521 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Eric Dumazet
b5b2d42bb3 af_packet: do not call packet_read_pending() from tpacket_destruct_skb()
[ Upstream commit 581073f626e387d3e7eed55c48c8495584ead7ba ]

trafgen performance considerably sank on hosts with many cores
after the blamed commit.

packet_read_pending() is very expensive, and calling it
in af_packet fast path defeats Daniel intent in commit
b013840810c2 ("packet: use percpu mmap tx frame pending refcount")

tpacket_destruct_skb() makes room for one packet, we can immediately
wakeup a producer, no need to completely drain the tx ring.

Fixes: 89ed5b519004 ("af_packet: Block execution of tasks waiting for transmit to complete in AF_PACKET")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240515163358.4105915-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-06-16 13:28:40 +02:00
Eric Dumazet
84c510411e packet: annotate data-races around ignore_outgoing
[ Upstream commit 6ebfad33161afacb3e1e59ed1c2feefef70f9f97 ]

ignore_outgoing is read locklessly from dev_queue_xmit_nit()
and packet_getsockopt()

Add appropriate READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() annotations.

syzbot reported:

BUG: KCSAN: data-race in dev_queue_xmit_nit / packet_setsockopt

write to 0xffff888107804542 of 1 bytes by task 22618 on cpu 0:
 packet_setsockopt+0xd83/0xfd0 net/packet/af_packet.c:4003
 do_sock_setsockopt net/socket.c:2311 [inline]
 __sys_setsockopt+0x1d8/0x250 net/socket.c:2334
 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2343 [inline]
 __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2340 [inline]
 __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x66/0x80 net/socket.c:2340
 do_syscall_64+0xd3/0x1d0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75

read to 0xffff888107804542 of 1 bytes by task 27 on cpu 1:
 dev_queue_xmit_nit+0x82/0x620 net/core/dev.c:2248
 xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3527 [inline]
 dev_hard_start_xmit+0xcc/0x3f0 net/core/dev.c:3547
 __dev_queue_xmit+0xf24/0x1dd0 net/core/dev.c:4335
 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3091 [inline]
 batadv_send_skb_packet+0x264/0x300 net/batman-adv/send.c:108
 batadv_send_broadcast_skb+0x24/0x30 net/batman-adv/send.c:127
 batadv_iv_ogm_send_to_if net/batman-adv/bat_iv_ogm.c:392 [inline]
 batadv_iv_ogm_emit net/batman-adv/bat_iv_ogm.c:420 [inline]
 batadv_iv_send_outstanding_bat_ogm_packet+0x3f0/0x4b0 net/batman-adv/bat_iv_ogm.c:1700
 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3254 [inline]
 process_scheduled_works+0x465/0x990 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
 worker_thread+0x526/0x730 kernel/workqueue.c:3416
 kthread+0x1d1/0x210 kernel/kthread.c:388
 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x60 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:243

value changed: 0x00 -> 0x01

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 27 Comm: kworker/u8:1 Tainted: G        W          6.8.0-syzkaller-08073-g480e035fc4c7 
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/29/2024
Workqueue: bat_events batadv_iv_send_outstanding_bat_ogm_packet

Fixes: fa788d986a3a ("packet: add sockopt to ignore outgoing packets")
Reported-by: syzbot+c669c1136495a2e7c31f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CANn89i+Z7MfbkBLOv=p7KZ7=K1rKHO4P1OL5LYDCtBiyqsa9oQ@mail.gmail.com/T/#t
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Xing <kerneljasonxing@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-03-26 18:22:25 -04:00
Wolfram Sang
7eee00feb6 packet: move from strlcpy with unused retval to strscpy
[ Upstream commit 8fc9d51ea2d32a05f7d7cf86a25cc86ecc57eb45 ]

Follow the advice of the below link and prefer 'strscpy' in this
subsystem. Conversion is 1:1 because the return value is not used.
Generated by a coccinelle script.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAHk-=wgfRnXz0W3D37d01q3JFkr_i_uTL=V6A6G1oUZcprmknw@mail.gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220818210227.8611-1-wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: a7d6027790ac ("arp: Prevent overflow in arp_req_get().")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-03-01 13:13:37 +01:00
Daniel Borkmann
148d8f0707 packet: Move reference count in packet_sock to atomic_long_t
commit db3fadacaf0c817b222090290d06ca2a338422d0 upstream.

In some potential instances the reference count on struct packet_sock
could be saturated and cause overflows which gets the kernel a bit
confused. To prevent this, move to a 64-bit atomic reference count on
64-bit architectures to prevent the possibility of this type to overflow.

Because we can not handle saturation, using refcount_t is not possible
in this place. Maybe someday in the future if it changes it could be
used. Also, instead of using plain atomic64_t, use atomic_long_t instead.
32-bit machines tend to be memory-limited (i.e. anything that increases
a reference uses so much memory that you can't actually get to 2**32
references). 32-bit architectures also tend to have serious problems
with 64-bit atomics. Hence, atomic_long_t is the more natural solution.

Reported-by: "The UK's National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC)" <security@ncsc.gov.uk>
Co-developed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231201131021.19999-1-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-12-13 18:18:14 +01:00
Eric Dumazet
9c7deea5af net/packet: annotate data-races around tp->status
commit 8a9896177784063d01068293caea3f74f6830ff6 upstream.

Another syzbot report [1] is about tp->status lockless reads
from __packet_get_status()

[1]
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __packet_rcv_has_room / __packet_set_status

write to 0xffff888117d7c080 of 8 bytes by interrupt on cpu 0:
__packet_set_status+0x78/0xa0 net/packet/af_packet.c:407
tpacket_rcv+0x18bb/0x1a60 net/packet/af_packet.c:2483
deliver_skb net/core/dev.c:2173 [inline]
__netif_receive_skb_core+0x408/0x1e80 net/core/dev.c:5337
__netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:5491 [inline]
__netif_receive_skb+0x57/0x1b0 net/core/dev.c:5607
process_backlog+0x21f/0x380 net/core/dev.c:5935
__napi_poll+0x60/0x3b0 net/core/dev.c:6498
napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6565 [inline]
net_rx_action+0x32b/0x750 net/core/dev.c:6698
__do_softirq+0xc1/0x265 kernel/softirq.c:571
invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:445 [inline]
__irq_exit_rcu+0x57/0xa0 kernel/softirq.c:650
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6d/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1106
asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:645
smpboot_thread_fn+0x33c/0x4a0 kernel/smpboot.c:112
kthread+0x1d7/0x210 kernel/kthread.c:379
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:308

read to 0xffff888117d7c080 of 8 bytes by interrupt on cpu 1:
__packet_get_status net/packet/af_packet.c:436 [inline]
packet_lookup_frame net/packet/af_packet.c:524 [inline]
__tpacket_has_room net/packet/af_packet.c:1255 [inline]
__packet_rcv_has_room+0x3f9/0x450 net/packet/af_packet.c:1298
tpacket_rcv+0x275/0x1a60 net/packet/af_packet.c:2285
deliver_skb net/core/dev.c:2173 [inline]
dev_queue_xmit_nit+0x38a/0x5e0 net/core/dev.c:2243
xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3574 [inline]
dev_hard_start_xmit+0xcf/0x3f0 net/core/dev.c:3594
__dev_queue_xmit+0xefb/0x1d10 net/core/dev.c:4244
dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3088 [inline]
can_send+0x4eb/0x5d0 net/can/af_can.c:276
bcm_can_tx+0x314/0x410 net/can/bcm.c:302
bcm_tx_timeout_handler+0xdb/0x260
__run_hrtimer kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1685 [inline]
__hrtimer_run_queues+0x217/0x700 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1749
hrtimer_run_softirq+0xd6/0x120 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1766
__do_softirq+0xc1/0x265 kernel/softirq.c:571
run_ksoftirqd+0x17/0x20 kernel/softirq.c:939
smpboot_thread_fn+0x30a/0x4a0 kernel/smpboot.c:164
kthread+0x1d7/0x210 kernel/kthread.c:379
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:308

value changed: 0x0000000000000000 -> 0x0000000020000081

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 19 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Not tainted 6.4.0-syzkaller 
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/27/2023

