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commit 66ad2fbcdbeab0edfd40c5d94f32f053b98c2320 upstream.
The newly added integrity_recheck() function has another larger stack
allocation, just like its caller integrity_metadata(). When it gets
inlined, the combination of the two exceeds the warning limit for 32-bit
architectures and possibly risks an overflow when this is called from
a deep call chain through a file system:
drivers/md/dm-integrity.c:1767:13: error: stack frame size (1048) exceeds limit (1024) in 'integrity_metadata' [-Werror,-Wframe-larger-than]
1767 | static void integrity_metadata(struct work_struct *w)
Since the caller at this point is done using its checksum buffer,
just reuse the same buffer in the new function to avoid the double
allocation.
[Mikulas: add "noinline" to integrity_recheck and verity_recheck.
These functions are only called on error, so they shouldn't bloat the
stack frame or code size of the caller.]
Fixes: c88f5e553fe3 ("dm-integrity: recheck the integrity tag after a failure")
Fixes: 9177f3c0dea6 ("dm-verity: recheck the hash after a failure")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 855678ed8534518e2b428bcbcec695de9ba248e8 upstream.
submit_flushes
atomic_set(&mddev->flush_pending, 1);
rdev_for_each_rcu(rdev, mddev)
atomic_inc(&mddev->flush_pending);
bi->bi_end_io = md_end_flush
submit_bio(bi);
/* flush io is done first */
md_end_flush
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&mddev->flush_pending))
percpu_ref_put(&mddev->active_io)
-> active_io is not released
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&mddev->flush_pending))
-> missing release of active_io
For consequence, mddev_suspend() will wait for 'active_io' to be zero
forever.
Fix this problem by releasing 'active_io' in submit_flushes() if
'flush_pending' is decreased to zero.
Fixes: fa2bbff7b0b4 ("md: synchronize flush io with array reconfiguration")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.1+
Reported-by: Blazej Kucman <blazej.kucman@linux.intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240130172524.0000417b@linux.intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240201092559.910982-7-yukuai1@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9177f3c0dea6143d05cac1bbd28668fd0e216d11 upstream.
If a userspace process reads (with O_DIRECT) multiple blocks into the same
buffer, dm-verity reports an error [1].
This commit fixes dm-verity, so that if hash verification fails, the data
is read again into a kernel buffer (where userspace can't modify it) and
the hash is rechecked. If the recheck succeeds, the content of the kernel
buffer is copied into the user buffer; if the recheck fails, an error is
reported.
[1] https://people.redhat.com/~mpatocka/testcases/blk-auth-modify/read2.c
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 50c70240097ce41fe6bce6478b80478281e4d0f7 upstream.
It was said that authenticated encryption could produce invalid tag when
the data that is being encrypted is modified [1]. So, fix this problem by
copying the data into the clone bio first and then encrypt them inside the
clone bio.
This may reduce performance, but it is needed to prevent the user from
corrupting the device by writing data with O_DIRECT and modifying them at
the same time.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240207004723.GA35324@sol.localdomain/T/
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c88f5e553fe38b2ffc4c33d08654e5281b297677 upstream.
If a userspace process reads (with O_DIRECT) multiple blocks into the same
buffer, dm-integrity reports an error [1]. The error is reported in a log
and it may cause RAID leg being kicked out of the array.
This commit fixes dm-integrity, so that if integrity verification fails,
the data is read again into a kernel buffer (where userspace can't modify
it) and the integrity tag is rechecked. If the recheck succeeds, the
content of the kernel buffer is copied into the user buffer; if the
recheck fails, an integrity error is reported.
[1] https://people.redhat.com/~mpatocka/testcases/blk-auth-modify/read2.c
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 42e15d12070b4ff9af2b980f1b65774c2dab0507 upstream.
If a userspace process reads (with O_DIRECT) multiple blocks into the same
buffer, dm-crypt reports an authentication error [1]. The error is
reported in a log and it may cause RAID leg being kicked out of the
array.
This commit fixes dm-crypt, so that if integrity verification fails, the
data is read again into a kernel buffer (where userspace can't modify it)
and the integrity tag is rechecked. If the recheck succeeds, the content
of the kernel buffer is copied into the user buffer; if the recheck fails,
an integrity error is reported.
[1] https://people.redhat.com/~mpatocka/testcases/blk-auth-modify/read2.c
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit bd504bcfec41a503b32054da5472904b404341a4 upstream.
The kvmalloc function fails with a warning if the size is larger than
INT_MAX. The warning was triggered by a syscall testing robot.
In order to avoid the warning, this commit limits the number of targets to
1048576 and the size of the parameter area to 1073741824.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit d6e035aad6c09991da1c667fb83419329a3baed8 ]
commit 5e2cf333b7bd ("md/raid5: Wait for MD_SB_CHANGE_PENDING in raid5d")
introduced a hung bug and will be reverted in next patch, since the issue
that commit is fixing is due to md superblock write is throttled by wbt,
to fix it, we can have superblock write bypass block layer throttle.
Fixes: 5e2cf333b7bd ("md/raid5: Wait for MD_SB_CHANGE_PENDING in raid5d")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.19+
Suggested-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Logan Gunthorpe <logang@deltatee.com>
Reviewed-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231108182216.73611-1-junxiao.bi@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 0a9bab391e336489169b95cb0d4553d921302189 upstream.
Tasklets have an inherent problem with memory corruption. The function
tasklet_action_common calls tasklet_trylock, then it calls the tasklet
callback and then it calls tasklet_unlock. If the tasklet callback frees
the structure that contains the tasklet or if it calls some code that may
free it, tasklet_unlock will write into free memory.
The commits 8e14f610159d and d9a02e016aaf try to fix it for dm-crypt, but
it is not a sufficient fix and the data corruption can still happen [1].
There is no fix for dm-verity and dm-verity will write into free memory
with every tasklet-processed bio.
There will be atomic workqueues implemented in the kernel 6.9 [2]. They
will have better interface and they will not suffer from the memory
corruption problem.
But we need something that stops the memory corruption now and that can be
backported to the stable kernels. So, I'm proposing this commit that
disables tasklets in both dm-crypt and dm-verity. This commit doesn't
remove the tasklet support, because the tasklet code will be reused when
atomic workqueues will be implemented.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/d390d7ee-f142-44d3-822a-87949e14608b@suse.de/T/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240130091300.2968534-1-tj@kernel.org/
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 39d42fa96ba1b ("dm crypt: add flags to optionally bypass kcryptd workqueues")
Fixes: 5721d4e5a9cdb ("dm verity: Add optional "try_verify_in_tasklet" feature")
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit dc1cc22ed58f11d58d8553c5ec5f11cbfc3e3039 ]
Upon assembling the array, both kernel and mdadm allow the devices to have event
counter difference of 1, and still consider them as up-to-date.
