0364249d20
and stripe targets; which are provided by DM core. - Various updates to use new safer string functions. - Update DM core to respect REQ_NOWAIT flag in normal bios so that memory allocations are always attempted with GFP_NOWAIT. - Add Mikulas Patocka to MAINTAINERS as a DM maintainer! - Improve DM delay target's handling of short delays (< 50ms) by using a kthread to check expiration of IOs rather than timers and a wq. - Update the DM error target so that it works with zoned storage. This helps xfstests to provide proper IO error handling coverage when testing a filesystem with native zoned storage support. - Update both DM crypt and integrity targets to improve performance by using crypto_shash_digest() rather than init+update+final sequence. - Fix DM crypt target by backfilling missing memory allocation accounting for compound pages. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQEzBAABCAAdFiEEJfWUX4UqZ4x1O2wixSPxCi2dA1oFAmVCeG8ACgkQxSPxCi2d A1oXAAgAnT0mb1psEwDhKiJG26bUeJDJHIaNTPPw4UpCvKEWU7lTxzJUmthnwLZI D+JnkrenAfGppdsFkHh1ogTBz8r60aeBTY31SUoCUVS/clwHxRstLCkSE2655an3 WNgrGItta5BRtcgTMxU7bmqVOD4Xyw704L7BK5CM4zKBQuXJtkegylALhdXvYSjs mvHWoPczFW6Rv79CkF0uTkon7Ji041BvKVjbp+fYQf9Pul5d6S1v4Jrvlo2EqblU 6OM75OosNgziQhdw7faVOgFCVkQfLkEeYsJ47dBOjpC3+sbyKENbC4r+ZmkCZGyI uJERswpmAkW7pp+Ab6sqG582DXvPvA== =PPwQ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'for-6.7/dm-changes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/device-mapper/linux-dm Pull device mapper updates from Mike Snitzer: - Update DM core to directly call the map function for both the linear and stripe targets; which are provided by DM core - Various updates to use new safer string functions - Update DM core to respect REQ_NOWAIT flag in normal bios so that memory allocations are always attempted with GFP_NOWAIT - Add Mikulas Patocka to MAINTAINERS as a DM maintainer! - Improve DM delay target's handling of short delays (< 50ms) by using a kthread to check expiration of IOs rather than timers and a wq - Update the DM error target so that it works with zoned storage. This helps xfstests to provide proper IO error handling coverage when testing a filesystem with native zoned storage support - Update both DM crypt and integrity targets to improve performance by using crypto_shash_digest() rather than init+update+final sequence - Fix DM crypt target by backfilling missing memory allocation accounting for compound pages * tag 'for-6.7/dm-changes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/device-mapper/linux-dm: dm crypt: account large pages in cc->n_allocated_pages dm integrity: use crypto_shash_digest() in sb_mac() dm crypt: use crypto_shash_digest() in crypt_iv_tcw_whitening() dm error: Add support for zoned block devices dm delay: for short delays, use kthread instead of timers and wq MAINTAINERS: add Mikulas Patocka as a DM maintainer dm: respect REQ_NOWAIT flag in normal bios issued to DM dm: enhance alloc_multiple_bios() to be more versatile dm: make __send_duplicate_bios return unsigned int dm log userspace: replace deprecated strncpy with strscpy dm ioctl: replace deprecated strncpy with strscpy_pad dm crypt: replace open-coded kmemdup_nul dm cache metadata: replace deprecated strncpy with strscpy dm: shortcut the calls to linear_map and stripe_map
3696 lines
96 KiB
C
3696 lines
96 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
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/*
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* Copyright (C) 2003 Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>
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* Copyright (C) 2004 Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
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* Copyright (C) 2006-2020 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
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* Copyright (C) 2013-2020 Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
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*
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* This file is released under the GPL.
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*/
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#include <linux/completion.h>
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#include <linux/err.h>
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <linux/init.h>
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/key.h>
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#include <linux/bio.h>
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#include <linux/blkdev.h>
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#include <linux/blk-integrity.h>
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#include <linux/mempool.h>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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#include <linux/crypto.h>
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#include <linux/workqueue.h>
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#include <linux/kthread.h>
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#include <linux/backing-dev.h>
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#include <linux/atomic.h>
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#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
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#include <linux/rbtree.h>
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#include <linux/ctype.h>
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#include <asm/page.h>
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#include <asm/unaligned.h>
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#include <crypto/hash.h>
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#include <crypto/md5.h>
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#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
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#include <crypto/aead.h>
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#include <crypto/authenc.h>
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#include <crypto/utils.h>
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#include <linux/rtnetlink.h> /* for struct rtattr and RTA macros only */
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#include <linux/key-type.h>
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#include <keys/user-type.h>
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#include <keys/encrypted-type.h>
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#include <keys/trusted-type.h>
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#include <linux/device-mapper.h>
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#include "dm-audit.h"
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#define DM_MSG_PREFIX "crypt"
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/*
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* context holding the current state of a multi-part conversion
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*/
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struct convert_context {
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struct completion restart;
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struct bio *bio_in;
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struct bio *bio_out;
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struct bvec_iter iter_in;
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struct bvec_iter iter_out;
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u64 cc_sector;
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atomic_t cc_pending;
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union {
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struct skcipher_request *req;
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struct aead_request *req_aead;
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} r;
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};
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/*
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* per bio private data
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*/
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struct dm_crypt_io {
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struct crypt_config *cc;
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struct bio *base_bio;
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u8 *integrity_metadata;
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bool integrity_metadata_from_pool:1;
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bool in_tasklet:1;
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struct work_struct work;
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struct tasklet_struct tasklet;
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struct convert_context ctx;
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atomic_t io_pending;
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blk_status_t error;
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sector_t sector;
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struct rb_node rb_node;
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} CRYPTO_MINALIGN_ATTR;
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struct dm_crypt_request {
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struct convert_context *ctx;
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struct scatterlist sg_in[4];
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struct scatterlist sg_out[4];
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u64 iv_sector;
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};
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struct crypt_config;
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struct crypt_iv_operations {
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int (*ctr)(struct crypt_config *cc, struct dm_target *ti,
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const char *opts);
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void (*dtr)(struct crypt_config *cc);
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int (*init)(struct crypt_config *cc);
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int (*wipe)(struct crypt_config *cc);
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int (*generator)(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv,
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struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq);
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int (*post)(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv,
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struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq);
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};
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struct iv_benbi_private {
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int shift;
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};
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#define LMK_SEED_SIZE 64 /* hash + 0 */
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struct iv_lmk_private {
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struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm;
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u8 *seed;
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};
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#define TCW_WHITENING_SIZE 16
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struct iv_tcw_private {
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struct crypto_shash *crc32_tfm;
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u8 *iv_seed;
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u8 *whitening;
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};
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#define ELEPHANT_MAX_KEY_SIZE 32
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struct iv_elephant_private {
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struct crypto_skcipher *tfm;
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};
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/*
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* Crypt: maps a linear range of a block device
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* and encrypts / decrypts at the same time.
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*/
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enum flags { DM_CRYPT_SUSPENDED, DM_CRYPT_KEY_VALID,
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DM_CRYPT_SAME_CPU, DM_CRYPT_NO_OFFLOAD,
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DM_CRYPT_NO_READ_WORKQUEUE, DM_CRYPT_NO_WRITE_WORKQUEUE,
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DM_CRYPT_WRITE_INLINE };
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enum cipher_flags {
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CRYPT_MODE_INTEGRITY_AEAD, /* Use authenticated mode for cipher */
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CRYPT_IV_LARGE_SECTORS, /* Calculate IV from sector_size, not 512B sectors */
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CRYPT_ENCRYPT_PREPROCESS, /* Must preprocess data for encryption (elephant) */
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};
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/*
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* The fields in here must be read only after initialization.
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*/
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struct crypt_config {
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struct dm_dev *dev;
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sector_t start;
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struct percpu_counter n_allocated_pages;
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struct workqueue_struct *io_queue;
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struct workqueue_struct *crypt_queue;
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spinlock_t write_thread_lock;
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struct task_struct *write_thread;
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struct rb_root write_tree;
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char *cipher_string;
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char *cipher_auth;
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char *key_string;
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const struct crypt_iv_operations *iv_gen_ops;
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union {
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struct iv_benbi_private benbi;
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struct iv_lmk_private lmk;
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struct iv_tcw_private tcw;
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struct iv_elephant_private elephant;
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} iv_gen_private;
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u64 iv_offset;
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unsigned int iv_size;
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unsigned short sector_size;
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unsigned char sector_shift;
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union {
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struct crypto_skcipher **tfms;
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struct crypto_aead **tfms_aead;
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} cipher_tfm;
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unsigned int tfms_count;
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unsigned long cipher_flags;
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/*
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* Layout of each crypto request:
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*
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* struct skcipher_request
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* context
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* padding
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* struct dm_crypt_request
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* padding
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* IV
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*
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* The padding is added so that dm_crypt_request and the IV are
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* correctly aligned.
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*/
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unsigned int dmreq_start;
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unsigned int per_bio_data_size;
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unsigned long flags;
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unsigned int key_size;
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unsigned int key_parts; /* independent parts in key buffer */
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unsigned int key_extra_size; /* additional keys length */
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unsigned int key_mac_size; /* MAC key size for authenc(...) */
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unsigned int integrity_tag_size;
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unsigned int integrity_iv_size;
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unsigned int on_disk_tag_size;
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/*
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* pool for per bio private data, crypto requests,
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* encryption requeusts/buffer pages and integrity tags
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*/
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unsigned int tag_pool_max_sectors;
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mempool_t tag_pool;
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mempool_t req_pool;
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mempool_t page_pool;
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struct bio_set bs;
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struct mutex bio_alloc_lock;
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u8 *authenc_key; /* space for keys in authenc() format (if used) */
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u8 key[] __counted_by(key_size);
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};
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#define MIN_IOS 64
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#define MAX_TAG_SIZE 480
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#define POOL_ENTRY_SIZE 512
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static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(dm_crypt_clients_lock);
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static unsigned int dm_crypt_clients_n;
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static volatile unsigned long dm_crypt_pages_per_client;
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#define DM_CRYPT_MEMORY_PERCENT 2
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#define DM_CRYPT_MIN_PAGES_PER_CLIENT (BIO_MAX_VECS * 16)
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static void crypt_endio(struct bio *clone);
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static void kcryptd_queue_crypt(struct dm_crypt_io *io);
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static struct scatterlist *crypt_get_sg_data(struct crypt_config *cc,
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struct scatterlist *sg);
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static bool crypt_integrity_aead(struct crypt_config *cc);
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/*
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* Use this to access cipher attributes that are independent of the key.
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*/
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static struct crypto_skcipher *any_tfm(struct crypt_config *cc)
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{
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return cc->cipher_tfm.tfms[0];
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}
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static struct crypto_aead *any_tfm_aead(struct crypt_config *cc)
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{
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return cc->cipher_tfm.tfms_aead[0];
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}
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/*
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* Different IV generation algorithms:
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*
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* plain: the initial vector is the 32-bit little-endian version of the sector
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* number, padded with zeros if necessary.
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*
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* plain64: the initial vector is the 64-bit little-endian version of the sector
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* number, padded with zeros if necessary.
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*
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* plain64be: the initial vector is the 64-bit big-endian version of the sector
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* number, padded with zeros if necessary.
