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commit 5981fe5b0529ba25d95f37d7faa434183ad618c5 upstream.
This never was intended to be a 'while' loop, it should've
just been an 'if' instead of 'while'. Fix this.
I noticed this while applying another patch from Ben that
intended to fix a busy loop at this spot.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: b16798f5b907 ("mac80211: mark station unauthorized before key removal")
Reported-by: Ben Greear <greearb@candelatech.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200803110209.253009ae41ff.I3522aad099392b31d5cf2dcca34cbac7e5832dde@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 0b467b63870d9c05c81456aa9bfee894ab2db3b6 ]
Without this patch, eapol frames cannot be received in mesh
mode, when 802.1X should be used. Initially only a MGTK is
defined, which is found and set as rx->key, when there are
no other keys set. ieee80211_drop_unencrypted would then
drop these eapol frames, as they are data frames without
encryption and there exists some rx->key.
Fix this by differentiating between mesh eapol frames and
other data frames with existing rx->key. Allow mesh mesh
eapol frames only if they are for our vif address.
With this patch in-place, ieee80211_rx_h_mesh_fwding continues
after the ieee80211_drop_unencrypted check and notices, that
these eapol frames have to be delivered locally, as they should.
Signed-off-by: Markus Theil <markus.theil@tu-ilmenau.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200625104214.50319-1-markus.theil@tu-ilmenau.de
[small code cleanups]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 30b2f0be23fb40e58d0ad2caf8702c2a44cda2e1 upstream.
commit 08a5bdde3812 ("mac80211: consider QoS Null frames for STA_NULLFUNC_ACKED")
Fixed a bug where we failed to take into account a
nullfunc frame can be either non-QoS or QoS. It turns out
there is at least one more bug in
ieee80211_sta_tx_notify(), introduced in
commit 7b6ddeaf27ec ("mac80211: use QoS NDP for AP probing"),
where we forgot to check for the QoS variant and so
assumed the QoS nullfunc frame never went out
Fix this by adding a helper ieee80211_is_any_nullfunc()
which consolidates the check for non-QoS and QoS nullfunc
frames. Replace existing compound conditionals and add a
couple more missing checks for QoS variant.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Pedersen <thomas@adapt-ip.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200114055940.18502-3-thomas@adapt-ip.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 8ca47eb9f9e4e10e7e7fa695731a88941732c38d ]
The function sta_info_get_by_idx() uses RCU list primitive.
It is called with local->sta_mtx held from mac80211/cfg.c.
Add lockdep expression to avoid any false positive RCU list warnings.
Signed-off-by: Madhuparna Bhowmik <madhuparnabhowmik10@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200409082906.27427-1-madhuparnabhowmik10@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 93e2d04a1888668183f3fb48666e90b9b31d29e6 ]
Previously mesh channel switch happens if beacon contains
CSA IE without checking the mesh peer info. Due to that
channel switch happens even if the beacon is not from
its own mesh peer. Fixing that by checking if the CSA
originated from the same mesh network before proceeding
for channel switch.
Signed-off-by: Tamizh chelvam <tamizhr@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1585403604-29274-1-git-send-email-tamizhr@codeaurora.org
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 6cb5f3ea4654faf8c28b901266e960b1a4787b26 upstream.
When fixing the initialization race, we neglected to account for
the fact that debugfs is initialized in wiphy_register(), and
some debugfs things went missing (or rather were rerooted to the
global debugfs root).
Fix this by adding debugfs entries only after wiphy_register().
This requires some changes in the rate control code since it
currently adds debugfs at alloc time, which can no longer be
done after the reordering.
Reported-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <rong.a.chen@intel.com>
Reported-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
Reported-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 52e04b4ce5d0 ("mac80211: fix race in ieee80211_register_hw()")
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Acked-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200423111344.0e00d3346f12.Iadc76a03a55093d94391fc672e996a458702875d@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 52e04b4ce5d03775b6a78f3ed1097480faacc9fd upstream.
