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commit 6dbf7bb555981fb5faf7b691e8f6169fc2b2e63b upstream.
If block_write_full_page() is called for a page that is beyond current
inode size, it will truncate page buffers for the page and return 0.
This logic has been added in 2.5.62 in commit 81eb69062588 ("fix ext3
BUG due to race with truncate") in history.git tree to fix a problem
with ext3 in data=ordered mode. This particular problem doesn't exist
anymore because ext3 is long gone and ext4 handles ordered data
differently. Also normally buffers are invalidated by truncate code and
there's no need to specially handle this in ->writepage() code.
This invalidation of page buffers in block_write_full_page() is causing
issues to filesystems (e.g. ext4 or ocfs2) when block device is shrunk
under filesystem's hands and metadata buffers get discarded while being
tracked by the journalling layer. Although it is obviously "not
supported" it can cause kernel crashes like:
[ 7986.689400] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at
+0000000000000008
[ 7986.697197] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 7986.699724] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP PTI
[ 7986.703200] CPU: 4 PID: 203778 Comm: jbd2/dm-3-8 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G
+O --------- - - 4.18.0-147.5.0.5.h126.eulerosv2r9.x86_64 #1
[ 7986.716438] Hardware name: Huawei RH2288H V3/BC11HGSA0, BIOS 1.57 08/11/2015
[ 7986.723462] RIP: 0010:jbd2_journal_grab_journal_head+0x1b/0x40 [jbd2]
...
[ 7986.810150] Call Trace:
[ 7986.812595] __jbd2_journal_insert_checkpoint+0x23/0x70 [jbd2]
[ 7986.818408] jbd2_journal_commit_transaction+0x155f/0x1b60 [jbd2]
[ 7986.836467] kjournald2+0xbd/0x270 [jbd2]
which is not great. The crash happens because bh->b_private is suddently
NULL although BH_JBD flag is still set (this is because
block_invalidatepage() cleared BH_Mapped flag and subsequent bh lookup
found buffer without BH_Mapped set, called init_page_buffers() which has
rewritten bh->b_private). So just remove the invalidation in
block_write_full_page().
Note that the buffer cache invalidation when block device changes size
is already careful to avoid similar problems by using
invalidate_mapping_pages() which skips busy buffers so it was only this
odd block_write_full_page() behavior that could tear down bdev buffers
under filesystem's hands.
Reported-by: Ye Bin <yebin10@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit c6cc4c5a72505a0ecefc9b413f16bec512f38078 ]
RHBZ: 1848178
Some calls that set attributes, like utimensat(), are not supposed to return
-EINTR and thus do not have handlers for this in glibc which causes us
to leak -EINTR to the applications which are also unprepared to handle it.
For example tar will break if utimensat() return -EINTR and abort unpacking
the archive. Other applications may break too.
To handle this we add checks, and retry, for -EINTR in cifs_setattr()
Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 0ddc5154b24c96f20e94d653b0a814438de6032b ]
In gfs2_check_sb(), no validation checks are performed with regards to
the size of the superblock.
syzkaller detected a slab-out-of-bounds bug that was primarily caused
because the block size for a superblock was set to zero.
A valid size for a superblock is a power of 2 between 512 and PAGE_SIZE.
Performing validation checks and ensuring that the size of the superblock
is valid fixes this bug.
Reported-by: syzbot+af90d47a37376844e731@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Tested-by: syzbot+af90d47a37376844e731@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Suggested-by: Andrew Price <anprice@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anant Thazhemadam <anant.thazhemadam@gmail.com>
[Minor code reordering.]
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit c2a04b02c060c4858762edce4674d5cba3e5a96f ]
syzkaller found the following splat with CONFIG_DEBUG_KOBJECT_RELEASE=y:
Read of size 1 at addr ffff000028e896b8 by task kworker/1:2/228
CPU: 1 PID: 228 Comm: kworker/1:2 Tainted: G S 5.9.0-rc8+ #101
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Workqueue: events kobject_delayed_cleanup
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x0/0x4d8
show_stack+0x34/0x48
dump_stack+0x174/0x1f8
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x5c/0x550
kasan_report+0x13c/0x1c0
__asan_report_load1_noabort+0x34/0x60
memcmp+0xd0/0xd8
gfs2_uevent+0xc4/0x188
kobject_uevent_env+0x54c/0x1240
kobject_uevent+0x2c/0x40
__kobject_del+0x190/0x1d8
kobject_delayed_cleanup+0x2bc/0x3b8
process_one_work+0x96c/0x18c0
worker_thread+0x3f0/0xc30
kthread+0x390/0x498
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
Allocated by task 1110:
kasan_save_stack+0x28/0x58
__kasan_kmalloc.isra.0+0xc8/0xe8
kasan_kmalloc+0x10/0x20
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x1d8/0x2f0
alloc_super+0x64/0x8c0
sget_fc+0x110/0x620
get_tree_bdev+0x190/0x648
gfs2_get_tree+0x50/0x228
vfs_get_tree+0x84/0x2e8
path_mount+0x1134/0x1da8
do_mount+0x124/0x138
__arm64_sys_mount+0x164/0x238
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x15c/0x598
do_el0_svc+0x60/0x150
el0_svc+0x34/0xb0
el0_sync_handler+0xc8/0x5b4
el0_sync+0x15c/0x180
Freed by task 228:
kasan_save_stack+0x28/0x58
kasan_set_track+0x28/0x40
kasan_set_free_info+0x24/0x48
__kasan_slab_free+0x118/0x190
kasan_slab_free+0x14/0x20
slab_free_freelist_hook+0x6c/0x210
kfree+0x13c/0x460
Use the same pattern as f2fs + ext4 where the kobject destruction must
complete before allowing the FS itself to be freed. This means that we
need an explicit free_sbd in the callers.
Cc: Bob Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com>
Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jamie Iles <jamie@nuviainc.com>
[Also go to fail_free when init_names fails.]
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit e0770e91424f694b461141cbc99adf6b23006b60 ]
When we try to use file already used as a quota file again (for the same
or different quota type), strange things can happen. At the very least
lockdep annotations may be wrong but also inode flags may be wrongly set
/ reset. When the file is used for two quota types at once we can even
corrupt the file and likely crash the kernel. Catch all these cases by
checking whether passed file is already used as quota file and bail
early in that case.
