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[ Upstream commit 2225a8dda263edc35a0e8b858fe2945cf6240fde ]
This is a bug that causes early crashes in builds with an .exit.text
section smaller than a page and an .init.text section that ends in the
beginning of a physical page (this is kinda random, which might
explain why this wasn't really encountered before).
The init sections are ordered like this:
.init.text
.exit.text
.init.data
Currently, these sections aren't page aligned.
Because the init code might become read-only at runtime and because
the .init.text section can potentially reside on the same physical
page as .init.data, the beginning of .init.data might be mapped
read-only along with .init.text.
Then when the kernel tries to modify a variable in .init.data (like
kthreadd_done, used in kernel_init()) the kernel panics.
To avoid this, make _einittext page aligned and also align .exit.text
to make sure .init.data is always seperated from the text segments.
Fixes: 060ef9d89d18 ("powerpc32: PAGE_EXEC required for inittext")
Signed-off-by: Ariel Marcovitch <ariel.marcovitch@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210102201156.10805-1-ariel.marcovitch@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit fdcfeaba38e5b183045f5b079af94f97658eabe6 ]
Use the common INIT_DATA_SECTION rule for the linker script in an effort
to regularize the linker script.
Signed-off-by: Youling Tang <tangyouling@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1604487550-20040-1-git-send-email-tangyouling@loongson.cn
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 3ce47d95b7346dcafd9bed3556a8d072cb2b8571 upstream.
Commit eff8728fe698 ("vmlinux.lds.h: Add PGO and AutoFDO input
sections") added ".text.unlikely.*" and ".text.hot.*" due to an LLVM
change [1].
After another LLVM change [2], these sections are seen in some PowerPC
builds, where there is a orphan section warning then build failure:
$ make -skj"$(nproc)" \
ARCH=powerpc CROSS_COMPILE=powerpc64le-linux-gnu- LLVM=1 O=out \
distclean powernv_defconfig zImage.epapr
ld.lld: warning: kernel/built-in.a(panic.o):(.text.unlikely.) is being placed in '.text.unlikely.'
...
ld.lld: warning: address (0xc000000000009314) of section .text is not a multiple of alignment (256)
...
ERROR: start_text address is c000000000009400, should be c000000000008000
ERROR: try to enable LD_HEAD_STUB_CATCH config option
ERROR: see comments in arch/powerpc/tools/head_check.sh
...
Explicitly handle these sections like in the main linker script so
there is no more build failure.
[1]: https://reviews.llvm.org/D79600
[2]: https://reviews.llvm.org/D92493
Fixes: 83a092cf95f2 ("powerpc: Link warning for orphan sections")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1218
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210104205952.1399409-1-natechancellor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit ffa1797040c5da391859a9556be7b735acbe1242 ]
I noticed that iounmap() of msgr_block_addr before return from
mpic_msgr_probe() in the error handling case is missing. So use
devm_ioremap() instead of just ioremap() when remapping the message
register block, so the mapping will be automatically released on
probe failure.
Signed-off-by: Qinglang Miao <miaoqinglang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201028091551.136400-1-miaoqinglang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 1891ef21d92c4801ea082ee8ed478e304ddc6749 ]
fls() and fls64() are using __builtin_ctz() and _builtin_ctzll().
On powerpc, those builtins trivially use ctlzw and ctlzd power
instructions.
Allthough those instructions provide the expected result with
input argument 0, __builtin_ctz() and __builtin_ctzll() are
documented as undefined for value 0.
The easiest fix would be to use fls() and fls64() functions
defined in include/asm-generic/bitops/builtin-fls.h and
include/asm-generic/bitops/fls64.h, but GCC output is not optimal:
00000388 <testfls>:
388: 2c 03 00 00 cmpwi r3,0
38c: 41 82 00 10 beq 39c <testfls+0x14>
390: 7c 63 00 34 cntlzw r3,r3
394: 20 63 00 20 subfic r3,r3,32
398: 4e 80 00 20 blr
39c: 38 60 00 00 li r3,0
3a0: 4e 80 00 20 blr
000003b0 <testfls64>:
3b0: 2c 03 00 00 cmpwi r3,0
3b4: 40 82 00 1c bne 3d0 <testfls64+0x20>
3b8: 2f 84 00 00 cmpwi cr7,r4,0
3bc: 38 60 00 00 li r3,0
3c0: 4d 9e 00 20 beqlr cr7
3c4: 7c 83 00 34 cntlzw r3,r4
3c8: 20 63 00 20 subfic r3,r3,32
3cc: 4e 80 00 20 blr
3d0: 7c 63 00 34 cntlzw r3,r3
3d4: 20 63 00 40 subfic r3,r3,64
3d8: 4e 80 00 20 blr
When the input of fls(x) is a constant, just check x for nullity and
return either 0 or __builtin_clz(x). Otherwise, use cntlzw instruction
directly.
For fls64() on PPC64, do the same but with __builtin_clzll() and
cntlzd instruction. On PPC32, lets take the generic fls64() which
will use our fls(). The result is as expected:
00000388 <testfls>:
388: 7c 63 00 34 cntlzw r3,r3
38c: 20 63 00 20 subfic r3,r3,32
390: 4e 80 00 20 blr
000003a0 <testfls64>:
3a0: 2c 03 00 00 cmpwi r3,0
3a4: 40 82 00 10 bne 3b4 <testfls64+0x14>
3a8: 7c 83 00 34 cntlzw r3,r4
3ac: 20 63 00 20 subfic r3,r3,32
3b0: 4e 80 00 20 blr
3b4: 7c 63 00 34 cntlzw r3,r3
3b8: 20 63 00 40 subfic r3,r3,64
3bc: 4e 80 00 20 blr
Fixes: 2fcff790dcb4 ("powerpc: Use builtin functions for fls()/__fls()/fls64()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Acked-by: Segher Boessenkool <segher@kernel.crashing.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/348c2d3f19ffcff8abe50d52513f989c4581d000.1603375524.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit d6718941a2767fb383e105d257d2105fe4f15f0e upstream.
It's very easy to crash the kernel right now by simply trying to
enable memtrace concurrently, hammering on the "enable" interface
loop.sh:
#!/bin/bash
dmesg --console-off
while true; do
echo 0x40000000 > /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/memtrace/enable
done
[root@localhost ~]# loop.sh &
[root@localhost ~]# loop.sh &
Resulting quickly in a kernel crash. Let's properly protect using a
mutex.