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*
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* essiv: "encrypted sector|salt initial vector", the sector number is
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* encrypted with the bulk cipher using a salt as key. The salt
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* should be derived from the bulk cipher's key via hashing.
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*
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* benbi: the 64-bit "big-endian 'narrow block'-count", starting at 1
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* (needed for LRW-32-AES and possible other narrow block modes)
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*
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* null: the initial vector is always zero. Provides compatibility with
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* obsolete loop_fish2 devices. Do not use for new devices.
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*
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* lmk: Compatible implementation of the block chaining mode used
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* by the Loop-AES block device encryption system
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* designed by Jari Ruusu. See http://loop-aes.sourceforge.net/
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* It operates on full 512 byte sectors and uses CBC
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* with an IV derived from the sector number, the data and
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* optionally extra IV seed.
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* This means that after decryption the first block
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* of sector must be tweaked according to decrypted data.
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* Loop-AES can use three encryption schemes:
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* version 1: is plain aes-cbc mode
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* version 2: uses 64 multikey scheme with lmk IV generator
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* version 3: the same as version 2 with additional IV seed
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* (it uses 65 keys, last key is used as IV seed)
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*
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* tcw: Compatible implementation of the block chaining mode used
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* by the TrueCrypt device encryption system (prior to version 4.1).
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* For more info see: https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/TrueCryptOnDiskFormat
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* It operates on full 512 byte sectors and uses CBC
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* with an IV derived from initial key and the sector number.
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* In addition, whitening value is applied on every sector, whitening
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* is calculated from initial key, sector number and mixed using CRC32.
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* Note that this encryption scheme is vulnerable to watermarking attacks
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* and should be used for old compatible containers access only.
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*
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* eboiv: Encrypted byte-offset IV (used in Bitlocker in CBC mode)
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* The IV is encrypted little-endian byte-offset (with the same key
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* and cipher as the volume).
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*
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* elephant: The extended version of eboiv with additional Elephant diffuser
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* used with Bitlocker CBC mode.
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* This mode was used in older Windows systems
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* https://download.microsoft.com/download/0/2/3/0238acaf-d3bf-4a6d-b3d6-0a0be4bbb36e/bitlockercipher200608.pdf
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*/
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static int crypt_iv_plain_gen(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv,
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struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq)
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{
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memset(iv, 0, cc->iv_size);
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*(__le32 *)iv = cpu_to_le32(dmreq->iv_sector & 0xffffffff);
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return 0;
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}
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static int crypt_iv_plain64_gen(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv,
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struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq)
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{
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memset(iv, 0, cc->iv_size);
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*(__le64 *)iv = cpu_to_le64(dmreq->iv_sector);
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return 0;
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}
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static int crypt_iv_plain64be_gen(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv,
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struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq)
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{
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memset(iv, 0, cc->iv_size);
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/* iv_size is at least of size u64; usually it is 16 bytes */
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*(__be64 *)&iv[cc->iv_size - sizeof(u64)] = cpu_to_be64(dmreq->iv_sector);
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return 0;
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}
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static int crypt_iv_essiv_gen(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv,
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struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq)
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{
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/*
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* ESSIV encryption of the IV is now handled by the crypto API,
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* so just pass the plain sector number here.
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*/
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memset(iv, 0, cc->iv_size);
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*(__le64 *)iv = cpu_to_le64(dmreq->iv_sector);
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return 0;
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}
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static int crypt_iv_benbi_ctr(struct crypt_config *cc, struct dm_target *ti,
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const char *opts)
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{
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unsigned int bs;
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int log;
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if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc))
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bs = crypto_aead_blocksize(any_tfm_aead(cc));
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else
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bs = crypto_skcipher_blocksize(any_tfm(cc));
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log = ilog2(bs);
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/*
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* We need to calculate how far we must shift the sector count
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* to get the cipher block count, we use this shift in _gen.
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*/
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if (1 << log != bs) {
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ti->error = "cypher blocksize is not a power of 2";
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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if (log > 9) {
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ti->error = "cypher blocksize is > 512";
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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cc->iv_gen_private.benbi.shift = 9 - log;
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return 0;
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}
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static void crypt_iv_benbi_dtr(struct crypt_config *cc)
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{
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}
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static int crypt_iv_benbi_gen(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv,
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struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq)
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{
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__be64 val;
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memset(iv, 0, cc->iv_size - sizeof(u64)); /* rest is cleared below */
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val = cpu_to_be64(((u64)dmreq->iv_sector << cc->iv_gen_private.benbi.shift) + 1);
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put_unaligned(val, (__be64 *)(iv + cc->iv_size - sizeof(u64)));
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return 0;
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}
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static int crypt_iv_null_gen(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv,
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struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq)
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{
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memset(iv, 0, cc->iv_size);
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return 0;
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}
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static void crypt_iv_lmk_dtr(struct crypt_config *cc)
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{
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struct iv_lmk_private *lmk = &cc->iv_gen_private.lmk;
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if (lmk->hash_tfm && !IS_ERR(lmk->hash_tfm))
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crypto_free_shash(lmk->hash_tfm);
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lmk->hash_tfm = NULL;
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kfree_sensitive(lmk->seed);
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lmk->seed = NULL;
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}
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|
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static int crypt_iv_lmk_ctr(struct crypt_config *cc, struct dm_target *ti,
