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[ Upstream commit 51270d573a8d9dd5afdc7934de97d66c0e14b5fd ]
I'm updating __assign_str() and will be removing the second parameter. To
make sure that it does not break anything, I make sure that it matches the
__string() field, as that is where the string is actually going to be
saved in. To make sure there's nothing that breaks, I added a WARN_ON() to
make sure that what was used in __string() is the same that is used in
__assign_str().
In doing this change, an error was triggered as __assign_str() now expects
the string passed in to be a char * value. I instead had the following
warning:
include/trace/events/qdisc.h: In function ‘trace_event_raw_event_qdisc_reset’:
include/trace/events/qdisc.h:91:35: error: passing argument 1 of 'strcmp' from incompatible pointer type [-Werror=incompatible-pointer-types]
91 | __assign_str(dev, qdisc_dev(q));
That's because the qdisc_enqueue() and qdisc_reset() pass in qdisc_dev(q)
to __assign_str() and to __string(). But that function returns a pointer
to struct net_device and not a string.
It appears that these events are just saving the pointer as a string and
then reading it as a string as well.
Use qdisc_dev(q)->name to save the device instead.
Fixes: a34dac0b90552 ("net_sched: add tracepoints for qdisc_reset() and qdisc_destroy()")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Reviewed-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 99099c6bc75a30b76bb5d6774a0509ab6f06af05 ]
ice_qp_dis() currently does things in very mixed way. Tx is stopped
before disabling IRQ on related queue vector, then it takes care of
disabling Rx and finally NAPI is disabled.
Let us start with disabling IRQs in the first place followed by turning
off NAPI. Then it is safe to handle queues.
One subtle change on top of that is that even though ice_qp_ena() looks
more sane, clear ICE_CFG_BUSY as the last thing there.
Fixes: 2d4238f55697 ("ice: Add support for AF_XDP")
Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com>
Tested-by: Chandan Kumar Rout <chandanx.rout@intel.com> (A Contingent Worker at Intel)
Acked-by: Magnus Karlsson <magnus.karlsson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit d562b11c1eac7d73f4c778b4cbe5468f86b1f20d ]
Disable NAPI before shutting down queues that this particular NAPI
contains so that the order of actions in i40e_queue_pair_disable()
mirrors what we do in i40e_queue_pair_enable().
Fixes: 123cecd427b6 ("i40e: added queue pair disable/enable functions")
Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com>
Tested-by: Chandan Kumar Rout <chandanx.rout@intel.com> (A Contingent Worker at Intel)
Acked-by: Magnus Karlsson <magnus.karlsson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit cbf996f52c4e658b3fb4349a869a62fd2d4c3c1c ]
Currently routines that are supposed to toggle state of ring pair do not
take care of associated interrupt with queue vector that these rings
belong to. This causes funky issues such as dead interface due to irq
misconfiguration, as per Pavel's report from Closes: tag.
Add a function responsible for disabling single IRQ in EIMC register and
call this as a very first thing when disabling ring pair during xsk_pool
setup. For enable let's reuse ixgbe_irq_enable_queues(). Besides this,
disable/enable NAPI as first/last thing when dealing with closing or
opening ring pair that xsk_pool is being configured on.
Reported-by: Pavel Vazharov <pavel@x3me.net>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAJEV1ijxNyPTwASJER1bcZzS9nMoZJqfR86nu_3jFFVXzZQ4NA@mail.gmail.com/
Fixes: 024aa5800f32 ("ixgbe: added Rx/Tx ring disable/enable functions")
Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com>
Acked-by: Magnus Karlsson <magnus.karlsson@intel.com>
Tested-by: Chandan Kumar Rout <chandanx.rout@intel.com> (A Contingent Worker at Intel)
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 1eecc7ab82c42133b748e1895275942a054a7f67 ]
Current driver has some asymmetry in the runtime PM calls. On lan78xx_open()
it will call usb_autopm_get() and unconditionally usb_autopm_put(). And
on lan78xx_stop() it will call only usb_autopm_put(). So far, it was
working only because this driver do not activate autosuspend by default,
so it was visible only by warning "Runtime PM usage count underflow!".
Since, with current driver, we can't use runtime PM with active link,
execute lan78xx_open()->usb_autopm_put() only in error case. Otherwise,
keep ref counting high as long as interface is open.
Fixes: 55d7de9de6c3 ("Microchip's LAN7800 family USB 2/3 to 10/100/1000 Ethernet device driver")
Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 51d31149a88b5c5a8d2d33f06df93f6187a25b4c ]
The addition of bal_rank_mask with encoding version 17 was merged
into ceph.git in Oct 2022 and made it into v18.2.0 release normally.
A few months later, the much delayed addition of max_xattr_size got
merged, also with encoding version 17, placed before bal_rank_mask
in the encoding -- but it didn't make v18.2.0 release.
The way this ended up being resolved on the MDS side is that
bal_rank_mask will continue to be encoded in version 17 while
max_xattr_size is now encoded in version 18. This does mean that
older kernels will misdecode version 17, but this is also true for
v18.2.0 and v18.2.1 clients in userspace.
The best we can do is backport this adjustment -- see ceph.git
commit 78abfeaff27fee343fb664db633de5b221699a73 for details.
[ idryomov: changelog ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/64440
Fixes: d93231a6bc8a ("ceph: prevent a client from exceeding the MDS maximum xattr size")
Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Patrick Donnelly <pdonnell@ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Venky Shankar <vshankar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit fa765c4b4aed2d64266b694520ecb025c862c5a9 upstream.
shutdown_pirq and startup_pirq are not taking the
irq_mapping_update_lock because they can't due to lock inversion. Both
are called with the irq_desc->lock being taking. The lock order,
however, is first irq_mapping_update_lock and then irq_desc->lock.