However, a device whose event count is behind by 1, may in fact not be up-to-date,
and array resync with such a device may cause data corruption.
To avoid this, consult the superblock of the freshest device about the status
of a device, whose event counter is behind by 1.
Signed-off-by: Alex Lyakas <alex.lyakas@zadara.com>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1702470271-16073-1-git-send-email-alex.lyakas@zadara.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
This reverts commit bed9e27baf52a09b7ba2a3714f1e24e17ced386d.
The original set [1][2] was expected to undo a suboptimal fix in [2], and
replace it with a better fix [1]. However, as reported by Dan Moulding [2]
causes an issue with raid5 with journal device.
Revert [2] for now to close the issue. We will follow up on another issue
reported by Juxiao Bi, as [2] is expected to fix it. We believe this is a
good trade-off, because the latter issue happens less freqently.
In the meanwhile, we will NOT revert [1], as it contains the right logic.
[1] commit d6e035aad6c0 ("md: bypass block throttle for superblock update")
[2] commit bed9e27baf52 ("Revert "md/raid5: Wait for MD_SB_CHANGE_PENDING in raid5d"")
Reported-by: Dan Moulding <dan@danm.net>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-raid/20240123005700.9302-1-dan@danm.net/
Fixes: bed9e27baf52 ("Revert "md/raid5: Wait for MD_SB_CHANGE_PENDING in raid5d"")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.19+
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 7dab24554dedd4e6f408af8eb2d25c89997a6a1f upstream.
Use the type blk_opf_t for read and write operations instead of int. This
patch does not affect the generated code but fixes the following sparse
warning:
drivers/md/raid1.c:1993:60: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 5 (different base types)
expected restricted blk_opf_t [usertype] opf
got int rw
Cc: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Fixes: 3c5e514db58f ("md/raid1: Use the new blk_opf_t type")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.0+
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202401080657.UjFnvQgX-lkp@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240108001223.23835-1-bvanassche@acm.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit fa2bbff7b0b4e211fec5e5686ef96350690597b5 ]
Currently rcu is used to protect iterating rdev from submit_flushes():
submit_flushes remove_and_add_spares
synchronize_rcu
pers->hot_remove_disk()
rcu_read_lock()
rdev_for_each_rcu
if (rdev->raid_disk >= 0)
rdev->radi_disk = -1;
atomic_inc(&rdev->nr_pending)
rcu_read_unlock()
bi = bio_alloc_bioset()
bi->bi_end_io = md_end_flush
bi->private = rdev
submit_bio
// issue io for removed rdev
Fix this problem by grabbing 'acive_io' before iterating rdev, make sure
that remove_and_add_spares() won't concurrent with submit_flushes().
Fixes: a2826aa92e2e ("md: support barrier requests on all personalities.")
Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231129020234.1586910-1-yukuai1@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit bed9e27baf52a09b7ba2a3714f1e24e17ced386d upstream.
This reverts commit 5e2cf333b7bd5d3e62595a44d598a254c697cd74.
That commit introduced the following race and can cause system hung.
md_write_start: raid5d:
// mddev->in_sync == 1
set "MD_SB_CHANGE_PENDING"
// running before md_write_start wakeup it
waiting "MD_SB_CHANGE_PENDING" cleared
>>>>>>>>> hung
wakeup mddev->thread
...
waiting "MD_SB_CHANGE_PENDING" cleared
>>>> hung, raid5d should clear this flag
but get hung by same flag.
The issue reverted commit fixing is fixed by last patch in a new way.
Fixes: 5e2cf333b7bd ("md/raid5: Wait for MD_SB_CHANGE_PENDING in raid5d")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.19+
Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231108182216.73611-2-junxiao.bi@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b86f4b790c998afdbc88fe1aa55cfe89c4068726 upstream.
__bio_for_each_segment assumes that the first struct bio_vec argument
doesn't change - it calls "bio_advance_iter_single((bio), &(iter),
(bvl).bv_len)" to advance the iterator. Unfortunately, the dm-integrity
code changes the bio_vec with "bv.bv_len -= pos". When this code path
is taken, the iterator would be out of sync and dm-integrity would
report errors. This happens if the machine is out of memory and
"kmalloc" fails.
Fix this bug by making a copy of "bv" and changing the copy instead.
Fixes: 7eada909bfd7 ("dm: add integrity target")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.12+
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit d48300120627a1cb98914738fff38b424625b8ad ]
As described in commit 8111964f1b85 ("dm thin: Fix ABBA deadlock between
shrink_slab and dm_pool_abort_metadata"), ABBA deadlocks will be
triggered because shrinker_rwsem currently needs to held by
dm_pool_abort_metadata() as a side-effect of thin-pool metadata
operation failure.
The following three problem scenarios have been noticed:
1) Described by commit 8111964f1b85 ("dm thin: Fix ABBA deadlock between
shrink_slab and dm_pool_abort_metadata")
2) shrinker_rwsem and throttle->lock
P1(drop cache) P2(kworker)
drop_caches_sysctl_handler
drop_slab
shrink_slab
down_read(&shrinker_rwsem) - LOCK A
do_shrink_slab
super_cache_scan
prune_icache_sb
dispose_list
evict
ext4_evict_inode
ext4_clear_inode
ext4_discard_preallocations
ext4_mb_load_buddy_gfp
ext4_mb_init_cache
ext4_wait_block_bitmap
__ext4_error
ext4_handle_error
ext4_commit_super
...
dm_submit_bio
do_worker
throttle_work_update
down_write(&t->lock) -- LOCK B
process_deferred_bios
commit
metadata_operation_failed
dm_pool_abort_metadata
dm_block_manager_create
dm_bufio_client_create
register_shrinker
down_write(&shrinker_rwsem)
-- LOCK A
thin_map
thin_bio_map
thin_defer_bio_with_throttle
throttle_lock
down_read(&t->lock) - LOCK B
3) shrinker_rwsem and wait_on_buffer
P1(drop cache) P2(kworker)
drop_caches_sysctl_handler
drop_slab
shrink_slab
down_read(&shrinker_rwsem) - LOCK A
do_shrink_slab
...
ext4_wait_block_bitmap
__ext4_error
ext4_handle_error
jbd2_journal_abort
jbd2_journal_update_sb_errno
jbd2_write_superblock
submit_bh
// LOCK B
// RELEASE B
do_worker
throttle_work_update
down_write(&t->lock) - LOCK B
process_deferred_bios
process_bio
commit
metadata_operation_failed
dm_pool_abort_metadata
dm_block_manager_create
dm_bufio_client_create
register_shrinker
register_shrinker_prepared
down_write(&shrinker_rwsem) - LOCK A
bio_endio
wait_on_buffer
__wait_on_buffer
Fix these by resetting dm_bufio_client without holding shrinker_rwsem.