A race condition leading to a kernel crash is observed during invocation
of ieee80211_register_hw() on a dragonboard410c device having wcn36xx
driver built as a loadable module along with a wifi manager in user-space
waiting for a wifi device (wlanX) to be active.
Sequence diagram for a particular kernel crash scenario:
user-space ieee80211_register_hw() ieee80211_tasklet_handler()
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
| | |
|<---phy0----wiphy_register() |
|-----iwd if_add---->| |
| |<---IRQ----(RX packet)
| Kernel crash |
| due to unallocated |
| workqueue. |
| | |
| alloc_ordered_workqueue() |
| | |
| Misc wiphy init. |
| | |
| ieee80211_if_add() |
| | |
As evident from above sequence diagram, this race condition isn't specific
to a particular wifi driver but rather the initialization sequence in
ieee80211_register_hw() needs to be fixed. So re-order the initialization
sequence and the updated sequence diagram would look like:
user-space ieee80211_register_hw() ieee80211_tasklet_handler()
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
| | |
| alloc_ordered_workqueue() |
| | |
| Misc wiphy init. |
| | |
|<---phy0----wiphy_register() |
|-----iwd if_add---->| |
| |<---IRQ----(RX packet)
| | |
| ieee80211_if_add() |
| | |
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1586254255-28713-1-git-send-email-sumit.garg@linaro.org
[Johannes: fix rtnl imbalances]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit be8c827f50a0bcd56361b31ada11dc0a3c2fd240 upstream.
The original patch didn't copy the ieee80211_is_data() condition
because on most drivers the management frames don't go through
this path. However, they do on iwlwifi/mvm, so we do need to keep
the condition here.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ce2e1ca70307 ("mac80211: Check port authorization in the ieee80211_tx_dequeue() case")
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Woody Suwalski <terraluna977@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ce2e1ca703071723ca2dd94d492a5ab6d15050da upstream.
mac80211 used to check port authorization in the Data frame enqueue case
when going through start_xmit(). However, that authorization status may
change while the frame is waiting in a queue. Add a similar check in the
dequeue case to avoid sending previously accepted frames after
authorization change. This provides additional protection against
potential leaking of frames after a station has been disconnected and
the keys for it are being removed.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200326155133.ced84317ea29.I34d4c47cd8cc8a4042b38a76f16a601fbcbfd9b3@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b95d2ccd2ccb834394d50347d0e40dc38a954e4a upstream.
When a frame is transmitted via the nl80211 TX rather than as a
normal frame, IEEE80211_TX_CTRL_PORT_CTRL_PROTO wasn't set and
this will lead to wrong decisions (rate control etc.) being made
about the frame; fix this.
Fixes: 911806491425 ("mac80211: Add support for tx_control_port")
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200326155333.f183f52b02f0.I4054e2a8c11c2ddcb795a0103c87be3538690243@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b16798f5b907733966fd1a558fca823b3c67e4a1 upstream.
If a station is still marked as authorized, mark it as no longer
so before removing its keys. This allows frames transmitted to it
to be rejected, providing additional protection against leaking
plain text data during the disconnection flow.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200326155133.ccb4fb0bb356.If48f0f0504efdcf16b8921f48c6d3bb2cb763c99@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a0761a301746ec2d92d7fcb82af69c0a6a4339aa upstream.
If we know that we have an encrypted link (based on having had
a key configured for TX in the past) then drop all data frames
in the key selection handler if there's no key anymore.
This fixes an issue with mac80211 internal TXQs - there we can
buffer frames for an encrypted link, but then if the key is no
longer there when they're dequeued, the frames are sent without
encryption. This happens if a station is disconnected while the
frames are still on the TXQ.
Detecting that a link should be encrypted based on a first key
having been configured for TX is fine as there are no use cases
for a connection going from with encryption to no encryption.