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const char *opts)
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{
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struct iv_lmk_private *lmk = &cc->iv_gen_private.lmk;
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|
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if (cc->sector_size != (1 << SECTOR_SHIFT)) {
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ti->error = "Unsupported sector size for LMK";
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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lmk->hash_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("md5", 0,
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CRYPTO_ALG_ALLOCATES_MEMORY);
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if (IS_ERR(lmk->hash_tfm)) {
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ti->error = "Error initializing LMK hash";
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return PTR_ERR(lmk->hash_tfm);
|
|
}
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|
|
|
/* No seed in LMK version 2 */
|
|
if (cc->key_parts == cc->tfms_count) {
|
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lmk->seed = NULL;
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return 0;
|
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}
|
|
|
|
lmk->seed = kzalloc(LMK_SEED_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!lmk->seed) {
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crypt_iv_lmk_dtr(cc);
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|
ti->error = "Error kmallocing seed storage in LMK";
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int crypt_iv_lmk_init(struct crypt_config *cc)
|
|
{
|
|
struct iv_lmk_private *lmk = &cc->iv_gen_private.lmk;
|
|
int subkey_size = cc->key_size / cc->key_parts;
|
|
|
|
/* LMK seed is on the position of LMK_KEYS + 1 key */
|
|
if (lmk->seed)
|
|
memcpy(lmk->seed, cc->key + (cc->tfms_count * subkey_size),
|
|
crypto_shash_digestsize(lmk->hash_tfm));
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int crypt_iv_lmk_wipe(struct crypt_config *cc)
|
|
{
|
|
struct iv_lmk_private *lmk = &cc->iv_gen_private.lmk;
|
|
|
|
if (lmk->seed)
|
|
memset(lmk->seed, 0, LMK_SEED_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int crypt_iv_lmk_one(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv,
|
|
struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq,
|
|
u8 *data)
|
|
{
|
|
struct iv_lmk_private *lmk = &cc->iv_gen_private.lmk;
|
|
SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, lmk->hash_tfm);
|
|
struct md5_state md5state;
|
|
__le32 buf[4];
|
|
int i, r;
|
|
|
|
desc->tfm = lmk->hash_tfm;
|
|
|
|
r = crypto_shash_init(desc);
|
|
if (r)
|
|
return r;
|
|
|
|
if (lmk->seed) {
|
|
r = crypto_shash_update(desc, lmk->seed, LMK_SEED_SIZE);
|
|
if (r)
|
|
return r;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Sector is always 512B, block size 16, add data of blocks 1-31 */
|
|
r = crypto_shash_update(desc, data + 16, 16 * 31);
|
|
if (r)
|
|
return r;
|
|
|
|
/* Sector is cropped to 56 bits here */
|
|
buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(dmreq->iv_sector & 0xFFFFFFFF);
|
|
buf[1] = cpu_to_le32((((u64)dmreq->iv_sector >> 32) & 0x00FFFFFF) | 0x80000000);
|
|
buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(4024);
|
|
buf[3] = 0;
|
|
r = crypto_shash_update(desc, (u8 *)buf, sizeof(buf));
|
|
if (r)
|
|
return r;
|
|
|
|
/* No MD5 padding here */
|
|
r = crypto_shash_export(desc, &md5state);
|
|
if (r)
|
|
return r;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < MD5_HASH_WORDS; i++)
|
|
__cpu_to_le32s(&md5state.hash[i]);
|
|
memcpy(iv, &md5state.hash, cc->iv_size);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int crypt_iv_lmk_gen(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv,
|
|
struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq)
|
|
{
|
|
struct scatterlist *sg;
|
|
u8 *src;
|
|
int r = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (bio_data_dir(dmreq->ctx->bio_in) == WRITE) {
|
|
sg = crypt_get_sg_data(cc, dmreq->sg_in);
|
|
src = kmap_local_page(sg_page(sg));
|
|
r = crypt_iv_lmk_one(cc, iv, dmreq, src + sg->offset);
|
|
kunmap_local(src);
|
|
} else
|
|
memset(iv, 0, cc->iv_size);
|
|
|
|
return r;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int crypt_iv_lmk_post(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv,
|
|
struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq)
|
|
{
|
|
struct scatterlist *sg;
|
|
u8 *dst;
|
|
int r;
|
|
|
|
if (bio_data_dir(dmreq->ctx->bio_in) == WRITE)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
sg = crypt_get_sg_data(cc, dmreq->sg_out);
|
|
dst = kmap_local_page(sg_page(sg));
|
|
r = crypt_iv_lmk_one(cc, iv, dmreq, dst + sg->offset);
|
|
|
|
/* Tweak the first block of plaintext sector */
|
|
if (!r)
|
|
crypto_xor(dst + sg->offset, iv, cc->iv_size);
|
|
|
|
kunmap_local(dst);
|
|
return r;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void crypt_iv_tcw_dtr(struct crypt_config *cc)
|
|
{
|
|
struct iv_tcw_private *tcw = &cc->iv_gen_private.tcw;
|
|
|
|
kfree_sensitive(tcw->iv_seed);
|
|
tcw->iv_seed = NULL;
|
|
kfree_sensitive(tcw->whitening);
|
|
tcw->whitening = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (tcw->crc32_tfm && !IS_ERR(tcw->crc32_tfm))
|
|
crypto_free_shash(tcw->crc32_tfm);
|
|
tcw->crc32_tfm = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int crypt_iv_tcw_ctr(struct crypt_config *cc, struct dm_target *ti,
|
|
const char *opts)
|
|
{
|
|
struct iv_tcw_private *tcw = &cc->iv_gen_private.tcw;
|
|
|
|
if (cc->sector_size != (1 << SECTOR_SHIFT)) {
|
|
ti->error = "Unsupported sector size for TCW";
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (cc->key_size <= (cc->iv_size + TCW_WHITENING_SIZE)) {
|
|
ti->error = "Wrong key size for TCW";
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
tcw->crc32_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("crc32", 0,
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_ALLOCATES_MEMORY);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(tcw->crc32_tfm)) {
|
|
ti->error = "Error initializing CRC32 in TCW";
|
|
return PTR_ERR(tcw->crc32_tfm);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
tcw->iv_seed = kzalloc(cc->iv_size, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
tcw->whitening = kzalloc(TCW_WHITENING_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!tcw->iv_seed || !tcw->whitening) {
|
|
crypt_iv_tcw_dtr(cc);
|
|
ti->error = "Error allocating seed storage in TCW";
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int crypt_iv_tcw_init(struct crypt_config *cc)
|
|
{
|
|
struct iv_tcw_private *tcw = &cc->iv_gen_private.tcw;
|
|
int key_offset = cc->key_size - cc->iv_size - TCW_WHITENING_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(tcw->iv_seed, &cc->key[key_offset], cc->iv_size);
|
|
memcpy(tcw->whitening, &cc->key[key_offset + cc->iv_size],
|
|
TCW_WHITENING_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int crypt_iv_tcw_wipe(struct crypt_config *cc)
|
|
{
|
|
struct iv_tcw_private *tcw = &cc->iv_gen_private.tcw;
|
|
|
|
memset(tcw->iv_seed, 0, cc->iv_size);
|
|
memset(tcw->whitening, 0, TCW_WHITENING_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int crypt_iv_tcw_whitening(struct crypt_config *cc,
|
|
struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq,
|
|
u8 *data)
|
|
{
|
|
struct iv_tcw_private *tcw = &cc->iv_gen_private.tcw;
|
|
__le64 sector = cpu_to_le64(dmreq->iv_sector);
|
|
u8 buf[TCW_WHITENING_SIZE];
|
|
SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tcw->crc32_tfm);
|
|
int i, r;
|
|
|
|
/* xor whitening with sector number */
|
|
crypto_xor_cpy(buf, tcw->whitening, (u8 *)§or, 8);
|
|
crypto_xor_cpy(&buf[8], tcw->whitening + 8, (u8 *)§or, 8);
|
|
|
|
/* calculate crc32 for every 32bit part and xor it */
|
|
desc->tfm = tcw->crc32_tfm;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
|
|
r = crypto_shash_digest(desc, &buf[i * 4], 4, &buf[i * 4]);
|
|
if (r)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
crypto_xor(&buf[0], &buf[12], 4);
|
|
crypto_xor(&buf[4], &buf[8], 4);
|
|
|
|
/* apply whitening (8 bytes) to whole sector */
|
|
for (i = 0; i < ((1 << SECTOR_SHIFT) / 8); i++)
|
|
crypto_xor(data + i * 8, buf, 8);
|
|
out:
|
|
memzero_explicit(buf, sizeof(buf));
|
|
return r;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int crypt_iv_tcw_gen(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv,
|
|
struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq)
|
|
{
|
|
struct scatterlist *sg;
|
|
struct iv_tcw_private *tcw = &cc->iv_gen_private.tcw;
|
|
__le64 sector = cpu_to_le64(dmreq->iv_sector);
|
|
u8 *src;
|
|
int r = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Remove whitening from ciphertext */
|
|
if (bio_data_dir(dmreq->ctx->bio_in) != WRITE) {
|
|
sg = crypt_get_sg_data(cc, dmreq->sg_in);
|
|
src = kmap_local_page(sg_page(sg));
|
|
r = crypt_iv_tcw_whitening(cc, dmreq, src + sg->offset);
|
|
kunmap_local(src);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Calculate IV */
|
|
crypto_xor_cpy(iv, tcw->iv_seed, (u8 *)§or, 8);
|
|
if (cc->iv_size > 8)
|
|
crypto_xor_cpy(&iv[8], tcw->iv_seed + 8, (u8 *)§or,
|
|
cc->iv_size - 8);
|
|
|
|
return r;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int crypt_iv_tcw_post(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv,
|
|
struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq)
|
|
{
|
|
struct scatterlist *sg;
|
|
u8 *dst;
|
|
int r;
|
|
|
|
if (bio_data_dir(dmreq->ctx->bio_in) != WRITE)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Apply whitening on ciphertext */
|
|
sg = crypt_get_sg_data(cc, dmreq->sg_out);
|
|
dst = kmap_local_page(sg_page(sg));
|
|
r = crypt_iv_tcw_whitening(cc, dmreq, dst + sg->offset);
|
|
kunmap_local(dst);
|
|
|
|
return r;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int crypt_iv_random_gen(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv,
|
|
struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Used only for writes, there must be an additional space to store IV */
|
|
get_random_bytes(iv, cc->iv_size);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int crypt_iv_eboiv_ctr(struct crypt_config *cc, struct dm_target *ti,
|
|
const char *opts)
|
|
{
|
|
if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc)) {
|
|
ti->error = "AEAD transforms not supported for EBOIV";
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (crypto_skcipher_blocksize(any_tfm(cc)) != cc->iv_size) {
|
|
ti->error = "Block size of EBOIV cipher does not match IV size of block cipher";
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int crypt_iv_eboiv_gen(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv,
|
|
struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq)
|
|
{
|
|
struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = any_tfm(cc);
|
|
struct skcipher_request *req;
|
|
struct scatterlist src, dst;
|
|
DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
|
|
unsigned int reqsize;
|
|
int err;
|
|
u8 *buf;
|
|
|
|
reqsize = sizeof(*req) + crypto_skcipher_reqsize(tfm);
|
|
reqsize = ALIGN(reqsize, __alignof__(__le64));
|
|
|
|
req = kmalloc(reqsize + cc->iv_size, GFP_NOIO);
|
|
if (!req)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
skcipher_request_set_tfm(req, tfm);
|
|
|
|
buf = (u8 *)req + reqsize;
|
|
memset(buf, 0, cc->iv_size);
|
|
*(__le64 *)buf = cpu_to_le64(dmreq->iv_sector * cc->sector_size);
|
|
|
|
sg_init_one(&src, page_address(ZERO_PAGE(0)), cc->iv_size);
|
|
sg_init_one(&dst, iv, cc->iv_size);
|
|
skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &src, &dst, cc->iv_size, buf);
|
|
skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, crypto_req_done, &wait);
|
|
err = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req), &wait);
|
|
kfree_sensitive(req);
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void crypt_iv_elephant_dtr(struct crypt_config *cc)
|
|
{
|
|
struct iv_elephant_private *elephant = &cc->iv_gen_private.elephant;
|
|
|
|
crypto_free_skcipher(elephant->tfm);
|
|
elephant->tfm = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int crypt_iv_elephant_ctr(struct crypt_config *cc, struct dm_target *ti,
|
|
const char *opts)
|
|
{
|
|
struct iv_elephant_private *elephant = &cc->iv_gen_private.elephant;
|
|
int r;
|
|
|
|
elephant->tfm = crypto_alloc_skcipher("ecb(aes)", 0,
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_ALLOCATES_MEMORY);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(elephant->tfm)) {
|
|
r = PTR_ERR(elephant->tfm);
|
|
elephant->tfm = NULL;
|
|
return r;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
r = crypt_iv_eboiv_ctr(cc, ti, NULL);
|
|
if (r)
|
|
crypt_iv_elephant_dtr(cc);
|
|
return r;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void diffuser_disk_to_cpu(u32 *d, size_t n)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifndef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
|
|
d[i] = le32_to_cpu((__le32)d[i]);
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void diffuser_cpu_to_disk(__le32 *d, size_t n)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifndef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
|
|
d[i] = cpu_to_le32((u32)d[i]);
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void diffuser_a_decrypt(u32 *d, size_t n)
|
|
{
|
|
int i, i1, i2, i3;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
|
|
i1 = 0;
|
|
i2 = n - 2;
|
|
i3 = n - 5;
|
|
|
|
while (i1 < (n - 1)) {
|
|
d[i1] += d[i2] ^ (d[i3] << 9 | d[i3] >> 23);
|
|
i1++; i2++; i3++;
|
|
|
|
if (i3 >= n)
|
|
i3 -= n;
|
|
|
|
d[i1] += d[i2] ^ d[i3];
|
|
i1++; i2++; i3++;
|
|
|
|
if (i2 >= n)
|
|
i2 -= n;
|
|
|
|
d[i1] += d[i2] ^ (d[i3] << 13 | d[i3] >> 19);
|
|
i1++; i2++; i3++;
|
|
|
|
d[i1] += d[i2] ^ d[i3];
|
|
i1++; i2++; i3++;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void diffuser_a_encrypt(u32 *d, size_t n)
|
|
{
|
|
int i, i1, i2, i3;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
|
|
i1 = n - 1;
|
|
i2 = n - 2 - 1;
|
|
i3 = n - 5 - 1;
|
|
|
|
while (i1 > 0) {
|
|
d[i1] -= d[i2] ^ d[i3];
|
|
i1--; i2--; i3--;
|
|
|
|
d[i1] -= d[i2] ^ (d[i3] << 13 | d[i3] >> 19);
|
|
i1--; i2--; i3--;
|
|
|
|
if (i2 < 0)
|
|
i2 += n;
|
|
|
|
d[i1] -= d[i2] ^ d[i3];
|
|
i1--; i2--; i3--;
|
|
|
|
if (i3 < 0)
|
|
i3 += n;
|
|
|
|
d[i1] -= d[i2] ^ (d[i3] << 9 | d[i3] >> 23);
|
|
i1--; i2--; i3--;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void diffuser_b_decrypt(u32 *d, size_t n)
|
|
{
|
|
int i, i1, i2, i3;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
|
|
i1 = 0;
|
|
i2 = 2;
|
|
i3 = 5;
|
|
|
|
while (i1 < (n - 1)) {
|
|
d[i1] += d[i2] ^ d[i3];
|
|
i1++; i2++; i3++;
|
|
|
|
d[i1] += d[i2] ^ (d[i3] << 10 | d[i3] >> 22);
|
|
i1++; i2++; i3++;
|
|
|
|
if (i2 >= n)
|
|
i2 -= n;
|
|
|
|
d[i1] += d[i2] ^ d[i3];
|
|
i1++; i2++; i3++;
|
|
|
|
if (i3 >= n)
|
|
i3 -= n;
|
|
|
|
d[i1] += d[i2] ^ (d[i3] << 25 | d[i3] >> 7);
|
|
i1++; i2++; i3++;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void diffuser_b_encrypt(u32 *d, size_t n)
|
|
{
|
|
int i, i1, i2, i3;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
|
|
i1 = n - 1;
|
|
i2 = 2 - 1;
|
|
i3 = 5 - 1;
|
|
|
|
while (i1 > 0) {
|
|
d[i1] -= d[i2] ^ (d[i3] << 25 | d[i3] >> 7);
|
|
i1--; i2--; i3--;
|
|
|
|
if (i3 < 0)
|
|
i3 += n;
|
|
|
|
d[i1] -= d[i2] ^ d[i3];
|
|
i1--; i2--; i3--;
|
|
|
|
if (i2 < 0)
|
|
i2 += n;
|
|
|
|
d[i1] -= d[i2] ^ (d[i3] << 10 | d[i3] >> 22);
|
|
i1--; i2--; i3--;
|
|
|
|
d[i1] -= d[i2] ^ d[i3];
|
|
i1--; i2--; i3--;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int crypt_iv_elephant(struct crypt_config *cc, struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq)
|
|
{
|
|
struct iv_elephant_private *elephant = &cc->iv_gen_private.elephant;
|
|
u8 *es, *ks, *data, *data2, *data_offset;
|
|
struct skcipher_request *req;
|
|
struct scatterlist *sg, *sg2, src, dst;
|
|
DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
|
|
int i, r;
|
|
|
|
req = skcipher_request_alloc(elephant->tfm, GFP_NOIO);
|
|
es = kzalloc(16, GFP_NOIO); /* Key for AES */
|
|
ks = kzalloc(32, GFP_NOIO); /* Elephant sector key */
|
|
|
|
if (!req || !es || !ks) {
|
|
r = -ENOMEM;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*(__le64 *)es = cpu_to_le64(dmreq->iv_sector * cc->sector_size);
|
|
|
|
/* E(Ks, e(s)) */
|
|
sg_init_one(&src, es, 16);
|
|
sg_init_one(&dst, ks, 16);
|
|
skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &src, &dst, 16, NULL);
|
|
skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, crypto_req_done, &wait);
|
|
r = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req), &wait);
|
|
if (r)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
/* E(Ks, e'(s)) */
|
|
es[15] = 0x80;
|
|
sg_init_one(&dst, &ks[16], 16);
|
|
r = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req), &wait);
|
|
if (r)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
sg = crypt_get_sg_data(cc, dmreq->sg_out);
|
|
data = kmap_local_page(sg_page(sg));
|
|
data_offset = data + sg->offset;
|
|
|
|
/* Cannot modify original bio, copy to sg_out and apply Elephant to it */
|
|
if (bio_data_dir(dmreq->ctx->bio_in) == WRITE) {
|
|
sg2 = crypt_get_sg_data(cc, dmreq->sg_in);
|
|
data2 = kmap_local_page(sg_page(sg2));
|
|
memcpy(data_offset, data2 + sg2->offset, cc->sector_size);
|
|
kunmap_local(data2);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (bio_data_dir(dmreq->ctx->bio_in) != WRITE) {
|
|
diffuser_disk_to_cpu((u32 *)data_offset, cc->sector_size / sizeof(u32));
|
|
diffuser_b_decrypt((u32 *)data_offset, cc->sector_size / sizeof(u32));
|
|
diffuser_a_decrypt((u32 *)data_offset, cc->sector_size / sizeof(u32));
|
|
diffuser_cpu_to_disk((__le32 *)data_offset, cc->sector_size / sizeof(u32));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < (cc->sector_size / 32); i++)
|
|
crypto_xor(data_offset + i * 32, ks, 32);
|
|
|
|
if (bio_data_dir(dmreq->ctx->bio_in) == WRITE) {
|
|
diffuser_disk_to_cpu((u32 *)data_offset, cc->sector_size / sizeof(u32));
|
|
diffuser_a_encrypt((u32 *)data_offset, cc->sector_size / sizeof(u32));
|
|
diffuser_b_encrypt((u32 *)data_offset, cc->sector_size / sizeof(u32));
|
|
diffuser_cpu_to_disk((__le32 *)data_offset, cc->sector_size / sizeof(u32));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
kunmap_local(data);
|
|
out:
|
|
kfree_sensitive(ks);
|
|
kfree_sensitive(es);
|
|
skcipher_request_free(req);
|
|
return r;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int crypt_iv_elephant_gen(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv,
|
|
struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq)
|
|
{
|
|
int r;
|
|
|
|
if (bio_data_dir(dmreq->ctx->bio_in) == WRITE) {
|
|
r = crypt_iv_elephant(cc, dmreq);
|
|
if (r)
|
|
return r;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return crypt_iv_eboiv_gen(cc, iv, dmreq);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int crypt_iv_elephant_post(struct crypt_config *cc, u8 *iv,
|
|
struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq)
|
|
{
|
|
if (bio_data_dir(dmreq->ctx->bio_in) != WRITE)
|
|
return crypt_iv_elephant(cc, dmreq);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int crypt_iv_elephant_init(struct crypt_config *cc)
|
|
{
|
|
struct iv_elephant_private *elephant = &cc->iv_gen_private.elephant;
|
|
int key_offset = cc->key_size - cc->key_extra_size;
|
|
|
|
return crypto_skcipher_setkey(elephant->tfm, &cc->key[key_offset], cc->key_extra_size);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int crypt_iv_elephant_wipe(struct crypt_config *cc)
|
|
{
|
|
struct iv_elephant_private *elephant = &cc->iv_gen_private.elephant;
|
|
u8 key[ELEPHANT_MAX_KEY_SIZE];
|
|
|
|
memset(key, 0, cc->key_extra_size);
|
|
return crypto_skcipher_setkey(elephant->tfm, key, cc->key_extra_size);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static const struct crypt_iv_operations crypt_iv_plain_ops = {
|
|
.generator = crypt_iv_plain_gen
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static const struct crypt_iv_operations crypt_iv_plain64_ops = {
|
|
.generator = crypt_iv_plain64_gen
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static const struct crypt_iv_operations crypt_iv_plain64be_ops = {
|
|
.generator = crypt_iv_plain64be_gen
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static const struct crypt_iv_operations crypt_iv_essiv_ops = {
|
|
.generator = crypt_iv_essiv_gen
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static const struct crypt_iv_operations crypt_iv_benbi_ops = {
|
|
.ctr = crypt_iv_benbi_ctr,
|
|
.dtr = crypt_iv_benbi_dtr,
|
|
.generator = crypt_iv_benbi_gen
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static const struct crypt_iv_operations crypt_iv_null_ops = {
|
|
.generator = crypt_iv_null_gen
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static const struct crypt_iv_operations crypt_iv_lmk_ops = {
|
|
.ctr = crypt_iv_lmk_ctr,
|
|
.dtr = crypt_iv_lmk_dtr,
|
|
.init = crypt_iv_lmk_init,
|
|
.wipe = crypt_iv_lmk_wipe,
|
|
.generator = crypt_iv_lmk_gen,
|
|
.post = crypt_iv_lmk_post
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static const struct crypt_iv_operations crypt_iv_tcw_ops = {
|
|
.ctr = crypt_iv_tcw_ctr,
|
|
.dtr = crypt_iv_tcw_dtr,
|
|
.init = crypt_iv_tcw_init,
|
|
.wipe = crypt_iv_tcw_wipe,
|
|
.generator = crypt_iv_tcw_gen,
|
|
.post = crypt_iv_tcw_post
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static const struct crypt_iv_operations crypt_iv_random_ops = {
|
|
.generator = crypt_iv_random_gen
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static const struct crypt_iv_operations crypt_iv_eboiv_ops = {
|
|
.ctr = crypt_iv_eboiv_ctr,
|
|
.generator = crypt_iv_eboiv_gen
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static const struct crypt_iv_operations crypt_iv_elephant_ops = {
|
|
.ctr = crypt_iv_elephant_ctr,
|
|
.dtr = crypt_iv_elephant_dtr,
|
|
.init = crypt_iv_elephant_init,
|
|
.wipe = crypt_iv_elephant_wipe,
|
|
.generator = crypt_iv_elephant_gen,
|
|
.post = crypt_iv_elephant_post
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Integrity extensions
|
|
*/
|
|
static bool crypt_integrity_aead(struct crypt_config *cc)
|
|
{
|
|
return test_bit(CRYPT_MODE_INTEGRITY_AEAD, &cc->cipher_flags);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool crypt_integrity_hmac(struct crypt_config *cc)
|
|
{
|
|
return crypt_integrity_aead(cc) && cc->key_mac_size;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Get sg containing data */
|
|
static struct scatterlist *crypt_get_sg_data(struct crypt_config *cc,
|
|
struct scatterlist *sg)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(crypt_integrity_aead(cc)))
|
|
return &sg[2];
|
|
|
|
return sg;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int dm_crypt_integrity_io_alloc(struct dm_crypt_io *io, struct bio *bio)
|
|
{
|
|
struct bio_integrity_payload *bip;
|
|
unsigned int tag_len;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
if (!bio_sectors(bio) || !io->cc->on_disk_tag_size)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
bip = bio_integrity_alloc(bio, GFP_NOIO, 1);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(bip))
|
|
return PTR_ERR(bip);
|
|
|
|
tag_len = io->cc->on_disk_tag_size * (bio_sectors(bio) >> io->cc->sector_shift);
|
|
|
|
bip->bip_iter.bi_sector = io->cc->start + io->sector;
|
|
|
|
ret = bio_integrity_add_page(bio, virt_to_page(io->integrity_metadata),