Fixes: 8111964f1b85 ("dm thin: Fix ABBA deadlock between shrink_slab and dm_pool_abort_metadata")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Li Lingfeng <lilingfeng3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 3eba5e0b2422aec3c9e79822029599961fdcab97 ]
In run_cache_set() after c->root returned from bch_btree_node_get(), it
is checked by IS_ERR_OR_NULL(). Indeed it is unncessary to check NULL
because bch_btree_node_get() will not return NULL pointer to caller.
This patch replaces IS_ERR_OR_NULL() by IS_ERR() for the above reason.
Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231120052503.6122-11-colyli@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 31f5b956a197d4ec25c8a07cb3a2ab69d0c0b82f ]
This patch adds code comments to bch_btree_node_get() and
__bch_btree_node_alloc() that NULL pointer will not be returned and it
is unnecessary to check NULL pointer by the callers of these routines.
Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231120052503.6122-10-colyli@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit be93825f0e6428c2d3f03a6e4d447dc48d33d7ff ]
Variable cur_idx is being initialized with a value that is never read,
it is being re-assigned later in a while-loop. Remove the redundant
assignment. Cleans up clang scan build warning:
drivers/md/bcache/writeback.c:916:2: warning: Value stored to 'cur_idx'
is never read [deadcode.DeadStores]
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.i.king@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231120052503.6122-4-colyli@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit baf8fb7e0e5ec54ea0839f0c534f2cdcd79bea9c ]
Arraies bcache->stripe_sectors_dirty and bcache->full_dirty_stripes are
used for dirty data writeback, their sizes are decided by backing device
capacity and stripe size. Larger backing device capacity or smaller
stripe size make these two arraies occupies more dynamic memory space.
Currently bcache->stripe_size is directly inherited from
queue->limits.io_opt of underlying storage device. For normal hard
drives, its limits.io_opt is 0, and bcache sets the corresponding
stripe_size to 1TB (1<<31 sectors), it works fine 10+ years. But for
devices do declare value for queue->limits.io_opt, small stripe_size
(comparing to 1TB) becomes an issue for oversize memory allocations of
bcache->stripe_sectors_dirty and bcache->full_dirty_stripes, while the
capacity of hard drives gets much larger in recent decade.
For example a raid5 array assembled by three 20TB hardrives, the raid
device capacity is 40TB with typical 512KB limits.io_opt. After the math
calculation in bcache code, these two arraies will occupy 400MB dynamic
memory. Even worse Andrea Tomassetti reports that a 4KB limits.io_opt is
declared on a new 2TB hard drive, then these two arraies request 2GB and
512MB dynamic memory from kzalloc(). The result is that bcache device
always fails to initialize on his system.
To avoid the oversize memory allocation, bcache->stripe_size should not
directly inherited by queue->limits.io_opt from the underlying device.
This patch defines BCH_MIN_STRIPE_SZ (4MB) as minimal bcache stripe size
and set bcache device's stripe size against the declared limits.io_opt
value from the underlying storage device,
- If the declared limits.io_opt > BCH_MIN_STRIPE_SZ, bcache device will
set its stripe size directly by this limits.io_opt value.
- If the declared limits.io_opt < BCH_MIN_STRIPE_SZ, bcache device will
set its stripe size by a value multiplying limits.io_opt and euqal or
large than BCH_MIN_STRIPE_SZ.
Then the minimal stripe size of a bcache device will always be >= 4MB.
For a 40TB raid5 device with 512KB limits.io_opt, memory occupied by
bcache->stripe_sectors_dirty and bcache->full_dirty_stripes will be 50MB
in total. For a 2TB hard drive with 4KB limits.io_opt, memory occupied
by these two arraies will be 2.5MB in total.
Such mount of memory allocated for bcache->stripe_sectors_dirty and
bcache->full_dirty_stripes is reasonable for most of storage devices.
Reported-by: Andrea Tomassetti <andrea.tomassetti-opensource@devo.com>
Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Eric Wheeler <bcache@lists.ewheeler.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231120052503.6122-2-colyli@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit c467e97f079f0019870c314996fae952cc768e82 upstream.
During a reshape or a RAID6 array such as expanding by adding an additional
disk, I/Os to the region of the array which have not yet been reshaped can
stall indefinitely. This is from errors in the stripe_ahead_of_reshape
function causing md to think the I/O is to a region in the actively
undergoing the reshape.
stripe_ahead_of_reshape fails to account for the q disk having a sector
value of 0. By not excluding the q disk from the for loop, raid6 will always
generate a min_sector value of 0, causing a return value which stalls.
The function's max_sector calculation also uses min() when it should use
max(), causing the max_sector value to always be 0. During a backwards
rebuild this can cause the opposite problem where it allows I/O to advance
when it should wait.
Fixing these errors will allow safe I/O to advance in a timely manner and
delay only I/O which is unsafe due to stripes in the middle of undergoing
the reshape.
Fixes: 486f60558607 ("md/raid5: Check all disks in a stripe_head for reshape progress")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.0+
Signed-off-by: David Jeffery <djeffery@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Laurence Oberman <loberman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231128181233.6187-1-djeffery@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit c9f7cb5b2bc968adcdc686c197ed108f47fd8eb0 ]
If md_set_readonly() failed, the array could still be read-write, however
'MD_RECOVERY_FROZEN' could still be set, which leave the array in an
abnormal state that sync or recovery can't continue anymore.
Hence make sure the flag is cleared after md_set_readonly() returns.
Fixes: 88724bfa68be ("md: wait for pending superblock updates before switching to read-only")
Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Xiao Ni <xni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231205094215.1824240-3-yukuai1@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit f97a5528b21eb175d90dce2df9960c8d08e1be82 ]
Introduce md_ro_state for mddev->ro, so it is easy to understand.
Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: c9f7cb5b2bc9 ("md: don't leave 'MD_RECOVERY_FROZEN' in error path of md_set_readonly()")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 0193e3966ceeeef69e235975918b287ab093082b upstream.
We found an issue under Android OTA scenario that many BIOs have to do
FEC where the data under dm-verity is 100% complete and no corruption.
Android OTA has many dm-block layers, from upper to lower:
dm-verity
dm-snapshot
dm-origin & dm-cow
dm-linear
ufs
DM tables have to change 2 times during Android OTA merging process.
When doing table change, the dm-snapshot will be suspended for a while.
During this interval, many readahead IOs are submitted to dm_verity
from filesystem. Then the kverity works are busy doing FEC process
which cost too much time to finish dm-verity IO. This causes needless
delay which feels like system is hung.
After adding debugging it was found that each readahead IO needed
around 10s to finish when this situation occurred. This is due to IO
amplification:
dm-snapshot suspend
erofs_readahead // 300+ io is submitted
dm_submit_bio (dm_verity)
dm_submit_bio (dm_snapshot)
bio return EIO
bio got nothing, it's empty
verity_end_io
verity_verify_io
forloop range(0, io->n_blocks) // each io->nblocks ~= 20
verity_fec_decode
fec_decode_rsb
fec_read_bufs
forloop range(0, v->fec->rsn) // v->fec->rsn = 253
new_read
submit_bio (dm_snapshot)
end loop
end loop
dm-snapshot resume
Readahead BIOs get nothing while dm-snapshot is suspended, so all of
them will cause verity's FEC.
Each readahead BIO needs to verify ~20 (io->nblocks) blocks.
Each block needs to do FEC, and every block needs to do 253
(v->fec->rsn) reads.
So during the suspend interval(~200ms), 300 readahead BIOs trigger
~1518000 (300*20*253) IOs to dm-snapshot.
As readahead IO is not required by userspace, and to fix this issue,
it is best to pass readahead errors to upper layer to handle it.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: a739ff3f543a ("dm verity: add support for forward error correction")
Signed-off-by: Wu Bo <bo.wu@vivo.com>
Reviewed-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 38bc1ab135db87577695816b190e7d6d8ec75879 upstream.
dm_verity_fec_io is placed after the end of two hash digests. If the hash
digest has unaligned length, struct dm_verity_fec_io could be unaligned.
This commit fixes the placement of struct dm_verity_fec_io, so that it's
aligned.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: a739ff3f543a ("dm verity: add support for forward error correction")
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 7cc47e64d3d69786a2711a4767e26b26ba63d7ed upstream.
We found that after long run, the dirty_data of the bcache device
will have errors. This error cannot be eliminated unless re-register.
We also found that reattach after detach, this error can accumulate.
In bch_sectors_dirty_init(), all inode <= d->id keys will be recounted
again. This is wrong, we only need to count the keys of the current
device.
Fixes: b144e45fc576 ("bcache: make bch_sectors_dirty_init() to be multithreaded")
Signed-off-by: Mingzhe Zou <mingzhe.zou@easystack.cn>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231120052503.6122-6-colyli@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2c7f497ac274a14330208b18f6f734000868ebf9 upstream.
In SHOW(), the variable 'n' is of type 'size_t.' While there is a
conditional check to verify that 'n' is not equal to zero before
executing the 'do_div' macro, concerns arise regarding potential
division by zero error in 64-bit environments.
The concern arises when 'n' is 64 bits in size, greater than zero, and
the lower 32 bits of it are zeros. In such cases, the conditional check
passes because 'n' is non-zero, but the 'do_div' macro casts 'n' to
'uint32_t,' effectively truncating it to its lower 32 bits.
Consequently, the 'n' value becomes zero.
To fix this potential division by zero error and ensure precise
division handling, this commit replaces the 'do_div' macro with
div64_u64(). div64_u64() is designed to work with 64-bit operands,
guaranteeing that division is performed correctly.
This change enhances the robustness of the code, ensuring that division
operations yield accurate results in all scenarios, eliminating the
possibility of division by zero, and improving compatibility across
different 64-bit environments.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.
Signed-off-by: Rand Deeb <rand.sec96@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231120052503.6122-5-colyli@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 777967e7e9f6f5f3e153abffb562bffaf4430d26 upstream.
In btree_gc_rewrite_node(), pointer 'n' is not checked after it returns
from btree_gc_rewrite_node(). There is potential possibility that 'n' is
a non NULL ERR_PTR(), referencing such error code is not permitted in
following code. Therefore a return value checking is necessary after 'n'
is back from btree_node_alloc_replacement().
Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231120052503.6122-3-colyli@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 6fc45b6ed921dc00dfb264dc08c7d67ee63d2656 ]
In delay_presuspend, we set the atomic variable may_delay and then stop
the timer and flush pending bios. The intention here is to prevent the
delay target from re-arming the timer again.
However, this test is racy. Suppose that one thread goes to delay_bio,
sees that dc->may_delay is one and proceeds; now, another thread executes
delay_presuspend, it sets dc->may_delay to zero, deletes the timer and
flushes pending bios. Then, the first thread continues and adds the bio to
delayed->list despite the fact that dc->may_delay is false.
Fix this bug by changing may_delay's type from atomic_t to bool and
only access it while holding the delayed_bios_lock mutex. Note that we
don't have to grab the mutex in delay_resume because there are no bios
in flight at this point.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 2faac25d7958c4761bb8cec54adb79f806783ad6 upstream.