This fixes occasional generic/219 failure due to lockdep complaint.
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
Reported-by: Ritesh Harjani <riteshh@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201015110330.28716-1-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit c6a5d954950c5031444173ad2195efc163afcac9 ]
If you replace a seed device in a sprouted fs, it appears to have
successfully replaced the seed device, but if you look closely, it
didn't. Here is an example.
$ mkfs.btrfs /dev/sda
$ btrfstune -S1 /dev/sda
$ mount /dev/sda /btrfs
$ btrfs device add /dev/sdb /btrfs
$ umount /btrfs
$ btrfs device scan --forget
$ mount -o device=/dev/sda /dev/sdb /btrfs
$ btrfs replace start -f /dev/sda /dev/sdc /btrfs
$ echo $?
0
BTRFS info (device sdb): dev_replace from /dev/sda (devid 1) to /dev/sdc started
BTRFS info (device sdb): dev_replace from /dev/sda (devid 1) to /dev/sdc finished
$ btrfs fi show
Label: none uuid: ab2c88b7-be81-4a7e-9849-c3666e7f9f4f
Total devices 2 FS bytes used 256.00KiB
devid 1 size 3.00GiB used 520.00MiB path /dev/sdc
devid 2 size 3.00GiB used 896.00MiB path /dev/sdb
Label: none uuid: 10bd3202-0415-43af-96a8-d5409f310a7e
Total devices 1 FS bytes used 128.00KiB
devid 1 size 3.00GiB used 536.00MiB path /dev/sda
So as per the replace start command and kernel log replace was successful.
Now let's try to clean mount.
$ umount /btrfs
$ btrfs device scan --forget
$ mount -o device=/dev/sdc /dev/sdb /btrfs
mount: /btrfs: wrong fs type, bad option, bad superblock on /dev/sdb, missing codepage or helper program, or other error.
[ 636.157517] BTRFS error (device sdc): failed to read chunk tree: -2
[ 636.180177] BTRFS error (device sdc): open_ctree failed
That's because per dev items it is still looking for the original seed
device.
$ btrfs inspect-internal dump-tree -d /dev/sdb
item 0 key (DEV_ITEMS DEV_ITEM 1) itemoff 16185 itemsize 98
devid 1 total_bytes 3221225472 bytes_used 545259520
io_align 4096 io_width 4096 sector_size 4096 type 0
generation 6 start_offset 0 dev_group 0
seek_speed 0 bandwidth 0
uuid 59368f50-9af2-4b17-91da-8a783cc418d4 <--- seed uuid
fsid 10bd3202-0415-43af-96a8-d5409f310a7e <--- seed fsid
item 1 key (DEV_ITEMS DEV_ITEM 2) itemoff 16087 itemsize 98
devid 2 total_bytes 3221225472 bytes_used 939524096
io_align 4096 io_width 4096 sector_size 4096 type 0
generation 0 start_offset 0 dev_group 0
seek_speed 0 bandwidth 0
uuid 56a0a6bc-4630-4998-8daf-3c3030c4256a <- sprout uuid
fsid ab2c88b7-be81-4a7e-9849-c3666e7f9f4f <- sprout fsid
But the replaced target has the following uuid+fsid in its superblock
which doesn't match with the expected uuid+fsid in its devitem.
$ btrfs in dump-super /dev/sdc | egrep '^generation|dev_item.uuid|dev_item.fsid|devid'
generation 20
dev_item.uuid 59368f50-9af2-4b17-91da-8a783cc418d4
dev_item.fsid ab2c88b7-be81-4a7e-9849-c3666e7f9f4f [match]
dev_item.devid 1
So if you provide the original seed device the mount shall be
successful. Which so long happening in the test case btrfs/163.
$ btrfs device scan --forget
$ mount -o device=/dev/sda /dev/sdb /btrfs
Fix in this patch:
If a seed is not sprouted then there is no replacement of it, because of
its read-only filesystem with a read-only device. Similarly, in the case
of a sprouted filesystem, the seed device is still read only. So, mark
it as you can't replace a seed device, you can only add a new device and
then delete the seed device. If replace is attempted then returns
-EINVAL.
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 8df0fa39bdd86ca81a8d706a6ed9d33cc65ca625 ]
When callers pass XFS_BMAPI_REMAP into xfs_bunmapi, they want the extent
to be unmapped from the given file fork without the extent being freed.
We do this for non-rt files, but we forgot to do this for realtime
files. So far this isn't a big deal since nobody makes a bunmapi call
to a rt file with the REMAP flag set, but don't leave a logic bomb.
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit f4c32e87de7d66074d5612567c5eac7325024428 ]
The realtime bitmap and summary files are regular files that are hidden
away from the directory tree. Since they're regular files, inode
inactivation will try to purge what it thinks are speculative
preallocations beyond the incore size of the file. Unfortunately,
xfs_growfs_rt forgets to update the incore size when it resizes the
inodes, with the result that inactivating the rt inodes at unmount time
will cause their contents to be truncated.
Fix this by updating the incore size when we change the ondisk size as
part of updating the superblock. Note that we don't do this when we're
allocating blocks to the rt inodes because we actually want those blocks
to get purged if the growfs fails.
This fixes corruption complaints from the online rtsummary checker when
running xfs/233. Since that test requires rmap, one can also trigger
this by growing an rt volume, cycling the mount, and creating rt files.
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanrlinux@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 86f33603f8c51537265ff7ac0320638fd2cbdb1b ]
First problem is we hit BUG_ON() in f2fs_get_sum_page given EIO on
f2fs_get_meta_page_nofail().
Quick fix was not to give any error with infinite loop, but syzbot caught
a case where it goes to that loop from fuzzed image. In turned out we abused
f2fs_get_meta_page_nofail() like in the below call stack.
- f2fs_fill_super
- f2fs_build_segment_manager
- build_sit_entries
- get_current_sit_page
INFO: task syz-executor178:6870 can't die for more than 143 seconds.
task:syz-executor178 state:R
stack:26960 pid: 6870 ppid: 6869 flags:0x00004006
Call Trace:
Showing all locks held in the system:
1 lock held by khungtaskd/1179:
#0: ffffffff8a554da0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x53/0x260 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:6242
1 lock held by systemd-journal/3920:
1 lock held by in:imklog/6769:
#0: ffff88809eebc130 (&f->f_pos_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __fdget_pos+0xe9/0x100 fs/file.c:930
1 lock held by syz-executor178/6870:
#0: ffff8880925120e0 (&type->s_umount_key#47/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: alloc_super+0x201/0xaf0 fs/super.c:229
Actually, we didn't have to use _nofail in this case, since we could return
error to mount(2) already with the error handler.