Fixes: 69e3c75f4d54 ("net: TX_RING and packet mmap")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230803145600.2937518-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-08-16 18:19:23 +02:00
Eric Dumazet
26e830858a af_packet: do not use READ_ONCE() in packet_bind()
[ Upstream commit 6ffc57ea004234d9373c57b204fd10370a69f392 ]

A recent patch added READ_ONCE() in packet_bind() and packet_bind_spkt()

This is better handled by reading pkt_sk(sk)->num later
in packet_do_bind() while appropriate lock is held.

READ_ONCE() in writers are often an evidence of something being wrong.

Fixes: 822b5a1c17df ("af_packet: Fix data-races of pkt_sk(sk)->num.")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230526154342.2533026-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-06-09 10:28:53 +02:00
Kuniyuki Iwashima
603eec060d af_packet: Fix data-races of pkt_sk(sk)->num.
[ Upstream commit 822b5a1c17df7e338b9f05d1cfe5764e37c7f74f ]

syzkaller found a data race of pkt_sk(sk)->num.

The value is changed under lock_sock() and po->bind_lock, so we
need READ_ONCE() to access pkt_sk(sk)->num without these locks in
packet_bind_spkt(), packet_bind(), and sk_diag_fill().

Note that WRITE_ONCE() is already added by commit c7d2ef5dd4b0
("net/packet: annotate accesses to po->bind").

BUG: KCSAN: data-race in packet_bind / packet_do_bind

write (marked) to 0xffff88802ffd1cee of 2 bytes by task 7322 on cpu 0:
 packet_do_bind+0x446/0x640 net/packet/af_packet.c:3236
 packet_bind+0x99/0xe0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3321
 __sys_bind+0x19b/0x1e0 net/socket.c:1803
 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1814 [inline]
 __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1812 [inline]
 __x64_sys_bind+0x40/0x50 net/socket.c:1812
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc

read to 0xffff88802ffd1cee of 2 bytes by task 7318 on cpu 1:
 packet_bind+0xbf/0xe0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3322
 __sys_bind+0x19b/0x1e0 net/socket.c:1803
 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1814 [inline]
 __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1812 [inline]
 __x64_sys_bind+0x40/0x50 net/socket.c:1812
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc

value changed: 0x0300 -> 0x0000

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 7318 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 6.3.0-13380-g7fddb5b5300c 
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014

Fixes: 96ec6327144e ("packet: Diag core and basic socket info dumping")
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230524232934.50950-1-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-06-09 10:28:53 +02:00
Eric Dumazet
4188c52694 net: add vlan_get_protocol_and_depth() helper
[ Upstream commit 4063384ef762cc5946fc7a3f89879e76c6ec51e2 ]

Before blamed commit, pskb_may_pull() was used instead
of skb_header_pointer() in __vlan_get_protocol() and friends.

Few callers depended on skb->head being populated with MAC header,
syzbot caught one of them (skb_mac_gso_segment())

Add vlan_get_protocol_and_depth() to make the intent clearer
and use it where sensible.

This is a more generic fix than commit e9d3f80935b6
("net/af_packet: make sure to pull mac header") which was
dealing with a similar issue.

kernel BUG at include/linux/skbuff.h:2655 !
invalid opcode: 0000 [] SMP KASAN
CPU: 0 PID: 1441 Comm: syz-executor199 Not tainted 6.1.24-syzkaller 
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/14/2023
RIP: 0010:__skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2655 [inline]
RIP: 0010:skb_mac_gso_segment+0x68f/0x6a0 net/core/gro.c:136
Code: fd 48 8b 5c 24 10 44 89 6b 70 48 c7 c7 c0 ae 0d 86 44 89 e6 e8 a1 91 d0 00 48 c7 c7 00 af 0d 86 48 89 de 31 d2 e8 d1 4a e9 ff <0f> 0b 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41
RSP: 0018:ffffc90001bd7520 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: ffffffff8469736a RBX: ffff88810f31dac0 RCX: ffff888115a18b00
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffffc90001bd75e8 R08: ffffffff84697183 R09: fffff5200037adf9
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: dffffc0000000001 R12: 0000000000000012
R13: 000000000000fee5 R14: 0000000000005865 R15: 000000000000fed7
FS: 000055555633f300(0000) GS:ffff8881f6a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000020000000 CR3: 0000000116fea000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
[<ffffffff847018dd>] __skb_gso_segment+0x32d/0x4c0 net/core/dev.c:3419
[<ffffffff8470398a>] skb_gso_segment include/linux/netdevice.h:4819 [inline]
[<ffffffff8470398a>] validate_xmit_skb+0x3aa/0xee0 net/core/dev.c:3725
[<ffffffff84707042>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x1332/0x3300 net/core/dev.c:4313
[<ffffffff851a9ec7>] dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 include/linux/netdevice.h:3029
[<ffffffff851b4a82>] packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3111 [inline]
[<ffffffff851b4a82>] packet_sendmsg+0x49d2/0x6470 net/packet/af_packet.c:3142
[<ffffffff84669a12>] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:716 [inline]
[<ffffffff84669a12>] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:736 [inline]
[<ffffffff84669a12>] __sys_sendto+0x472/0x5f0 net/socket.c:2139
[<ffffffff84669c75>] __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2151 [inline]
[<ffffffff84669c75>] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2147 [inline]
[<ffffffff84669c75>] __x64_sys_sendto+0xe5/0x100 net/socket.c:2147
[<ffffffff8551d40f>] do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
[<ffffffff8551d40f>] do_syscall_64+0x2f/0x50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
[<ffffffff85600087>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Fixes: 469aceddfa3e ("vlan: consolidate VLAN parsing code and limit max parsing depth")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-05-30 12:44:01 +01:00
Kuniyuki Iwashima
5cfe3f910f af_packet: Don't send zero-byte data in packet_sendmsg_spkt().
[ Upstream commit 6a341729fb31b4c5df9f74f24b4b1c98410c9b87 ]

syzkaller reported a warning below [0].

We can reproduce it by sending 0-byte data from the (AF_PACKET,
SOCK_PACKET) socket via some devices whose dev->hard_header_len
is 0.

    struct sockaddr_pkt addr = {
        .spkt_family = AF_PACKET,
        .spkt_device = "tun0",
    };
    int fd;

    fd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_PACKET, 0);
    sendto(fd, NULL, 0, 0, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr));

We have a similar fix for the (AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW) socket as
commit dc633700f00f ("net/af_packet: check len when min_header_len
equals to 0").

Let's add the same test for the SOCK_PACKET socket.