Fixes: 9d5171a8f248 ("powerpc/powernv: Enable removal of memory for in memory tracing")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org# v4.14+
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201111145322.15793-3-david@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b1198a88230f2ce50c271e22b82a8b8610b2eea9 upstream.
We execute certain NPU2 setup code (such as mapping an LPID to a device
in NPU2) unconditionally if an Nvlink bridge is detected. However this
cannot succeed on POWER8NVL machines and errors appear in dmesg. This is
harmless as skiboot returns an error and the only place we check it is
vfio-pci but that code does not get called on P8+ either.
This adds a check if pnv_npu2_xxx helpers are called on a machine with
NPU2 which initializes pnv_phb::npu in pnv_npu2_init();
pnv_phb::npu==NULL on POWER8/NVL (Naples).
While at this, fix NULL derefencing in pnv_npu_peers_take_ownership/
pnv_npu_peers_release_ownership which occurs when GPUs on mentioned P8s
cause EEH which happens if "vfio-pci" disables devices using
the D3 power state; the vfio-pci's disable_idle_d3 module parameter
controls this and must be set on Naples. The EEH handling clears
the entire pnv_ioda_pe struct in pnv_ioda_free_pe() hence
the NULL derefencing. We cannot recover from that but at least we stop
crashing.
Tested on
- POWER9 pvr=004e1201, Ubuntu 19.04 host, Ubuntu 18.04 vm,
NVIDIA GV100 10de:1db1 driver 418.39
- POWER8 pvr=004c0100, RHEL 7.6 host, Ubuntu 16.10 vm,
NVIDIA P100 10de:15f9 driver 396.47
Fixes: 1b785611e119 ("powerpc/powernv/npu: Add release_ownership hook")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.0
Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201122073828.15446-1-aik@ozlabs.ru
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 1e78f723d6a52966bfe3804209dbf404fdc9d3bb upstream.
When SMC1 is relocated and early debug is selected, the
board hangs is ppc_md.setup_arch(). This is because ones
the microcode has been loaded and SMC1 relocated, early
debug writes in the weed.
To allow smooth continuation, the SMC1 parameter RAM set up
by the bootloader have to be copied into the new location.
Fixes: 43db76f41824 ("powerpc/8xx: Add microcode patch to move SMC parameter RAM.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b2f71f39eca543f1e4ec06596f09a8b12235c701.1607076683.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f10881a46f8914428110d110140a455c66bdf27b upstream.
Commit bd59380c5ba4 ("powerpc/rtas: Restrict RTAS requests from userspace")
introduced the following error when invoking the errinjct userspace
tool:
[root@ltcalpine2-lp5 librtas]# errinjct open
[327884.071171] sys_rtas: RTAS call blocked - exploit attempt?
[327884.071186] sys_rtas: token=0x26, nargs=0 (called by errinjct)
errinjct: Could not open RTAS error injection facility
errinjct: librtas: open: Unexpected I/O error
The entry for ibm,open-errinjct in rtas_filter array has a typo where
the "j" is omitted in the rtas call name. After fixing this typo the
errinjct tool functions again as expected.
[root@ltcalpine2-lp5 linux]# errinjct open
RTAS error injection facility open, token = 1
Fixes: bd59380c5ba4 ("powerpc/rtas: Restrict RTAS requests from userspace")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tyrel Datwyler <tyreld@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201208195434.8289-1-tyreld@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d85be8a49e733dcd23674aa6202870d54bf5600d upstream.
The placeholder for instruction selection should use the second
argument's operand, which is %1, not %0. This could generate incorrect
assembly code if the memory addressing of operand %0 is a different
form from that of operand %1.
Also remove the %Un placeholder because having %Un placeholders
for two operands which are based on the same local var (ptep) doesn't
make much sense. By the way, it doesn't change the current behaviour
because "<>" constraint is missing for the associated "=m".
[chleroy: revised commit log iaw segher's comments and removed %U0]
Fixes: 9bf2b5cdc5fe ("powerpc: Fixes for CONFIG_PTE_64BIT for SMP support")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.28+
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Acked-by: Segher Boessenkool <segher@kernel.crashing.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/96354bd77977a6a933fe9020da57629007fdb920.1603358942.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit aa8e21c053d72b6639ea5a7f1d3a1d0209534c94 upstream.
Perf event attritube supports exclude_kernel flag to avoid
sampling/profiling in supervisor state (kernel). Based on this event
attr flag, Monitor Mode Control Register bit is set to freeze on
supervisor state. But sometimes (due to hardware limitation), Sampled
Instruction Address Register (SIAR) locks on to kernel address even
when freeze on supervisor is set. Patch here adds a check to drop
those samples.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Athira Rajeev <atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1606289215-1433-1-git-send-email-atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 7ceb40027e19567a0a066e3b380cc034cdd9a124 ]
The verification and message introduced by commit 374f3f5979f9
("powerpc/mm/hash: Handle user access of kernel address gracefully")
applies to all platforms, it should not be limited to BOOK3S.
Make the BOOK3S version of sanity_check_fault() the one for all,
and bail out earlier if not BOOK3S.
Fixes: 374f3f5979f9 ("powerpc/mm/hash: Handle user access of kernel address gracefully")
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Reviewed-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/fe199d5af3578d3bf80035d203a94d742a7a28af.1607491748.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit b866459489fe8ef0e92cde3cbd6bbb1af6c4e99b ]
Partitions with cache nodes in the device tree can encounter the
following warning on resume:
CPU 0 already accounted in PowerPC,POWER9@0(Data)
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3177 at arch/powerpc/kernel/cacheinfo.c:197 cacheinfo_cpu_online+0x640/0x820
These calls to cacheinfo_cpu_offline/online have been redundant since
commit e610a466d16a ("powerpc/pseries/mobility: rebuild cacheinfo
hierarchy post-migration").
Fixes: e610a466d16a ("powerpc/pseries/mobility: rebuild cacheinfo hierarchy post-migration")
Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201207215200.1785968-25-nathanl@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 52719fce3f4c7a8ac9eaa191e8d75a697f9fbcbc ]
There are three ways pseries_suspend_begin() can be reached:
1. When "mem" is written to /sys/power/state:
kobj_attr_store()
-> state_store()
-> pm_suspend()
-> suspend_devices_and_enter()
-> pseries_suspend_begin()
This never works because there is no way to supply a valid stream id
using this interface, and H_VASI_STATE is called with a stream id of
zero. So this call path is useless at best.