This opens multiple races:
- shutdown_pirq can be interrupted by a function that allocates an event
channel:
CPU0 CPU1
shutdown_pirq {
xen_evtchn_close(e)
__startup_pirq {
EVTCHNOP_bind_pirq
-> returns just freed evtchn e
set_evtchn_to_irq(e, irq)
}
xen_irq_info_cleanup() {
set_evtchn_to_irq(e, -1)
}
}
Assume here event channel e refers here to the same event channel
number.
After this race the evtchn_to_irq mapping for e is invalid (-1).
- __startup_pirq races with __unbind_from_irq in a similar way. Because
__startup_pirq doesn't take irq_mapping_update_lock it can grab the
evtchn that __unbind_from_irq is currently freeing and cleaning up. In
this case even though the event channel is allocated, its mapping can
be unset in evtchn_to_irq.
The fix is to first cleanup the mappings and then close the event
channel. In this way, when an event channel gets allocated it's
potential previous evtchn_to_irq mappings are guaranteed to be unset already.
This is also the reverse order of the allocation where first the event
channel is allocated and then the mappings are setup.
On a 5.10 kernel prior to commit 3fcdaf3d7634 ("xen/events: modify internal
[un]bind interfaces"), we hit a BUG like the following during probing of NVMe
devices. The issue is that during nvme_setup_io_queues, pci_free_irq
is called for every device which results in a call to shutdown_pirq.
With many nvme devices it's therefore likely to hit this race during
boot because there will be multiple calls to shutdown_pirq and
startup_pirq are running potentially in parallel.
------------[ cut here ]------------
blkfront: xvda: barrier or flush: disabled; persistent grants: enabled; indirect descriptors: enabled; bounce buffer: enabled
kernel BUG at drivers/xen/events/events_base.c:499!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
CPU: 44 PID: 375 Comm: kworker/u257:23 Not tainted 5.10.201-191.748.amzn2.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: Xen HVM domU, BIOS 4.11.amazon 08/24/2006
Workqueue: nvme-reset-wq nvme_reset_work
RIP: 0010:bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xdf/0xf0
Code: 5d 41 5e c3 cc cc cc cc 44 89 f7 e8 2b 55 ad ff 49 89 c5 48 85 c0 0f 84 64 ff ff ff 4c 8b 68 30 41 83 fe ff 0f 85 60 ff ff ff <0f> 0b 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 0f 1f 44 00 00
RSP: 0000:ffffc9000d533b08 EFLAGS: 00010046
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000006
RDX: 0000000000000028 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI: 00000000ffffffff
RBP: ffff888107419680 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffff82d72b00
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00000000000001ed
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000ffffffff R15: 0000000000000002
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88bc8b500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000002610001 CR4: 00000000001706e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c1/0x2d9
? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c1/0x2d9
? set_affinity_irq+0xdc/0x1c0
? __die_body.cold+0x8/0xd
? die+0x2b/0x50
? do_trap+0x90/0x110
? bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xdf/0xf0
? do_error_trap+0x65/0x80
? bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xdf/0xf0
? exc_invalid_op+0x4e/0x70
? bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xdf/0xf0
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x12/0x20
? bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xdf/0xf0
? bind_evtchn_to_cpu+0xc5/0xf0
set_affinity_irq+0xdc/0x1c0
irq_do_set_affinity+0x1d7/0x1f0
irq_setup_affinity+0xd6/0x1a0
irq_startup+0x8a/0xf0
__setup_irq+0x639/0x6d0
? nvme_suspend+0x150/0x150
request_threaded_irq+0x10c/0x180
? nvme_suspend+0x150/0x150
pci_request_irq+0xa8/0xf0
? __blk_mq_free_request+0x74/0xa0
queue_request_irq+0x6f/0x80
nvme_create_queue+0x1af/0x200
nvme_create_io_queues+0xbd/0xf0
nvme_setup_io_queues+0x246/0x320
? nvme_irq_check+0x30/0x30
nvme_reset_work+0x1c8/0x400
process_one_work+0x1b0/0x350
worker_thread+0x49/0x310
? process_one_work+0x350/0x350
kthread+0x11b/0x140
? __kthread_bind_mask+0x60/0x60
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
Modules linked in:
---[ end trace a11715de1eee1873 ]---
Fixes: d46a78b05c0e ("xen: implement pirq type event channels")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Co-debugged-by: Andrew Panyakin <apanyaki@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Maximilian Heyne <mheyne@amazon.de>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240124163130.31324-1-mheyne@amazon.de
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Maximilian Heyne <mheyne@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a7a6a01f88e87dec4bf2365571dd2dc7403d52d0 upstream.
The recently introduced EFI memory attributes protocol should be used
if it exists to ensure that the memory allocation created for the kernel
permits execution. This is needed for compatibility with tightened
requirements related to Windows logo certification for x86 PCs.
Currently, we simply strip the execute protect (XP) attribute from the
entire range, but this might be rejected under some firmware security
policies, and so in a subsequent patch, this will be changed to only
strip XP from the executable region that runs early, and make it
read-only (RO) as well.
In order to catch any issues early, ensure that the memory attribute
protocol works as intended, and give up if it produces spurious errors.
Note that the DXE services based fallback was always based on best
effort, so don't propagate any errors returned by that API.
Fixes: a1b87d54f4e4 ("x86/efistub: Avoid legacy decompressor when doing EFI boot")
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit dab4e1f06cabb6834de14264394ccab197007302 upstream.