[0]:
skb_assert_len
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 19945 at include/linux/skbuff.h:2552 skb_assert_len include/linux/skbuff.h:2552 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 19945 at include/linux/skbuff.h:2552 __dev_queue_xmit+0x1f26/0x31d0 net/core/dev.c:4159
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 19945 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.3.0-rc7-02330-gca6270c12e20 
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:skb_assert_len include/linux/skbuff.h:2552 [inline]
RIP: 0010:__dev_queue_xmit+0x1f26/0x31d0 net/core/dev.c:4159
Code: 89 de e8 1d a2 85 fd 84 db 75 21 e8 64 a9 85 fd 48 c7 c6 80 2a 1f 86 48 c7 c7 c0 06 1f 86 c6 05 23 cf 27 04 01 e8 fa ee 56 fd <0f> 0b e8 43 a9 85 fd 0f b6 1d 0f cf 27 04 31 ff 89 de e8 e3 a1 85
RSP: 0018:ffff8880217af6e0 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffc90001133000
RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: ffffffff81186922 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: ffff8880217af8b0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff888030045640
R13: ffff8880300456b0 R14: ffff888030045650 R15: ffff888030045718
FS:  00007fc5864da640(0000) GS:ffff88806cd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000020005740 CR3: 000000003f856003 CR4: 0000000000770ee0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3085 [inline]
 packet_sendmsg_spkt+0xc4b/0x1230 net/packet/af_packet.c:2066
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:724 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0x1b4/0x200 net/socket.c:747
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x331/0x970 net/socket.c:2503
 ___sys_sendmsg+0x11d/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2557
 __sys_sendmmsg+0x18c/0x430 net/socket.c:2643
 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2672 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2669 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x9c/0x100 net/socket.c:2669
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x3c/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
RIP: 0033:0x7fc58791de5d
Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 73 9f 1b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fc5864d9cc8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000133
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004bbf80 RCX: 00007fc58791de5d
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020005740 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 00000000004bbf80 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007fc58797e530 R15: 0000000000000000
 </TASK>
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
skb len=0 headroom=16 headlen=0 tailroom=304
mac=(16,0) net=(16,-1) trans=-1
shinfo(txflags=0 nr_frags=0 gso(size=0 type=0 segs=0))
csum(0x0 ip_summed=0 complete_sw=0 valid=0 level=0)
hash(0x0 sw=0 l4=0) proto=0x0000 pkttype=0 iif=0
dev name=sit0 feat=0x00000006401d7869
sk family=17 type=10 proto=0

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-05-17 11:35:59 +02:00
Eric Dumazet
8e402d5198 net/packet: convert po->auxdata to an atomic flag
[ Upstream commit fd53c297aa7b077ae98a3d3d2d3aa278a1686ba6 ]

po->auxdata can be read while another thread
is changing its value, potentially raising KCSAN splat.

Convert it to PACKET_SOCK_AUXDATA flag.

Fixes: 8dc419447415 ("[PACKET]: Add optional checksum computation for recvmsg")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-05-17 11:35:41 +02:00
Eric Dumazet
f3ac72c7ab net/packet: convert po->origdev to an atomic flag
[ Upstream commit ee5675ecdf7a4e713ed21d98a70c2871d6ebed01 ]

syzbot/KCAN reported that po->origdev can be read
while another thread is changing its value.

We can avoid this splat by converting this field
to an actual bit.

Following patches will convert remaining 1bit fields.

Fixes: 80feaacb8a64 ("[AF_PACKET]: Add option to return orig_dev to userspace.")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-05-17 11:35:41 +02:00
Eric Dumazet
4760229b82 net/packet: annotate accesses to po->xmit
[ Upstream commit b9d83ab8a708f23a4001d60e9d8d0b3be3d9f607 ]

po->xmit can be set from setsockopt(PACKET_QDISC_BYPASS),
while read locklessly.

Use READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() to avoid potential load/store
tearing issues.

Fixes: d346a3fae3ff ("packet: introduce PACKET_QDISC_BYPASS socket option")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2023-05-17 11:35:41 +02:00
Eric Dumazet
de2ea2a0ad net/af_packet: make sure to pull mac header
commit e9d3f80935b6607dcdc5682b00b1d4b28e0a0c5d upstream.

GSO assumes skb->head contains link layer headers.

tun device in some case can provide base 14 bytes,
regardless of VLAN being used or not.

After blamed commit, we can end up setting a network
header offset of 18+, we better pull the missing
bytes to avoid a posible crash in GSO.

syzbot report was:
kernel BUG at include/linux/skbuff.h:2699!
invalid opcode: 0000 [] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 1 PID: 3601 Comm: syz-executor210 Not tainted 5.18.0-syzkaller-11338-g2c5ca23f7414 
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:__skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2699 [inline]
RIP: 0010:skb_mac_gso_segment+0x48f/0x530 net/core/gro.c:136
Code: 00 48 c7 c7 00 96 d4 8a c6 05 cb d3 45 06 01 e8 26 bb d0 01 e9 2f fd ff ff 49 c7 c4 ea ff ff ff e9 f1 fe ff ff e8 91 84 19 fa <0f> 0b 48 89 df e8 97 44 66 fa e9 7f fd ff ff e8 ad 44 66 fa e9 48
RSP: 0018:ffffc90002e2f4b8 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000012 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff88805bb58000 RSI: ffffffff8760ed0f RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 0000000000005dbc R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 0000000000000fe0
R10: 0000000000000fe4 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000fe0
R13: ffff88807194d780 R14: 1ffff920005c5e9b R15: 0000000000000012
FS:  000055555730f300(0000) GS:ffff8880b9d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000200015c0 CR3: 0000000071ff8000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __skb_gso_segment+0x327/0x6e0 net/core/dev.c:3411
 skb_gso_segment include/linux/netdevice.h:4749 [inline]
 validate_xmit_skb+0x6bc/0xf10 net/core/dev.c:3669
 validate_xmit_skb_list+0xbc/0x120 net/core/dev.c:3719
 sch_direct_xmit+0x3d1/0xbe0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:327
 __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3815 [inline]
 __dev_queue_xmit+0x14a1/0x3a00 net/core/dev.c:4219
 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3071 [inline]
 packet_sendmsg+0x21cb/0x5550 net/packet/af_packet.c:3102
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:734
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x6eb/0x810 net/socket.c:2492
 ___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2546
 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2575 [inline]
 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2584 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2582 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x132/0x220 net/socket.c:2582
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
RIP: 0033:0x7f4b95da06c9
Code: 28 c3 e8 4a 15 00 00 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 c0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffd7defc4c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffd7defc4f0 RCX: 00007f4b95da06c9
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000140 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: bb1414ac00000050 R09: bb1414ac00000050
R10: 0000000000000004 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007ffd7defc4e0 R14: 00007ffd7defc4d8 R15: 00007ffd7defc4d4
 </TASK>

Fixes: dfed913e8b55 ("net/af_packet: add VLAN support for AF_PACKET SOCK_RAW GSO")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Acked-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-01-18 11:41:45 +01:00
Hangbin Liu
ad3f90a9c4 net/af_packet: add VLAN support for AF_PACKET SOCK_RAW GSO
commit dfed913e8b55a0c2c4906f1242fd38fd9a116e49 upstream.