2. When a stream id is written to /sys/devices/system/power/hibernate.
pseries_suspend_begin() is polled directly from store_hibernate()
until the stream is in the "Suspending" state (i.e. the platform is
ready for the OS to suspend execution):
dev_attr_store()
-> store_hibernate()
-> pseries_suspend_begin()
3. When a stream id is written to /sys/devices/system/power/hibernate
(continued). After #2, pseries_suspend_begin() is called once again
from the pm core:
dev_attr_store()
-> store_hibernate()
-> pm_suspend()
-> suspend_devices_and_enter()
-> pseries_suspend_begin()
This is redundant because the VASI suspend state is already known to
be Suspending.
The begin() callback of platform_suspend_ops is optional, so we can
simply remove that assignment with no loss of function.
Fixes: 32d8ad4e621d ("powerpc/pseries: Partition hibernation support")
Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201207215200.1785968-18-nathanl@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit fe18a35e685c9bdabc8b11b3e19deb85a068b75d ]
Commit 63ce271b5e37 ("powerpc/prom: convert PROM_BUG() to standard
trap") added an EMIT_BUG_ENTRY for the trap after the branch to
start_kernel(). The EMIT_BUG_ENTRY was for the address "0b", however the
trap was not labeled with "0". Hence the address used for bug is in
relative_toc() where the previous "0" label is. Label the trap as "0" so
the correct address is used.
Fixes: 63ce271b5e37 ("powerpc/prom: convert PROM_BUG() to standard trap")
Signed-off-by: Jordan Niethe <jniethe5@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201130004404.30953-1-jniethe5@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit f75e7d73bdf73f07b0701a6d21c111ef5d9021dd ]
On systems without any specific PMU driver support registered, running
'perf record' with —intr-regs will crash ( perf record -I <workload> ).
The relevant portion from crash logs and Call Trace:
Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at address 0x00000068
Faulting instruction address: 0xc00000000013eb18
Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
CPU: 2 PID: 13435 Comm: kill Kdump: loaded Not tainted 4.18.0-193.el8.ppc64le #1
NIP: c00000000013eb18 LR: c000000000139f2c CTR: c000000000393d80
REGS: c0000004a07ab4f0 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (4.18.0-193.el8.ppc64le)
NIP [c00000000013eb18] is_sier_available+0x18/0x30
LR [c000000000139f2c] perf_reg_value+0x6c/0xb0
Call Trace:
[c0000004a07ab770] [c0000004a07ab7c8] 0xc0000004a07ab7c8 (unreliable)
[c0000004a07ab7a0] [c0000000003aa77c] perf_output_sample+0x60c/0xac0
[c0000004a07ab840] [c0000000003ab3f0] perf_event_output_forward+0x70/0xb0
[c0000004a07ab8c0] [c00000000039e208] __perf_event_overflow+0x88/0x1a0
[c0000004a07ab910] [c00000000039e42c] perf_swevent_hrtimer+0x10c/0x1d0
[c0000004a07abc50] [c000000000228b9c] __hrtimer_run_queues+0x17c/0x480
[c0000004a07abcf0] [c00000000022aaf4] hrtimer_interrupt+0x144/0x520
[c0000004a07abdd0] [c00000000002a864] timer_interrupt+0x104/0x2f0
[c0000004a07abe30] [c0000000000091c4] decrementer_common+0x114/0x120
When perf record session is started with "-I" option, capturing registers
on each sample calls is_sier_available() to check for the
SIER (Sample Instruction Event Register) availability in the platform.
This function in core-book3s accesses 'ppmu->flags'. If a platform specific
PMU driver is not registered, ppmu is set to NULL and accessing its
members results in a crash. Fix the crash by returning false in
is_sier_available() if ppmu is not set.
Fixes: 333804dc3b7a ("powerpc/perf: Update perf_regs structure to include SIER")
Reported-by: Sachin Sant <sachinp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Athira Rajeev <atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1606185640-1720-1-git-send-email-atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 78665179e569c7e1fe102fb6c21d0f5b6951f084 ]
On 8xx, we get the following features:
[ 0.000000] cpu_features = 0x0000000000000100
[ 0.000000] possible = 0x0000000000000120
[ 0.000000] always = 0x0000000000000000
This is not correct. As CONFIG_PPC_8xx is mutually exclusive with all
other configurations, the three lines should be equal.
The problem is due to CPU_FTRS_GENERIC_32 which is taken when
CONFIG_BOOK3S_32 is NOT selected. This CPU_FTRS_GENERIC_32 is
pointless because there is no generic configuration supporting
all 32 bits but book3s/32.
Remove this pointless generic features definition to unbreak the
calculation of 'possible' features and 'always' features.
Fixes: 76bc080ef5a3 ("[POWERPC] Make default cputable entries reflect selected CPU family")
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/76a85f30bf981d1aeaae00df99321235494da254.1604426550.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit a7223f5bfcaeade4a86d35263493bcda6c940891 ]
Commit 7053f80d9696 ("powerpc/64: Prevent stack protection in early
boot") introduced a couple of uses of __attribute__((optimize)) with
function scope, to disable the stack protector in some early boot
code.
Unfortunately, and this is documented in the GCC man pages [0],
overriding function attributes for optimization is broken, and is only
supported for debug scenarios, not for production: the problem appears
to be that setting GCC -f flags using this method will cause it to
forget about some or all other optimization settings that have been
applied.
So the only safe way to disable the stack protector is to disable it
for the entire source file.
[0] https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Common-Function-Attributes.html
Fixes: 7053f80d9696 ("powerpc/64: Prevent stack protection in early boot")
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
[mpe: Drop one remaining use of __nostackprotector, reported by snowpatch]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201028080433.26799-1-ardb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 3c0b976bf20d236c57adcefa80f86a0a1d737727 ]
Currently in generic_secondary_smp_init(), cur_cpu_spec->cpu_restore()
is called before a stack has been set up in r1. This was previously fine
as the cpu_restore() functions were implemented in assembly and did not
use a stack. However commit 5a61ef74f269 ("powerpc/64s: Support new
device tree binding for discovering CPU features") used
__restore_cpu_cpufeatures() as the cpu_restore() function for a
device-tree features based cputable entry. This is a C function and
hence uses a stack in r1.
generic_secondary_smp_init() is entered on the secondary cpus via the
primary cpu using the OPAL call opal_start_cpu(). In OPAL, each hardware
thread has its own stack. The OPAL call is ran in the primary's hardware
thread. During the call, a job is scheduled on a secondary cpu that will
start executing at the address of generic_secondary_smp_init(). Hence
the value that will be left in r1 when the secondary cpu enters the
kernel is part of that secondary cpu's individual OPAL stack. This means
that __restore_cpu_cpufeatures() will write to that OPAL stack. This is
not horribly bad as each hardware thread has its own stack and the call
that enters the kernel from OPAL never returns, but it is still wrong
and should be corrected.