We get a kernel crash about "unable to handle kernel paging request":
```dmesg
[368033.032005] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffffffad9ae4b5
[368033.032007] PGD fc3a0d067 P4D fc3a0d067 PUD fc3a0e063 PMD 8000000fc38000e1
[368033.032012] Oops: 0003 [#1] SMP PTI
[368033.032015] CPU: 23 PID: 55090 Comm: bch_dirtcnt[0] Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE --------- - - 4.18.0-147.5.1.es8_24.x86_64 #1
[368033.032017] Hardware name: Tsinghua Tongfang THTF Chaoqiang Server/072T6D, BIOS 2.4.3 01/17/2017
[368033.032027] RIP: 0010:native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x183/0x1d0
[368033.032029] Code: 8b 02 48 85 c0 74 f6 48 89 c1 eb d0 c1 e9 12 83 e0
03 83 e9 01 48 c1 e0 05 48 63 c9 48 05 c0 3d 02 00 48 03 04 cd 60 68 93
ad <48> 89 10 8b 42 08 85 c0 75 09 f3 90 8b 42 08 85 c0 74 f7 48 8b 02
[368033.032031] RSP: 0018:ffffbb48852abe00 EFLAGS: 00010082
[368033.032032] RAX: ffffffffad9ae4b5 RBX: 0000000000000246 RCX: 0000000000003bf3
[368033.032033] RDX: ffff97b0ff8e3dc0 RSI: 0000000000600000 RDI: ffffbb4884743c68
[368033.032034] RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000007ffffffffff
[368033.032035] R10: ffffbb486bb01000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffffffc068da70
[368033.032036] R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[368033.032038] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff97b0ff8c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[368033.032039] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[368033.032040] CR2: ffffffffad9ae4b5 CR3: 0000000fc3a0a002 CR4: 00000000003626e0
[368033.032042] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[368033.032043] bcache: bch_cached_dev_attach() Caching rbd479 as bcache462 on set 8cff3c36-4a76-4242-afaa-7630206bc70b
[368033.032045] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[368033.032046] Call Trace:
[368033.032054] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x32/0x40
[368033.032061] __wake_up_common_lock+0x63/0xc0
[368033.032073] ? bch_ptr_invalid+0x10/0x10 [bcache]
[368033.033502] bch_dirty_init_thread+0x14c/0x160 [bcache]
[368033.033511] ? read_dirty_submit+0x60/0x60 [bcache]
[368033.033516] kthread+0x112/0x130
[368033.033520] ? kthread_flush_work_fn+0x10/0x10
[368033.034505] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
```
The crash occurred when call wake_up(&state->wait), and then we want
to look at the value in the state. However, bch_sectors_dirty_init()
is not found in the stack of any task. Since state is allocated on
the stack, we guess that bch_sectors_dirty_init() has exited, causing
bch_dirty_init_thread() to be unable to handle kernel paging request.
In order to verify this idea, we added some printing information during
wake_up(&state->wait). We find that "wake up" is printed twice, however
we only expect the last thread to wake up once.
```dmesg
[ 994.641004] alcache: bch_dirty_init_thread() wake up
[ 994.641018] alcache: bch_dirty_init_thread() wake up
[ 994.641523] alcache: bch_sectors_dirty_init() init exit
```
There is a race. If bch_sectors_dirty_init() exits after the first wake
up, the second wake up will trigger this bug("unable to handle kernel
paging request").
Proceed as follows:
bch_sectors_dirty_init
kthread_run ==============> bch_dirty_init_thread(bch_dirtcnt[0])
... ...
atomic_inc(&state.started) ...
... ...
atomic_read(&state.enough) ...
... atomic_set(&state->enough, 1)
kthread_run ======================================================> bch_dirty_init_thread(bch_dirtcnt[1])
... atomic_dec_and_test(&state->started) ...
atomic_inc(&state.started) ... ...
... wake_up(&state->wait) ...
atomic_read(&state.enough) atomic_dec_and_test(&state->started)
... ...
wait_event(state.wait, atomic_read(&state.started) == 0) ...
return ...
wake_up(&state->wait)
We believe it is very common to wake up twice if there is no dirty, but
crash is an extremely low probability event. It's hard for us to reproduce
this issue. We attached and detached continuously for a week, with a total
of more than one million attaches and only one crash.
Putting atomic_inc(&state.started) before kthread_run() can avoid waking
up twice.
Fixes: b144e45fc576 ("bcache: make bch_sectors_dirty_init() to be multithreaded")
Signed-off-by: Mingzhe Zou <mingzhe.zou@easystack.cn>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231120052503.6122-8-colyli@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 45b478951b2ba5aea70b2850c49c1aa83aedd0d2 upstream.
md_end_clone_io() may overwrite error status in orig_bio->bi_status with
BLK_STS_OK. This could happen when orig_bio has BIO_CHAIN (split by
md_submit_bio => bio_split_to_limits, for example). As a result, upper
layer may miss error reported from md (or the device) and consider the
failed IO was successful.
Fix this by only update orig_bio->bi_status when current bio reports
error and orig_bio is BLK_STS_OK. This is the same behavior as
__bio_chain_endio().
Fixes: 10764815ff47 ("md: add io accounting for raid0 and raid5")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.14+
Reported-by: Bhanu Victor DiCara <00bvd0+linux@gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/regressions/5727380.DvuYhMxLoT@bvd0/
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Xiao Ni <xni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Guoqing Jiang <guoqing.jiang@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f72f4312d4388376fc8a1f6cf37cb21a0d41758b upstream.
Commit 028ddcac477b ("bcache: Remove unnecessary NULL point check in
node allocations") do the following change inside btree_gc_coalesce(),
31 @@ -1340,7 +1340,7 @@ static int btree_gc_coalesce(
32 memset(new_nodes, 0, sizeof(new_nodes));
33 closure_init_stack(&cl);
34
35 - while (nodes < GC_MERGE_NODES && !IS_ERR_OR_NULL(r[nodes].b))
36 + while (nodes < GC_MERGE_NODES && !IS_ERR(r[nodes].b))
37 keys += r[nodes++].keys;
38
39 blocks = btree_default_blocks(b->c) * 2 / 3;
At line 35 the original r[nodes].b is not always allocatored from
__bch_btree_node_alloc(), and possibly initialized as NULL pointer by
caller of btree_gc_coalesce(). Therefore the change at line 36 is not
correct.
This patch replaces the mistaken IS_ERR() by IS_ERR_OR_NULL() to avoid
potential issue.
Fixes: 028ddcac477b ("bcache: Remove unnecessary NULL point check in node allocations")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 6.5+
Cc: Zheng Wang <zyytlz.wz@163.com>
Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231120052503.6122-9-colyli@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 28f07f2ab4b3a2714f1fefcc58ada4bcc195f806 upstream.
The commit 5721d4e5a9cd enhanced dm-verity, so that it can verify blocks
from tasklets rather than from workqueues. This reportedly improves
performance significantly.
However, dm-verity was using the flag CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP from
tasklets which resulted in warnings about sleeping function being called
from non-sleeping context.
