Willem de Bruijn 792d5414d0 dccp: limit sk_filter trim to payload
commit 4f0c40d94461cfd23893a17335b2ab78ecb333c8 upstream.

Dccp verifies packet integrity, including length, at initial rcv in
dccp_invalid_packet, later pulls headers in dccp_enqueue_skb.

A call to sk_filter in-between can cause __skb_pull to wrap skb->len.
skb_copy_datagram_msg interprets this as a negative value, so
(correctly) fails with EFAULT. The negative length is reported in
ioctl SIOCINQ or possibly in a DCCP_WARN in dccp_close.

Introduce an sk_receive_skb variant that caps how small a filter
program can trim packets, and call this in dccp with the header
length. Excessively trimmed packets are now processed normally and
queued for reception as 0B payloads.

Fixes: 7c657876b63c ("[DCCP]: Initial implementation")
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-05-10 10:25:51 +02:00
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