Create the temp kernel stack before calling cpu_restore().
As noted by mpe, for a kexec boot, the secondary CPUs are released from
the spin loop at address 0x60 by smp_release_cpus() and then jump to
generic_secondary_smp_init(). The call to smp_release_cpus() is in
setup_arch(), and it comes before the call to emergency_stack_init().
emergency_stack_init() allocates an emergency stack in the PACA for each
CPU. This address in the PACA is what is used to set up the temp kernel
stack in generic_secondary_smp_init(). Move releasing the secondary CPUs
to after the PACAs have been allocated an emergency stack, otherwise the
PACA stack pointer will contain garbage and hence the temp kernel stack
created from it will be broken.
Fixes: 5a61ef74f269 ("powerpc/64s: Support new device tree binding for discovering CPU features")
Signed-off-by: Jordan Niethe <jniethe5@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201014072837.24539-1-jniethe5@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit e02152ba2810f7c88cb54e71cda096268dfa9241 ]
Currently a build with CONFIG_E200=y will fail with:
Error: invalid switch -me200
Error: unrecognized option -me200
Upstream binutils has never supported an -me200 option. Presumably it
was supported at some point by either a fork or Freescale internal
binutils.
We can't support code that we can't even build test, so drop the
addition of -me200 to the build flags, so we can at least build with
CONFIG_E200=y.
Reported-by: Németh Márton <nm127@freemail.hu>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Acked-by: Scott Wood <oss@buserror.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201116120913.165317-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 9ea69a55b3b9a71cded9726af591949c1138f235 upstream.
With virtio multiqueue, normally each queue IRQ is mapped to a CPU.
Commit 0d9f0a52c8b9f ("virtio_scsi: use virtio IRQ affinity") exposed
an existing shortcoming of the arch code by moving virtio_scsi to
the automatic IRQ affinity assignment.
The affinity is correctly computed in msi_desc but this is not applied
to the system IRQs.
It appears the affinity is correctly passed to rtas_setup_msi_irqs() but
lost at this point and never passed to irq_domain_alloc_descs()
(see commit 06ee6d571f0e ("genirq: Add affinity hint to irq allocation"))
because irq_create_mapping() doesn't take an affinity parameter.
Use the new irq_create_mapping_affinity() function, which allows to forward
the affinity setting from rtas_setup_msi_irqs() to irq_domain_alloc_descs().
With this change, the virtqueues are correctly dispatched between the CPUs
on pseries.
Fixes: e75eafb9b039 ("genirq/msi: Switch to new irq spreading infrastructure")
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <lvivier@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201126082852.1178497-3-lvivier@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a1ee28117077c3bf24e5ab6324c835eaab629c45 upstream.
This can be hit by an HPT guest running on an HPT host and bring down
the host, so it's quite important to fix.
Fixes: 7290f3b3d3e6 ("powerpc/64s/powernv: machine check dump SLB contents")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.4+
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Mahesh Salgaonkar <mahesh@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201128070728.825934-2-npiggin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit b6b79dd53082db11070b4368d85dd6699ff0b063 ]
Using DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE needs linux/jump_table.h.
Otherwise the build fails with eg:
arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/kup-radix.h:66:1: warning: data definition has no type or storage class
66 | DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(uaccess_flush_key);
Fixes: 9a32a7e78bd0 ("powerpc/64s: flush L1D after user accesses")
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
[mpe: Massage change log]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201123184016.693fe464@canb.auug.org.au
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit cef397038167ac15d085914493d6c86385773709 ]
Stefan Agner reported a bug when using zsram on 32-bit Arm machines
with RAM above the 4GB address boundary:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000
pgd = a27bd01c
[00000000] *pgd=236a0003, *pmd=1ffa64003
Internal error: Oops: 207 [#1] SMP ARM
Modules linked in: mdio_bcm_unimac(+) brcmfmac cfg80211 brcmutil raspberrypi_hwmon hci_uart crc32_arm_ce bcm2711_thermal phy_generic genet
CPU: 0 PID: 123 Comm: mkfs.ext4 Not tainted 5.9.6 #1
Hardware name: BCM2711
PC is at zs_map_object+0x94/0x338
LR is at zram_bvec_rw.constprop.0+0x330/0xa64
pc : [<c0602b38>] lr : [<c0bda6a0>] psr: 60000013
sp : e376bbe0 ip : 00000000 fp : c1e2921c
r10: 00000002 r9 : c1dda730 r8 : 00000000
r7 : e8ff7a00 r6 : 00000000 r5 : 02f9ffa0 r4 : e3710000
r3 : 000fdffe r2 : c1e0ce80 r1 : ebf979a0 r0 : 00000000
Flags: nZCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment user
Control: 30c5383d Table: 235c2a80 DAC: fffffffd
Process mkfs.ext4 (pid: 123, stack limit = 0x495a22e6)
Stack: (0xe376bbe0 to 0xe376c000)
As it turns out, zsram needs to know the maximum memory size, which
is defined in MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS when CONFIG_SPARSEMEM is set, or in
MAX_POSSIBLE_PHYSMEM_BITS on the x86 architecture.
The same problem will be hit on all 32-bit architectures that have a
physical address space larger than 4GB and happen to not enable sparsemem
and include asm/sparsemem.h from asm/pgtable.h.
After the initial discussion, I suggested just always defining
MAX_POSSIBLE_PHYSMEM_BITS whenever CONFIG_PHYS_ADDR_T_64BIT is
set, or provoking a build error otherwise. This addresses all
configurations that can currently have this runtime bug, but
leaves all other configurations unchanged.