With extended key IDs, however, there is a case of having a key
configured for only decryption, so we can't just trigger this
behaviour on a key being configured.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/iwlwifi.20200326150855.6865c7f28a14.I9fb1d911b064262d33e33dfba730cdeef83926ca@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit ba32679cac50c38fdf488296f96b1f3175532b8e ]
When trying to transmit to an unknown destination, the mesh code would
unconditionally transmit a HWMP PREQ even if HWMP is not the current
path selection algorithm.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Cavallari <nicolas.cavallari@green-communications.fr>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200305140409.12204-1-cavallar@lri.fr
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 253216ffb2a002a682c6f68bd3adff5b98b71de8 ]
local->sta_mtx is held in __ieee80211_check_fast_rx_iface().
No need to use list_for_each_entry_rcu() as it also requires
a cond argument to avoid false lockdep warnings when not used in
RCU read-side section (with CONFIG_PROVE_RCU_LIST).
Therefore use list_for_each_entry();
Signed-off-by: Madhuparna Bhowmik <madhuparnabhowmik10@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200223143302.15390-1-madhuparnabhowmik10@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 0daa63ed4c6c4302790ce67b7a90c0997ceb7514 upstream.
The below-mentioned commit changed the code to unlock *inside*
the function, but previously the unlock was *outside*. It failed
to remove the outer unlock, however, leading to double unlock.
Fix this.
Fixes: 33483a6b88e4 ("mac80211: fix missing unlock on error in ieee80211_mark_sta_auth()")
Signed-off-by: Andrei Otcheretianski <andrei.otcheretianski@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200221104719.cce4741cf6eb.I671567b185c8a4c2409377e483fd149ce590f56d@changeid
[rewrite commit message to better explain what happened]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 33181ea7f5a62a17fbe55f0f73428ecb5e686be8 ]
Before this patch, STA's would set new width of 160/80+80 MHz based on AP capability only.
This is wrong because STA may not support > 80MHz BW.
Fix is to verify STA has 160/80+80 MHz capability before increasing its width to > 80MHz.
The "support_80_80" and "support_160" setting is based on:
"Table 9-272 — Setting of the Supported Channel Width Set subfield and Extended NSS BW
Support subfield at a STA transmitting the VHT Capabilities Information field"
From "Draft P802.11REVmd_D3.0.pdf"
Signed-off-by: Aviad Brikman <aviad.brikman@celeno.com>
Signed-off-by: Shay Bar <shay.bar@celeno.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200210130728.23674-1-shay.bar@celeno.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit a04564c99bb4a92f805a58e56b2d22cc4978f152 ]
We only use the parsing CRC for checking if a beacon changed,
and elements with an ID > 63 cannot be represented in the
filter. Thus, like we did before with WMM and Cisco vendor
elements, just statically add these forgotten items to the
CRC:
- WLAN_EID_VHT_OPERATION
- WLAN_EID_OPMODE_NOTIF
I guess that in most cases when VHT/HE operation change, the HT
operation also changed, and so the change was picked up, but we
did notice that pure operating mode notification changes were
ignored.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200131111300.891737-22-luca@coelho.fi
[restrict to VHT for the mac80211 branch]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 2bf973ff9b9aeceb8acda629ae65341820d4b35b upstream.
Previously I intended to ignore quiet mode in probe response, however
I ended up ignoring it instead for action frames. As a matter of fact,
this path isn't invoked for probe responses to start with. Just revert
this patch.
Signed-off-by: Sara Sharon <sara.sharon@intel.com>
Fixes: 7976b1e9e3bf ("mac80211: ignore quiet mode in probe")
Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200131111300.891737-15-luca@coelho.fi
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 6f601265215a421f425ba3a4850a35861d024643 ]
TKIP replay protection was skipped for the very first frame received
after a new key is configured. While this is potentially needed to avoid
dropping a frame in some cases, this does leave a window for replay
attacks with group-addressed frames at the station side. Any earlier
frame sent by the AP using the same key would be accepted as a valid
frame and the internal RSC would then be updated to the TSC from that
frame. This would allow multiple previously transmitted group-addressed
frames to be replayed until the next valid new group-addressed frame
from the AP is received by the station.