|
|
tag_len, offset_in_page(io->integrity_metadata));
|
|
if (unlikely(ret != tag_len))
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int crypt_integrity_ctr(struct crypt_config *cc, struct dm_target *ti)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INTEGRITY
|
|
struct blk_integrity *bi = blk_get_integrity(cc->dev->bdev->bd_disk);
|
|
struct mapped_device *md = dm_table_get_md(ti->table);
|
|
|
|
/* From now we require underlying device with our integrity profile */
|
|
if (!bi || strcasecmp(bi->profile->name, "DM-DIF-EXT-TAG")) {
|
|
ti->error = "Integrity profile not supported.";
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (bi->tag_size != cc->on_disk_tag_size ||
|
|
bi->tuple_size != cc->on_disk_tag_size) {
|
|
ti->error = "Integrity profile tag size mismatch.";
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (1 << bi->interval_exp != cc->sector_size) {
|
|
ti->error = "Integrity profile sector size mismatch.";
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc)) {
|
|
cc->integrity_tag_size = cc->on_disk_tag_size - cc->integrity_iv_size;
|
|
DMDEBUG("%s: Integrity AEAD, tag size %u, IV size %u.", dm_device_name(md),
|
|
cc->integrity_tag_size, cc->integrity_iv_size);
|
|
|
|
if (crypto_aead_setauthsize(any_tfm_aead(cc), cc->integrity_tag_size)) {
|
|
ti->error = "Integrity AEAD auth tag size is not supported.";
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (cc->integrity_iv_size)
|
|
DMDEBUG("%s: Additional per-sector space %u bytes for IV.", dm_device_name(md),
|
|
cc->integrity_iv_size);
|
|
|
|
if ((cc->integrity_tag_size + cc->integrity_iv_size) != bi->tag_size) {
|
|
ti->error = "Not enough space for integrity tag in the profile.";
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
#else
|
|
ti->error = "Integrity profile not supported.";
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void crypt_convert_init(struct crypt_config *cc,
|
|
struct convert_context *ctx,
|
|
struct bio *bio_out, struct bio *bio_in,
|
|
sector_t sector)
|
|
{
|
|
ctx->bio_in = bio_in;
|
|
ctx->bio_out = bio_out;
|
|
if (bio_in)
|
|
ctx->iter_in = bio_in->bi_iter;
|
|
if (bio_out)
|
|
ctx->iter_out = bio_out->bi_iter;
|
|
ctx->cc_sector = sector + cc->iv_offset;
|
|
init_completion(&ctx->restart);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq_of_req(struct crypt_config *cc,
|
|
void *req)
|
|
{
|
|
return (struct dm_crypt_request *)((char *)req + cc->dmreq_start);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void *req_of_dmreq(struct crypt_config *cc, struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq)
|
|
{
|
|
return (void *)((char *)dmreq - cc->dmreq_start);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static u8 *iv_of_dmreq(struct crypt_config *cc,
|
|
struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq)
|
|
{
|
|
if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc))
|
|
return (u8 *)ALIGN((unsigned long)(dmreq + 1),
|
|
crypto_aead_alignmask(any_tfm_aead(cc)) + 1);
|
|
else
|
|
return (u8 *)ALIGN((unsigned long)(dmreq + 1),
|
|
crypto_skcipher_alignmask(any_tfm(cc)) + 1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static u8 *org_iv_of_dmreq(struct crypt_config *cc,
|
|
struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq)
|
|
{
|
|
return iv_of_dmreq(cc, dmreq) + cc->iv_size;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static __le64 *org_sector_of_dmreq(struct crypt_config *cc,
|
|
struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq)
|
|
{
|
|
u8 *ptr = iv_of_dmreq(cc, dmreq) + cc->iv_size + cc->iv_size;
|
|
|
|
return (__le64 *) ptr;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static unsigned int *org_tag_of_dmreq(struct crypt_config *cc,
|
|
struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq)
|
|
{
|
|
u8 *ptr = iv_of_dmreq(cc, dmreq) + cc->iv_size +
|
|
cc->iv_size + sizeof(uint64_t);
|
|
|
|
return (unsigned int *)ptr;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void *tag_from_dmreq(struct crypt_config *cc,
|
|
struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq)
|
|
{
|
|
struct convert_context *ctx = dmreq->ctx;
|
|
struct dm_crypt_io *io = container_of(ctx, struct dm_crypt_io, ctx);
|
|
|
|
return &io->integrity_metadata[*org_tag_of_dmreq(cc, dmreq) *
|
|
cc->on_disk_tag_size];
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void *iv_tag_from_dmreq(struct crypt_config *cc,
|
|
struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq)
|
|
{
|
|
return tag_from_dmreq(cc, dmreq) + cc->integrity_tag_size;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int crypt_convert_block_aead(struct crypt_config *cc,
|
|
struct convert_context *ctx,
|
|
struct aead_request *req,
|
|
unsigned int tag_offset)
|
|
{
|
|
struct bio_vec bv_in = bio_iter_iovec(ctx->bio_in, ctx->iter_in);
|
|
struct bio_vec bv_out = bio_iter_iovec(ctx->bio_out, ctx->iter_out);
|
|
struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq;
|
|
u8 *iv, *org_iv, *tag_iv, *tag;
|
|
__le64 *sector;
|
|
int r = 0;
|
|
|
|
BUG_ON(cc->integrity_iv_size && cc->integrity_iv_size != cc->iv_size);
|
|
|
|
/* Reject unexpected unaligned bio. */
|
|
if (unlikely(bv_in.bv_len & (cc->sector_size - 1)))
|
|
return -EIO;
|
|
|
|
dmreq = dmreq_of_req(cc, req);
|
|
dmreq->iv_sector = ctx->cc_sector;
|
|
if (test_bit(CRYPT_IV_LARGE_SECTORS, &cc->cipher_flags))
|
|
dmreq->iv_sector >>= cc->sector_shift;
|
|
dmreq->ctx = ctx;
|
|
|
|
*org_tag_of_dmreq(cc, dmreq) = tag_offset;
|
|
|
|
sector = org_sector_of_dmreq(cc, dmreq);
|
|
*sector = cpu_to_le64(ctx->cc_sector - cc->iv_offset);
|
|
|
|
iv = iv_of_dmreq(cc, dmreq);
|
|
org_iv = org_iv_of_dmreq(cc, dmreq);
|
|
tag = tag_from_dmreq(cc, dmreq);
|
|
tag_iv = iv_tag_from_dmreq(cc, dmreq);
|
|
|
|
/* AEAD request:
|
|
* |----- AAD -------|------ DATA -------|-- AUTH TAG --|
|
|
* | (authenticated) | (auth+encryption) | |
|
|
* | sector_LE | IV | sector in/out | tag in/out |
|
|
*/
|
|
sg_init_table(dmreq->sg_in, 4);
|
|
sg_set_buf(&dmreq->sg_in[0], sector, sizeof(uint64_t));
|
|
sg_set_buf(&dmreq->sg_in[1], org_iv, cc->iv_size);
|
|
sg_set_page(&dmreq->sg_in[2], bv_in.bv_page, cc->sector_size, bv_in.bv_offset);
|
|
sg_set_buf(&dmreq->sg_in[3], tag, cc->integrity_tag_size);
|
|
|
|
sg_init_table(dmreq->sg_out, 4);
|
|
sg_set_buf(&dmreq->sg_out[0], sector, sizeof(uint64_t));
|
|
sg_set_buf(&dmreq->sg_out[1], org_iv, cc->iv_size);
|
|
sg_set_page(&dmreq->sg_out[2], bv_out.bv_page, cc->sector_size, bv_out.bv_offset);
|
|
sg_set_buf(&dmreq->sg_out[3], tag, cc->integrity_tag_size);
|
|
|
|
if (cc->iv_gen_ops) {
|
|
/* For READs use IV stored in integrity metadata */
|
|
if (cc->integrity_iv_size && bio_data_dir(ctx->bio_in) != WRITE) {
|
|
memcpy(org_iv, tag_iv, cc->iv_size);
|
|
} else {
|
|
r = cc->iv_gen_ops->generator(cc, org_iv, dmreq);
|
|
if (r < 0)
|
|
return r;
|
|
/* Store generated IV in integrity metadata */
|
|
if (cc->integrity_iv_size)
|
|
memcpy(tag_iv, org_iv, cc->iv_size);
|
|
}
|
|
/* Working copy of IV, to be modified in crypto API */
|
|
memcpy(iv, org_iv, cc->iv_size);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
aead_request_set_ad(req, sizeof(uint64_t) + cc->iv_size);
|
|
if (bio_data_dir(ctx->bio_in) == WRITE) {
|
|
aead_request_set_crypt(req, dmreq->sg_in, dmreq->sg_out,
|
|
cc->sector_size, iv);
|
|
r = crypto_aead_encrypt(req);
|
|
if (cc->integrity_tag_size + cc->integrity_iv_size != cc->on_disk_tag_size)
|
|
memset(tag + cc->integrity_tag_size + cc->integrity_iv_size, 0,
|
|
cc->on_disk_tag_size - (cc->integrity_tag_size + cc->integrity_iv_size));
|
|
} else {
|
|
aead_request_set_crypt(req, dmreq->sg_in, dmreq->sg_out,
|
|
cc->sector_size + cc->integrity_tag_size, iv);
|
|
r = crypto_aead_decrypt(req);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (r == -EBADMSG) {
|
|
sector_t s = le64_to_cpu(*sector);
|
|
|
|
DMERR_LIMIT("%pg: INTEGRITY AEAD ERROR, sector %llu",
|
|
ctx->bio_in->bi_bdev, s);
|
|
dm_audit_log_bio(DM_MSG_PREFIX, "integrity-aead",
|
|
ctx->bio_in, s, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!r && cc->iv_gen_ops && cc->iv_gen_ops->post)
|
|
r = cc->iv_gen_ops->post(cc, org_iv, dmreq);
|
|
|
|
bio_advance_iter(ctx->bio_in, &ctx->iter_in, cc->sector_size);
|
|
bio_advance_iter(ctx->bio_out, &ctx->iter_out, cc->sector_size);
|
|
|
|
return r;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int crypt_convert_block_skcipher(struct crypt_config *cc,
|
|
struct convert_context *ctx,
|
|
struct skcipher_request *req,
|
|
unsigned int tag_offset)
|
|
{
|
|
struct bio_vec bv_in = bio_iter_iovec(ctx->bio_in, ctx->iter_in);
|
|
struct bio_vec bv_out = bio_iter_iovec(ctx->bio_out, ctx->iter_out);
|
|
struct scatterlist *sg_in, *sg_out;
|
|
struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq;
|
|
u8 *iv, *org_iv, *tag_iv;
|
|
__le64 *sector;
|
|
int r = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Reject unexpected unaligned bio. */
|
|
if (unlikely(bv_in.bv_len & (cc->sector_size - 1)))
|
|
return -EIO;
|
|
|
|
dmreq = dmreq_of_req(cc, req);
|
|
dmreq->iv_sector = ctx->cc_sector;
|
|
if (test_bit(CRYPT_IV_LARGE_SECTORS, &cc->cipher_flags))
|
|
dmreq->iv_sector >>= cc->sector_shift;
|
|
dmreq->ctx = ctx;
|
|
|
|
*org_tag_of_dmreq(cc, dmreq) = tag_offset;
|
|
|
|
iv = iv_of_dmreq(cc, dmreq);
|
|
org_iv = org_iv_of_dmreq(cc, dmreq);
|
|
tag_iv = iv_tag_from_dmreq(cc, dmreq);
|
|
|
|
sector = org_sector_of_dmreq(cc, dmreq);
|
|
*sector = cpu_to_le64(ctx->cc_sector - cc->iv_offset);
|
|
|
|
/* For skcipher we use only the first sg item */
|
|
sg_in = &dmreq->sg_in[0];
|
|
sg_out = &dmreq->sg_out[0];
|
|
|
|
sg_init_table(sg_in, 1);
|
|
sg_set_page(sg_in, bv_in.bv_page, cc->sector_size, bv_in.bv_offset);
|
|
|
|
sg_init_table(sg_out, 1);
|
|
sg_set_page(sg_out, bv_out.bv_page, cc->sector_size, bv_out.bv_offset);
|
|
|
|
if (cc->iv_gen_ops) {
|
|
/* For READs use IV stored in integrity metadata */
|
|
if (cc->integrity_iv_size && bio_data_dir(ctx->bio_in) != WRITE) {
|
|
memcpy(org_iv, tag_iv, cc->integrity_iv_size);
|
|
} else {
|
|
r = cc->iv_gen_ops->generator(cc, org_iv, dmreq);
|
|
if (r < 0)
|
|
return r;
|
|
/* Data can be already preprocessed in generator */
|
|
if (test_bit(CRYPT_ENCRYPT_PREPROCESS, &cc->cipher_flags))
|
|
sg_in = sg_out;
|
|
/* Store generated IV in integrity metadata */
|
|
if (cc->integrity_iv_size)
|
|
memcpy(tag_iv, org_iv, cc->integrity_iv_size);
|
|
}
|
|
/* Working copy of IV, to be modified in crypto API */
|
|
memcpy(iv, org_iv, cc->iv_size);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg_in, sg_out, cc->sector_size, iv);
|
|
|
|
if (bio_data_dir(ctx->bio_in) == WRITE)
|
|
r = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req);
|
|
else
|
|
r = crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req);
|
|
|
|
if (!r && cc->iv_gen_ops && cc->iv_gen_ops->post)
|
|
r = cc->iv_gen_ops->post(cc, org_iv, dmreq);
|
|
|
|
bio_advance_iter(ctx->bio_in, &ctx->iter_in, cc->sector_size);
|
|
bio_advance_iter(ctx->bio_out, &ctx->iter_out, cc->sector_size);
|
|
|
|
return r;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void kcryptd_async_done(void *async_req, int error);
|
|
|
|
static int crypt_alloc_req_skcipher(struct crypt_config *cc,
|
|
struct convert_context *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned int key_index = ctx->cc_sector & (cc->tfms_count - 1);
|
|
|
|
if (!ctx->r.req) {
|
|
ctx->r.req = mempool_alloc(&cc->req_pool, in_interrupt() ? GFP_ATOMIC : GFP_NOIO);
|
|
if (!ctx->r.req)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
skcipher_request_set_tfm(ctx->r.req, cc->cipher_tfm.tfms[key_index]);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Use REQ_MAY_BACKLOG so a cipher driver internally backlogs
|
|
* requests if driver request queue is full.