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at crypto/internal.h:206
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 14, name: ksoftirqd/0
preempt_count: 100, expected: 0
RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0
CPU: 0 PID: 14 Comm: ksoftirqd/0 Tainted: G W 6.7.0-rc1 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x32/0x50
__might_resched+0x110/0x160
crypto_hash_walk_done+0x54/0xb0
shash_ahash_update+0x51/0x60
verity_hash_update.isra.0+0x4a/0x130 [dm_verity]
verity_verify_io+0x165/0x550 [dm_verity]
? free_unref_page+0xdf/0x170
? psi_group_change+0x113/0x390
verity_tasklet+0xd/0x70 [dm_verity]
tasklet_action_common.isra.0+0xb3/0xc0
__do_softirq+0xaf/0x1ec
? smpboot_thread_fn+0x1d/0x200
? sort_range+0x20/0x20
run_ksoftirqd+0x15/0x30
smpboot_thread_fn+0xed/0x200
kthread+0xdc/0x110
? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
ret_from_fork+0x28/0x40
? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
</TASK>
This commit fixes dm-verity so that it doesn't use the flags
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP and CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG from tasklets. The
crypto API would do GFP_ATOMIC allocation instead, it could return -ENOMEM
and we catch -ENOMEM in verity_tasklet and requeue the request to the
workqueue.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.0+
Fixes: 5721d4e5a9cd ("dm verity: Add optional "try_verify_in_tasklet" feature")
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9850ccd5dd88075b2b7fd28d96299d5535f58cc5 upstream.
Commit 4dba12881f88 ("dm zoned: support arbitrary number of devices")
made the pointers to additional zoned devices to be stored in a
dynamically allocated dmz->ddev array. However, this array is not freed.
Rename dmz_put_zoned_device to dmz_put_zoned_devices and fix it to
free the dmz->ddev array when cleaning up zoned device information.
Remove NULL assignment for all dmz->ddev elements and just free the
dmz->ddev array instead.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org).
Fixes: 4dba12881f88 ("dm zoned: support arbitrary number of devices")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin@ispras.ru>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2fd7b0f6d5ad655b1d947d3acdd82f687c31465e upstream.
When raid5_get_active_stripe is called with a ctx containing a stripe_head in
its batch_last pointer, it can cause a deadlock if the task sleeps waiting on
another stripe_head to become available. The stripe_head held by batch_last
can be blocking the advancement of other stripe_heads, leading to no
stripe_heads being released so raid5_get_active_stripe waits forever.
Like with the quiesce state handling earlier in the function, batch_last
needs to be released by raid5_get_active_stripe before it waits for another
stripe_head.
Fixes: 3312e6c887fe ("md/raid5: Keep a reference to last stripe_head for batch")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.0+
Signed-off-by: David Jeffery <djeffery@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Logan Gunthorpe <logang@deltatee.com>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231002183422.13047-1-djeffery@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit f6007dce0cd35d634d9be91ef3515a6385dcee16 ]
There's a race condition in the multipath target when retrieve_deps
races with multipath_message calling dm_get_device and dm_put_device.
retrieve_deps walks the list of open devices without holding any lock
but multipath may add or remove devices to the list while it is
running. The end result may be memory corruption or use-after-free
memory access.
See this description of a UAF with multipath_message():
https://listman.redhat.com/archives/dm-devel/2022-October/052373.html
Fix this bug by introducing a new rw semaphore "devices_lock". We grab
devices_lock for read in retrieve_deps and we grab it for write in
dm_get_device and dm_put_device.
Reported-by: Luo Meng <luomeng12@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Tested-by: Li Lingfeng <lilingfeng3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit a9ce385344f916cd1c36a33905e564f5581beae9 upstream.
dm looks up the table for IO based on the request type, with an
assumption that if the request is marked REQ_NOWAIT, it's fine to
attempt to submit that IO while under RCU read lock protection. This
is not OK, as REQ_NOWAIT just means that we should not be sleeping
waiting on other IO, it does not mean that we can't potentially
schedule.
A simple test case demonstrates this quite nicely:
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
struct iovec iov;
int fd;
fd = open("/dev/dm-0", O_RDONLY | O_DIRECT);
posix_memalign(&iov.iov_base, 4096, 4096);
iov.iov_len = 4096;
preadv2(fd, &iov, 1, 0, RWF_NOWAIT);
return 0;
}
which will instantly spew:
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at include/linux/sched/mm.h:306
in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 5580, name: dm-nowait
preempt_count: 0, expected: 0
RCU nest depth: 1, expected: 0
INFO: lockdep is turned off.
CPU: 7 PID: 5580 Comm: dm-nowait Not tainted 6.6.0-rc1-g39956d2dcd81 #132
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x11d/0x1b0
__might_resched+0x3c3/0x5e0
? preempt_count_sub+0x150/0x150
mempool_alloc+0x1e2/0x390
? mempool_resize+0x7d0/0x7d0
? lock_sync+0x190/0x190
? lock_release+0x4b7/0x670
? internal_get_user_pages_fast+0x868/0x2d40
bio_alloc_bioset+0x417/0x8c0
? bvec_alloc+0x200/0x200
? internal_get_user_pages_fast+0xb8c/0x2d40
bio_alloc_clone+0x53/0x100
dm_submit_bio+0x27f/0x1a20
? lock_release+0x4b7/0x670
? blk_try_enter_queue+0x1a0/0x4d0
? dm_dax_direct_access+0x260/0x260
? rcu_is_watching+0x12/0xb0
? blk_try_enter_queue+0x1cc/0x4d0
__submit_bio+0x239/0x310
? __bio_queue_enter+0x700/0x700
? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0x40/0x60
? ktime_get+0x285/0x470
submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x4d9/0xb80
? should_fail_request+0x80/0x80
? preempt_count_sub+0x150/0x150
? lock_release+0x4b7/0x670
? __bio_add_page+0x143/0x2d0
? iov_iter_revert+0x27/0x360
submit_bio_noacct+0x53e/0x1b30
submit_bio_wait+0x10a/0x230
? submit_bio_wait_endio+0x40/0x40
__blkdev_direct_IO_simple+0x4f8/0x780
? blkdev_bio_end_io+0x4c0/0x4c0
? stack_trace_save+0x90/0xc0
? __bio_clone+0x3c0/0x3c0
? lock_release+0x4b7/0x670
? lock_sync+0x190/0x190
? atime_needs_update+0x3bf/0x7e0
? timestamp_truncate+0x21b/0x2d0
? inode_owner_or_capable+0x240/0x240
blkdev_direct_IO.part.0+0x84a/0x1810
? rcu_is_watching+0x12/0xb0
? lock_release+0x4b7/0x670
? blkdev_read_iter+0x40d/0x530
? reacquire_held_locks+0x4e0/0x4e0
? __blkdev_direct_IO_simple+0x780/0x780
? rcu_is_watching+0x12/0xb0
? __mark_inode_dirty+0x297/0xd50
? preempt_count_add+0x72/0x140
blkdev_read_iter+0x2a4/0x530
do_iter_readv_writev+0x2f2/0x3c0
? generic_copy_file_range+0x1d0/0x1d0
? fsnotify_perm.part.0+0x25d/0x630
? security_file_permission+0xd8/0x100
do_iter_read+0x31b/0x880
? import_iovec+0x10b/0x140
vfs_readv+0x12d/0x1a0
? vfs_iter_read+0xb0/0xb0
? rcu_is_watching+0x12/0xb0
? rcu_is_watching+0x12/0xb0
? lock_release+0x4b7/0x670
do_preadv+0x1b3/0x260
? do_readv+0x370/0x370
__x64_sys_preadv2+0xef/0x150
do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x7f5af41ad806
Code: 41 54 41 89 fc 55 44 89 c5 53 48 89 cb 48 83 ec 18 80 3d e4 dd 0d 00 00 74 7a 45 89 c1 49 89 ca 45 31 c0 b8 47 01 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 0f 87 be 00 00 00 48 85 c0 79 4a 48 8b 0d da 55
RSP: 002b:00007ffd3145c7f0 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000147
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f5af41ad806
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00007ffd3145c850 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000000000008 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000008
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000003
R13: 00007ffd3145c850 R14: 000055f5f0431dd8 R15: 0000000000000001
</TASK>
where in fact it is dm itself that attempts to allocate a bio clone with
GFP_NOIO under the rcu read lock, regardless of the request type.