Fix this by limiting the no-replay-protection exception to apply only
for the case where TSC=0, i.e., when this is for the very first frame
protected using the new key, and the local RSC had not been set to a
higher value when configuring the key (which may happen with GTK).
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200107153545.10934-1-j@w1.fi
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 26ec17a1dc5ecdd8d91aba63ead6f8b5ad5dea0d ]
In case a radar event of CAC_FINISHED or RADAR_DETECTED
happens during another phy is during CAC we might need
to cancel that CAC.
If we got a radar in a channel that another phy is now
doing CAC on then the CAC should be canceled there.
If, for example, 2 phys doing CAC on the same channels,
or on comptable channels, once on of them will finish his
CAC the other might need to cancel his CAC, since it is no
longer relevant.
To fix that the commit adds an callback and implement it in
mac80211 to end CAC.
This commit also adds a call to said callback if after a radar
event we see the CAC is no longer relevant
Signed-off-by: Orr Mazor <Orr.Mazor@tandemg.com>
Reviewed-by: Sergey Matyukevich <sergey.matyukevich.os@quantenna.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191222145449.15792-1-Orr.Mazor@tandemg.com
[slightly reformat/reword commit message]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 753ffad3d6243303994227854d951ff5c70fa9e0 ]
Fix overwriting of the qos_ctrl.tid field for encrypted frames injected on
a monitor interface. While qos_ctrl.tid is not encrypted, it's used as an
input into the encryption algorithm so it's protected, and thus cannot be
modified after encryption. For injected frames, the encryption may already
have been done in userspace, so we cannot change any fields.
Before passing the frame to the driver, the qos_ctrl.tid field is updated
from skb->priority. Prior to dbd50a851c50 skb->priority was updated in
ieee80211_select_queue_80211(), but this function is no longer always
called.
Update skb->priority in ieee80211_monitor_start_xmit() so that the value
is stored, and when later code 'modifies' the TID it really sets it to
the same value as before, preserving the encryption.
Fixes: dbd50a851c50 ("mac80211: only allocate one queue when using iTXQs")
Signed-off-by: Fredrik Olofsson <fredrik.olofsson@anyfinetworks.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191119133451.14711-1-fredrik.olofsson@anyfinetworks.com
[rewrite commit message based on our discussion]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 08a5bdde3812993cb8eb7aa9124703df0de28e4b ]
Commit 7b6ddeaf27ec ("mac80211: use QoS NDP for AP probing")
let STAs send QoS Null frames as PS triggers if the AP was
a QoS STA. However, the mac80211 PS stack relies on an
interface flag IEEE80211_STA_NULLFUNC_ACKED for
determining trigger frame ACK, which was not being set for
acked non-QoS Null frames. The effect is an inability to
trigger hardware sleep via IEEE80211_CONF_PS since the QoS
Null frame was seemingly never acked.
This bug only applies to drivers which set both
IEEE80211_HW_REPORTS_TX_ACK_STATUS and
IEEE80211_HW_PS_NULLFUNC_STACK.
Detect the acked QoS Null frame to restore STA power save.
Fixes: 7b6ddeaf27ec ("mac80211: use QoS NDP for AP probing")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Pedersen <thomas@adapt-ip.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191119053538.25979-4-thomas@adapt-ip.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
In the first 5 minutes after boot (time of INITIAL_JIFFIES),
ieee80211_sta_last_active() returns zero if last_ack is zero. This
leads to "inactive time" showing jiffies_to_msecs(jiffies).
# iw wlan0 station get fc:ec:da:64:a6:dd
Station fc:ec:da:64:a6:dd (on wlan0)
inactive time: 4294894049 ms
.