Currently, the kernel drops GSO VLAN tagged packet if it's created with
socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, 0) plus virtio_net_hdr.

The reason is AF_PACKET doesn't adjust the skb network header if there is
a VLAN tag. Then after virtio_net_hdr_set_proto() called, the skb->protocol
will be set to ETH_P_IP/IPv6. And in later inet/ipv6_gso_segment() the skb
is dropped as network header position is invalid.

Let's handle VLAN packets by adjusting network header position in
packet_parse_headers(). The adjustment is safe and does not affect the
later xmit as tap device also did that.

In packet_snd(), packet_parse_headers() need to be moved before calling
virtio_net_hdr_set_proto(), so we can set correct skb->protocol and
network header first.

There is no need to update tpacket_snd() as it calls packet_parse_headers()
in tpacket_fill_skb(), which is already before calling virtio_net_hdr_*
functions.

skb->no_fcs setting is also moved upper to make all skb settings together
and keep consistency with function packet_sendmsg_spkt().

Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220425014502.985464-1-liuhangbin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-01-18 11:41:45 +01:00
Willem de Bruijn
168de4096b packet: do not set TP_STATUS_CSUM_VALID on CHECKSUM_COMPLETE
[ Upstream commit b85f628aa158a653c006e9c1405a117baef8c868 ]

CHECKSUM_COMPLETE signals that skb->csum stores the sum over the
entire packet. It does not imply that an embedded l4 checksum
field has been validated.

Fixes: 682f048bd494 ("af_packet: pass checksum validation status to the user")
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221128161812.640098-1-willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-12-08 11:23:03 +01:00
Zhengchao Shao
25a80e7284 net/af_packet: check len when min_header_len equals to 0
commit dc633700f00f726e027846a318c5ffeb8deaaeda upstream.

User can use AF_PACKET socket to send packets with the length of 0.
When min_header_len equals to 0, packet_snd will call __dev_queue_xmit
to send packets, and sock->type can be any type.

Reported-by: syzbot+5ea725c25d06fb9114c4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: fd1894224407 ("bpf: Don't redirect packets with invalid pkt_len")
Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-09-05 10:27:48 +02:00
Hangbin Liu
f883def546 net/packet: fix packet_sock xmit return value checking
[ Upstream commit 29e8e659f984be00d75ec5fef4e37c88def72712 ]

packet_sock xmit could be dev_queue_xmit, which also returns negative
errors. So only checking positive errors is not enough, or userspace
sendmsg may return success while packet is not send out.

Move the net_xmit_errno() assignment in the braces as checkpatch.pl said
do not use assignment in if condition.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: Flavio Leitner <fbl@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-04-27 13:50:47 +02:00
Eric Dumazet
268dcf1f7b net/packet: fix slab-out-of-bounds access in packet_recvmsg()
[ Upstream commit c700525fcc06b05adfea78039de02628af79e07a ]

syzbot found that when an AF_PACKET socket is using PACKET_COPY_THRESH
and mmap operations, tpacket_rcv() is queueing skbs with
garbage in skb->cb[], triggering a too big copy [1]

Presumably, users of af_packet using mmap() already gets correct
metadata from the mapped buffer, we can simply make sure
to clear 12 bytes that might be copied to user space later.

BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:225 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in packet_recvmsg+0x56c/0x1150 net/packet/af_packet.c:3489
Write of size 165 at addr ffffc9000385fb78 by task syz-executor233/3631

CPU: 0 PID: 3631 Comm: syz-executor233 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc7-syzkaller-02396-g0b3660695e80 
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106
 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xf/0x336 mm/kasan/report.c:255
 __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:442 [inline]
 kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf mm/kasan/report.c:459
 check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:183 [inline]
 kasan_check_range+0x13d/0x180 mm/kasan/generic.c:189
 memcpy+0x39/0x60 mm/kasan/shadow.c:66
 memcpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:225 [inline]
 packet_recvmsg+0x56c/0x1150 net/packet/af_packet.c:3489
 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:948 [inline]
 sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:966 [inline]
 sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:962 [inline]
 ____sys_recvmsg+0x2c4/0x600 net/socket.c:2632
 ___sys_recvmsg+0x127/0x200 net/socket.c:2674
 __sys_recvmsg+0xe2/0x1a0 net/socket.c:2704
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7fdfd5954c29
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 41 15 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 c0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffcf8e71e48 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002f
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007fdfd5954c29
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000500 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 000000000000000d R09: 000000000000000d
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffcf8e71e60
R13: 00000000000f4240 R14: 000000000000c1ff R15: 00007ffcf8e71e54
 </TASK>

addr ffffc9000385fb78 is located in stack of task syz-executor233/3631 at offset 32 in frame:
 ____sys_recvmsg+0x0/0x600 include/linux/uio.h:246

this frame has 1 object:
 [32, 160) 'addr'

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffffc9000385fa80: 00 04 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 ffffc9000385fb00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00
>ffffc9000385fb80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f3
                                                                ^
 ffffc9000385fc00: f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1
 ffffc9000385fc80: f1 f1 f1 00 f2 f2 f2 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00
==================================================================

Fixes: 0fb375fb9b93 ("[AF_PACKET]: Allow for > 8 byte hardware addresses.")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220312232958.3535620-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-03-23 09:12:06 +01:00
Eric Dumazet
4fc41403f0 af_packet: fix data-race in packet_setsockopt / packet_setsockopt
commit e42e70ad6ae2ae511a6143d2e8da929366e58bd9 upstream.

When packet_setsockopt( PACKET_FANOUT_DATA ) reads po->fanout,
no lock is held, meaning that another thread can change po->fanout.

Given that po->fanout can only be set once during the socket lifetime
(it is only cleared from fanout_release()), we can use
READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() to document the race.

BUG: KCSAN: data-race in packet_setsockopt / packet_setsockopt

write to 0xffff88813ae8e300 of 8 bytes by task 14653 on cpu 0:
 fanout_add net/packet/af_packet.c:1791 [inline]
 packet_setsockopt+0x22fe/0x24a0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3931
 __sys_setsockopt+0x209/0x2a0 net/socket.c:2180
 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2191 [inline]
 __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2188 [inline]
 __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x62/0x70 net/socket.c:2188
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

read to 0xffff88813ae8e300 of 8 bytes by task 14654 on cpu 1:
 packet_setsockopt+0x691/0x24a0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3935
 __sys_setsockopt+0x209/0x2a0 net/socket.c:2180
 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2191 [inline]
 __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2188 [inline]
 __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x62/0x70 net/socket.c:2188
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

value changed: 0x0000000000000000 -> 0xffff888106f8c000

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 14654 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.16.0-syzkaller 
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011

Fixes: 47dceb8ecdc1 ("packet: add classic BPF fanout mode")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220201022358.330621-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-02-05 12:35:37 +01:00
Congyu Liu
e372ecd455 net: fix information leakage in /proc/net/ptype
commit 47934e06b65637c88a762d9c98329ae6e3238888 upstream.

In one net namespace, after creating a packet socket without binding
it to a device, users in other net namespaces can observe the new
`packet_type` added by this packet socket by reading `/proc/net/ptype`
file. This is minor information leakage as packet socket is
namespace aware.

Add a net pointer in `packet_type` to keep the net namespace of
of corresponding packet socket. In `ptype_seq_show`, this net pointer
must be checked when it is not NULL.