|
|
*/
|
|
skcipher_request_set_callback(ctx->r.req,
|
|
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
|
|
kcryptd_async_done, dmreq_of_req(cc, ctx->r.req));
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int crypt_alloc_req_aead(struct crypt_config *cc,
|
|
struct convert_context *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!ctx->r.req_aead) {
|
|
ctx->r.req_aead = mempool_alloc(&cc->req_pool, in_interrupt() ? GFP_ATOMIC : GFP_NOIO);
|
|
if (!ctx->r.req_aead)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
aead_request_set_tfm(ctx->r.req_aead, cc->cipher_tfm.tfms_aead[0]);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Use REQ_MAY_BACKLOG so a cipher driver internally backlogs
|
|
* requests if driver request queue is full.
|
|
*/
|
|
aead_request_set_callback(ctx->r.req_aead,
|
|
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
|
|
kcryptd_async_done, dmreq_of_req(cc, ctx->r.req_aead));
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int crypt_alloc_req(struct crypt_config *cc,
|
|
struct convert_context *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc))
|
|
return crypt_alloc_req_aead(cc, ctx);
|
|
else
|
|
return crypt_alloc_req_skcipher(cc, ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void crypt_free_req_skcipher(struct crypt_config *cc,
|
|
struct skcipher_request *req, struct bio *base_bio)
|
|
{
|
|
struct dm_crypt_io *io = dm_per_bio_data(base_bio, cc->per_bio_data_size);
|
|
|
|
if ((struct skcipher_request *)(io + 1) != req)
|
|
mempool_free(req, &cc->req_pool);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void crypt_free_req_aead(struct crypt_config *cc,
|
|
struct aead_request *req, struct bio *base_bio)
|
|
{
|
|
struct dm_crypt_io *io = dm_per_bio_data(base_bio, cc->per_bio_data_size);
|
|
|
|
if ((struct aead_request *)(io + 1) != req)
|
|
mempool_free(req, &cc->req_pool);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void crypt_free_req(struct crypt_config *cc, void *req, struct bio *base_bio)
|
|
{
|
|
if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc))
|
|
crypt_free_req_aead(cc, req, base_bio);
|
|
else
|
|
crypt_free_req_skcipher(cc, req, base_bio);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Encrypt / decrypt data from one bio to another one (can be the same one)
|
|
*/
|
|
static blk_status_t crypt_convert(struct crypt_config *cc,
|
|
struct convert_context *ctx, bool atomic, bool reset_pending)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned int tag_offset = 0;
|
|
unsigned int sector_step = cc->sector_size >> SECTOR_SHIFT;
|
|
int r;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* if reset_pending is set we are dealing with the bio for the first time,
|
|
* else we're continuing to work on the previous bio, so don't mess with
|
|
* the cc_pending counter
|
|
*/
|
|
if (reset_pending)
|
|
atomic_set(&ctx->cc_pending, 1);
|
|
|
|
while (ctx->iter_in.bi_size && ctx->iter_out.bi_size) {
|
|
|
|
r = crypt_alloc_req(cc, ctx);
|
|
if (r) {
|
|
complete(&ctx->restart);
|
|
return BLK_STS_DEV_RESOURCE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
atomic_inc(&ctx->cc_pending);
|
|
|
|
if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc))
|
|
r = crypt_convert_block_aead(cc, ctx, ctx->r.req_aead, tag_offset);
|
|
else
|
|
r = crypt_convert_block_skcipher(cc, ctx, ctx->r.req, tag_offset);
|
|
|
|
switch (r) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* The request was queued by a crypto driver
|
|
* but the driver request queue is full, let's wait.
|
|
*/
|
|
case -EBUSY:
|
|
if (in_interrupt()) {
|
|
if (try_wait_for_completion(&ctx->restart)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* we don't have to block to wait for completion,
|
|
* so proceed
|
|
*/
|
|
} else {
|
|
/*
|
|
* we can't wait for completion without blocking
|
|
* exit and continue processing in a workqueue
|
|
*/
|
|
ctx->r.req = NULL;
|
|
ctx->cc_sector += sector_step;
|
|
tag_offset++;
|
|
return BLK_STS_DEV_RESOURCE;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
wait_for_completion(&ctx->restart);
|
|
}
|
|
reinit_completion(&ctx->restart);
|
|
fallthrough;
|
|
/*
|
|
* The request is queued and processed asynchronously,
|
|
* completion function kcryptd_async_done() will be called.
|
|
*/
|
|
case -EINPROGRESS:
|
|
ctx->r.req = NULL;
|
|
ctx->cc_sector += sector_step;
|
|
tag_offset++;
|
|
continue;
|
|
/*
|
|
* The request was already processed (synchronously).
|
|
*/
|
|
case 0:
|
|
atomic_dec(&ctx->cc_pending);
|
|
ctx->cc_sector += sector_step;
|
|
tag_offset++;
|
|
if (!atomic)
|
|
cond_resched();
|
|
continue;
|
|
/*
|
|
* There was a data integrity error.
|
|
*/
|
|
case -EBADMSG:
|
|
atomic_dec(&ctx->cc_pending);
|
|
return BLK_STS_PROTECTION;
|
|
/*
|
|
* There was an error while processing the request.
|
|
*/
|
|
default:
|
|
atomic_dec(&ctx->cc_pending);
|
|
return BLK_STS_IOERR;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void crypt_free_buffer_pages(struct crypt_config *cc, struct bio *clone);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Generate a new unfragmented bio with the given size
|
|
* This should never violate the device limitations (but only because
|
|
* max_segment_size is being constrained to PAGE_SIZE).
|
|
*
|
|
* This function may be called concurrently. If we allocate from the mempool
|
|
* concurrently, there is a possibility of deadlock. For example, if we have
|
|
* mempool of 256 pages, two processes, each wanting 256, pages allocate from
|
|
* the mempool concurrently, it may deadlock in a situation where both processes
|
|
* have allocated 128 pages and the mempool is exhausted.
|
|
*
|
|
* In order to avoid this scenario we allocate the pages under a mutex.
|
|
*
|
|
* In order to not degrade performance with excessive locking, we try
|
|
* non-blocking allocations without a mutex first but on failure we fallback
|
|
* to blocking allocations with a mutex.
|
|
*
|
|
* In order to reduce allocation overhead, we try to allocate compound pages in
|
|
* the first pass. If they are not available, we fall back to the mempool.
|
|
*/
|
|
static struct bio *crypt_alloc_buffer(struct dm_crypt_io *io, unsigned int size)
|
|
{
|
|
struct crypt_config *cc = io->cc;
|
|
struct bio *clone;
|
|
unsigned int nr_iovecs = (size + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
|
|
gfp_t gfp_mask = GFP_NOWAIT | __GFP_HIGHMEM;
|
|
unsigned int remaining_size;
|
|
unsigned int order = MAX_ORDER - 1;
|
|
|
|
retry:
|
|
if (unlikely(gfp_mask & __GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM))
|
|
mutex_lock(&cc->bio_alloc_lock);
|
|
|
|
clone = bio_alloc_bioset(cc->dev->bdev, nr_iovecs, io->base_bio->bi_opf,
|
|
GFP_NOIO, &cc->bs);
|
|
clone->bi_private = io;
|
|
clone->bi_end_io = crypt_endio;
|
|
|
|
remaining_size = size;
|
|
|
|
while (remaining_size) {
|
|
struct page *pages;
|
|
unsigned size_to_add;
|
|
unsigned remaining_order = __fls((remaining_size + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
|
|
order = min(order, remaining_order);
|
|
|
|
while (order > 0) {
|
|
if (unlikely(percpu_counter_read_positive(&cc->n_allocated_pages) +
|
|
(1 << order) > dm_crypt_pages_per_client))
|
|
goto decrease_order;
|
|
pages = alloc_pages(gfp_mask
|
|
| __GFP_NOMEMALLOC | __GFP_NORETRY | __GFP_NOWARN | __GFP_COMP,
|
|
order);
|
|
if (likely(pages != NULL)) {
|
|
percpu_counter_add(&cc->n_allocated_pages, 1 << order);
|
|
goto have_pages;
|
|
}
|
|
decrease_order:
|
|
order--;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pages = mempool_alloc(&cc->page_pool, gfp_mask);
|
|
if (!pages) {
|
|
crypt_free_buffer_pages(cc, clone);
|
|
bio_put(clone);
|
|
gfp_mask |= __GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM;
|
|
order = 0;
|
|
goto retry;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
have_pages:
|
|
size_to_add = min((unsigned)PAGE_SIZE << order, remaining_size);
|
|
__bio_add_page(clone, pages, size_to_add, 0);
|
|
remaining_size -= size_to_add;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Allocate space for integrity tags */
|
|
if (dm_crypt_integrity_io_alloc(io, clone)) {
|
|
crypt_free_buffer_pages(cc, clone);
|
|
bio_put(clone);
|
|
clone = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(gfp_mask & __GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM))
|
|
mutex_unlock(&cc->bio_alloc_lock);
|
|
|
|
return clone;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void crypt_free_buffer_pages(struct crypt_config *cc, struct bio *clone)
|
|
{
|
|
struct folio_iter fi;
|
|
|
|
if (clone->bi_vcnt > 0) { /* bio_for_each_folio_all crashes with an empty bio */
|
|
bio_for_each_folio_all(fi, clone) {
|
|
if (folio_test_large(fi.folio)) {
|
|
percpu_counter_sub(&cc->n_allocated_pages,
|
|
1 << folio_order(fi.folio));
|
|
folio_put(fi.folio);
|
|
} else {
|
|
mempool_free(&fi.folio->page, &cc->page_pool);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void crypt_io_init(struct dm_crypt_io *io, struct crypt_config *cc,
|
|
struct bio *bio, sector_t sector)
|
|
{
|
|
io->cc = cc;
|
|
io->base_bio = bio;
|
|
io->sector = sector;
|
|
io->error = 0;
|
|
io->ctx.r.req = NULL;
|
|
io->integrity_metadata = NULL;
|
|
io->integrity_metadata_from_pool = false;
|
|
io->in_tasklet = false;
|
|
atomic_set(&io->io_pending, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void crypt_inc_pending(struct dm_crypt_io *io)
|
|
{
|
|
atomic_inc(&io->io_pending);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void kcryptd_io_bio_endio(struct work_struct *work)
|
|
{
|
|
struct dm_crypt_io *io = container_of(work, struct dm_crypt_io, work);
|
|
|
|
bio_endio(io->base_bio);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* One of the bios was finished. Check for completion of
|
|
* the whole request and correctly clean up the buffer.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void crypt_dec_pending(struct dm_crypt_io *io)
|
|
{
|
|
struct crypt_config *cc = io->cc;
|
|
struct bio *base_bio = io->base_bio;
|
|
blk_status_t error = io->error;
|
|
|
|
if (!atomic_dec_and_test(&io->io_pending))
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
if (io->ctx.r.req)
|
|
crypt_free_req(cc, io->ctx.r.req, base_bio);
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(io->integrity_metadata_from_pool))
|
|
mempool_free(io->integrity_metadata, &io->cc->tag_pool);
|
|
else
|
|
kfree(io->integrity_metadata);
|
|
|
|
base_bio->bi_status = error;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we are running this function from our tasklet,
|
|
* we can't call bio_endio() here, because it will call
|
|
* clone_endio() from dm.c, which in turn will
|
|
* free the current struct dm_crypt_io structure with
|
|
* our tasklet. In this case we need to delay bio_endio()
|
|
* execution to after the tasklet is done and dequeued.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (io->in_tasklet) {
|
|
INIT_WORK(&io->work, kcryptd_io_bio_endio);
|
|
queue_work(cc->io_queue, &io->work);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bio_endio(base_bio);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* kcryptd/kcryptd_io:
|
|
*
|
|
* Needed because it would be very unwise to do decryption in an
|
|
* interrupt context.