As a result, this patch tries to 1) remove _nofail callers as much as possible,
2) deal with error case in last remaining caller, f2fs_get_sum_page().
Reported-by: syzbot+ee250ac8137be41d7b13@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 6d7ab88a98c1b7a47c228f8ffb4f44d631eaf284 ]
As syzbot reported:
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x21c/0x280 lib/dump_stack.c:118
kmsan_report+0xf7/0x1e0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_report.c:122
__msan_warning+0x58/0xa0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:219
f2fs_lookup+0xe05/0x1a80 fs/f2fs/namei.c:503
lookup_open fs/namei.c:3082 [inline]
open_last_lookups fs/namei.c:3177 [inline]
path_openat+0x2729/0x6a90 fs/namei.c:3365
do_filp_open+0x2b8/0x710 fs/namei.c:3395
do_sys_openat2+0xa88/0x1140 fs/open.c:1168
do_sys_open fs/open.c:1184 [inline]
__do_compat_sys_openat fs/open.c:1242 [inline]
__se_compat_sys_openat+0x2a4/0x310 fs/open.c:1240
__ia32_compat_sys_openat+0x56/0x70 fs/open.c:1240
do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 [inline]
__do_fast_syscall_32+0x129/0x180 arch/x86/entry/common.c:139
do_fast_syscall_32+0x6a/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:162
do_SYSENTER_32+0x73/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:205
entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe+0x4d/0x5c
In f2fs_lookup(), @res_page could be used before being initialized,
because in __f2fs_find_entry(), once F2FS_I(dir)->i_current_depth was
been fuzzed to zero, then @res_page will never be initialized, causing
this kmsan warning, relocating @res_page initialization place to fix
this bug.
Reported-by: syzbot+0eac6f0bbd558fd866d7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit d53c3dfb23c45f7d4f910c3a3ca84bf0a99c6143 ]
Reading and modifying current->mm and current->active_mm and switching
mm should be done with irqs off, to prevent races seeing an intermediate
state.
This is similar to commit 38cf307c1f20 ("mm: fix kthread_use_mm() vs TLB
invalidate"). At exec-time when the new mm is activated, the old one
should usually be single-threaded and no longer used, unless something
else is holding an mm_users reference (which may be possible).
Absent other mm_users, there is also a race with preemption and lazy tlb
switching. Consider the kernel_execve case where the current thread is
using a lazy tlb active mm:
call_usermodehelper()
kernel_execve()
old_mm = current->mm;
active_mm = current->active_mm;
*** preempt *** --------------------> schedule()
prev->active_mm = NULL;
mmdrop(prev active_mm);
...
<-------------------- schedule()
current->mm = mm;
current->active_mm = mm;
if (!old_mm)
mmdrop(active_mm);
If we switch back to the kernel thread from a different mm, there is a
double free of the old active_mm, and a missing free of the new one.
Closing this race only requires interrupts to be disabled while ->mm
and ->active_mm are being switched, but the TLB problem requires also
holding interrupts off over activate_mm. Unfortunately not all archs
can do that yet, e.g., arm defers the switch if irqs are disabled and
expects finish_arch_post_lock_switch() to be called to complete the
flush; um takes a blocking lock in activate_mm().
So as a first step, disable interrupts across the mm/active_mm updates
to close the lazy tlb preempt race, and provide an arch option to
extend that to activate_mm which allows architectures doing IPI based
TLB shootdowns to close the second race.
This is a bit ugly, but in the interest of fixing the bug and backporting
before all architectures are converted this is a compromise.
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200914045219.3736466-2-npiggin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit d78092e4937de9ce55edcb4ee4c5e3c707be0190 upstream.
After unlock_request() pages from the ap->pages[] array may be put (e.g. by
aborting the connection) and the pages can be freed.
Prevent use after free by grabbing a reference to the page before calling
unlock_request().
The original patch was created by Pradeep P V K.
Reported-by: Pradeep P V K <ppvk@codeaurora.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d578b46db69d125a654f509bdc9091d84e924dc8 upstream.
Don't recheck it since xattr_permission() already
checks CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability.
Just follow 5d3ce4f70172 ("f2fs: avoid duplicated permission check for "trusted." xattrs")
Reported-by: Hongyu Jin <hongyu.jin@unisoc.com>
[ Gao Xiang: since it could cause some complex Android overlay
permission issue as well on android-5.4+, it'd be better to
backport to 5.4+ rather than pure cleanup on mainline. ]
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.4+
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200811070020.6339-1-hsiangkao@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Gao Xiang <hsiangkao@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 336af6a4686d885a067ecea8c3c3dd129ba4fc75 upstream.
Without this patch efivarfs_alloc_dentry creates dentries with slashes in
their name if the respective EFI variable has slashes in its name. This in
turn causes EIO on getdents64, which prevents a complete directory listing
of /sys/firmware/efi/efivars/.
This patch replaces the invalid shlashes with exclamation marks like
kobject_set_name_vargs does for /sys/firmware/efi/vars/ to have consistently
named dentries under /sys/firmware/efi/vars/ and /sys/firmware/efi/efivars/.
Signed-off-by: Michael Schaller <misch@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200925074502.150448-1-misch@google.com
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: dann frazier <dann.frazier@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit e9d4709fcc26353df12070566970f080e651f0c9 ]
When a usrjquota or grpjquota mount option is used multiple times, we
will leak memory allocated for the file name. Make sure the last setting
is used and all the previous ones are properly freed.
Reported-by: syzbot+c9e294bbe0333a6b7640@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit a805c111650cdba6ee880f528abdd03c1af82089 ]
It is trivial to trigger a WARN_ON_ONCE(1) in iomap_dio_actor() by
unprivileged users which would taint the kernel, or worse - panic if
panic_on_warn or panic_on_taint is set. Hence, just convert it to
pr_warn_ratelimited() to let users know their workloads are racing.
Thank Dave Chinner for the initial analysis of the racing reproducers.
Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 2a6ca4baed620303d414934aa1b7b0a8e7bab05f ]
There's an overflow bug in the realtime allocator. If the rt volume is
large enough to handle a single allocation request that is larger than
the maximum bmap extent length and the rt bitmap ends exactly on a
bitmap block boundary, it's possible that the near allocator will try to
check the freeness of a range that extends past the end of the bitmap.
This fails with a corruption error and shuts down the fs.
Therefore, constrain maxlen so that the range scan cannot run off the
end of the rt bitmap.
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 8859bf2b1278d064a139e3031451524a49a56bd0 ]
unlock_new_inode() is only meant to be called after a new inode has
already been inserted into the hash table. But reiserfs_new_inode() can
call it even before it has inserted the inode, triggering the WARNING in
unlock_new_inode(). Fix this by only calling unlock_new_inode() if the
inode has the I_NEW flag set, indicating that it's in the table.
This addresses the syzbot report "WARNING in unlock_new_inode"
(https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=187510916eb6a14598f7).
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200628070057.820213-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Reported-by: syzbot+187510916eb6a14598f7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 044e2e26f214e5ab26af85faffd8d1e4ec066931 ]
When we fail to read inode, some data accessed in udf_evict_inode() may
be uninitialized. Move the accesses to !is_bad_inode() branch.
Reported-by: syzbot+91f02b28f9bb5f5f1341@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 44ac6b829c4e173fdf6df18e6dd86aecf9a3dc99 ]
Although UDF standard allows it, we don't support sparing table larger
than a single block. Check it during mount so that we don't try to
access memory beyond end of buffer.
Reported-by: syzbot+9991561e714f597095da@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 3d2825c8c6105b0f36f3ff72760799fa2e71420e ]
This patch fixes the following memory detected by kmemleak and umount
gfs2 filesystem which removed the last lockspace:
unreferenced object 0xffff9264f482f600 (size 192):
comm "dlm_controld", pid 325, jiffies 4294690276 (age 48.136s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 6e 6f 64 65 73 00 00 00 ........nodes...
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<00000000060481d7>] make_space+0x41/0x130
[<000000008d905d46>] configfs_mkdir+0x1a2/0x5f0
[<00000000729502cf>] vfs_mkdir+0x155/0x210
[<000000000369bcf1>] do_mkdirat+0x6d/0x110
[<00000000cc478a33>] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
[<00000000ce9ccf01>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
The patch just remembers the "nodes" entry pointer in space as I think
it's created as subdirectory when parent "spaces" is created. In
function drop_space() we will lost the pointer reference to nds because
configfs_remove_default_groups(). However as this subdirectory is always
available when "spaces" exists it will just be freed when "spaces" will be
freed.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Aring <aahringo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Teigland <teigland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit af8c53c8bc087459b1aadd4c94805d8272358d79 ]
If userspace asked fsmap to try to count the number of entries, we cannot
return more than UINT_MAX entries because fmh_entries is u32.
Therefore, stop counting if we hit this limit or else we will waste time
to return truncated results.
Fixes: 0c9ec4beecac ("ext4: support GETFSMAP ioctls")
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201001222148.GA49520@magnolia
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 50b7d85680086126d7bd91dae81d57d4cb1ab6b7 ]
ramfs needs to check that pages are both physically contiguous and
contiguous in the file. If the page cache happens to have, eg, page A for
index 0 of the file, no page for index 1, and page A+1 for index 2, then
an mmap of the first two pages of the file will succeed when it should
fail.
Fixes: 642fb4d1f1dd ("[PATCH] NOMMU: Provide shared-writable mmap support on ramfs")
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200914122239.GO6583@casper.infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit ae284d87abade58c8db7760c808f311ef1ce693c ]
syzkaller found that with CONFIG_DEBUG_KOBJECT_RELEASE=y, unmounting an
f2fs filesystem could result in the following splat:
kobject: 'loop5' ((____ptrval____)): kobject_release, parent 0000000000000000 (delayed 250)
kobject: 'f2fs_xattr_entry-7:5' ((____ptrval____)): kobject_release, parent 0000000000000000 (delayed 750)
------------[ cut here ]------------
ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object type: timer_list hint: delayed_work_timer_fn+0x0/0x98
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 699 at lib/debugobjects.c:485 debug_print_object+0x180/0x240
Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
CPU: 0 PID: 699 Comm: syz-executor.5 Tainted: G S 5.9.0-rc8+ #101
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x0/0x4d8
show_stack+0x34/0x48
dump_stack+0x174/0x1f8
panic+0x360/0x7a0
__warn+0x244/0x2ec
report_bug+0x240/0x398
bug_handler+0x50/0xc0
call_break_hook+0x160/0x1d8
brk_handler+0x30/0xc0
do_debug_exception+0x184/0x340
el1_dbg+0x48/0xb0
el1_sync_handler+0x170/0x1c8
el1_sync+0x80/0x100
debug_print_object+0x180/0x240
debug_check_no_obj_freed+0x200/0x430
slab_free_freelist_hook+0x190/0x210
kfree+0x13c/0x460
f2fs_put_super+0x624/0xa58
generic_shutdown_super+0x120/0x300
kill_block_super+0x94/0xf8
kill_f2fs_super+0x244/0x308
deactivate_locked_super+0x104/0x150
deactivate_super+0x118/0x148
cleanup_mnt+0x27c/0x3c0
__cleanup_mnt+0x28/0x38
task_work_run+0x10c/0x248
do_notify_resume+0x9d4/0x1188
work_pending+0x8/0x34c
Like the error handling for f2fs_register_sysfs(), we need to wait for
the kobject to be destroyed before returning to prevent a potential
use-after-free.
Fixes: bf9e697ecd42 ("f2fs: expose features to sysfs entry")
Cc: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Cc: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jamie Iles <jamie@nuviainc.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit d88850bd5516a77c6f727e8b6cefb64e0cc929c7 ]
Fix some off-by-one errors in xfs_rtalloc_query_range. The highest key
in the realtime bitmap is always one less than the number of rt extents,
which means that the key clamp at the start of the function is wrong.
The 4th argument to xfs_rtfind_forw is the highest rt extent that we
want to probe, which means that passing 1 less than the high key is
wrong. Finally, drop the rem variable that controls the loop because we
can compare the iteration point (rtstart) against the high key directly.