.
connected time: 70 seconds
Fix by returning last_rx if last_ack == 0.
Signed-off-by: Ahmed Zaki <anzaki@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191031121243.27694-1-anzaki@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
If ieee80211_txq_setup_flows() fails, we don't clean up LED
state properly, leading to crashes later on, fix that.
Fixes: dc8b274f0952 ("mac80211: Move up init of TXQs")
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Acked-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@toke.dk>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191105154110.1ccf7112ba5d.I0ba865792446d051867b33153be65ce6b063d98c@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
In non-ETSI regulatory domains scan is blocked when operating channel
is a DFS channel. For ETSI, however, once DFS channel is marked as
available after the CAC, this channel will remain available (for some
time) even after leaving this channel.
Therefore a scan can be done without any impact on the availability
of the DFS channel as no new CAC is required after the scan.
Enable scan in mac80211 in these cases.
Signed-off-by: Aaron Komisar <aaron.komisar@tandemg.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1570024728-17284-1-git-send-email-aaron.komisar@tandemg.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
We can process deauth frames and all, but we drop them very
early in the RX path today - this could never have worked.
Fixes: 2cc59e784b54 ("mac80211: reply to AUTH with DEAUTH if sta allocation fails in IBSS")
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191004123706.15768-2-luca@coelho.fi
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Although this shouldn't occur in practice, it's a good idea to bounds
check the length field of the SSID element prior to using it for things
like allocations or memcpy operations.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Nicolas Waisman <nico@semmle.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191004095132.15777-1-will@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
If the interface type is P2P_DEVICE or NAN, read the file of
'/sys/kernel/debug/ieee80211/phyx/netdev:wlanx/aqm' will get a
NULL pointer dereference. As for those interface type, the
pointer sdata->vif.txq is NULL.
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000011
CPU: 1 PID: 30936 Comm: cat Not tainted 4.14.104 #1
task: ffffffc0337e4880 task.stack: ffffff800cd20000
PC is at ieee80211_if_fmt_aqm+0x34/0xa0 [mac80211]
LR is at ieee80211_if_fmt_aqm+0x34/0xa0 [mac80211]
[...]
Process cat (pid: 30936, stack limit = 0xffffff800cd20000)
[...]
[<ffffff8000b7cd00>] ieee80211_if_fmt_aqm+0x34/0xa0 [mac80211]
[<ffffff8000b7c414>] ieee80211_if_read+0x60/0xbc [mac80211]
[<ffffff8000b7ccc4>] ieee80211_if_read_aqm+0x28/0x30 [mac80211]
[<ffffff80082eff94>] full_proxy_read+0x2c/0x48
[<ffffff80081eef00>] __vfs_read+0x2c/0xd4
[<ffffff80081ef084>] vfs_read+0x8c/0x108
[<ffffff80081ef494>] SyS_read+0x40/0x7c
Signed-off-by: Miaoqing Pan <miaoqing@codeaurora.org>
Acked-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1569549796-8223-1-git-send-email-miaoqing@codeaurora.org
[trim useless data from commit message]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
The Layer 2 Update frame is used to update bridges when a station roams
to another AP even if that STA does not transmit any frames after the
reassociation. This behavior was described in IEEE Std 802.11F-2003 as
something that would happen based on MLME-ASSOCIATE.indication, i.e.,
before completing 4-way handshake. However, this IEEE trial-use
recommended practice document was published before RSN (IEEE Std
802.11i-2004) and as such, did not consider RSN use cases. Furthermore,
IEEE Std 802.11F-2003 was withdrawn in 2006 and as such, has not been
maintained amd should not be used anymore.
Sending out the Layer 2 Update frame immediately after association is
fine for open networks (and also when using SAE, FT protocol, or FILS
authentication when the station is actually authenticated by the time
association completes). However, it is not appropriate for cases where
RSN is used with PSK or EAP authentication since the station is actually
fully authenticated only once the 4-way handshake completes after
authentication and attackers might be able to use the unauthenticated
triggering of Layer 2 Update frame transmission to disrupt bridge
behavior.