Fixes: 2feb27dbe00c ("[NETNS]: Minor information leak via /proc/net/ptype file.")
Signed-off-by: Congyu Liu <liu3101@purdue.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-02-01 17:24:37 +01:00
Willem de Bruijn
027a13973d net/packet: rx_owner_map depends on pg_vec
[ Upstream commit ec6af094ea28f0f2dda1a6a33b14cd57e36a9755 ]

Packet sockets may switch ring versions. Avoid misinterpreting state
between versions, whose fields share a union. rx_owner_map is only
allocated with a packet ring (pg_vec) and both are swapped together.
If pg_vec is NULL, meaning no packet ring was allocated, then neither
was rx_owner_map. And the field may be old state from a tpacket_v3.

Fixes: 61fad6816fc1 ("net/packet: tpacket_rcv: avoid a producer race condition")
Reported-by: Syzbot <syzbot+1ac0994a0a0c55151121@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211215143937.106178-1-willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-12-22 09:29:38 +01:00
Eric Dumazet
f12a5b48bc net/packet: annotate accesses to po->ifindex
[ Upstream commit e032f7c9c7cefffcfb79b9fc16c53011d2d9d11f ]

Like prior patch, we need to annotate lockless accesses to po->ifindex
For instance, packet_getname() is reading po->ifindex (twice) while
another thread is able to change po->ifindex.

KCSAN reported:

BUG: KCSAN: data-race in packet_do_bind / packet_getname

write to 0xffff888143ce3cbc of 4 bytes by task 25573 on cpu 1:
 packet_do_bind+0x420/0x7e0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3191
 packet_bind+0xc3/0xd0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3255
 __sys_bind+0x200/0x290 net/socket.c:1637
 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1648 [inline]
 __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1646 [inline]
 __x64_sys_bind+0x3d/0x50 net/socket.c:1646
 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

read to 0xffff888143ce3cbc of 4 bytes by task 25578 on cpu 0:
 packet_getname+0x5b/0x1a0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3525
 __sys_getsockname+0x10e/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1887
 __do_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:1902 [inline]
 __se_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:1899 [inline]
 __x64_sys_getsockname+0x3e/0x50 net/socket.c:1899
 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

value changed: 0x00000000 -> 0x00000001

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 0 PID: 25578 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.13.0-rc6-syzkaller 
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-06-30 08:47:48 -04:00
Eric Dumazet
cdcedd3c86 net/packet: annotate accesses to po->bind
[ Upstream commit c7d2ef5dd4b03ed0ee1d13bc0c55f9cf62d49bd6 ]

tpacket_snd(), packet_snd(), packet_getname() and packet_seq_show()
can read po->num without holding a lock. This means other threads
can change po->num at the same time.

KCSAN complained about this known fact [1]
Add READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() to address the issue.

[1] BUG: KCSAN: data-race in packet_do_bind / packet_sendmsg

write to 0xffff888131a0dcc0 of 2 bytes by task 24714 on cpu 0:
 packet_do_bind+0x3ab/0x7e0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3181
 packet_bind+0xc3/0xd0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3255
 __sys_bind+0x200/0x290 net/socket.c:1637
 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1648 [inline]
 __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1646 [inline]
 __x64_sys_bind+0x3d/0x50 net/socket.c:1646
 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

read to 0xffff888131a0dcc0 of 2 bytes by task 24719 on cpu 1:
 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2899 [inline]
 packet_sendmsg+0x317/0x3570 net/packet/af_packet.c:3040
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:674 [inline]
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x360/0x4d0 net/socket.c:2350
 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2404 [inline]
 __sys_sendmsg+0x1ed/0x270 net/socket.c:2433
 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2442 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2440 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x42/0x50 net/socket.c:2440
 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

value changed: 0x0000 -> 0x1200

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 24719 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.13.0-rc4-syzkaller 
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-06-30 08:47:48 -04:00
Or Cohen
bc846b58fe net/packet: fix overflow in tpacket_rcv
[ Upstream commit acf69c946233259ab4d64f8869d4037a198c7f06 ]

Using tp_reserve to calculate netoff can overflow as
tp_reserve is unsigned int and netoff is unsigned short.

This may lead to macoff receving a smaller value then
sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr), and if po->has_vnet_hdr
is set, an out-of-bounds write will occur when
calling virtio_net_hdr_from_skb.

The bug is fixed by converting netoff to unsigned int
and checking if it exceeds USHRT_MAX.

This addresses CVE-2020-14386

Fixes: 8913336a7e8d ("packet: add PACKET_RESERVE sockopt")
Signed-off-by: Or Cohen <orcohen@paloaltonetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-09-09 19:12:29 +02:00
John Ogness
de236de3df af_packet: TPACKET_V3: fix fill status rwlock imbalance
[ Upstream commit 88fd1cb80daa20af063bce81e1fad14e945a8dc4 ]

After @blk_fill_in_prog_lock is acquired there is an early out vnet
situation that can occur. In that case, the rwlock needs to be
released.

Also, since @blk_fill_in_prog_lock is only acquired when @tp_version
is exactly TPACKET_V3, only release it on that exact condition as
well.

And finally, add sparse annotation so that it is clearer that
prb_fill_curr_block() and prb_clear_blk_fill_status() are acquiring
and releasing @blk_fill_in_prog_lock, respectively. sparse is still
unable to understand the balance, but the warnings are now on a
higher level that make more sense.

Fixes: 632ca50f2cbd ("af_packet: TPACKET_V3: replace busy-wait loop")
Signed-off-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-08-19 08:16:22 +02:00
Willem de Bruijn
86137342fd net/packet: tpacket_rcv: avoid a producer race condition
[ Upstream commit 61fad6816fc10fb8793a925d5c1256d1c3db0cd2 ]

PACKET_RX_RING can cause multiple writers to access the same slot if a
fast writer wraps the ring while a slow writer is still copying. This
is particularly likely with few, large, slots (e.g., GSO packets).

Synchronize kernel thread ownership of rx ring slots with a bitmap.

Writers acquire a slot race-free by testing tp_status TP_STATUS_KERNEL
while holding the sk receive queue lock. They release this lock before
copying and set tp_status to TP_STATUS_USER to release to userspace
when done. During copying, another writer may take the lock, also see
TP_STATUS_KERNEL, and start writing to the same slot.

Introduce a new rx_owner_map bitmap with a bit per slot. To acquire a
slot, test and set with the lock held. To release race-free, update
tp_status and owner bit as a transaction, so take the lock again.

This is the one of a variety of discussed options (see Link below):

* instead of a shadow ring, embed the data in the slot itself, such as
in tp_padding. But any test for this field may match a value left by
userspace, causing deadlock.

* avoid the lock on release. This leaves a small race if releasing the
shadow slot before setting TP_STATUS_USER. The below reproducer showed
that this race is not academic. If releasing the slot after tp_status,
the race is more subtle. See the first link for details.

* add a new tp_status TP_KERNEL_OWNED to avoid the transactional store
of two fields. But, legacy applications may interpret all non-zero
tp_status as owned by the user. As libpcap does. So this is possible
only opt-in by newer processes. It can be added as an optional mode.

* embed the struct at the tail of pg_vec to avoid extra allocation.
The implementation proved no less complex than a separate field.