Extend the bpf_fib_lookup() helper by making it to return the source
IPv4/IPv6 address if the BPF_FIB_LOOKUP_SRC flag is set.
For example, the following snippet can be used to derive the desired
source IP address:
struct bpf_fib_lookup p = { .ipv4_dst = ip4->daddr };
ret = bpf_skb_fib_lookup(skb, p, sizeof(p),
BPF_FIB_LOOKUP_SRC | BPF_FIB_LOOKUP_SKIP_NEIGH);
if (ret != BPF_FIB_LKUP_RET_SUCCESS)
return TC_ACT_SHOT;
/* the p.ipv4_src now contains the source address */
The inability to derive the proper source address may cause malfunctions
in BPF-based dataplanes for hosts containing netdevs with more than one
routable IP address or for multi-homed hosts.
For example, Cilium implements packet masquerading in BPF. If an
egressing netdev to which the Cilium's BPF prog is attached has
multiple IP addresses, then only one [hardcoded] IP address can be used for
masquerading. This breaks connectivity if any other IP address should have
been selected instead, for example, when a public and private addresses
are attached to the same egress interface.
The change was tested with Cilium [1].
Nikolay Aleksandrov helped to figure out the IPv6 addr selection.
[1]: https://github.com/cilium/cilium/pull/28283
Signed-off-by: Martynas Pumputis <m@lambda.lt>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231007081415.33502-2-m@lambda.lt
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 8ad77e72caae22a1ddcfd0c03f2884929e93b7a4 upstream.
Add ability to specify routing table ID to the `bpf_fib_lookup` BPF
helper.
A new field `tbid` is added to `struct bpf_fib_lookup` used as
parameters to the `bpf_fib_lookup` BPF helper.
When the helper is called with the `BPF_FIB_LOOKUP_DIRECT` and
`BPF_FIB_LOOKUP_TBID` flags the `tbid` field in `struct bpf_fib_lookup`
will be used as the table ID for the fib lookup.
If the `tbid` does not exist the fib lookup will fail with
`BPF_FIB_LKUP_RET_NOT_FWDED`.
The `tbid` field becomes a union over the vlan related output fields
in `struct bpf_fib_lookup` and will be zeroed immediately after usage.
This functionality is useful in containerized environments.
For instance, if a CNI wants to dictate the next-hop for traffic leaving
a container it can create a container-specific routing table and perform
a fib lookup against this table in a "host-net-namespace-side" TC program.
This functionality also allows `ip rule` like functionality at the TC
layer, allowing an eBPF program to pick a routing table based on some
aspect of the sk_buff.
As a concrete use case, this feature will be used in Cilium's SRv6 L3VPN
datapath.
When egress traffic leaves a Pod an eBPF program attached by Cilium will
determine which VRF the egress traffic should target, and then perform a
FIB lookup in a specific table representing this VRF's FIB.
Signed-off-by: Louis DeLosSantos <louis.delos.devel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230505-bpf-add-tbid-fib-lookup-v2-1-0a31c22c748c@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 43fb862de8f628c5db5e96831c915b9aebf62d33 upstream.
During VMentry VERW is executed to mitigate MDS. After VERW, any memory
access like register push onto stack may put host data in MDS affected
CPU buffers. A guest can then use MDS to sample host data.
Although likelihood of secrets surviving in registers at current VERW
callsite is less, but it can't be ruled out. Harden the MDS mitigation
by moving the VERW mitigation late in VMentry path.
Note that VERW for MMIO Stale Data mitigation is unchanged because of
the complexity of per-guest conditional VERW which is not easy to handle
that late in asm with no GPRs available. If the CPU is also affected by
MDS, VERW is unconditionally executed late in asm regardless of guest
having MMIO access.
[ pawan: conflict resolved in backport ]
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240213-delay-verw-v8-6-a6216d83edb7%40linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
commit 706a189dcf74d3b3f955e9384785e726ed6c7c80 upstream.
Use EFLAGS.CF instead of EFLAGS.ZF to track whether to use VMRESUME versus
VMLAUNCH. Freeing up EFLAGS.ZF will allow doing VERW, which clobbers ZF,
for MDS mitigations as late as possible without needing to duplicate VERW
for both paths.
[ pawan: resolved merge conflict in __vmx_vcpu_run in backport. ]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240213-delay-verw-v8-5-a6216d83edb7%40linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6613d82e617dd7eb8b0c40b2fe3acea655b1d611 upstream.
The VERW mitigation at exit-to-user is enabled via a static branch
mds_user_clear. This static branch is never toggled after boot, and can
be safely replaced with an ALTERNATIVE() which is convenient to use in
asm.
Switch to ALTERNATIVE() to use the VERW mitigation late in exit-to-user
path. Also remove the now redundant VERW in exc_nmi() and
arch_exit_to_user_mode().
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240213-delay-verw-v8-4-a6216d83edb7%40linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a0e2dab44d22b913b4c228c8b52b2a104434b0b3 upstream.
As done for entry_64, add support for executing VERW late in exit to
user path for 32-bit mode.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240213-delay-verw-v8-3-a6216d83edb7%40linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3c7501722e6b31a6e56edd23cea5e77dbb9ffd1a upstream.
Mitigation for MDS is to use VERW instruction to clear any secrets in
CPU Buffers. Any memory accesses after VERW execution can still remain
in CPU buffers. It is safer to execute VERW late in return to user path
to minimize the window in which kernel data can end up in CPU buffers.
There are not many kernel secrets to be had after SWITCH_TO_USER_CR3.