Fix this by postponing transmission of the Layer 2 Update frame from
station entry addition to the point when the station entry is marked
authorized. Similarly, send out the VLAN binding update only if the STA
entry has already been authorized.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* a fix in the new 6 GHz channel support
* a fix for recent minstrel (rate control) updates
for an infinite loop
* handle interface type changes better wrt. management frame
registrations (for management frames sent to userspace)
* add in-BSS RX time to survey information
* handle HW rfkill properly if !CONFIG_RFKILL
* send deauth on IBSS station expiry, to avoid state mismatches
* handle deferred crypto tailroom updates in mac80211 better
when device restart happens
* fix a spectre-v1 - really a continuation of a previous patch
* advertise NL80211_CMD_UPDATE_FT_IES as supported if so
* add some missing parsing in VHT extended NSS support
* support HE in mac80211_hwsim
* let mac80211 drivers determine the max MTU themselves
along with the usual cleanups etc.
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Merge tag 'mac80211-next-for-davem-2019-09-11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jberg/mac80211-next
Johannes Berg says:
====================
We have a number of changes, but things are settling down:
* a fix in the new 6 GHz channel support
* a fix for recent minstrel (rate control) updates
for an infinite loop
* handle interface type changes better wrt. management frame
registrations (for management frames sent to userspace)
* add in-BSS RX time to survey information
* handle HW rfkill properly if !CONFIG_RFKILL
* send deauth on IBSS station expiry, to avoid state mismatches
* handle deferred crypto tailroom updates in mac80211 better
when device restart happens
* fix a spectre-v1 - really a continuation of a previous patch
* advertise NL80211_CMD_UPDATE_FT_IES as supported if so
* add some missing parsing in VHT extended NSS support
* support HE in mac80211_hwsim
* let mac80211 drivers determine the max MTU themselves
along with the usual cleanups etc.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Make it possibly for drivers to adjust the default max_mtu
by storing it in the hardware struct and using that value
for all interfaces.
Signed-off-by: Wen Gong <wgong@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1567738137-31748-1-git-send-email-wgong@codeaurora.org
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
When we expire an inactive station, try to send it a deauth. This
helps if it's actually still around, and just has issues with
beacon distribution (or we do), and it will not also remove us.
Then, if we have shared state, this may not be reset properly,
causing problems; for example, we saw a case where aggregation
sessions weren't removed properly (due to the TX start being
offloaded to firmware and it relying on deauth for stop), causing
a lot of traffic to get lost due to the SN reset after remove/add
of the peer.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190830112451.21655-9-luca@coelho.fi
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
We already assume that key is not NULL and dereference it in a few
other places before we check whether it is NULL, so the check is
unnecessary. Remove it.
Fixes: 96fc6efb9ad9 ("mac80211: IEEE 802.11 Extended Key ID support")
Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190830112451.21655-8-luca@coelho.fi
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
In case we got a fw restart while roaming from encrypted AP to
non-encrypted one, we might end up with hitting a warning on the pending
counter crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec having a non-zero value.
The following comment taken from net/mac80211/key.c explains the rational
for the delayed tailroom needed:
/*
* The reason for the delayed tailroom needed decrementing is to
* make roaming faster: during roaming, all keys are first deleted
* and then new keys are installed. The first new key causes the
* crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt to go from 0 to 1, which invokes
* the cost of synchronize_net() (which can be slow). Avoid this
* by deferring the crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt decrementing on
* key removal for a while, so if we roam the value is larger than
* zero and no 0->1 transition happens.
*
* The cost is that if the AP switching was from an AP with keys
* to one without, we still allocate tailroom while it would no
* longer be needed. However, in the typical (fast) roaming case
* within an ESS this usually won't happen.