The additional locking cost on release adds contention, no different
than scaling on multicore or multiqueue h/w. In practice, below
reproducer nor small packet tcpdump showed a noticeable change in
perf report in cycles spent in spinlock. Where contention is
problematic, packet sockets support mitigation through PACKET_FANOUT.
And we can consider adding opt-in state TP_KERNEL_OWNED.

Easy to reproduce by running multiple netperf or similar TCP_STREAM
flows concurrently with `tcpdump -B 129 -n greater 60000`.

Based on an earlier patchset by Jon Rosen. See links below.

I believe this issue goes back to the introduction of tpacket_rcv,
which predates git history.

Link: https://www.mail-archive.com/netdev@vger.kernel.org/msg237222.html
Suggested-by: Jon Rosen <jrosen@cisco.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Rosen <jrosen@cisco.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-04-01 11:01:35 +02:00
Willem de Bruijn
a200e439c0 net/packet: tpacket_rcv: do not increment ring index on drop
[ Upstream commit 46e4c421a053c36bf7a33dda2272481bcaf3eed3 ]

In one error case, tpacket_rcv drops packets after incrementing the
ring producer index.

If this happens, it does not update tp_status to TP_STATUS_USER and
thus the reader is stalled for an iteration of the ring, causing out
of order arrival.

The only such error path is when virtio_net_hdr_from_skb fails due
to encountering an unknown GSO type.

Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-03-18 07:17:41 +01:00
Eric Dumazet
f6d362634e packet: fix data-race in fanout_flow_is_huge()
[ Upstream commit b756ad928d98e5ef0b74af7546a6a31a8dadde00 ]

KCSAN reported the following data-race [1]

Adding a couple of READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() should silence it.

Since the report hinted about multiple cpus using the history
concurrently, I added a test avoiding writing on it if the
victim slot already contains the desired value.

[1]

BUG: KCSAN: data-race in fanout_demux_rollover / fanout_demux_rollover

read to 0xffff8880b01786cc of 4 bytes by task 18921 on cpu 1:
 fanout_flow_is_huge net/packet/af_packet.c:1303 [inline]
 fanout_demux_rollover+0x33e/0x3f0 net/packet/af_packet.c:1353
 packet_rcv_fanout+0x34e/0x490 net/packet/af_packet.c:1453
 deliver_skb net/core/dev.c:1888 [inline]
 dev_queue_xmit_nit+0x15b/0x540 net/core/dev.c:1958
 xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3195 [inline]
 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x3f5/0x430 net/core/dev.c:3215
 __dev_queue_xmit+0x14ab/0x1b40 net/core/dev.c:3792
 dev_queue_xmit+0x21/0x30 net/core/dev.c:3825
 neigh_direct_output+0x1f/0x30 net/core/neighbour.c:1530
 neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:511 [inline]
 ip6_finish_output2+0x7a2/0xec0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:116
 __ip6_finish_output net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:142 [inline]
 __ip6_finish_output+0x2d7/0x330 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:127
 ip6_finish_output+0x41/0x160 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:152
 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:294 [inline]
 ip6_output+0xf2/0x280 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:175
 dst_output include/net/dst.h:436 [inline]
 ip6_local_out+0x74/0x90 net/ipv6/output_core.c:179
 ip6_send_skb+0x53/0x110 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1795
 udp_v6_send_skb.isra.0+0x3ec/0xa70 net/ipv6/udp.c:1173
 udpv6_sendmsg+0x1906/0x1c20 net/ipv6/udp.c:1471
 inet6_sendmsg+0x6d/0x90 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:576
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:637 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0x9f/0xc0 net/socket.c:657
 ___sys_sendmsg+0x2b7/0x5d0 net/socket.c:2311
 __sys_sendmmsg+0x123/0x350 net/socket.c:2413
 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2442 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2439 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x64/0x80 net/socket.c:2439
 do_syscall_64+0xcc/0x370 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

write to 0xffff8880b01786cc of 4 bytes by task 18922 on cpu 0:
 fanout_flow_is_huge net/packet/af_packet.c:1306 [inline]
 fanout_demux_rollover+0x3a4/0x3f0 net/packet/af_packet.c:1353
 packet_rcv_fanout+0x34e/0x490 net/packet/af_packet.c:1453
 deliver_skb net/core/dev.c:1888 [inline]
 dev_queue_xmit_nit+0x15b/0x540 net/core/dev.c:1958
 xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3195 [inline]
 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x3f5/0x430 net/core/dev.c:3215
 __dev_queue_xmit+0x14ab/0x1b40 net/core/dev.c:3792
 dev_queue_xmit+0x21/0x30 net/core/dev.c:3825
 neigh_direct_output+0x1f/0x30 net/core/neighbour.c:1530
 neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:511 [inline]
 ip6_finish_output2+0x7a2/0xec0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:116
 __ip6_finish_output net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:142 [inline]
 __ip6_finish_output+0x2d7/0x330 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:127
 ip6_finish_output+0x41/0x160 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:152
 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:294 [inline]
 ip6_output+0xf2/0x280 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:175
 dst_output include/net/dst.h:436 [inline]
 ip6_local_out+0x74/0x90 net/ipv6/output_core.c:179
 ip6_send_skb+0x53/0x110 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1795
 udp_v6_send_skb.isra.0+0x3ec/0xa70 net/ipv6/udp.c:1173
 udpv6_sendmsg+0x1906/0x1c20 net/ipv6/udp.c:1471
 inet6_sendmsg+0x6d/0x90 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:576
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:637 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0x9f/0xc0 net/socket.c:657
 ___sys_sendmsg+0x2b7/0x5d0 net/socket.c:2311
 __sys_sendmmsg+0x123/0x350 net/socket.c:2413
 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2442 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2439 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x64/0x80 net/socket.c:2439
 do_syscall_64+0xcc/0x370 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 0 PID: 18922 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.4.0-rc6+ 
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011

Fixes: 3b3a5b0aab5b ("packet: rollover huge flows before small flows")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-01-26 10:01:06 +01:00
Mao Wenan
772f764579 af_packet: set defaule value for tmo
[ Upstream commit b43d1f9f7067c6759b1051e8ecb84e82cef569fe ]

There is softlockup when using TPACKET_V3:
...
NMI watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#2 stuck for 60010ms!
(__irq_svc) from [<c0558a0c>] (_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x44/0x54)
(_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore) from [<c027b7e8>] (mod_timer+0x210/0x25c)
(mod_timer) from [<c0549c30>]
(prb_retire_rx_blk_timer_expired+0x68/0x11c)
(prb_retire_rx_blk_timer_expired) from [<c027a7ac>]
(call_timer_fn+0x90/0x17c)
(call_timer_fn) from [<c027ab6c>] (run_timer_softirq+0x2d4/0x2fc)
(run_timer_softirq) from [<c021eaf4>] (__do_softirq+0x218/0x318)
(__do_softirq) from [<c021eea0>] (irq_exit+0x88/0xac)
(irq_exit) from [<c0240130>] (msa_irq_exit+0x11c/0x1d4)
(msa_irq_exit) from [<c0209cf0>] (handle_IPI+0x650/0x7f4)
(handle_IPI) from [<c02015bc>] (gic_handle_irq+0x108/0x118)
(gic_handle_irq) from [<c0558ee4>] (__irq_usr+0x44/0x5c)
...