Add support for deploying VERW mitigation after user register state is
restored. This helps minimize the chances of kernel data ending up into
CPU buffers after executing VERW.
Note that the mitigation at the new location is not yet enabled.
Corner case not handled
=======================
Interrupts returning to kernel don't clear CPUs buffers since the
exit-to-user path is expected to do that anyways. But, there could be
a case when an NMI is generated in kernel after the exit-to-user path
has cleared the buffers. This case is not handled and NMI returning to
kernel don't clear CPU buffers because:
1. It is rare to get an NMI after VERW, but before returning to user.
2. For an unprivileged user, there is no known way to make that NMI
less rare or target it.
3. It would take a large number of these precisely-timed NMIs to mount
an actual attack. There's presumably not enough bandwidth.
4. The NMI in question occurs after a VERW, i.e. when user state is
restored and most interesting data is already scrubbed. Whats left
is only the data that NMI touches, and that may or may not be of
any interest.
[ pawan: resolved conflict for hunk swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode in backport ]
Suggested-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240213-delay-verw-v8-2-a6216d83edb7%40linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit baf8361e54550a48a7087b603313ad013cc13386 upstream.
MDS mitigation requires clearing the CPU buffers before returning to
user. This needs to be done late in the exit-to-user path. Current
location of VERW leaves a possibility of kernel data ending up in CPU
buffers for memory accesses done after VERW such as:
1. Kernel data accessed by an NMI between VERW and return-to-user can
remain in CPU buffers since NMI returning to kernel does not
execute VERW to clear CPU buffers.
2. Alyssa reported that after VERW is executed,
CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK=y scrubs the stack used by a system
call. Memory accesses during stack scrubbing can move kernel stack
contents into CPU buffers.
3. When caller saved registers are restored after a return from
function executing VERW, the kernel stack accesses can remain in
CPU buffers(since they occur after VERW).
To fix this VERW needs to be moved very late in exit-to-user path.
In preparation for moving VERW to entry/exit asm code, create macros
that can be used in asm. Also make VERW patching depend on a new feature
flag X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF.
[pawan: - Runtime patch jmp instead of verw in macro CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS
due to lack of relative addressing support for relocations
in kernels < v6.5.
- Add UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY to avoid warning:
arch/x86/entry/entry.o: warning: objtool: mds_verw_sel+0x0: unreachable instruction]
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <alyssa.milburn@intel.com>
Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240213-delay-verw-v8-1-a6216d83edb7%40linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This reverts commit 0db211ec0f1d32b93486e8f6565249ad4d1bece5 which is
commit 13619170303878e1dae86d9a58b039475c957fcf upstream.
It is reported to cause boot crashes in Android systems, so revert it
from the stable trees for now.
Cc: Rob Clark <robdclark@chromium.org>
Cc: Georgi Djakov <djakov@kernel.org>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Cc: Jon Hunter <jonathanh@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This reverts commit ee42bfc791aa3cd78e29046f26a09d189beb3efb which is
commit af42269c3523492d71ebbe11fefae2653e9cdc78 upstream.
It is reported to cause boot crashes in Android systems, so revert it
from the stable trees for now.
Cc: Rob Clark <robdclark@chromium.org>
Cc: Georgi Djakov <djakov@kernel.org>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 7838b4656110d950afdd92a081cc0f33e23e0ea8 ]
In commit 19416123ab3e ("block: define 'struct bvec_iter' as packed"),
what we need is to save the 4byte padding, and avoid `bio` to spread on
one extra cache line.
It is enough to define it as '__packed __aligned(4)', as '__packed'
alone means byte aligned, and can cause compiler to generate horrible
code on architectures that don't support unaligned access in case that
bvec_iter is embedded in other structures.
Cc: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Fixes: 19416123ab3e ("block: define 'struct bvec_iter' as packed")
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit ec5c54a9d3c4f9c15e647b049fea401ee5258696 ]
Hogs are added *after* ACPI so should be removed *before* in error path.
Fixes: a411e81e61df ("gpiolib: add hogs support for machine code")
Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 530b1dbd97846b110ea8a94c7cc903eca21786e5 ]
Chip outputs are enabled[1] before actual reset is performed[2] which might
cause pin output value to flip flop if previous pin value was set to 1.
Fix that behavior by making sure chip is fully reset before all outputs are
enabled.
Flip-flop can be noticed when module is removed and inserted again and one of
the pins was changed to 1 before removal. 100 microsecond flipping is
noticeable on oscilloscope (100khz SPI bus).
For a properly reset chip - output is enabled around 100 microseconds (on 100khz
SPI bus) later during probing process hence should be irrelevant behavioral
change.
Fixes: 7ebc194d0fd4 (gpio: 74x164: Introduce 'enable-gpios' property)
Link: https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.7.4/source/drivers/gpio/gpio-74x164.c#L130 [1]
Link: https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.7.4/source/drivers/gpio/gpio-74x164.c#L150 [2]
Signed-off-by: Arturas Moskvinas <arturas.moskvinas@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 09a3c1e46142199adcee372a420b024b4fc61051 ]
When kdump kernel tries to copy dump data over SR-IOV, LPAR panics due
to NULL pointer exception:
Kernel attempted to read user page (0) - exploit attempt? (uid: 0)
BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000000
Faulting instruction address: 0xc000000020847ad4
Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
Modules linked in: mlx5_core(+) vmx_crypto pseries_wdt papr_scm libnvdimm mlxfw tls psample sunrpc fuse overlay squashfs loop
CPU: 12 PID: 315 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 6.4.0-Test102+ #12
Hardware name: IBM,9080-HEX POWER10 (raw) 0x800200 0xf000006 of:IBM,FW1060.00 (NH1060_008) hv:phyp pSeries
NIP: c000000020847ad4 LR: c00000002083b2dc CTR: 00000000006cd18c
REGS: c000000029162ca0 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (6.4.0-Test102+)
MSR: 800000000280b033 <SF,VEC,VSX,EE,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 48288244 XER: 00000008
CFAR: c00000002083b2d8 DAR: 0000000000000000 DSISR: 40000000 IRQMASK: 1
...