I looked up the possible number of bits in source code and
datasheets, here is what I found:
- on ARC, CONFIG_ARC_HAS_PAE40 controls whether 32 or 40 bits are used
- on ARM, CONFIG_LPAE enables 40 bit addressing, without it we never
support more than 32 bits, even though supersections in theory allow
up to 40 bits as well.
- on MIPS, some MIPS32r1 or later chips support 36 bits, and MIPS32r5
XPA supports up to 60 bits in theory, but 40 bits are more than
anyone will ever ship
- On PowerPC, there are three different implementations of 36 bit
addressing, but 32-bit is used without CONFIG_PTE_64BIT
- On RISC-V, the normal page table format can support 34 bit
addressing. There is no highmem support on RISC-V, so anything
above 2GB is unused, but it might be useful to eventually support
CONFIG_ZRAM for high pages.
Fixes: 61989a80fb3a ("staging: zsmalloc: zsmalloc memory allocation library")
Fixes: 02390b87a945 ("mm/zsmalloc: Prepare to variable MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS")
Acked-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Agner <stefan@agner.ch>
Tested-by: Stefan Agner <stefan@agner.ch>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/bdfa44bf1c570b05d6c70898e2bbb0acf234ecdf.1604762181.git.stefan@agner.ch/
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 29daf869cbab69088fe1755d9dd224e99ba78b56 upstream.
The kernel expects pte_young() to work regardless of CONFIG_SWAP.
Make sure a minor fault is taken to set _PAGE_ACCESSED when it
is not already set, regardless of the selection of CONFIG_SWAP.
This adds at least 3 instructions to the TLB miss exception
handlers fast path. Following patch will reduce this overhead.
Also update the rotation instruction to the correct number of bits
to reflect all changes done to _PAGE_ACCESSED over time.
Fixes: d069cb4373fe ("powerpc/8xx: Don't touch ACCESSED when no SWAP.")
Fixes: 5f356497c384 ("powerpc/8xx: remove unused _PAGE_WRITETHRU")
Fixes: e0a8e0d90a9f ("powerpc/8xx: Handle PAGE_USER via APG bits")
Fixes: 5b2753fc3e8a ("powerpc/8xx: Implementation of PAGE_EXEC")
Fixes: a891c43b97d3 ("powerpc/8xx: Prepare handlers for _PAGE_HUGE for 512k pages.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/af834e8a0f1fa97bfae65664950f0984a70c4750.1602492856.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 89a83a0c69c81a25ce91002b90ca27ed86132a0a upstream.
Add a test modelled on the RFI flush test which counts the number
of L1D misses doing a simple syscall with the entry flush on and off.
For simplicity of backporting, this test duplicates a lot of code from
the upstream rfi_flush. This is cleaned up upstream, but we don't clean
it up here because it would involve bringing in even more commits.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 178d52c6e89c38d0553b0ac8b99927b11eb995b0 upstream.
In kup.h we currently include kup-radix.h for all 64-bit builds, which
includes Book3S and Book3E. The latter doesn't make sense, Book3E
never uses the Radix MMU.
This has worked up until now, but almost by accident, and the recent
uaccess flush changes introduced a build breakage on Book3E because of
the bad structure of the code.
So disentangle things so that we only use kup-radix.h for Book3S. This
requires some more stubs in kup.h.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9a32a7e78bd0cd9a9b6332cbdc345ee5ffd0c5de upstream.
IBM Power9 processors can speculatively operate on data in the L1 cache
before it has been completely validated, via a way-prediction mechanism. It
is not possible for an attacker to determine the contents of impermissible
memory using this method, since these systems implement a combination of
hardware and software security measures to prevent scenarios where
protected data could be leaked.
However these measures don't address the scenario where an attacker induces
the operating system to speculatively execute instructions using data that
the attacker controls. This can be used for example to speculatively bypass
"kernel user access prevention" techniques, as discovered by Anthony
Steinhauser of Google's Safeside Project. This is not an attack by itself,
but there is a possibility it could be used in conjunction with
side-channels or other weaknesses in the privileged code to construct an
attack.
This issue can be mitigated by flushing the L1 cache between privilege
boundaries of concern. This patch flushes the L1 cache after user accesses.
This is part of the fix for CVE-2020-4788.
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f79643787e0a0762d2409b7b8334e83f22d85695 upstream.
[backporting note: we need to mark some exception handlers as out-of-line
because the flushing makes them take too much space -- dja]
IBM Power9 processors can speculatively operate on data in the L1 cache
before it has been completely validated, via a way-prediction mechanism. It
is not possible for an attacker to determine the contents of impermissible
memory using this method, since these systems implement a combination of
hardware and software security measures to prevent scenarios where
protected data could be leaked.
However these measures don't address the scenario where an attacker induces
the operating system to speculatively execute instructions using data that
the attacker controls. This can be used for example to speculatively bypass
"kernel user access prevention" techniques, as discovered by Anthony
Steinhauser of Google's Safeside Project. This is not an attack by itself,
but there is a possibility it could be used in conjunction with
side-channels or other weaknesses in the privileged code to construct an
attack.
This issue can be mitigated by flushing the L1 cache between privilege
boundaries of concern. This patch flushes the L1 cache on kernel entry.
This is part of the fix for CVE-2020-4788.
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 11522448e641e8f1690c9db06e01985e8e19b401 upstream.
The kernel expects pte_young() to work regardless of CONFIG_SWAP.
Make sure a minor fault is taken to set _PAGE_ACCESSED when it
is not already set, regardless of the selection of CONFIG_SWAP.
Fixes: 84de6ab0e904 ("powerpc/603: don't handle PAGE_ACCESSED in TLB miss handlers.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a44367744de54e2315b2f1a8cbbd7f88488072e0.1602342806.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit fd552e0542b4532483289cce48fdbd27b692984b ]
Lockdep complains that a possible deadlock below in
eeh_addr_cache_show() because it is acquiring a lock with IRQ enabled,
but eeh_addr_cache_insert_dev() needs to acquire the same lock with IRQ
disabled. Let's just make eeh_addr_cache_show() acquire the lock with
IRQ disabled as well.