If __ethtool_get_link_ksettings() is failed in
prb_calc_retire_blk_tmo(), msec and tmo will be zero, so tov_in_jiffies
is zero and the timer expire for retire_blk_timer is turn to
mod_timer(&pkc->retire_blk_timer, jiffies + 0),
which will trigger cpu usage of softirq is 100%.

Fixes: f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation.")
Tested-by: Xiao Jiangfeng <xiaojiangfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mao Wenan <maowenan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-12-31 16:41:12 +01:00
Florian Westphal
895b5c9f20 netfilter: drop bridge nf reset from nf_reset
commit 174e23810cd31
("sk_buff: drop all skb extensions on free and skb scrubbing") made napi
recycle always drop skb extensions.  The additional skb_ext_del() that is
performed via nf_reset on napi skb recycle is not needed anymore.

Most nf_reset() calls in the stack are there so queued skb won't block
'rmmod nf_conntrack' indefinitely.

This removes the skb_ext_del from nf_reset, and renames it to a more
fitting nf_reset_ct().

In a few selected places, add a call to skb_ext_reset to make sure that
no active extensions remain.

I am submitting this for "net", because we're still early in the release
cycle.  The patch applies to net-next too, but I think the rename causes
needless divergence between those trees.

Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2019-10-01 18:42:15 +02:00
Eric Dumazet
32d3182cd2 net/packet: fix race in tpacket_snd()
packet_sendmsg() checks tx_ring.pg_vec to decide
if it must call tpacket_snd().

Problem is that the check is lockless, meaning another thread
can issue a concurrent setsockopt(PACKET_TX_RING ) to flip
tx_ring.pg_vec back to NULL.

Given that tpacket_snd() grabs pg_vec_lock mutex, we can
perform the check again to solve the race.

syzbot reported :

kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 1 PID: 11429 Comm: syz-executor394 Not tainted 5.3.0-rc4+ 
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:packet_lookup_frame+0x8d/0x270 net/packet/af_packet.c:474
Code: c1 ee 03 f7 73 0c 80 3c 0e 00 0f 85 cb 01 00 00 48 8b 0b 89 c0 4c 8d 24 c1 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 89 e1 48 c1 e9 03 <80> 3c 01 00 0f 85 94 01 00 00 48 8d 7b 10 4d 8b 3c 24 48 b8 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffff88809f82f7b8 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff8880a45c7030 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 1ffff110148b8e06 RDI: ffff8880a45c703c
RBP: ffff88809f82f7e8 R08: ffff888087aea200 R09: fffffbfff134ae50
R10: fffffbfff134ae4f R11: ffffffff89a5727f R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff8880a45c6ac0 R15: 0000000000000000
FS:  00007fa04716f700(0000) GS:ffff8880ae900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fa04716edb8 CR3: 0000000091eb4000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 packet_current_frame net/packet/af_packet.c:487 [inline]
 tpacket_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2667 [inline]
 packet_sendmsg+0x590/0x6250 net/packet/af_packet.c:2975
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:637 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0xd7/0x130 net/socket.c:657
 ___sys_sendmsg+0x3e2/0x920 net/socket.c:2311
 __sys_sendmmsg+0x1bf/0x4d0 net/socket.c:2413
 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2442 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2439 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x9d/0x100 net/socket.c:2439
 do_syscall_64+0xfd/0x6a0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:296
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

Fixes: 69e3c75f4d54 ("net: TX_RING and packet mmap")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-08-15 13:59:48 -07:00
David S. Miller
d96ff269a0 Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net
The new route handling in ip_mc_finish_output() from 'net' overlapped
with the new support for returning congestion notifications from BPF
programs.

In order to handle this I had to take the dev_loopback_xmit() calls
out of the switch statement.

The aquantia driver conflicts were simple overlapping changes.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-06-27 21:06:39 -07:00
Neil Horman
89ed5b5190 af_packet: Block execution of tasks waiting for transmit to complete in AF_PACKET
When an application is run that:
a) Sets its scheduler to be SCHED_FIFO
and
b) Opens a memory mapped AF_PACKET socket, and sends frames with the
MSG_DONTWAIT flag cleared, its possible for the application to hang
forever in the kernel.  This occurs because when waiting, the code in
tpacket_snd calls schedule, which under normal circumstances allows
other tasks to run, including ksoftirqd, which in some cases is
responsible for freeing the transmitted skb (which in AF_PACKET calls a
destructor that flips the status bit of the transmitted frame back to
available, allowing the transmitting task to complete).

However, when the calling application is SCHED_FIFO, its priority is
such that the schedule call immediately places the task back on the cpu,
preventing ksoftirqd from freeing the skb, which in turn prevents the
transmitting task from detecting that the transmission is complete.

We can fix this by converting the schedule call to a completion
mechanism.  By using a completion queue, we force the calling task, when
it detects there are no more frames to send, to schedule itself off the
cpu until such time as the last transmitted skb is freed, allowing
forward progress to be made.

Tested by myself and the reporter, with good results

Change Notes:

V1->V2:
	Enhance the sleep logic to support being interruptible and
allowing for honoring to SK_SNDTIMEO (Willem de Bruijn)

V2->V3:
	Rearrage the point at which we wait for the completion queue, to
avoid needing to check for ph/skb being null at the end of the loop.
Also move the complete call to the skb destructor to avoid needing to
modify __packet_set_status.  Also gate calling complete on
packet_read_pending returning zero to avoid multiple calls to complete.
(Willem de Bruijn)

	Move timeo computation within loop, to re-fetch the socket
timeout since we also use the timeo variable to record the return code
from the wait_for_complete call (Neil Horman)

V3->V4:
	Willem has requested that the control flow be restored to the
previous state.  Doing so lets us eliminate the need for the
po->wait_on_complete flag variable, and lets us get rid of the
packet_next_frame function, but introduces another complexity.
Specifically, but using the packet pending count, we can, if an
applications calls sendmsg multiple times with MSG_DONTWAIT set, each
set of transmitted frames, when complete, will cause
tpacket_destruct_skb to issue a complete call, for which there will
never be a wait_on_completion call.  This imbalance will lead to any
future call to wait_for_completion here to return early, when the frames
they sent may not have completed.  To correct this, we need to re-init
the completion queue on every call to tpacket_snd before we enter the
loop so as to ensure we wait properly for the frames we send in this
iteration.

	Change the timeout and interrupted gotos to out_put rather than
out_status so that we don't try to free a non-existant skb
	Clean up some extra newlines (Willem de Bruijn)

Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Reported-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-06-26 19:38:29 -07:00
Eric Dumazet
55655e3d11 net/packet: fix memory leak in packet_set_ring()
syzbot found we can leak memory in packet_set_ring(), if user application
provides buggy parameters.

Fixes: 7f953ab2ba46 ("af_packet: TX_RING support for TPACKET_V3")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Sowmini Varadhan <sowmini.varadhan@oracle.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-06-24 07:57:59 -07:00
Eric Dumazet
9bb6cd6524 net/packet: introduce packet_rcv_try_clear_pressure() helper
There are two places where we want to clear the pressure
if possible, add a helper to make it more obvious.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Suggested-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Acked-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes <vinicius.gomes@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-06-14 18:52:14 -07:00
Eric Dumazet
3a2bb84e4a net/packet: remove locking from packet_rcv_has_room()
__packet_rcv_has_room() can now be run without lock being held.

po->pressure is only a non persistent hint, we can mark
all read/write accesses with READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE()
to document the fact that the field could be written
without any synchronization.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-06-14 18:52:14 -07:00
Eric Dumazet
2c51c6273c net/packet: implement shortcut in tpacket_rcv()
tpacket_rcv() can be hit under DDOS quite hard, since
it will always grab a socket spinlock, to eventually find
there is no room for an additional packet.