*/
The next flow lead to the warning eventually reported as a bug:
1. Disconnect from encrypted AP
2. Set crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec = 1 for the key
3. Schedule work
4. Reconnect to non-encrypted AP
5. Add a new key, setting the tailroom counter = 1
6. Got FW restart while pending counter is set ---> hit the warning
While on it, the ieee80211_reset_crypto_tx_tailroom() func was merged into
its single caller ieee80211_reenable_keys (previously called
ieee80211_enable_keys). Also, we reset the crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec
and remove the counters warning as we just reset both.
Signed-off-by: Lior Cohen <lior2.cohen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190830112451.21655-7-luca@coelho.fi
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
When we reach this point, the key cannot be NULL. Remove the condition
that suggests otherwise.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190830112451.21655-6-luca@coelho.fi
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
"HE/HT/VHT" is a bit confusing since really the order of
development (and possible support) is different - change
this to "HT/VHT/HE".
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190830112451.21655-4-luca@coelho.fi
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
This fixes was missed in parsing the vht capabilities max bw
support.
Signed-off-by: Mordechay Goodstein <mordechay.goodstein@intel.com>
Fixes: e80d642552a3 ("mac80211: copy VHT EXT NSS BW Support/Capable data to station")
Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190830114057.22197-1-luca@coelho.fi
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
The noencrypt flag was intended to be set if the "frame was received
unencrypted" according to include/uapi/linux/nl80211.h. However, the
current behavior is opposite of this.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 018f6fbf540d ("mac80211: Send control port frames over nl80211")
Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190827224120.14545-3-denkenz@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
In ieee80211_deliver_skb_to_local_stack intercepts EAPoL frames if
mac80211 is configured to do so and forwards the contents over nl80211.
During this process some additional data is also forwarded, including
whether the frame was received encrypted or not. Unfortunately just
prior to the call to ieee80211_deliver_skb_to_local_stack, skb->cb is
cleared, resulting in incorrect data being exposed over nl80211.
Fixes: 018f6fbf540d ("mac80211: Send control port frames over nl80211")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190827224120.14545-2-denkenz@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Currently the for-loop will spin forever if variable supported is
non-zero because supported is never changed. Fix this by adding in
the missing right shift of supported.
Addresses-Coverity: ("Infinite loop")
Fixes: 48cb39522a9d ("mac80211: minstrel_ht: improve rate probing for devices with static fallback")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190822122034.28664-1-colin.king@canonical.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
On some devices that only support static rate fallback tables sending rate
control probing packets can be really expensive.
Probing lower rates can already hurt throughput quite a bit. What hurts even
more is the fact that on mt76x0/mt76x2, single probing packets can only be
forced by directing packets at a different internal hardware queue, which
causes some heavy reordering and extra latency.
The reordering issue is mainly problematic while pushing lots of packets to
a particular station. If there is little activity, the overhead of probing is
neglegible.
The static fallback behavior is designed to pretty much only handle rate
control algorithms that use only a very limited set of rates on which the
algorithm switches up/down based on packet error rate.
In order to better support that kind of hardware, this patch implements a
different approach to rate probing where it switches to a slightly higher rate,
waits for tx status feedback, then updates the stats and switches back to
the new max throughput rate. This only triggers above a packet rate of 100
per stats interval (~50ms).
For that kind of probing, the code has to reduce the set of probing rates
a lot more compared to single packet probing, so it uses only one packet
per MCS group which is either slightly faster, or as close as possible to
the max throughput rate.
This allows switching between similar rates with different numbers of
streams. The algorithm assumes that the hardware will work its way lower
within an MCS group in case of retransmissions, so that lower rates don't
have to be probed by the high packets per second rate probing code.
To further reduce the search space, it also does not probe rates with lower
channel bandwidth than the max throughput rate.
At the moment, these changes will only affect mt76x0/mt76x2.
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190820095449.45255-4-nbd@nbd.name
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