Fix this by getting rid of the special casing for REQ_NOWAIT, and just
use the normal SRCU protected table lookup. Get rid of the bio based
table locking helpers at the same time, as they are now unused.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 563a225c9fd2 ("dm: introduce dm_{get,put}_live_table_bio called from dm_submit_bio")
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c8870379a21fbd9ad14ca36204ccfbe9d25def43 upstream.
If there are multiple arrays in system and one mddevice is marked
with MD_DELETED and md_seq_next() is called in the middle of removal
then it _get()s proper device but it may _put() deleted one. As a result,
active counter may never be zeroed for mddevice and it cannot
be removed.
Put the device which has been _get with previous md_seq_next() call.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 12a6caf27324 ("md: only delete entries from all_mddevs when the disk is freed")
Reported-by: AceLan Kao <acelan@gmail.com>
Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=217798
Cc: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mariusz Tkaczyk <mariusz.tkaczyk@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230914152416.10819-1-mariusz.tkaczyk@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit df203da47f4428bc286fc99318936416253a321c ]
There is a compile error when this commit is added:
md: raid1: fix potential OOB in raid1_remove_disk()
drivers/md/raid1.c: In function 'raid1_remove_disk':
drivers/md/raid1.c:1844:9: error: ISO C90 forbids mixed declarations
and code [-Werror=declaration-after-statement]
1844 | struct raid1_info *p = conf->mirrors + number;
| ^~~~~~
That's because the new code was inserted before the struct.
The change is move the struct command above this commit.
Fixes: 8b0472b50bcf ("md: raid1: fix potential OOB in raid1_remove_disk()")
Signed-off-by: Nigel Croxon <ncroxon@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/46d929d0-2aab-4cf2-b2bf-338963e8ba5a@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 8b0472b50bcf0f19a5119b00a53b63579c8e1e4d ]
If rddev->raid_disk is greater than mddev->raid_disks, there will be
an out-of-bounds in raid1_remove_disk(). We have already found
similar reports as follows:
1) commit d17f744e883b ("md-raid10: fix KASAN warning")
2) commit 1ebc2cec0b7d ("dm raid: fix KASAN warning in raid5_remove_disk")
Fix this bug by checking whether the "number" variable is
valid.
Signed-off-by: Zhang Shurong <zhang_shurong@foxmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/tencent_0D24426FAC6A21B69AC0C03CE4143A508F09@qq.com
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 433279beba1d4872da10b7b60a539e0cb828b32b upstream.
Commit 3e453522593d ("md: Free resources in __md_stop") tried to fix
null-ptr-deference for 'active_io' by moving percpu_ref_exit() to
__md_stop(), however, the commit also moving 'writes_pending' to
__md_stop(), and this will cause mdadm tests broken:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000038
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
CPU: 15 PID: 17830 Comm: mdadm Not tainted 6.3.0-rc3-next-20230324-00009-g520d37
RIP: 0010:free_percpu+0x465/0x670
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__percpu_ref_exit+0x48/0x70
percpu_ref_exit+0x1a/0x90
__md_stop+0xe9/0x170
do_md_stop+0x1e1/0x7b0
md_ioctl+0x90c/0x1aa0
blkdev_ioctl+0x19b/0x400
vfs_ioctl+0x20/0x50
__x64_sys_ioctl+0xba/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0x6c/0xe0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
And the problem can be reporduced 100% by following test:
mdadm -CR /dev/md0 -l1 -n1 /dev/sda --force
echo inactive > /sys/block/md0/md/array_state
echo read-auto > /sys/block/md0/md/array_state
echo inactive > /sys/block/md0/md/array_state
Root cause:
// start raid
raid1_run
mddev_init_writes_pending
percpu_ref_init
// inactive raid
array_state_store
do_md_stop
__md_stop
percpu_ref_exit
// start raid again
array_state_store
do_md_run
raid1_run
mddev_init_writes_pending
if (mddev->writes_pending.percpu_count_ptr)
// won't reinit
// inactive raid again
...
percpu_ref_exit
-> null-ptr-deference
Before the commit, 'writes_pending' is exited when mddev is freed, and
it's safe to restart raid because mddev_init_writes_pending() already make
sure that 'writes_pending' will only be initialized once.
Fix the prblem by moving 'writes_pending' back, it's a litter hard to find
the relationship between alloc memory and free memory, however, code
changes is much less and we lived with this for a long time already.
Fixes: 3e453522593d ("md: Free resources in __md_stop")
Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiao Ni <xni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230328094400.1448955-1-yukuai1@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3e453522593d74a87cf68a38e14aa36ebca1dbcd upstream.
If md_run() fails after ->active_io is initialized, then percpu_ref_exit
is called in error path. However, later md_free_disk will call
percpu_ref_exit again which leads to a panic because of null pointer
dereference. It can also trigger this bug when resources are initialized
but are freed in error path, then will be freed again in md_free_disk.