Using tcpdump [1] on a busy host can lead to catastrophic consequences,
because of all cpus spinning on a contended spinlock.

This replicates a similar strategy used in packet_rcv()

[1] Also some applications mistakenly use af_packet socket
bound to ETH_P_ALL only to send packets.
Receive queue is never drained and immediately full.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-06-14 18:52:14 -07:00
Eric Dumazet
8e8e2951e3 net/packet: make tp_drops atomic
Under DDOS, we want to be able to increment tp_drops without
touching the spinlock. This will help readers to drain
the receive queue slightly faster :/

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-06-14 18:52:14 -07:00
Eric Dumazet
0338a14523 net/packet: constify __packet_rcv_has_room()
Goal is use the helper without lock being held.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-06-14 18:52:14 -07:00
Eric Dumazet
dcf70cefaf net/packet: constify prb_lookup_block() and __tpacket_v3_has_room()
Goal is to be able to use __tpacket_v3_has_room() without holding
a lock.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-06-14 18:52:14 -07:00
Eric Dumazet
d4b5bd98fa net/packet: constify packet_lookup_frame() and __tpacket_has_room()
Goal is to be able to use __tpacket_has_room() without holding a lock.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-06-14 18:52:14 -07:00
Eric Dumazet
96f657e6cf net/packet: constify __packet_get_status() argument
struct packet_sock  is only read.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-06-14 18:52:14 -07:00
Mao Wenan
46088059aa packet: remove unused variable 'status' in __packet_lookup_frame_in_block
The variable 'status' in  __packet_lookup_frame_in_block() is never used since
introduction in commit f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer
implementation."), we can remove it.

Signed-off-by: Mao Wenan <maowenan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-06-11 12:11:11 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
1e1d926369 Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net
Pull networking fixes from David Miller:

 1) Free AF_PACKET po->rollover properly, from Willem de Bruijn.

 2) Read SFP eeprom in max 16 byte increments to avoid problems with
    some SFP modules, from Russell King.

 3) Fix UDP socket lookup wrt. VRF, from Tim Beale.

 4) Handle route invalidation properly in s390 qeth driver, from Julian
    Wiedmann.

 5) Memory leak on unload in RDS, from Zhu Yanjun.

 6) sctp_process_init leak, from Neil HOrman.

 7) Fix fib_rules rule insertion semantic change that broke Android,
    from Hangbin Liu.

* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net: (33 commits)
  pktgen: do not sleep with the thread lock held.
  net: mvpp2: Use strscpy to handle stat strings
  net: rds: fix memory leak in rds_ib_flush_mr_pool
  ipv6: fix EFAULT on sendto with icmpv6 and hdrincl
  ipv6: use READ_ONCE() for inet->hdrincl as in ipv4
  Revert "fib_rules: return 0 directly if an exactly same rule exists when NLM_F_EXCL not supplied"
  net: aquantia: fix wol configuration not applied sometimes
  ethtool: fix potential userspace buffer overflow
  Fix memory leak in sctp_process_init
  net: rds: fix memory leak when unload rds_rdma
  ipv6: fix the check before getting the cookie in rt6_get_cookie
  ipv4: not do cache for local delivery if bc_forwarding is enabled
  s390/qeth: handle error when updating TX queue count
  s390/qeth: fix VLAN attribute in bridge_hostnotify udev event
  s390/qeth: check dst entry before use
  s390/qeth: handle limited IPv4 broadcast in L3 TX path
  net: fix indirect calls helpers for ptype list hooks.
  net: ipvlan: Fix ipvlan device tso disabled while NETIF_F_IP_CSUM is set
  udp: only choose unbound UDP socket for multicast when not in a VRF
  net/tls: replace the sleeping lock around RX resync with a bit lock
  ...
2019-06-07 09:29:14 -07:00
Willem de Bruijn
afa0925c6f packet: unconditionally free po->rollover
Rollover used to use a complex RCU mechanism for assignment, which had
a race condition. The below patch fixed the bug and greatly simplified
the logic.

The feature depends on fanout, but the state is private to the socket.
Fanout_release returns f only when the last member leaves and the
fanout struct is to be freed.

Destroy rollover unconditionally, regardless of fanout state.

Fixes: 57f015f5eccf2 ("packet: fix crash in fanout_demux_rollover()")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Diagnosed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-06-02 18:10:14 -07:00
Thomas Gleixner
2874c5fd28 treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 152
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):

  this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
  it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
  the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at
  your option any later version

extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier

  GPL-2.0-or-later

has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 3029 file(s).

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070032.746973796@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-05-30 11:26:32 -07:00
Thomas Gleixner
ec8f24b7fa treewide: Add SPDX license identifier - Makefile/Kconfig
Add SPDX license identifiers to all Make/Kconfig files which:

 - Have no license information of any form

These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX
license identifier is:

  GPL-2.0-only

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-05-21 10:50:46 +02:00
Thomas Gleixner
09c434b8a0 treewide: Add SPDX license identifier for more missed files
Add SPDX license identifiers to all files which:

 - Have no license information of any form

 - Have MODULE_LICENCE("GPL*") inside which was used in the initial
   scan/conversion to ignore the file

These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX
license identifier is:

  GPL-2.0-only

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-05-21 10:50:45 +02:00
YueHaibing
36096f2f4f packet: Fix error path in packet_init
kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:47!
invalid opcode: 0000 [
CPU: 0 PID: 12914 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G        W         5.1.0+ 
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.9.3-0-ge2fc41e-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid+0x53/0x90
Code: 48 8b 32 48 39 fe 75 35 48 8b 50 08 48 39 f2 75 40 b8 01 00 00 00 5d c3 48
89 fe 48 89 c2 48 c7 c7 18 75 fe 82 e8 cb 34 78 ff <0f> 0b 48 89 fe 48 c7 c7 50 75 fe 82 e8 ba 34 78 ff 0f 0b 48 89 f2
RSP: 0018:ffffc90001c2fe40 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 000000000000004e RBX: ffffffffa0184000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff888237a17788 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
RBP: ffffc90001c2fe40 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffffc90001c2fe10 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffc90001c2fe50 R14: ffffffffa0184000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS:  00007f3d83634540(0000) GS:ffff888237a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000555c350ea818 CR3: 0000000231677000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
 unregister_pernet_operations+0x34/0x120
 unregister_pernet_subsys+0x1c/0x30
 packet_exit+0x1c/0x369 [af_packet
 __x64_sys_delete_module+0x156/0x260
 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x133/0x1b0
 ? do_syscall_64+0x12/0x1f0
 do_syscall_64+0x6e/0x1f0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

When modprobe af_packet, register_pernet_subsys
fails and does a cleanup, ops->list is set to LIST_POISON1,
but the module init is considered to success, then while rmmod it,
BUG() is triggered in __list_del_entry_valid which is called from
unregister_pernet_subsys. This patch fix error handing path in
packet_init to avoid possilbe issue if some error occur.

Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-05-09 13:45:46 -07:00
David S. Miller
ff24e4980a Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net
Three trivial overlapping conflicts.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-05-02 22:14:21 -04:00