The sordid history of this function is that the original commit (fb3c3)
incorrectly passed (high_rec->ar_startblock - 1) as the 'limit' parameter
to xfs_rtfind_forw. This was wrong because the "high key" is supposed
to be the largest key for which the caller wants result rows, not the
key for the first row that could possibly be outside the range that the
caller wants to see.
A subsequent attempt (8ad56) to strengthen the parameter checking added
incorrect clamping of the parameters to the number of rt blocks in the
system (despite the bitmap functions all taking units of rt extents) to
avoid querying ranges past the end of rt bitmap file but failed to fix
the incorrect _rtfind_forw parameter. The original _rtfind_forw
parameter error then survived the conversion of the startblock and
blockcount fields to rt extents (a0e5c), and the most recent off-by-one
fix (a3a37) thought it was patching a problem when the end of the rt
volume is not in use, but none of these fixes actually solved the
original problem that the author was confused about the "limit" argument
to xfs_rtfind_forw.
Sadly, all four of these patches were written by this author and even
his own usage of this function and rt testing were inadequate to get
this fixed quickly.
Original-problem: fb3c3de2f65c ("xfs: add a couple of queries to iterate free extents in the rtbitmap")
Not-fixed-by: 8ad560d2565e ("xfs: strengthen rtalloc query range checks")
Not-fixed-by: a0e5c435babd ("xfs: fix xfs_rtalloc_rec units")
Fixes: a3a374bf1889 ("xfs: fix off-by-one error in xfs_rtalloc_query_range")
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanrlinux@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 8ffa90e1145c70c7ac47f14b59583b2296d89e72 ]
Refactor xfs_getfsmap to improve its performance: instead of indirectly
calling a function that copies one record to userspace at a time, create
a shadow buffer in the kernel and copy the whole array once at the end.
On the author's computer, this reduces the runtime on his /home by ~20%.
This also eliminates a deadlock when running GETFSMAP against the
realtime device. The current code locks the rtbitmap to create
fsmappings and copies them into userspace, having not released the
rtbitmap lock. If the userspace buffer is an mmap of a sparse file that
itself resides on the realtime device, the write page fault will recurse
into the fs for allocation, which will deadlock on the rtbitmap lock.
Fixes: 4c934c7dd60c ("xfs: report realtime space information via the rtbitmap")
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanrlinux@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit acd1ac3aa22fd58803a12d26b1ab7f70232f8d8d ]
If userspace asked fsmap to count the number of entries, we cannot
return more than UINT_MAX entries because fmh_entries is u32.
Therefore, stop counting if we hit this limit or else we will waste time
to return truncated results.
Fixes: e89c041338ed ("xfs: implement the GETFSMAP ioctl")
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanrlinux@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 09cad07547445bf3a41683e4d3abcd154c123ef5 ]
Fix data race in prepend_path() with re-reading mnt->mnt_ns twice
without holding the lock.
is_mounted() does check for NULL, but is_anon_ns(mnt->mnt_ns) might
re-read the pointer again which could be NULL already, if in between
reads one of kern_unmount()/kern_unmount_array()/umount_tree() sets
mnt->mnt_ns to NULL.
This is seen in production with the following stack trace:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000048
...
RIP: 0010:prepend_path.isra.4+0x1ce/0x2e0
Call Trace:
d_path+0xe6/0x150
proc_pid_readlink+0x8f/0x100
vfs_readlink+0xf8/0x110
do_readlinkat+0xfd/0x120
__x64_sys_readlinkat+0x1a/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x42/0x110
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Fixes: f2683bd8d5bd ("[PATCH] fix d_absolute_path() interplay with fsmount()")
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 67197a4f28d28d0b073ab0427b03cb2ee5382578 ]
Currently __set_oom_adj loops through all processes in the system to keep
oom_score_adj and oom_score_adj_min in sync between processes sharing
their mm. This is done for any task with more that one mm_users, which
includes processes with multiple threads (sharing mm and signals).
However for such processes the loop is unnecessary because their signal
structure is shared as well.
Android updates oom_score_adj whenever a tasks changes its role
(background/foreground/...) or binds to/unbinds from a service, making it
more/less important. Such operation can happen frequently. We noticed
that updates to oom_score_adj became more expensive and after further
investigation found out that the patch mentioned in "Fixes" introduced a
regression. Using Pixel 4 with a typical Android workload, write time to
oom_score_adj increased from ~3.57us to ~362us. Moreover this regression
linearly depends on the number of multi-threaded processes running on the
system.
Mark the mm with a new MMF_MULTIPROCESS flag bit when task is created with
(CLONE_VM && !CLONE_THREAD && !CLONE_VFORK). Change __set_oom_adj to use
MMF_MULTIPROCESS instead of mm_users to decide whether oom_score_adj
update should be synchronized between multiple processes. To prevent
races between clone() and __set_oom_adj(), when oom_score_adj of the
process being cloned might be modified from userspace, we use
oom_adj_mutex. Its scope is changed to global.
The combination of (CLONE_VM && !CLONE_THREAD) is rarely used except for
the case of vfork(). To prevent performance regressions of vfork(), we
skip taking oom_adj_mutex and setting MMF_MULTIPROCESS when CLONE_VFORK is
specified. Clearing the MMF_MULTIPROCESS flag (when the last process
sharing the mm exits) is left out of this patch to keep it simple and
because it is believed that this threading model is rare. Should there
ever be a need for optimizing that case as well, it can be done by hooking
into the exit path, likely following the mm_update_next_owner pattern.
With the combination of (CLONE_VM && !CLONE_THREAD && !CLONE_VFORK) being
quite rare, the regression is gone after the change is applied.
[surenb@google.com: v3]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200902012558.2335613-1-surenb@google.com
Fixes: 44a70adec910 ("mm, oom_adj: make sure processes sharing mm have same view of oom_score_adj")
Reported-by: Tim Murray <timmurray@google.com>
Suggested-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>
Cc: Christian Kellner <christian@kellner.me>
Cc: Adrian Reber <areber@redhat.com>
Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@gmail.com>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200824153036.3201505-1-surenb@google.com
Debugged-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit e6e7ca92623a43156100306861272e04d46385fc ]
If we find a page in write_begin which is !Uptodate, we need
to clear any error on the page before starting to read data
into it. This matches how filemap_fault(), do_read_cache_page()
and generic_file_buffered_read() handle PageError on !Uptodate pages.