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000038
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Workqueue: md_misc mddev_delayed_delete
RIP: 0010:free_percpu+0x110/0x630
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__percpu_ref_exit+0x44/0x70
percpu_ref_exit+0x16/0x90
md_free_disk+0x2f/0x80
disk_release+0x101/0x180
device_release+0x84/0x110
kobject_put+0x12a/0x380
kobject_put+0x160/0x380
mddev_delayed_delete+0x19/0x30
process_one_work+0x269/0x680
worker_thread+0x266/0x640
kthread+0x151/0x1b0
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
For creating raid device, md raid calls do_md_run->md_run, dm raid calls
md_run. We alloc those memory in md_run. For stopping raid device, md raid
calls do_md_stop->__md_stop, dm raid calls md_stop->__md_stop. So we can
free those memory resources in __md_stop.
Fixes: 72adae23a72c ("md: Change active_io to percpu")
Reported-and-tested-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Xiao Ni <xni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit cc22b5407e9ca76adb7efeed843146510b1b72a5 ]
When a bio is split by md raid0, the newly created bio will not be tracked
by md for I/O accounting. Only the portion of I/O still assigned to the
original bio which was reduced by the split will be accounted for. This
results in md iostat data sometimes showing I/O values far below the actual
amount of data being sent through md.
md_account_bio() needs to be called for all bio generated by the bio split.
A simple example of the issue was generated using a raid0 device on partitions
to the same device. Since all raid0 I/O then goes to one device, it makes it
easy to see a gap between the md device and its sd storage. Reading an lvm
device on top of the md device, the iostat output (some 0 columns and extra
devices removed to make the data more compact) was:
Device tps kB_read/s kB_wrtn/s kB_dscd/s kB_read
md2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0
sde 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0
md2 1364.00 411496.00 0.00 0.00 411496
sde 1734.00 646144.00 0.00 0.00 646144
md2 1699.00 510680.00 0.00 0.00 510680
sde 2155.00 802784.00 0.00 0.00 802784
md2 803.00 241480.00 0.00 0.00 241480
sde 1016.00 377888.00 0.00 0.00 377888
md2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0
sde 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0
I/O was generated doing large direct I/O reads (12M) with dd to a linear
lvm volume on top of the 4 leg raid0 device.
The md2 reads were showing as roughly 2/3 of the reads to the sde device
containing all of md2's raid partitions. The sum of reads to sde was
1826816 kB, which was the expected amount as it was the amount read by
dd. With the patch, the total reads from md will match the reads from
sde and be consistent with the amount of I/O generated.
Fixes: 10764815ff47 ("md: add io accounting for raid0 and raid5")
Signed-off-by: David Jeffery <djeffery@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Laurence Oberman <loberman@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Laurence Oberman <loberman@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230816181433.13289-1-djeffery@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 319ff40a542736d67e5bce18635de35d0e7a0bff ]
Commit f00d7c85be9e ("md/raid0: fix up bio splitting.") among other
things changed how bio that needs to be split is submitted. Before this
commit, we have split the bio, mapped and submitted each part. After
this commit, we map only the first part of the split bio and submit the
second part unmapped. Due to bio sorting in __submit_bio_noacct() this
results in the following request ordering:
9,0 18 1181 0.525037895 15995 Q WS 1479315464 + 63392
Split off chunk-sized (1024 sectors) request:
9,0 18 1182 0.629019647 15995 X WS 1479315464 / 1479316488
Request is unaligned to the chunk so it's split in
raid0_make_request(). This is the first part mapped and punted to
bio_list:
8,0 18 7053 0.629020455 15995 A WS 739921928 + 1016 <- (9,0) 1479315464
Now raid0_make_request() returns, second part is postponed on
bio_list. __submit_bio_noacct() resorts the bio_list, mapped request
is submitted to the underlying device:
8,0 18 7054 0.629022782 15995 G WS 739921928 + 1016
Now we take another request from the bio_list which is the remainder
of the original huge request. Split off another chunk-sized bit from
it and the situation repeats:
9,0 18 1183 0.629024499 15995 X WS 1479316488 / 1479317512
8,16 18 6998 0.629025110 15995 A WS 739921928 + 1016 <- (9,0) 1479316488
8,16 18 6999 0.629026728 15995 G WS 739921928 + 1016
...
9,0 18 1184 0.629032940 15995 X WS 1479317512 / 1479318536 [libnetacq-write]
8,0 18 7059 0.629033294 15995 A WS 739922952 + 1016 <- (9,0) 1479317512
8,0 18 7060 0.629033902 15995 G WS 739922952 + 1016
...
This repeats until we consume the whole original huge request. Now we
finally get to processing the second parts of the split off requests
(in reverse order):
8,16 18 7181 0.629161384 15995 A WS 739952640 + 8 <- (9,0) 1479377920
8,0 18 7239 0.629162140 15995 A WS 739952640 + 8 <- (9,0) 1479376896
8,16 18 7186 0.629163881 15995 A WS 739951616 + 8 <- (9,0) 1479375872
8,0 18 7242 0.629164421 15995 A WS 739951616 + 8 <- (9,0) 1479374848
...
I guess it is obvious that this IO pattern is extremely inefficient way
to perform sequential IO. It also makes bio_list to grow to rather long
lengths.
Change raid0_make_request() to map both parts of the split bio. Since we
know we are provided with at most chunk-sized bios, we will always need
to split the incoming bio at most once.
Fixes: f00d7c85be9e ("md/raid0: fix up bio splitting.")
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230814092720.3931-2-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit af50e20afb401cc203bd2a9ff62ece0ae4976103 ]
Factor out helper function for mapping and submitting a bio out of
raid0_make_request(). We will use it later for submitting both parts of
a split bio.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230814092720.3931-1-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: 319ff40a5427 ("md/raid0: Fix performance regression for large sequential writes")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit c31fea2f8e2a72c817f318016bbc327095175a9f ]
After the commit 9631abdbf406c("md: Set MD_BROKEN for RAID1 and RAID10")
MD_BROKEN must be set if array is failed because state_store() checks it.
If it is set then -EBUSY is returned to userspace.
For raid0 and linear MD_BROKEN is not set by error_handler(). As a result
mdadm is unable to trigger clean-up actions. It is a regression.
This patch adds appropriate error_handler for raid0 and linear. The
error handler sets MD_BROKEN for this device.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Ni <xni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mariusz Tkaczyk <mariusz.tkaczyk@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230306130317.3418-1-mariusz.tkaczyk@linux.intel.com
Stable-dep-of: 319ff40a5427 ("md/raid0: Fix performance regression for large sequential writes")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
