists and goes to sleep.
Since commit 339ddb53d373 ("fs/epoll: remove unnecessary wakeups of
nested epoll") we are conservative in wakeups (there is only one place
for wakeup and this is ep_poll_callback()), thus ep_events_available()
must always observe correct state of two lists.
The easiest and correct way is to do the final check under the lock.
This does not impact the performance, since lock is taken anyway for
adding a wait entry to the wait queue.
The discussion of the problem can be found here:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/a2f22c3c-c25a-4bda-8339-a7bdaf17849e@akamai.com/
In this patch barrierless __set_current_state() is used. This is safe
since waitqueue_active() is called under the same lock on wakeup side.
Short-circuit for fatal signals (i.e. fatal_signal_pending() check) is
moved to the line just before actual events harvesting routine. This is
fully compliant to what is said in the comment of the patch where the
actual fatal_signal_pending() check was added: c257a340ede0 ("fs, epoll:
short circuit fetching events if thread has been killed").
Fixes: 339ddb53d373 ("fs/epoll: remove unnecessary wakeups of nested epoll")
Reported-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Roman Penyaev <rpenyaev@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Cc: Khazhismel Kumykov <khazhy@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200505145609.1865152-1-rpenyaev@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Rishabh Bhatnagar <risbhat@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f0a0ccda18d6fd826d7c7e7ad48a6ed61c20f8b4 upstream.
Syzbot reported a null-ptr-deref bug:
NILFS (loop0): segctord starting. Construction interval = 5 seconds, CP
frequency < 30 seconds
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
0xdffffc0000000002: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000010-0x0000000000000017]
CPU: 1 PID: 3603 Comm: segctord Not tainted
6.1.0-rc2-syzkaller-00105-gb229b6ca5abb #0
Hardware name: Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google
10/11/2022
RIP: 0010:nilfs_palloc_commit_free_entry+0xe5/0x6b0
fs/nilfs2/alloc.c:608
Code: 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 cd 05 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00
00 00 fc ff df 4c 8b 73 08 49 8d 7e 10 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02
00 0f 85 26 05 00 00 49 8b 46 10 be a6 00 00 00 48 c7 c7
RSP: 0018:ffffc90003dff830 EFLAGS: 00010212
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88802594e218 RCX: 000000000000000d
RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000000000002000 RDI: 0000000000000010
RBP: ffff888071880222 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 000000000000003f
R10: 000000000000000d R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888071880158
R13: ffff88802594e220 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000004
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9b00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fb1c08316a8 CR3: 0000000018560000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
nilfs_dat_commit_free fs/nilfs2/dat.c:114 [inline]
nilfs_dat_commit_end+0x464/0x5f0 fs/nilfs2/dat.c:193
nilfs_dat_commit_update+0x26/0x40 fs/nilfs2/dat.c:236
nilfs_btree_commit_update_v+0x87/0x4a0 fs/nilfs2/btree.c:1940
nilfs_btree_commit_propagate_v fs/nilfs2/btree.c:2016 [inline]
nilfs_btree_propagate_v fs/nilfs2/btree.c:2046 [inline]
nilfs_btree_propagate+0xa00/0xd60 fs/nilfs2/btree.c:2088
nilfs_bmap_propagate+0x73/0x170 fs/nilfs2/bmap.c:337
nilfs_collect_file_data+0x45/0xd0 fs/nilfs2/segment.c:568
nilfs_segctor_apply_buffers+0x14a/0x470 fs/nilfs2/segment.c:1018
nilfs_segctor_scan_file+0x3f4/0x6f0 fs/nilfs2/segment.c:1067
nilfs_segctor_collect_blocks fs/nilfs2/segment.c:1197 [inline]
nilfs_segctor_collect fs/nilfs2/segment.c:1503 [inline]
nilfs_segctor_do_construct+0x12fc/0x6af0 fs/nilfs2/segment.c:2045
nilfs_segctor_construct+0x8e3/0xb30 fs/nilfs2/segment.c:2379
nilfs_segctor_thread_construct fs/nilfs2/segment.c:2487 [inline]
nilfs_segctor_thread+0x3c3/0xf30 fs/nilfs2/segment.c:2570
kthread+0x2e4/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:376
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:306
</TASK>
...
If DAT metadata file is corrupted on disk, there is a case where
req->pr_desc_bh is NULL and blocknr is 0 at nilfs_dat_commit_end() during
a b-tree operation that cascadingly updates ancestor nodes of the b-tree,
because nilfs_dat_commit_alloc() for a lower level block can initialize
the blocknr on the same DAT entry between nilfs_dat_prepare_end() and
nilfs_dat_commit_end().
If this happens, nilfs_dat_commit_end() calls nilfs_dat_commit_free()
without valid buffer heads in req->pr_desc_bh and req->pr_bitmap_bh, and
causes the NULL pointer dereference above in
nilfs_palloc_commit_free_entry() function, which leads to a crash.
Fix this by adding a NULL check on req->pr_desc_bh and req->pr_bitmap_bh
before nilfs_palloc_commit_free_entry() in nilfs_dat_commit_free().
This also calls nilfs_error() in that case to notify that there is a fatal
flaw in the filesystem metadata and prevent further operations.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/00000000000097c20205ebaea3d6@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221114040441.1649940-1-zhangpeng362@huawei.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221119120542.17204-1-konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: ZhangPeng <zhangpeng362@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+ebe05ee8e98f755f61d0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Tested-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit ca57f02295f188d6c65ec02202402979880fa6d8 ]
The fileserver probing code attempts to work out the best fileserver to
use for a volume by retrieving the RTT calculated by AF_RXRPC for the
probe call sent to each server and comparing them. Sometimes, however,
no RTT estimate is available and rxrpc_kernel_get_srtt() returns false,
leading good fileservers to be given an RTT of UINT_MAX and thus causing
the rotation algorithm to ignore them.
Fix afs_select_fileserver() to ignore rxrpc_kernel_get_srtt()'s return
value and just take the estimated RTT it provides - which will be capped
at 1 second.
Fixes: 1d4adfaf6574 ("rxrpc: Make rxrpc_kernel_get_srtt() indicate validity")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
Tested-by: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/166965503999.3392585.13954054113218099395.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