|
|
*
|
|
* kcryptd performs the actual encryption or decryption.
|
|
*
|
|
* kcryptd_io performs the IO submission.
|
|
*
|
|
* They must be separated as otherwise the final stages could be
|
|
* starved by new requests which can block in the first stages due
|
|
* to memory allocation.
|
|
*
|
|
* The work is done per CPU global for all dm-crypt instances.
|
|
* They should not depend on each other and do not block.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void crypt_endio(struct bio *clone)
|
|
{
|
|
struct dm_crypt_io *io = clone->bi_private;
|
|
struct crypt_config *cc = io->cc;
|
|
unsigned int rw = bio_data_dir(clone);
|
|
blk_status_t error;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* free the processed pages
|
|
*/
|
|
if (rw == WRITE)
|
|
crypt_free_buffer_pages(cc, clone);
|
|
|
|
error = clone->bi_status;
|
|
bio_put(clone);
|
|
|
|
if (rw == READ && !error) {
|
|
kcryptd_queue_crypt(io);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(error))
|
|
io->error = error;
|
|
|
|
crypt_dec_pending(io);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#define CRYPT_MAP_READ_GFP GFP_NOWAIT
|
|
|
|
static int kcryptd_io_read(struct dm_crypt_io *io, gfp_t gfp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct crypt_config *cc = io->cc;
|
|
struct bio *clone;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We need the original biovec array in order to decrypt the whole bio
|
|
* data *afterwards* -- thanks to immutable biovecs we don't need to
|
|
* worry about the block layer modifying the biovec array; so leverage
|
|
* bio_alloc_clone().
|
|
*/
|
|
clone = bio_alloc_clone(cc->dev->bdev, io->base_bio, gfp, &cc->bs);
|
|
if (!clone)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
clone->bi_private = io;
|
|
clone->bi_end_io = crypt_endio;
|
|
|
|
crypt_inc_pending(io);
|
|
|
|
clone->bi_iter.bi_sector = cc->start + io->sector;
|
|
|
|
if (dm_crypt_integrity_io_alloc(io, clone)) {
|
|
crypt_dec_pending(io);
|
|
bio_put(clone);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
dm_submit_bio_remap(io->base_bio, clone);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void kcryptd_io_read_work(struct work_struct *work)
|
|
{
|
|
struct dm_crypt_io *io = container_of(work, struct dm_crypt_io, work);
|
|
|
|
crypt_inc_pending(io);
|
|
if (kcryptd_io_read(io, GFP_NOIO))
|
|
io->error = BLK_STS_RESOURCE;
|
|
crypt_dec_pending(io);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void kcryptd_queue_read(struct dm_crypt_io *io)
|
|
{
|
|
struct crypt_config *cc = io->cc;
|
|
|
|
INIT_WORK(&io->work, kcryptd_io_read_work);
|
|
queue_work(cc->io_queue, &io->work);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void kcryptd_io_write(struct dm_crypt_io *io)
|
|
{
|
|
struct bio *clone = io->ctx.bio_out;
|
|
|
|
dm_submit_bio_remap(io->base_bio, clone);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#define crypt_io_from_node(node) rb_entry((node), struct dm_crypt_io, rb_node)
|
|
|
|
static int dmcrypt_write(void *data)
|
|
{
|
|
struct crypt_config *cc = data;
|
|
struct dm_crypt_io *io;
|
|
|
|
while (1) {
|
|
struct rb_root write_tree;
|
|
struct blk_plug plug;
|
|
|
|
spin_lock_irq(&cc->write_thread_lock);
|
|
continue_locked:
|
|
|
|
if (!RB_EMPTY_ROOT(&cc->write_tree))
|
|
goto pop_from_list;
|
|
|
|
set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
|
|
|
|
spin_unlock_irq(&cc->write_thread_lock);
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(kthread_should_stop())) {
|
|
set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
schedule();
|
|
|
|
set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
|
|
spin_lock_irq(&cc->write_thread_lock);
|
|
goto continue_locked;
|
|
|
|
pop_from_list:
|
|
write_tree = cc->write_tree;
|
|
cc->write_tree = RB_ROOT;
|
|
spin_unlock_irq(&cc->write_thread_lock);
|
|
|
|
BUG_ON(rb_parent(write_tree.rb_node));
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Note: we cannot walk the tree here with rb_next because
|
|
* the structures may be freed when kcryptd_io_write is called.
|
|
*/
|
|
blk_start_plug(&plug);
|
|
do {
|
|
io = crypt_io_from_node(rb_first(&write_tree));
|
|
rb_erase(&io->rb_node, &write_tree);
|
|
kcryptd_io_write(io);
|
|
cond_resched();
|
|
} while (!RB_EMPTY_ROOT(&write_tree));
|
|
blk_finish_plug(&plug);
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void kcryptd_crypt_write_io_submit(struct dm_crypt_io *io, int async)
|
|
{
|
|
struct bio *clone = io->ctx.bio_out;
|
|
struct crypt_config *cc = io->cc;
|
|
unsigned long flags;
|
|
sector_t sector;
|
|
struct rb_node **rbp, *parent;
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(io->error)) {
|
|
crypt_free_buffer_pages(cc, clone);
|
|
bio_put(clone);
|
|
crypt_dec_pending(io);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* crypt_convert should have filled the clone bio */
|
|
BUG_ON(io->ctx.iter_out.bi_size);
|
|
|
|
clone->bi_iter.bi_sector = cc->start + io->sector;
|
|
|
|
if ((likely(!async) && test_bit(DM_CRYPT_NO_OFFLOAD, &cc->flags)) ||
|
|
test_bit(DM_CRYPT_NO_WRITE_WORKQUEUE, &cc->flags)) {
|
|
dm_submit_bio_remap(io->base_bio, clone);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
spin_lock_irqsave(&cc->write_thread_lock, flags);
|
|
if (RB_EMPTY_ROOT(&cc->write_tree))
|
|
wake_up_process(cc->write_thread);
|
|
rbp = &cc->write_tree.rb_node;
|
|
parent = NULL;
|
|
sector = io->sector;
|
|
while (*rbp) {
|
|
parent = *rbp;
|
|
if (sector < crypt_io_from_node(parent)->sector)
|
|
rbp = &(*rbp)->rb_left;
|
|
else
|
|
rbp = &(*rbp)->rb_right;
|
|
}
|
|
rb_link_node(&io->rb_node, parent, rbp);
|
|
rb_insert_color(&io->rb_node, &cc->write_tree);
|
|
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cc->write_thread_lock, flags);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool kcryptd_crypt_write_inline(struct crypt_config *cc,
|
|
struct convert_context *ctx)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
if (!test_bit(DM_CRYPT_WRITE_INLINE, &cc->flags))
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Note: zone append writes (REQ_OP_ZONE_APPEND) do not have ordering
|
|
* constraints so they do not need to be issued inline by
|
|
* kcryptd_crypt_write_convert().
|
|
*/
|
|
switch (bio_op(ctx->bio_in)) {
|
|
case REQ_OP_WRITE:
|
|
case REQ_OP_WRITE_ZEROES:
|
|
return true;
|
|
default:
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void kcryptd_crypt_write_continue(struct work_struct *work)
|
|
{
|
|
struct dm_crypt_io *io = container_of(work, struct dm_crypt_io, work);
|
|
struct crypt_config *cc = io->cc;
|
|
struct convert_context *ctx = &io->ctx;
|
|
int crypt_finished;
|
|
sector_t sector = io->sector;
|
|
blk_status_t r;
|
|
|
|
wait_for_completion(&ctx->restart);
|
|
reinit_completion(&ctx->restart);
|
|
|
|
r = crypt_convert(cc, &io->ctx, true, false);
|
|
if (r)
|
|
io->error = r;
|
|
crypt_finished = atomic_dec_and_test(&ctx->cc_pending);
|
|
if (!crypt_finished && kcryptd_crypt_write_inline(cc, ctx)) {
|
|
/* Wait for completion signaled by kcryptd_async_done() */
|
|
wait_for_completion(&ctx->restart);
|
|
crypt_finished = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Encryption was already finished, submit io now */
|
|
if (crypt_finished) {
|
|
kcryptd_crypt_write_io_submit(io, 0);
|
|
io->sector = sector;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
crypt_dec_pending(io);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void kcryptd_crypt_write_convert(struct dm_crypt_io *io)
|
|
{
|
|
struct crypt_config *cc = io->cc;
|
|
struct convert_context *ctx = &io->ctx;
|
|
struct bio *clone;
|
|
int crypt_finished;
|
|
sector_t sector = io->sector;
|
|
blk_status_t r;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Prevent io from disappearing until this function completes.
|
|
*/
|
|
crypt_inc_pending(io);
|
|
crypt_convert_init(cc, ctx, NULL, io->base_bio, sector);
|
|
|
|
clone = crypt_alloc_buffer(io, io->base_bio->bi_iter.bi_size);
|
|
if (unlikely(!clone)) {
|
|
io->error = BLK_STS_IOERR;
|
|
goto dec;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
io->ctx.bio_out = clone;
|
|
io->ctx.iter_out = clone->bi_iter;
|
|
|
|
sector += bio_sectors(clone);
|
|
|
|
crypt_inc_pending(io);
|
|
r = crypt_convert(cc, ctx,
|
|
test_bit(DM_CRYPT_NO_WRITE_WORKQUEUE, &cc->flags), true);
|
|
/*
|
|
* Crypto API backlogged the request, because its queue was full
|
|
* and we're in softirq context, so continue from a workqueue
|
|
* (TODO: is it actually possible to be in softirq in the write path?)