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&pci_io_addr_cache_root.piar_lock);
local_irq_disable();
lock(&tp->lock);
lock(&pci_io_addr_cache_root.piar_lock);
<Interrupt>
lock(&tp->lock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
lock_acquire+0x140/0x5f0
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x64/0xb0
eeh_addr_cache_insert_dev+0x48/0x390
eeh_probe_device+0xb8/0x1a0
pnv_pcibios_bus_add_device+0x3c/0x80
pcibios_bus_add_device+0x118/0x290
pci_bus_add_device+0x28/0xe0
pci_bus_add_devices+0x54/0xb0
pcibios_init+0xc4/0x124
do_one_initcall+0xac/0x528
kernel_init_freeable+0x35c/0x3fc
kernel_init+0x24/0x148
ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x80
lock_acquire+0x140/0x5f0
_raw_spin_lock+0x4c/0x70
eeh_addr_cache_show+0x38/0x110
seq_read+0x1a0/0x660
vfs_read+0xc8/0x1f0
ksys_read+0x74/0x130
system_call_exception+0xf8/0x1d0
system_call_common+0xe8/0x218
Fixes: 5ca85ae6318d ("powerpc/eeh_cache: Add a way to dump the EEH address cache")
Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201028152717.8967-1-cai@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 1da4a0272c5469169f78cd76cf175ff984f52f06 upstream.
__get_user_atomic_128_aligned() stores to kaddr using stvx which is a
VMX store instruction, hence kaddr must be 16 byte aligned otherwise
the store won't occur as expected.
Unfortunately when we call __get_user_atomic_128_aligned() in
p9_hmi_special_emu(), the buffer we pass as kaddr (ie. vbuf) isn't
guaranteed to be 16B aligned. This means that the write to vbuf in
__get_user_atomic_128_aligned() has the bottom bits of the address
truncated. This results in other local variables being
overwritten. Also vbuf will not contain the correct data which results
in the userspace emulation being wrong and hence undetected user data
corruption.
In the past we've been mostly lucky as vbuf has ended up aligned but
this is fragile and isn't always true. CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR in
particular can change the stack arrangement enough that our luck runs
out.
This issue only occurs on POWER9 Nimbus <= DD2.1 bare metal.
The fix is to align vbuf to a 16 byte boundary.
Fixes: 5080332c2c89 ("powerpc/64s: Add workaround for P9 vector CI load issue")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.15+
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201013043741.743413-1-mikey@neuling.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit aea948bb80b478ddc2448f7359d574387521a52d upstream.
Every error log reported by OPAL is exported to userspace through a
sysfs interface and notified using kobject_uevent(). The userspace
daemon (opal_errd) then reads the error log and acknowledges the error
log is saved safely to disk. Once acknowledged the kernel removes the
respective sysfs file entry causing respective resources to be
released including kobject.
However it's possible the userspace daemon may already be scanning
elog entries when a new sysfs elog entry is created by the kernel.
User daemon may read this new entry and ack it even before kernel can
notify userspace about it through kobject_uevent() call. If that
happens then we have a potential race between
elog_ack_store->kobject_put() and kobject_uevent which can lead to
use-after-free of a kernfs object resulting in a kernel crash. eg:
BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access on read at 0x6b6b6b6b6b6b6bfb
Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000008ff2a0
Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA PowerNV
CPU: 27 PID: 805 Comm: irq/29-opal-elo Not tainted 5.9.0-rc2-gcc-8.2.0-00214-g6f56a67bcbb5-dirty #363
...
NIP kobject_uevent_env+0xa0/0x910
LR elog_event+0x1f4/0x2d0
Call Trace:
0x5deadbeef0000122 (unreliable)
elog_event+0x1f4/0x2d0
irq_thread_fn+0x4c/0xc0
irq_thread+0x1c0/0x2b0
kthread+0x1c4/0x1d0
ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x6c
This patch fixes this race by protecting the sysfs file
creation/notification by holding a reference count on kobject until we
safely send kobject_uevent().
The function create_elog_obj() returns the elog object which if used
by caller function will end up in use-after-free problem again.
However, the return value of create_elog_obj() function isn't being
used today and there is no need as well. Hence change it to return
void to make this fix complete.
Fixes: 774fea1a38c6 ("powerpc/powernv: Read OPAL error log and export it through sysfs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.15+
Reported-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mahesh Salgaonkar <mahesh@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Vasant Hegde <hegdevasant@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
[mpe: Rework the logic to use a single return, reword comments, add oops]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201006122051.190176-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 301d2ea6572386245c5d2d2dc85c3b5a737b85ac upstream.
Similar to commit 89c140bbaeee ("pseries: Fix 64 bit logical memory block panic")
make sure different variables tracking lmb_size are updated to be 64 bit.
This was found by code audit.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201007114836.282468-3-aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a02f6d42357acf6e5de6ffc728e6e77faf3ad217 upstream.
It's not done anything for a long time. Save the percpu variable, and
emit a warning to remind users to not expect it to do anything.
This uses pr_warn_once instead of pr_warn_ratelimit as testing
'ppc64_cpu --smt=off' on a 24 core / 4 SMT system showed the warning
to be noisy, as the online/offline loop is slow.
Fixes: 3fa8cad82b94 ("powerpc/pseries/cpuidle: smt-snooze-delay cleanup.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.14
Signed-off-by: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au>
Acked-by: Gautham R. Shenoy <ego@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200902000012.3440389-1-joel@jms.id.au
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit bd59380c5ba4147dcbaad3e582b55ccfd120b764 upstream.
A number of userspace utilities depend on making calls to RTAS to retrieve
information and update various things.
The existing API through which we expose RTAS to userspace exposes more
RTAS functionality than we actually need, through the sys_rtas syscall,
which allows root (or anyone with CAP_SYS_ADMIN) to make any RTAS call they
want with arbitrary arguments.
Many RTAS calls take the address of a buffer as an argument, and it's up to
the caller to specify the physical address of the buffer as an argument. We
allocate a buffer (the "RMO buffer") in the Real Memory Area that RTAS can
access, and then expose the physical address and size of this buffer in
/proc/powerpc/rtas/rmo_buffer. Userspace is expected to read this address,
poke at the buffer using /dev/mem, and pass an address in the RMO buffer to
the RTAS call.
However, there's nothing stopping the caller from specifying whatever
address they want in the RTAS call, and it's easy to construct a series of
RTAS calls that can overwrite arbitrary bytes (even without /dev/mem
access).
Additionally, there are some RTAS calls that do potentially dangerous
things and for which there are no legitimate userspace use cases.
In the past, this would not have been a particularly big deal as it was
assumed that root could modify all system state freely, but with Secure
Boot and lockdown we need to care about this.