NIP _find_next_zero_bit+0x24/0x110
LR bitmap_find_next_zero_area_off+0x5c/0xe0
Call Trace:
dev_printk_emit+0x38/0x48 (unreliable)
iommu_area_alloc+0xc4/0x180
iommu_range_alloc+0x1e8/0x580
iommu_alloc+0x60/0x130
iommu_alloc_coherent+0x158/0x2b0
dma_iommu_alloc_coherent+0x3c/0x50
dma_alloc_attrs+0x170/0x1f0
mlx5_cmd_init+0xc0/0x760 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_function_setup+0xf0/0x510 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_init_one+0x84/0x210 [mlx5_core]
probe_one+0x118/0x2c0 [mlx5_core]
local_pci_probe+0x68/0x110
pci_call_probe+0x68/0x200
pci_device_probe+0xbc/0x1a0
really_probe+0x104/0x540
__driver_probe_device+0xb4/0x230
driver_probe_device+0x54/0x130
__driver_attach+0x158/0x2b0
bus_for_each_dev+0xa8/0x130
driver_attach+0x34/0x50
bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x300
driver_register+0xa4/0x1b0
__pci_register_driver+0x68/0x80
mlx5_init+0xb8/0x100 [mlx5_core]
do_one_initcall+0x60/0x300
do_init_module+0x7c/0x2b0
At the time of LPAR dump, before kexec hands over control to kdump
kernel, DDWs (Dynamic DMA Windows) are scanned and added to the FDT.
For the SR-IOV case, default DMA window "ibm,dma-window" is removed from
the FDT and DDW added, for the device.
Now, kexec hands over control to the kdump kernel.
When the kdump kernel initializes, PCI busses are scanned and IOMMU
group/tables created, in pci_dma_bus_setup_pSeriesLP(). For the SR-IOV
case, there is no "ibm,dma-window". The original commit: b1fc44eaa9ba,
fixes the path where memory is pre-mapped (direct mapped) to the DDW.
When TCEs are direct mapped, there is no need to initialize IOMMU
tables.
iommu_table_setparms_lpar() only considers "ibm,dma-window" property
when initiallizing IOMMU table. In the scenario where TCEs are
dynamically allocated for SR-IOV, newly created IOMMU table is not
initialized. Later, when the device driver tries to enter TCEs for the
SR-IOV device, NULL pointer execption is thrown from iommu_area_alloc().
The fix is to initialize the IOMMU table with DDW property stored in the
FDT. There are 2 points to remember:
1. For the dedicated adapter, kdump kernel would encounter both
default and DDW in FDT. In this case, DDW property is used to
initialize the IOMMU table.
2. A DDW could be direct or dynamic mapped. kdump kernel would
initialize IOMMU table and mark the existing DDW as
"dynamic". This works fine since, at the time of table
initialization, iommu_table_clear() makes some space in the
DDW, for some predefined number of TCEs which are needed for
kdump to succeed.
Fixes: b1fc44eaa9ba ("pseries/iommu/ddw: Fix kdump to work in absence of ibm,dma-window")
Signed-off-by: Gaurav Batra <gbatra@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian King <brking@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20240125203017.61014-1-gbatra@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit aa82ac51d63328714645c827775d64dbfd9941f3 upstream.
syzbot reported another task hung in __unix_gc(). [0]
The current while loop assumes that all of the left candidates
have oob_skb and calling kfree_skb(oob_skb) releases the remaining
candidates.
However, I missed a case that oob_skb has self-referencing fd and
another fd and the latter sk is placed before the former in the
candidate list. Then, the while loop never proceeds, resulting
the task hung.
__unix_gc() has the same loop just before purging the collected skb,
so we can call kfree_skb(oob_skb) there and let __skb_queue_purge()
release all inflight sockets.
[0]:
Sending NMI from CPU 0 to CPUs 1:
NMI backtrace for cpu 1
CPU: 1 PID: 2784 Comm: kworker/u4:8 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc4-syzkaller-01028-g71b605d32017 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/25/2024
Workqueue: events_unbound __unix_gc
RIP: 0010:__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc+0x0/0x70 kernel/kcov.c:200
Code: 89 fb e8 23 00 00 00 48 8b 3d 84 f5 1a 0c 48 89 de 5b e9 43 26 57 00 0f 1f 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 <f3> 0f 1e fa 48 8b 04 24 65 48 8b 0d 90 52 70 7e 65 8b 15 91 52 70
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000a17fa78 EFLAGS: 00000287
RAX: ffffffff8a0a6108 RBX: ffff88802b6c2640 RCX: ffff88802c0b3b80
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffffc9000a17fbf0 R08: ffffffff89383f1d R09: 1ffff1100ee5ff84
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed100ee5ff85 R12: 1ffff110056d84ee
R13: ffffc9000a17fae0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffffff8f47b840
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007ffef5687ff8 CR3: 0000000029b34000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<NMI>
</NMI>
<TASK>
__unix_gc+0xe69/0xf40 net/unix/garbage.c:343
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:2633 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0x913/0x1420 kernel/workqueue.c:2706
worker_thread+0xa5f/0x1000 kernel/workqueue.c:2787
kthread+0x2ef/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388
ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:242
</TASK>
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+ecab4d36f920c3574bf9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=ecab4d36f920c3574bf9
Fixes: 25236c91b5ab ("af_unix: Fix task hung while purging oob_skb in GC.")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
From: Yuntao Wang <ytcoode@gmail.com>
[ Commit 01638431c465741e071ab34acf3bef3c2570f878 upstream ]
When KASLR is enabled, the KASLR_FLAG bit in boot_params->hdr.loadflags
should be set to 1 to propagate KASLR status from compressed kernel to
kernel, just as the choose_random_location() function does.