When calling iomap_set_range_uptodate() in __iomap_write_begin(), blocks
were not being marked as uptodate.
This was found with generic/127 and a specially modified kernel which
would fail (some) readahead I/Os. The test read some bytes in a prior
page which caused readahead to extend into page 0x34. There was
a subsequent write to page 0x34, followed by a read to page 0x34.
Because the blocks were still marked as !Uptodate, the read caused all
blocks to be re-read, overwriting the write. With this change, and the
next one, the bytes which were written are marked as being Uptodate, so
even though the page is still marked as !Uptodate, the blocks containing
the written data are not re-read from storage.
Fixes: 9dc55f1389f9 ("iomap: add support for sub-pagesize buffered I/O without buffer heads")
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 62593011247c8a8cfeb0c86aff84688b196727c2 upstream.
TCP server info field server->total_read is modified in parallel by
demultiplex thread and decrypt offload worker thread. server->total_read
is used in calculation to discard the remaining data of PDU which is
not read into memory.
Because of parallel modification, server->total_read can get corrupted
and can result in discarding the valid data of next PDU.
Signed-off-by: Rohith Surabattula <rohiths@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> #5.4+
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0bd294b55a5de442370c29fa53bab17aef3ff318 upstream.
In crypt_message, when smb2_get_enc_key returns error, we need to
return the error back to the caller. If not, we end up processing
the message further, causing a kernel oops due to unwarranted access
of memory.
Call Trace:
smb3_receive_transform+0x120/0x870 [cifs]
cifs_demultiplex_thread+0xb53/0xc20 [cifs]
? cifs_handle_standard+0x190/0x190 [cifs]
kthread+0x116/0x130
? kthread_park+0x80/0x80
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
Signed-off-by: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d367cb960ce88914898cbfa43645c2e43ede9465 upstream.
The "end" pointer is either NULL or it points to the next byte to parse.
If there isn't a next byte then dereferencing "end" is an off-by-one out
of bounds error. And, of course, if it's NULL that leads to an Oops.
Printing "*end" doesn't seem very useful so let's delete this code.
Also for the last debug statement, I noticed that it should be printing
"sequence_end" instead of "end" so fix that as well.
Reported-by: Dominik Maier <dmaier@sect.tu-berlin.de>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c2bb80b8bdd04dfe32364b78b61b6a47f717af52 upstream.
With suitably crafted reiserfs image and mount command reiserfs will
crash when trying to verify that XATTR_ROOT directory can be looked up
in / as that recurses back to xattr code like:
xattr_lookup+0x24/0x280 fs/reiserfs/xattr.c:395
reiserfs_xattr_get+0x89/0x540 fs/reiserfs/xattr.c:677
reiserfs_get_acl+0x63/0x690 fs/reiserfs/xattr_acl.c:209
get_acl+0x152/0x2e0 fs/posix_acl.c:141
check_acl fs/namei.c:277 [inline]
acl_permission_check fs/namei.c:309 [inline]
generic_permission+0x2ba/0x550 fs/namei.c:353
do_inode_permission fs/namei.c:398 [inline]
inode_permission+0x234/0x4a0 fs/namei.c:463
lookup_one_len+0xa6/0x200 fs/namei.c:2557
reiserfs_lookup_privroot+0x85/0x1e0 fs/reiserfs/xattr.c:972
reiserfs_fill_super+0x2b51/0x3240 fs/reiserfs/super.c:2176
mount_bdev+0x24f/0x360 fs/super.c:1417
Fix the problem by bailing from reiserfs_xattr_get() when xattrs are not
yet initialized.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: syzbot+9b33c9b118d77ff59b6f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4443390e08d34d5771ab444f601cf71b3c9634a4 upstream.
reiserfs_read_locked_inode() didn't initialize key length properly. Use
_make_cpu_key() macro for key initialization so that all key member are
properly initialized.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: syzbot+d94d02749498bb7bab4b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a30a3d2067536cbcce26c055e70cc3a6ae4fd45c upstream
inc_block_group_ro does a calculation to see if we have enough room left
over if we mark this block group as read only in order to see if it's ok
to mark the block group as read only.
The problem is this calculation _only_ works for data, where our used is
always less than our total. For metadata we will overcommit, so this
will almost always fail for metadata.
Fix this by exporting btrfs_can_overcommit, and then see if we have
enough space to remove the remaining free space in the block group we
are trying to mark read only. If we do then we can mark this block
group as read only.
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 9f246926b4d5db4c5e8c78e4897757de26c95be6 upstream
We have the space_info, we can just check its flags to see if it's the
system chunk space info.
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 64b7f674c292207624b3d788eda2dde3dc1415df upstream.
On setxattr() syscall path due to an apprent typo the size of a dynamically
allocated memory chunk for storing struct smb2_file_full_ea_info object is
computed incorrectly, to be more precise the first addend is the size of
a pointer instead of the wanted object size. Coincidentally it makes no
difference on 64-bit platforms, however on 32-bit targets the following
memcpy() writes 4 bytes of data outside of the dynamically allocated memory.
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-16 (Not tainted): Redzone overwritten
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: 0x79e69a6f-0x9e5cdecf @offset=368. First byte 0x73 instead of 0xcc
INFO: Slab 0xd36d2454 objects=85 used=51 fp=0xf7d0fc7a flags=0x35000201
INFO: Object 0x6f171df3 @offset=352 fp=0x00000000
Redzone 5d4ff02d: cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc ................
Object 6f171df3: 00 00 00 00 00 05 06 00 73 6e 72 75 62 00 66 69 ........snrub.fi
Redzone 79e69a6f: 73 68 32 0a sh2.
Padding 56254d82: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ZZZZZZZZ
CPU: 0 PID: 8196 Comm: attr Tainted: G B 5.9.0-rc8+ #3
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x54/0x6e
print_trailer+0x12c/0x134
check_bytes_and_report.cold+0x3e/0x69
check_object+0x18c/0x250
free_debug_processing+0xfe/0x230
__slab_free+0x1c0/0x300
kfree+0x1d3/0x220
smb2_set_ea+0x27d/0x540
cifs_xattr_set+0x57f/0x620
__vfs_setxattr+0x4e/0x60
__vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x4e/0x100
__vfs_setxattr_locked+0xae/0xd0
vfs_setxattr+0x4e/0xe0
setxattr+0x12c/0x1a0
path_setxattr+0xa4/0xc0
__ia32_sys_lsetxattr+0x1d/0x20
__do_fast_syscall_32+0x40/0x70
do_fast_syscall_32+0x29/0x60
do_SYSENTER_32+0x15/0x20
entry_SYSENTER_32+0x9f/0xf2
Fixes: 5517554e4313 ("cifs: Add support for writing attributes on SMB2+")
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Zapolskiy <vladimir@tuxera.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6d4572a9d71d5fc2affee0258d8582d39859188c upstream.