We can't fundamentally change the ABI at this point, however we can address
this by implementing a filter that checks RTAS calls against a list
of permitted calls and forces the caller to use addresses within the RMO
buffer.
The list is based off the list of calls that are used by the librtas
userspace library, and has been tested with a number of existing userspace
RTAS utilities. For compatibility with any applications we are not aware of
that require other calls, the filter can be turned off at build time.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200820044512.7543-1-ajd@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ec72024e35dddb88a81e40071c87ceb18b5ee835 upstream.
Similar to commit 89c140bbaeee ("pseries: Fix 64 bit logical memory block panic")
make sure different variables tracking lmb_size are updated to be 64 bit.
This was found by code audit.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201007114836.282468-2-aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 05e6295dc7de859c9d56334805485c4d20bebf25 ]
The current nested KVM code does not support HPT guests. This is
informed/enforced in some ways:
- Hosts < P9 will not be able to enable the nested HV feature;
- The nested hypervisor MMU capabilities will not contain
KVM_CAP_PPC_MMU_HASH_V3;
- QEMU reflects the MMU capabilities in the
'ibm,arch-vec-5-platform-support' device-tree property;
- The nested guest, at 'prom_parse_mmu_model' ignores the
'disable_radix' kernel command line option if HPT is not supported;
- The KVM_PPC_CONFIGURE_V3_MMU ioctl will fail if trying to use HPT.
There is, however, still a way to start a HPT guest by using
max-compat-cpu=power8 at the QEMU machine options. This leads to the
guest being set to use hash after QEMU calls the KVM_PPC_ALLOCATE_HTAB
ioctl.
With the guest set to hash, the nested hypervisor goes through the
entry path that has no knowledge of nesting (kvmppc_run_vcpu) and
crashes when it tries to execute an hypervisor-privileged (mtspr
HDEC) instruction at __kvmppc_vcore_entry:
root@L1:~ $ qemu-system-ppc64 -machine pseries,max-cpu-compat=power8 ...
<snip>
[ 538.543303] CPU: 83 PID: 25185 Comm: CPU 0/KVM Not tainted 5.9.0-rc4 #1
[ 538.543355] NIP: c00800000753f388 LR: c00800000753f368 CTR: c0000000001e5ec0
[ 538.543417] REGS: c0000013e91e33b0 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (5.9.0-rc4)
[ 538.543470] MSR: 8000000002843033 <SF,VEC,VSX,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 22422882 XER: 20040000
[ 538.543546] CFAR: c00800000753f4b0 IRQMASK: 3
GPR00: c0080000075397a0 c0000013e91e3640 c00800000755e600 0000000080000000
GPR04: 0000000000000000 c0000013eab19800 c000001394de0000 00000043a054db72
GPR08: 00000000003b1652 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 c0080000075502e0
GPR12: c0000000001e5ec0 c0000007ffa74200 c0000013eab19800 0000000000000008
GPR16: 0000000000000000 c00000139676c6c0 c000000001d23948 c0000013e91e38b8
GPR20: 0000000000000053 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 0000000000000000
GPR24: 0000000000000001 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 0000000000000001
GPR28: 0000000000000001 0000000000000053 c0000013eab19800 0000000000000001
[ 538.544067] NIP [c00800000753f388] __kvmppc_vcore_entry+0x90/0x104 [kvm_hv]
[ 538.544121] LR [c00800000753f368] __kvmppc_vcore_entry+0x70/0x104 [kvm_hv]
[ 538.544173] Call Trace:
[ 538.544196] [c0000013e91e3640] [c0000013e91e3680] 0xc0000013e91e3680 (unreliable)
[ 538.544260] [c0000013e91e3820] [c0080000075397a0] kvmppc_run_core+0xbc8/0x19d0 [kvm_hv]
[ 538.544325] [c0000013e91e39e0] [c00800000753d99c] kvmppc_vcpu_run_hv+0x404/0xc00 [kvm_hv]
[ 538.544394] [c0000013e91e3ad0] [c0080000072da4fc] kvmppc_vcpu_run+0x34/0x48 [kvm]
[ 538.544472] [c0000013e91e3af0] [c0080000072d61b8] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x310/0x420 [kvm]
[ 538.544539] [c0000013e91e3b80] [c0080000072c7450] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x298/0x778 [kvm]
[ 538.544605] [c0000013e91e3ce0] [c0000000004b8c2c] sys_ioctl+0x1dc/0xc90
[ 538.544662] [c0000013e91e3dc0] [c00000000002f9a4] system_call_exception+0xe4/0x1c0
[ 538.544726] [c0000013e91e3e20] [c00000000000d140] system_call_common+0xf0/0x27c
[ 538.544787] Instruction dump:
[ 538.544821] f86d1098 60000000 60000000 48000099 e8ad0fe8 e8c500a0 e9264140 75290002
[ 538.544886] 7d1602a6 7cec42a6 40820008 7d0807b4 <7d164ba6> 7d083a14 f90d10a0 480104fd
[ 538.544953] ---[ end trace 74423e2b948c2e0c ]---
This patch makes the KVM_PPC_ALLOCATE_HTAB ioctl fail when running in
the nested hypervisor, causing QEMU to abort.
Reported-by: Satheesh Rajendran <sathnaga@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Fabiano Rosas <farosas@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 66acd46080bd9e5ad2be4b0eb1d498d5145d058e ]
powerpc uses IPIs in some situations to switch a kernel thread away
from a lazy tlb mm, which is subject to the TLB flushing race
described in the changelog introducing ARCH_WANT_IRQS_OFF_ACTIVATE_MM.
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200914045219.3736466-3-npiggin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit f6bac19cf65c5be21d14a0c9684c8f560f2096dd ]
When building with W=1 we get the following warning:
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/smp.c: In function ‘pnv_smp_cpu_kill_self’:
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/smp.c:276:16: error: suggest braces around
empty body in an ‘if’ statement [-Werror=empty-body]
276 | cpu, srr1);
| ^
cc1: all warnings being treated as errors
The full context is this block:
if (srr1 && !generic_check_cpu_restart(cpu))
DBG("CPU%d Unexpected exit while offline srr1=%lx!\n",
cpu, srr1);
When building with DEBUG undefined DBG() expands to nothing and GCC emits
the warning due to the lack of braces around an empty statement.
Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200804005410.146094-2-oohall@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 4ff753feab021242144818b9a3ba011238218145 ]
When an UE or memory error exception is encountered the MCE handler
tries to find the pfn using addr_to_pfn() which takes effective
address as an argument, later pfn is used to poison the page where
memory error occurred, recent rework in this area made addr_to_pfn
to run in real mode, which can be fatal as it may try to access
memory outside RMO region.
Have two helper functions to separate things to be done in real mode
and virtual mode without changing any functionality. This also fixes
the following error as the use of addr_to_pfn is now moved to virtual
mode.
Without this change following kernel crash is seen on hitting UE.
[ 485.128036] Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
[ 485.128040] LE SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
[ 485.128047] Modules linked in:
[ 485.128067] CPU: 15 PID: 6536 Comm: insmod Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE 5.7.0 #22
[ 485.128074] NIP: c00000000009b24c LR: c0000000000398d8 CTR: c000000000cd57c0
[ 485.128078] REGS: c000000003f1f970 TRAP: 0300 Tainted: G OE (5.7.0)
[ 485.128082] MSR: 8000000000001003 <SF,ME,RI,LE> CR: 28008284 XER: 00000001
[ 485.128088] CFAR: c00000000009b190 DAR: c0000001fab00000 DSISR: 40000000 IRQMASK: 1
[ 485.128088] GPR00: 0000000000000001 c000000003f1fbf0 c000000001634300 0000b0fa01000000
[ 485.128088] GPR04: d000000002220000 0000000000000000 00000000fab00000 0000000000000022
[ 485.128088] GPR08: c0000001fab00000 0000000000000000 c0000001fab00000 c000000003f1fc14
[ 485.128088] GPR12: 0000000000000008 c000000003ff5880 d000000002100008 0000000000000000
[ 485.128088] GPR16: 000000000000ff20 000000000000fff1 000000000000fff2 d0000000021a1100
[ 485.128088] GPR20: d000000002200000 c00000015c893c50 c000000000d49b28 c00000015c893c50
[ 485.128088] GPR24: d0000000021a0d08 c0000000014e5da8 d0000000021a0818 000000000000000a
[ 485.128088] GPR28: 0000000000000008 000000000000000a c0000000017e2970 000000000000000a
[ 485.128125] NIP [c00000000009b24c] __find_linux_pte+0x11c/0x310
[ 485.128130] LR [c0000000000398d8] addr_to_pfn+0x138/0x170
[ 485.128133] Call Trace:
[ 485.128135] Instruction dump:
[ 485.128138] 3929ffff 7d4a3378 7c883c36 7d2907b4 794a1564 7d294038 794af082 3900ffff
[ 485.128144] 79291f24 790af00e 78e70020 7d095214 <7c69502a> 2fa30000 419e011c 70690040
[ 485.128152] ---[ end trace d34b27e29ae0e340 ]---
Fixes: 9ca766f9891d ("powerpc/64s/pseries: machine check convert to use common event code")
Signed-off-by: Ganesh Goudar <ganeshgr@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200724063946.21378-1-ganeshgr@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 0a43ae3e2beb77e3481d812834d33abe270768ab ]
Every dump reported by OPAL is exported to userspace through a sysfs
interface and notified using kobject_uevent(). The userspace daemon
(opal_errd) then reads the dump and acknowledges that the dump is
saved safely to disk. Once acknowledged the kernel removes the
respective sysfs file entry causing respective resources to be
released including kobject.
However it's possible the userspace daemon may already be scanning
dump entries when a new sysfs dump entry is created by the kernel.
User daemon may read this new entry and ack it even before kernel can
notify userspace about it through kobject_uevent() call. If that
happens then we have a potential race between
dump_ack_store->kobject_put() and kobject_uevent which can lead to
use-after-free of a kernfs object resulting in a kernel crash.
This patch fixes this race by protecting the sysfs file
creation/notification by holding a reference count on kobject until we
safely send kobject_uevent().
The function create_dump_obj() returns the dump object which if used
by caller function will end up in use-after-free problem again.
However, the return value of create_dump_obj() function isn't being
used today and there is no need as well. Hence change it to return
void to make this fix complete.
Fixes: c7e64b9ce04a ("powerpc/powernv Platform dump interface")
Signed-off-by: Vasant Hegde <hegdevasant@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201017164210.264619-1-hegdevasant@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 0f9866f7e85765bbda86666df56c92f377c3bc10 ]
Commit 9e9f60108423f ("powerpc/perf/{hv-gpci, hv-common}: generate
requests with counters annotated") adds a framework for defining
gpci counters.
In this patch, they adds starting_index value as '0xffffffffffffffff'.
which is wrong as starting_index is of size 32 bits.
Because of this, incase we try to run hv-gpci event we get error.
In power9 machine:
command#: perf stat -e hv_gpci/system_tlbie_count_and_time_tlbie_instructions_issued/
-C 0 -I 1000
event syntax error: '..bie_count_and_time_tlbie_instructions_issued/'
\___ value too big for format, maximum is 4294967295
This patch fix this issue and changes starting_index value to '0xffffffff'
After this patch:
command#: perf stat -e hv_gpci/system_tlbie_count_and_time_tlbie_instructions_issued/ -C 0 -I 1000
1.000085786 1,024 hv_gpci/system_tlbie_count_and_time_tlbie_instructions_issued/
2.000287818 1,024 hv_gpci/system_tlbie_count_and_time_tlbie_instructions_issued/
2.439113909 17,408 hv_gpci/system_tlbie_count_and_time_tlbie_instructions_issued/
Fixes: 9e9f60108423 ("powerpc/perf/{hv-gpci, hv-common}: generate requests with counters annotated")
Signed-off-by: Kajol Jain <kjain@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201003074943.338618-1-kjain@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 3b6c3adbb2fa42749c3d38cfc4d4d0b7e096bb7b ]
PMU counter support functions enforces event constraints for group of
events to check if all events in a group can be monitored. Incase of
event codes using PMC5 and PMC6 ( 500fa and 600f4 respectively ), not
all constraints are applicable, say the threshold or sample bits. But
current code includes pmc5 and pmc6 in some group constraints (like
IC_DC Qualifier bits) which is actually not applicable and hence
results in those events not getting counted when scheduled along with
group of other events. Patch fixes this by excluding PMC5/6 from
constraints which are not relevant for it.
Fixes: 7ffd948 ("powerpc/perf: factor out power8 pmu functions")
Signed-off-by: Athira Rajeev <atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1600672204-1610-1-git-send-email-atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