Currently, when the kernel is booted via the EFI stub, the KASLR_FLAG
bit in boot_params->hdr.loadflags is not set, even though it should be.
This causes some functions, such as kernel_randomize_memory(), not to
execute as expected. Fix it.
Fixes: a1b87d54f4e4 ("x86/efistub: Avoid legacy decompressor when doing EFI boot")
Signed-off-by: Yuntao Wang <ytcoode@gmail.com>
[ardb: drop 'else' branch clearing KASLR_FLAG]
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
[ Commit 50dcc2e0d62e3c4a54f39673c4dc3dcde7c74d52 upstream ]
Now that the x86 EFI stub calls into some APIs exposed by the
decompressor (e.g., kaslr_get_random_long()), it is necessary to ensure
that the global boot_params variable is set correctly before doing so.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
[ Commit b9e909f78e7e4b826f318cfe7bedf3ce229920e6 upstream ]
The x86 decompressor is built and linked as a separate executable, but
it shares components with the kernel proper, which are either #include'd
as C files, or linked into the decompresor as a static library (e.g, the
EFI stub)
Both the kernel itself and the decompressor define a global symbol
'boot_params' to refer to the boot_params struct, but in the former
case, it refers to the struct directly, whereas in the decompressor, it
refers to a global pointer variable referring to the struct boot_params
passed by the bootloader or constructed from scratch.
This ambiguity is unfortunate, and makes it impossible to assign this
decompressor variable from the x86 EFI stub, given that declaring it as
extern results in a clash. So rename the decompressor version (whose
scope is limited) to boot_params_ptr.
[ mingo: Renamed 'boot_params_p' to 'boot_params_ptr' for clarity ]
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
[ Commit 2f77465b05b1270c832b5e2ee27037672ad2a10a upstream ]
The EFI stub's kernel placement logic randomizes the physical placement
of the kernel by taking all available memory into account, and picking a
region at random, based on a random seed.
When KASLR is disabled, this seed is set to 0x0, and this results in the
lowest available region of memory to be selected for loading the kernel,
even if this is below LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR. Some of this memory is
typically reserved for the GFP_DMA region, to accommodate masters that
can only access the first 16 MiB of system memory.
Even if such devices are rare these days, we may still end up with a
warning in the kernel log, as reported by Tom:
swapper/0: page allocation failure: order:10, mode:0xcc1(GFP_KERNEL|GFP_DMA), nodemask=(null),cpuset=/,mems_allowed=0
Fix this by tweaking the random allocation logic to accept a low bound
on the placement, and set it to LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR.
Fixes: a1b87d54f4e4 ("x86/efistub: Avoid legacy decompressor when doing EFI boot")
Reported-by: Tom Englund <tomenglund26@gmail.com>
Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218404
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
[ Commit 50d7cdf7a9b1ab6f4f74a69c84e974d5dc0c1bf1 upstream ]
River reports boot hangs with v6.6 and v6.7, and the bisect points to
commit
a1b87d54f4e4 ("x86/efistub: Avoid legacy decompressor when doing EFI boot")
which moves the memory allocation and kernel decompression from the
legacy decompressor (which executes *after* ExitBootServices()) to the
EFI stub, using boot services for allocating the memory. The memory
allocation succeeds but the subsequent call to decompress_kernel() never
returns, resulting in a failed boot and a hanging system.
As it turns out, this issue only occurs when physical address
randomization (KASLR) is enabled, and given that this is a feature we
can live without (virtual KASLR is much more important), let's disable
the physical part of KASLR when booting on AMI UEFI firmware claiming to
implement revision v2.0 of the specification (which was released in
2006), as this is the version these systems advertise.
Fixes: a1b87d54f4e4 ("x86/efistub: Avoid legacy decompressor when doing EFI boot")
Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218173
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
[ Commit a1b87d54f4e45ff5e0d081fb1d9db3bf1a8fb39a upstream ]
The bare metal decompressor code was never really intended to run in a
hosted environment such as the EFI boot services, and does a few things
that are becoming problematic in the context of EFI boot now that the
logo requirements are getting tighter: EFI executables will no longer be
allowed to consist of a single executable section that is mapped with
read, write and execute permissions if they are intended for use in a
context where Secure Boot is enabled (and where Microsoft's set of
certificates is used, i.e., every x86 PC built to run Windows).
To avoid stepping on reserved memory before having inspected the E820
tables, and to ensure the correct placement when running a kernel build
that is non-relocatable, the bare metal decompressor moves its own
executable image to the end of the allocation that was reserved for it,
in order to perform the decompression in place. This means the region in
question requires both write and execute permissions, which either need
to be given upfront (which EFI will no longer permit), or need to be
applied on demand using the existing page fault handling framework.