[BUG]
When the data space is exhausted, even if the inode has NOCOW attribute,
we will still refuse to truncate unaligned range due to ENOSPC.
The following script can reproduce it pretty easily:
#!/bin/bash
dev=/dev/test/test
mnt=/mnt/btrfs
umount $dev &> /dev/null
umount $mnt &> /dev/null
mkfs.btrfs -f $dev -b 1G
mount -o nospace_cache $dev $mnt
touch $mnt/foobar
chattr +C $mnt/foobar
xfs_io -f -c "pwrite -b 4k 0 4k" $mnt/foobar > /dev/null
xfs_io -f -c "pwrite -b 4k 0 1G" $mnt/padding &> /dev/null
sync
xfs_io -c "fpunch 0 2k" $mnt/foobar
umount $mnt
Currently this will fail at the fpunch part.
[CAUSE]
Because btrfs_truncate_block() always reserves space without checking
the NOCOW attribute.
Since the writeback path follows NOCOW bit, we only need to bother the
space reservation code in btrfs_truncate_block().
[FIX]
Make btrfs_truncate_block() follow btrfs_buffered_write() to try to
reserve data space first, and fall back to NOCOW check only when we
don't have enough space.
Such always-try-reserve is an optimization introduced in
btrfs_buffered_write(), to avoid expensive btrfs_check_can_nocow() call.
This patch will export check_can_nocow() as btrfs_check_can_nocow(), and
use it in btrfs_truncate_block() to fix the problem.
Reported-by: Martin Doucha <martin.doucha@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 260a63395f90f67d6ab89e4266af9e3dc34a77e9 upstream.
If we attempt to do a RWF_NOWAIT write against a file range for which we
can only do NOCOW for a part of it, due to the existence of holes or
shared extents for example, we proceed with the write as if it were
possible to NOCOW the whole range.
Example:
$ mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/sdb
$ mount /dev/sdb /mnt
$ touch /mnt/sdj/bar
$ chattr +C /mnt/sdj/bar
$ xfs_io -d -c "pwrite -S 0xab -b 256K 0 256K" /mnt/bar
wrote 262144/262144 bytes at offset 0
256 KiB, 1 ops; 0.0003 sec (694.444 MiB/sec and 2777.7778 ops/sec)
$ xfs_io -c "fpunch 64K 64K" /mnt/bar
$ sync
$ xfs_io -d -c "pwrite -N -V 1 -b 128K -S 0xfe 0 128K" /mnt/bar
wrote 131072/131072 bytes at offset 0
128 KiB, 1 ops; 0.0007 sec (160.051 MiB/sec and 1280.4097 ops/sec)
This last write should fail with -EAGAIN since the file range from 64K to
128K is a hole. On xfs it fails, as expected, but on ext4 it currently
succeeds because apparently it is expensive to check if there are extents
allocated for the whole range, but I'll check with the ext4 people.
Fix the issue by checking if check_can_nocow() returns a number of
NOCOW'able bytes smaller then the requested number of bytes, and if it
does return -EAGAIN.
Fixes: edf064e7c6fec3 ("btrfs: nowait aio support")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6b7faadd985c990324b5b5bd18cc4ba5c395eb65 upstream.
[BUG]
When deleting large files (which cross block group boundary) with
discard mount option, we find some btrfs_discard_extent() calls only
trimmed part of its space, not the whole range:
btrfs_discard_extent: type=0x1 start=19626196992 len=2144530432 trimmed=1073741824 ratio=50%
type: bbio->map_type, in above case, it's SINGLE DATA.
start: Logical address of this trim
len: Logical length of this trim
trimmed: Physically trimmed bytes
ratio: trimmed / len
Thus leaving some unused space not discarded.
[CAUSE]
When discard mount option is specified, after a transaction is fully
committed (super block written to disk), we begin to cleanup pinned
extents in the following call chain:
btrfs_commit_transaction()
|- btrfs_finish_extent_commit()
|- find_first_extent_bit(unpin, 0, &start, &end, EXTENT_DIRTY);
|- btrfs_discard_extent()
However, pinned extents are recorded in an extent_io_tree, which can
merge adjacent extent states.
When a large file gets deleted and it has adjacent file extents across
block group boundary, we will get a large merged range like this:
|<--- BG1 --->|<--- BG2 --->|
|//////|<-- Range to discard --->|/////|
To discard that range, we have the following calls:
btrfs_discard_extent()
|- btrfs_map_block()
| Returned bbio will end at BG1's end. As btrfs_map_block()
| never returns result across block group boundary.
|- btrfs_issuse_discard()
Issue discard for each stripe.
So we will only discard the range in BG1, not the remaining part in BG2.
Furthermore, this bug is not that reliably observed, for above case, if
there is no other extent in BG2, BG2 will be empty and btrfs will trim
all space of BG2, covering up the bug.
[FIX]
- Allow __btrfs_map_block_for_discard() to modify @length parameter
btrfs_map_block() uses its @length paramter to notify the caller how
many bytes are mapped in current call.
With __btrfs_map_block_for_discard() also modifing the @length,
btrfs_discard_extent() now understands when to do extra trim.
- Call btrfs_map_block() in a loop until we hit the range end Since we
now know how many bytes are mapped each time, we can iterate through
each block group boundary and issue correct trim for each range.
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Tested-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2d974619a77f106f3d1341686dea95c0eaad601f upstream.
The old code goes:
offset = logical - em->start;
length = min_t(u64, em->len - offset, length);
Where @length calculation is dependent on offset, it can take reader
several more seconds to find it's just the same code as:
offset = logical - em->start;
length = min_t(u64, em->start + em->len - logical, length);
Use above code to make the length calculate independent from other
variable, thus slightly increase the readability.
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9722b10148504c4153a74a9c89725af271e490fc upstream.
