Eric W. Biederman 00b06da29c signal: Add SA_IMMUTABLE to ensure forced siganls do not get changed
As Andy pointed out that there are races between
force_sig_info_to_task and sigaction[1] when force_sig_info_task.  As
Kees discovered[2] ptrace is also able to change these signals.

In the case of seeccomp killing a process with a signal it is a
security violation to allow the signal to be caught or manipulated.

Solve this problem by introducing a new flag SA_IMMUTABLE that
prevents sigaction and ptrace from modifying these forced signals.
This flag is carefully made kernel internal so that no new ABI is
introduced.

Longer term I think this can be solved by guaranteeing short circuit
delivery of signals in this case.  Unfortunately reliable and
guaranteed short circuit delivery of these signals is still a ways off
from being implemented, tested, and merged.  So I have implemented a much
simpler alternative for now.

[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b5d52d25-7bde-4030-a7b1-7c6f8ab90660@www.fastmail.com
[2] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/202110281136.5CE65399A7@keescook
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 307d522f5eb8 ("signal/seccomp: Refactor seccomp signal and coredump generation")
Tested-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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