However, the physical placement of the kernel is usually randomized
anyway, and even if it isn't, a dedicated decompression output buffer
can be allocated anywhere in memory using EFI APIs when still running in
the boot services, given that EFI support already implies a relocatable
kernel. This means that decompression in place is never necessary, nor
is moving the compressed image from one end to the other.
Since EFI already maps all of memory 1:1, it is also unnecessary to
create new page tables or handle page faults when decompressing the
kernel. That means there is also no need to replace the special
exception handlers for SEV. Generally, there is little need to do
any of the things that the decompressor does beyond
- initialize SEV encryption, if needed,
- perform the 4/5 level paging switch, if needed,
- decompress the kernel
- relocate the kernel
So do all of this from the EFI stub code, and avoid the bare metal
decompressor altogether.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230807162720.545787-24-ardb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
[ Commit 31c77a50992e8dd136feed7b67073bb5f1f978cc upstream ]
Before refactoring the EFI stub boot flow to avoid the legacy bare metal
decompressor, duplicate the SNP feature check in the EFI stub before
handing over to the kernel proper.
The SNP feature check can be performed while running under the EFI boot
services, which means it can force the boot to fail gracefully and
return an error to the bootloader if the loaded kernel does not
implement support for all the features that the hypervisor enabled.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230807162720.545787-23-ardb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
[ Commit 11078876b7a6a1b7226344fecab968945c806832 upstream ]
Currently, the EFI stub relies on DXE services in some cases to clear
non-execute restrictions from page allocations that need to be
executable. This is dodgy, because DXE services are not specified by
UEFI but by PI, and they are not intended for consumption by OS loaders.
However, no alternative existed at the time.
Now, there is a new UEFI protocol that should be used instead, so if it
exists, prefer it over the DXE services calls.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230807162720.545787-18-ardb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
[ Commit 83381519352d6b5b3e429bf72aaab907480cb6b6 upstream ]
Factor out the decompressor sequence that invokes the decompressor,
parses the ELF and applies the relocations so that it can be called
directly from the EFI stub.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230807162720.545787-21-ardb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
[ Commit cb380000dd23cbbf8bd7d023b51896804c1f7e68 upstream ]
In preparation for updating the EFI stub boot flow to avoid the bare
metal decompressor code altogether, implement the support code for
switching between 4 and 5 levels of paging before jumping to the kernel
proper.
This reuses the newly refactored trampoline that the bare metal
decompressor uses, but relies on EFI APIs to allocate 32-bit addressable
memory and remap it with the appropriate permissions. Given that the
bare metal decompressor will no longer call into the trampoline if the
number of paging levels is already set correctly, it is no longer needed
to remove NX restrictions from the memory range where this trampoline
may end up.
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
[ Commit bc5ddceff4c14494d83449ad45c985e6cd353fce upstream ]
x86 will need to limit the kernel memory allocation to the lowest 512
MiB of memory, to match the behavior of the existing bare metal KASLR
physical randomization logic. So in preparation for that, add a limit
parameter to efi_random_alloc() and wire it up.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230807162720.545787-22-ardb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
From: Evgeniy Baskov <baskov@ispras.ru>
[ Commit 79729f26b074a5d2722c27fa76cc45ef721e65cd upstream ]
EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PROTOCOL servers as a better alternative to
DXE services for setting memory attributes in EFI Boot Services
environment. This protocol is better since it is a part of UEFI
specification itself and not UEFI PI specification like DXE
services.
Add EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PROTOCOL definitions.
Support mixed mode properly for its calls.
Tested-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Evgeniy Baskov <baskov@ispras.ru>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
[ Commit d7156b986d4cc0657fa6dc05c9fcf51c3d55a0fe upstream ]
The so-called EFI handover protocol is value-add from the distros that
permits a loader to simply copy a PE kernel image into memory and call
an alternative entrypoint that is described by an embedded boot_params
structure.
Most implementations of this protocol do not bother to check the PE
header for minimum alignment, section placement, etc, and therefore also
don't clear the image's BSS, or even allocate enough memory for it.
Allocating more memory on the fly is rather difficult, but at least
clear the BSS region explicitly when entering in this manner, so that
the EFI stub code does not get confused by global variables that were
not zero-initialized correctly.
When booting in mixed mode, this BSS clearing must occur before any
global state is created, so clear it in the 32-bit asm entry point.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230807162720.545787-7-ardb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
[ Commit 12792064587623065250069d1df980e2c9ac3e67 upstream ]
The native 32-bit or 64-bit EFI handover protocol entrypoint offset
relative to the respective startup_32/64 address is described in
boot_params as handover_offset, so that the special Linux/x86 aware EFI
loader can find it there.
When mixed mode is enabled, this single field has to describe this
offset for both the 32-bit and 64-bit entrypoints, so their respective
relative offsets have to be identical. Given that startup_32 and
startup_64 are 0x200 bytes apart, and the EFI handover entrypoint
resides at a fixed offset, the 32-bit and 64-bit versions of those
entrypoints must be exactly 0x200 bytes apart as well.
Currently, hard-coded fixed offsets are used to ensure this, but it is
sufficient to emit the 64-bit entrypoint 0x200 bytes after the 32-bit
one, wherever it happens to reside. This allows this code (which is now
EFI mixed mode specific) to be moved into efi_mixed.S and out of the
startup code in head_64.S.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230807162720.545787-6-ardb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
[ Commit df9215f15206c2a81909ccf60f21d170801dce38 upstream ]
Now that the EFI entry code in assembler is only used by the optional
and deprecated EFI handover protocol, and given that the EFI stub C code
no longer returns to it, most of it can simply be dropped.