When doing an incremental send and a file has extents shared with itself
at different file offsets, it's possible for send to emit clone operations
that will fail at the destination because the source range goes beyond the
file's current size. This happens when the file size has increased in the
send snapshot, there is a hole between the shared extents and both shared
extents are at file offsets which are greater the file's size in the
parent snapshot.
Example:
$ mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/sdb
$ mount /dev/sdb /mnt/sdb
$ xfs_io -f -c "pwrite -S 0xf1 0 64K" /mnt/sdb/foobar
$ btrfs subvolume snapshot -r /mnt/sdb /mnt/sdb/base
$ btrfs send -f /tmp/1.snap /mnt/sdb/base
# Create a 320K extent at file offset 512K.
$ xfs_io -c "pwrite -S 0xab 512K 64K" /mnt/sdb/foobar
$ xfs_io -c "pwrite -S 0xcd 576K 64K" /mnt/sdb/foobar
$ xfs_io -c "pwrite -S 0xef 640K 64K" /mnt/sdb/foobar
$ xfs_io -c "pwrite -S 0x64 704K 64K" /mnt/sdb/foobar
$ xfs_io -c "pwrite -S 0x73 768K 64K" /mnt/sdb/foobar
# Clone part of that 320K extent into a lower file offset (192K).
# This file offset is greater than the file's size in the parent
# snapshot (64K). Also the clone range is a bit behind the offset of
# the 320K extent so that we leave a hole between the shared extents.
$ xfs_io -c "reflink /mnt/sdb/foobar 448K 192K 192K" /mnt/sdb/foobar
$ btrfs subvolume snapshot -r /mnt/sdb /mnt/sdb/incr
$ btrfs send -p /mnt/sdb/base -f /tmp/2.snap /mnt/sdb/incr
$ mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/sdc
$ mount /dev/sdc /mnt/sdc
$ btrfs receive -f /tmp/1.snap /mnt/sdc
$ btrfs receive -f /tmp/2.snap /mnt/sdc
ERROR: failed to clone extents to foobar: Invalid argument
The problem is that after processing the extent at file offset 256K, which
refers to the first 128K of the 320K extent created by the buffered write
operations, we have 'cur_inode_next_write_offset' set to 384K, which
corresponds to the end offset of the partially shared extent (256K + 128K)
and to the current file size in the receiver. Then when we process the
extent at offset 512K, we do extent backreference iteration to figure out
if we can clone the extent from some other inode or from the same inode,
and we consider the extent at offset 256K of the same inode as a valid
source for a clone operation, which is not correct because at that point
the current file size in the receiver is 384K, which corresponds to the
end of last processed extent (at file offset 256K), so using a clone
source range from 256K to 256K + 320K is invalid because that goes past
the current size of the file (384K) - this makes the receiver get an
-EINVAL error when attempting the clone operation.
So fix this by excluding clone sources that have a range that goes beyond
the current file size in the receiver when iterating extent backreferences.
A test case for fstests follows soon.
Fixes: 11f2069c113e02 ("Btrfs: send, allow clone operations within the same file")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.5+
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 11f2069c113e02971b8db6fda62f9b9cd31a030f upstream.
For send we currently skip clone operations when the source and
destination files are the same. This is so because clone didn't support
this case in its early days, but support for it was added back in May
2013 by commit a96fbc72884fcb ("Btrfs: allow file data clone within a
file"). This change adds support for it.
Example:
$ mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/sdd
$ mount /dev/sdd /mnt/sdd
$ xfs_io -f -c "pwrite -S 0xab -b 64K 0 64K" /mnt/sdd/foobar
$ xfs_io -c "reflink /mnt/sdd/foobar 0 64K 64K" /mnt/sdd/foobar
$ btrfs subvolume snapshot -r /mnt/sdd /mnt/sdd/snap
$ mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/sde
$ mount /dev/sde /mnt/sde
$ btrfs send /mnt/sdd/snap | btrfs receive /mnt/sde
Without this change file foobar at the destination has a single 128Kb
extent:
$ filefrag -v /mnt/sde/snap/foobar
Filesystem type is: 9123683e
File size of /mnt/sde/snap/foobar is 131072 (32 blocks of 4096 bytes)
ext: logical_offset: physical_offset: length: expected: flags:
0: 0.. 31: 0.. 31: 32: last,unknown_loc,delalloc,eof
/mnt/sde/snap/foobar: 1 extent found
With this we get a single 64Kb extent that is shared at file offsets 0
and 64K, just like in the source filesystem:
$ filefrag -v /mnt/sde/snap/foobar
Filesystem type is: 9123683e
File size of /mnt/sde/snap/foobar is 131072 (32 blocks of 4096 bytes)
ext: logical_offset: physical_offset: length: expected: flags:
0: 0.. 15: 3328.. 3343: 16: shared
1: 16.. 31: 3328.. 3343: 16: 3344: last,shared,eof
/mnt/sde/snap/foobar: 2 extents found
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
If we queue work in io_poll_wake(), it will leads to list double
add. So we should add the list when the callback func is the
io_sq_wq_submit_work.
The following oops was seen:
list_add double add: new=ffff9ca6a8f1b0e0, prev=ffff9ca62001cee8,
next=ffff9ca6a8f1b0e0.
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:31!
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
io_poll_wake+0xf3/0x230
__wake_up_common+0x91/0x170
__wake_up_common_lock+0x7a/0xc0
io_commit_cqring+0xea/0x280
? blkcg_iolatency_done_bio+0x2b/0x610
io_cqring_add_event+0x3e/0x60
io_complete_rw+0x58/0x80
dio_complete+0x106/0x250
blk_update_request+0xa0/0x3b0
blk_mq_end_request+0x1a/0x110
blk_mq_complete_request+0xd0/0xe0
nvme_irq+0x129/0x270 [nvme]
__handle_irq_event_percpu+0x7b/0x190
handle_irq_event_percpu+0x30/0x80
handle_irq_event+0x3c/0x60
handle_edge_irq+0x91/0x1e0
do_IRQ+0x4d/0xd0
common_interrupt+0xf/0xf
Fixes: 1c4404efcf2c ("io_uring: make sure async workqueue is canceled on exit")
Reported-by: Jiachen Zhang <zhangjiachen.jaycee@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Muchun Song <songmuchun@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