While at it, clarify the symbol naming, by merging efi_main() and
efi_stub_entry(), making the latter the shared entry point for all
different boot modes that enter via the EFI stub.
The efi32_stub_entry() and efi64_stub_entry() names are referenced
explicitly by the tooling that populates the setup header, so these must
be retained, but can be emitted as aliases of efi_stub_entry() where
appropriate.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230807162720.545787-5-ardb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
From: Johan Hovold <johan+linaro@kernel.org>
[ Commit 0217a40d7ba6e71d7f3422fbe89b436e8ee7ece7 upstream ]
Add the missing sanity check to efivars_register() so that it is no
longer possible to override an already registered set of efivar ops
(without first deregistering them).
This can help debug initialisation ordering issues where drivers have so
far unknowingly been relying on overriding the generic ops.
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan+linaro@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
[ Commit a37dac5c5dcfe0f1fd58513c16cdbc280a47f628 upstream ]
The UEFI spec does not mention or reason about the configured size of
the virtual address space at all, but it does mention that all memory
should be identity mapped using a page size of 4 KiB.
This means that a LPA2 capable system that has any system memory outside
of the 48-bit addressable physical range and follows the spec to the
letter may serve page allocation requests from regions of memory that
the kernel cannot access unless it was built with LPA2 support and
enables it at runtime.
So let's ensure that all page allocations are limited to the 48-bit
range.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 4102db175b5d884d133270fdbd0e59111ce688fc ]
The nfs4_file table is global, so shutting it down when a containerized
nfsd is shut down is wrong and can lead to double-frees. Tear down the
nfs4_file_rhltable in nfs4_state_shutdown instead of
nfs4_state_shutdown_net.
Fixes: d47b295e8d76 ("NFSD: Use rhashtable for managing nfs4_file objects")
Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2169017
Reported-by: JianHong Yin <jiyin@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 7c24fa225081f31bc6da6a355c1ba801889ab29a ]
Since nfsd4_state_shrinker_count always calls mod_delayed_work with
0 delay, we can replace delayed_work with work_struct to save some
space and overhead.
Also add the call to cancel_work after unregister the shrinker
in nfs4_state_shutdown_net.
Signed-off-by: Dai Ngo <dai.ngo@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit f385f7d244134246f984975ed34cd75f77de479f ]
Currently the nfsd-client shrinker is registered and unregistered at
the time the nfsd module is loaded and unloaded. The problem with this
is the shrinker is being registered before all of the relevant fields
in nfsd_net are initialized when nfsd is started. This can lead to an
oops when memory is low and the shrinker is called while nfsd is not
running.
This patch moves the register/unregister of nfsd-client shrinker from
module load/unload time to nfsd startup/shutdown time.
Fixes: 44df6f439a17 ("NFSD: add delegation reaper to react to low memory condition")
Reported-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Dai Ngo <dai.ngo@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 5304930dbae82d259bcf7e5611db7c81e7a42eff ]
The premise that "Once an svc thread is scheduled and executing an
RPC, no other processes will touch svc_rqst::rq_flags" is false.
svc_xprt_enqueue() examines the RQ_BUSY flag in scheduled nfsd
threads when determining which thread to wake up next.
Fixes: 9315564747cb ("NFSD: Use only RQ_DROPME to signal the need to drop a reply")
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit e78e274eb22d966258a3845acc71d3c5b8ee2ea8 ]
When built with Control Flow Integrity, function prototypes between
caller and function declaration must match. These mismatches are visible
at compile time with the new -Wcast-function-type-strict in Clang[1].
There were 97 warnings produced by NFS. For example:
fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c:2228:17: warning: cast from '__be32 (*)(struct nfsd4_compoundargs *, struct nfsd4_access *)' (aka 'unsigned int (*)(struct nfsd4_compoundargs *, struct nfsd4_access *)') to 'nfsd4_dec' (aka 'unsigned int (*)(struct nfsd4_compoundargs *, void *)') converts to incompatible function type [-Wcast-function-type-strict]
[OP_ACCESS] = (nfsd4_dec)nfsd4_decode_access,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The enc/dec callbacks were defined as passing "void *" as the second
argument, but were being implicitly cast to a new type. Replace the
argument with union nfsd4_op_u, and perform explicit member selection
in the function body. There are no resulting binary differences.
Changes were made mechanically using the following Coccinelle script,
with minor by-hand fixes for members that didn't already match their
existing argument name:
@find@
identifier func;
type T, opsT;
identifier ops, N;
@@
opsT ops[] = {
[N] = (T) func,
};
@already_void@
identifier find.func;
identifier name;
@@
func(...,
-void
+union nfsd4_op_u
*name)
{
...
}
@proto depends on !already_void@
identifier find.func;
type T;
identifier name;
position p;
@@
func@p(...,
T name
) {
...
}
@script:python get_member@
type_name << proto.T;
member;
@@
coccinelle.member = cocci.make_ident(type_name.split("_", 1)[1].split(' ',1)[0])
@convert@
identifier find.func;
type proto.T;
identifier proto.name;
position proto.p;
identifier get_member.member;
@@
func@p(...,
- T name
+ union nfsd4_op_u *u
) {
+ T name = &u->member;
...
}
@cast@
identifier find.func;
type T, opsT;
identifier ops, N;
@@
opsT ops[] = {
[N] =
- (T)
func,
};
Cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Cc: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 9315564747cb6a570e99196b3a4880fb817635fd ]
Clean up: NFSv2 has the only two usages of rpc_drop_reply in the
NFSD code base. Since NFSv2 is going away at some point, replace
these in order to simplify the "drop this reply?" check in
nfsd_dispatch().
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