|
|
*/
|
|
if (r == BLK_STS_DEV_RESOURCE) {
|
|
INIT_WORK(&io->work, kcryptd_crypt_write_continue);
|
|
queue_work(cc->crypt_queue, &io->work);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
if (r)
|
|
io->error = r;
|
|
crypt_finished = atomic_dec_and_test(&ctx->cc_pending);
|
|
if (!crypt_finished && kcryptd_crypt_write_inline(cc, ctx)) {
|
|
/* Wait for completion signaled by kcryptd_async_done() */
|
|
wait_for_completion(&ctx->restart);
|
|
crypt_finished = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Encryption was already finished, submit io now */
|
|
if (crypt_finished) {
|
|
kcryptd_crypt_write_io_submit(io, 0);
|
|
io->sector = sector;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
dec:
|
|
crypt_dec_pending(io);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void kcryptd_crypt_read_done(struct dm_crypt_io *io)
|
|
{
|
|
crypt_dec_pending(io);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void kcryptd_crypt_read_continue(struct work_struct *work)
|
|
{
|
|
struct dm_crypt_io *io = container_of(work, struct dm_crypt_io, work);
|
|
struct crypt_config *cc = io->cc;
|
|
blk_status_t r;
|
|
|
|
wait_for_completion(&io->ctx.restart);
|
|
reinit_completion(&io->ctx.restart);
|
|
|
|
r = crypt_convert(cc, &io->ctx, true, false);
|
|
if (r)
|
|
io->error = r;
|
|
|
|
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&io->ctx.cc_pending))
|
|
kcryptd_crypt_read_done(io);
|
|
|
|
crypt_dec_pending(io);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void kcryptd_crypt_read_convert(struct dm_crypt_io *io)
|
|
{
|
|
struct crypt_config *cc = io->cc;
|
|
blk_status_t r;
|
|
|
|
crypt_inc_pending(io);
|
|
|
|
crypt_convert_init(cc, &io->ctx, io->base_bio, io->base_bio,
|
|
io->sector);
|
|
|
|
r = crypt_convert(cc, &io->ctx,
|
|
test_bit(DM_CRYPT_NO_READ_WORKQUEUE, &cc->flags), true);
|
|
/*
|
|
* Crypto API backlogged the request, because its queue was full
|
|
* and we're in softirq context, so continue from a workqueue
|
|
*/
|
|
if (r == BLK_STS_DEV_RESOURCE) {
|
|
INIT_WORK(&io->work, kcryptd_crypt_read_continue);
|
|
queue_work(cc->crypt_queue, &io->work);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
if (r)
|
|
io->error = r;
|
|
|
|
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&io->ctx.cc_pending))
|
|
kcryptd_crypt_read_done(io);
|
|
|
|
crypt_dec_pending(io);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void kcryptd_async_done(void *data, int error)
|
|
{
|
|
struct dm_crypt_request *dmreq = data;
|
|
struct convert_context *ctx = dmreq->ctx;
|
|
struct dm_crypt_io *io = container_of(ctx, struct dm_crypt_io, ctx);
|
|
struct crypt_config *cc = io->cc;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* A request from crypto driver backlog is going to be processed now,
|
|
* finish the completion and continue in crypt_convert().
|
|
* (Callback will be called for the second time for this request.)
|
|
*/
|
|
if (error == -EINPROGRESS) {
|
|
complete(&ctx->restart);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!error && cc->iv_gen_ops && cc->iv_gen_ops->post)
|
|
error = cc->iv_gen_ops->post(cc, org_iv_of_dmreq(cc, dmreq), dmreq);
|
|
|
|
if (error == -EBADMSG) {
|
|
sector_t s = le64_to_cpu(*org_sector_of_dmreq(cc, dmreq));
|
|
|
|
DMERR_LIMIT("%pg: INTEGRITY AEAD ERROR, sector %llu",
|
|
ctx->bio_in->bi_bdev, s);
|
|
dm_audit_log_bio(DM_MSG_PREFIX, "integrity-aead",
|
|
ctx->bio_in, s, 0);
|
|
io->error = BLK_STS_PROTECTION;
|
|
} else if (error < 0)
|
|
io->error = BLK_STS_IOERR;
|
|
|
|
crypt_free_req(cc, req_of_dmreq(cc, dmreq), io->base_bio);
|
|
|
|
if (!atomic_dec_and_test(&ctx->cc_pending))
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The request is fully completed: for inline writes, let
|
|
* kcryptd_crypt_write_convert() do the IO submission.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (bio_data_dir(io->base_bio) == READ) {
|
|
kcryptd_crypt_read_done(io);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (kcryptd_crypt_write_inline(cc, ctx)) {
|
|
complete(&ctx->restart);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
kcryptd_crypt_write_io_submit(io, 1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void kcryptd_crypt(struct work_struct *work)
|
|
{
|
|
struct dm_crypt_io *io = container_of(work, struct dm_crypt_io, work);
|
|
|
|
if (bio_data_dir(io->base_bio) == READ)
|
|
kcryptd_crypt_read_convert(io);
|
|
else
|
|
kcryptd_crypt_write_convert(io);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void kcryptd_crypt_tasklet(unsigned long work)
|
|
{
|
|
kcryptd_crypt((struct work_struct *)work);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void kcryptd_queue_crypt(struct dm_crypt_io *io)
|
|
{
|
|
struct crypt_config *cc = io->cc;
|
|
|
|
if ((bio_data_dir(io->base_bio) == READ && test_bit(DM_CRYPT_NO_READ_WORKQUEUE, &cc->flags)) ||
|
|
(bio_data_dir(io->base_bio) == WRITE && test_bit(DM_CRYPT_NO_WRITE_WORKQUEUE, &cc->flags))) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* in_hardirq(): Crypto API's skcipher_walk_first() refuses to work in hard IRQ context.
|
|
* irqs_disabled(): the kernel may run some IO completion from the idle thread, but
|
|
* it is being executed with irqs disabled.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (in_hardirq() || irqs_disabled()) {
|
|
io->in_tasklet = true;
|
|
tasklet_init(&io->tasklet, kcryptd_crypt_tasklet, (unsigned long)&io->work);
|
|
tasklet_schedule(&io->tasklet);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
kcryptd_crypt(&io->work);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
INIT_WORK(&io->work, kcryptd_crypt);
|
|
queue_work(cc->crypt_queue, &io->work);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void crypt_free_tfms_aead(struct crypt_config *cc)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!cc->cipher_tfm.tfms_aead)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
if (cc->cipher_tfm.tfms_aead[0] && !IS_ERR(cc->cipher_tfm.tfms_aead[0])) {
|
|
crypto_free_aead(cc->cipher_tfm.tfms_aead[0]);
|
|
cc->cipher_tfm.tfms_aead[0] = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
kfree(cc->cipher_tfm.tfms_aead);
|
|
cc->cipher_tfm.tfms_aead = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void crypt_free_tfms_skcipher(struct crypt_config *cc)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned int i;
|
|
|
|
if (!cc->cipher_tfm.tfms)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < cc->tfms_count; i++)
|
|
if (cc->cipher_tfm.tfms[i] && !IS_ERR(cc->cipher_tfm.tfms[i])) {
|
|
crypto_free_skcipher(cc->cipher_tfm.tfms[i]);
|
|
cc->cipher_tfm.tfms[i] = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
kfree(cc->cipher_tfm.tfms);
|
|
cc->cipher_tfm.tfms = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void crypt_free_tfms(struct crypt_config *cc)
|
|
{
|
|
if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc))
|
|
crypt_free_tfms_aead(cc);
|
|
else
|
|
crypt_free_tfms_skcipher(cc);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int crypt_alloc_tfms_skcipher(struct crypt_config *cc, char *ciphermode)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned int i;
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
cc->cipher_tfm.tfms = kcalloc(cc->tfms_count,
|
|
sizeof(struct crypto_skcipher *),
|
|
GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!cc->cipher_tfm.tfms)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < cc->tfms_count; i++) {
|
|
cc->cipher_tfm.tfms[i] = crypto_alloc_skcipher(ciphermode, 0,
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_ALLOCATES_MEMORY);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(cc->cipher_tfm.tfms[i])) {
|
|
err = PTR_ERR(cc->cipher_tfm.tfms[i]);
|
|
crypt_free_tfms(cc);
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* dm-crypt performance can vary greatly depending on which crypto
|
|
* algorithm implementation is used. Help people debug performance
|
|
* problems by logging the ->cra_driver_name.
|
|
*/
|
|
DMDEBUG_LIMIT("%s using implementation \"%s\"", ciphermode,
|
|
crypto_skcipher_alg(any_tfm(cc))->base.cra_driver_name);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int crypt_alloc_tfms_aead(struct crypt_config *cc, char *ciphermode)
|
|
{
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
cc->cipher_tfm.tfms = kmalloc(sizeof(struct crypto_aead *), GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!cc->cipher_tfm.tfms)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
cc->cipher_tfm.tfms_aead[0] = crypto_alloc_aead(ciphermode, 0,
|
|
CRYPTO_ALG_ALLOCATES_MEMORY);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(cc->cipher_tfm.tfms_aead[0])) {
|
|
err = PTR_ERR(cc->cipher_tfm.tfms_aead[0]);
|
|
crypt_free_tfms(cc);
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
DMDEBUG_LIMIT("%s using implementation \"%s\"", ciphermode,
|
|
crypto_aead_alg(any_tfm_aead(cc))->base.cra_driver_name);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int crypt_alloc_tfms(struct crypt_config *cc, char *ciphermode)
|
|
{
|
|
if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc))
|
|
return crypt_alloc_tfms_aead(cc, ciphermode);
|
|
else
|
|
return crypt_alloc_tfms_skcipher(cc, ciphermode);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static unsigned int crypt_subkey_size(struct crypt_config *cc)
|
|
{
|
|
return (cc->key_size - cc->key_extra_size) >> ilog2(cc->tfms_count);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static unsigned int crypt_authenckey_size(struct crypt_config *cc)
|
|
{
|
|
return crypt_subkey_size(cc) + RTA_SPACE(sizeof(struct crypto_authenc_key_param));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If AEAD is composed like authenc(hmac(sha256),xts(aes)),
|
|
* the key must be for some reason in special format.
|
|
* This funcion converts cc->key to this special format.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void crypt_copy_authenckey(char *p, const void *key,
|
|
unsigned int enckeylen, unsigned int authkeylen)
|
|
{
|
|
struct crypto_authenc_key_param *param;
|
|
struct rtattr *rta;
|
|
|
|
rta = (struct rtattr *)p;
|
|
param = RTA_DATA(rta);
|
|
param->enckeylen = cpu_to_be32(enckeylen);
|
|
rta->rta_len = RTA_LENGTH(sizeof(*param));
|
|
rta->rta_type = CRYPTO_AUTHENC_KEYA_PARAM;
|
|
p += RTA_SPACE(sizeof(*param));
|
|
memcpy(p, key + enckeylen, authkeylen);
|
|
p += authkeylen;
|
|
memcpy(p, key, enckeylen);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int crypt_setkey(struct crypt_config *cc)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned int subkey_size;
|
|
int err = 0, i, r;
|
|
|
|
/* Ignore extra keys (which are used for IV etc) */
|
|
subkey_size = crypt_subkey_size(cc);
|
|
|
|
if (crypt_integrity_hmac(cc)) {
|
|
if (subkey_size < cc->key_mac_size)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
crypt_copy_authenckey(cc->authenc_key, cc->key,
|
|
subkey_size - cc->key_mac_size,
|
|
cc->key_mac_size);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < cc->tfms_count; i++) {
|
|
if (crypt_integrity_hmac(cc))
|
|
r = crypto_aead_setkey(cc->cipher_tfm.tfms_aead[i],
|
|
cc->authenc_key, crypt_authenckey_size(cc));
|
|
else if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc))
|
|
r = crypto_aead_setkey(cc->cipher_tfm.tfms_aead[i],
|
|
cc->key + (i * subkey_size),
|
|
subkey_size);
|
|
else
|
|
r = crypto_skcipher_setkey(cc->cipher_tfm.tfms[i],
|
|
cc->key + (i * subkey_size),
|
|
subkey_size);
|
|
if (r)
|
|
err = r;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (crypt_integrity_hmac(cc))
|
|
memzero_explicit(cc->authenc_key, crypt_authenckey_size(cc));
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
|
|
|
|
static bool contains_whitespace(const char *str)
|
|
{
|
|
while (*str)
|
|
if (isspace(*str++))
|
|
return true;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int set_key_user(struct crypt_config *cc, struct key *key)
|
|
{
|
|
const struct user_key_payload *ukp;
|
|
|
|
ukp = user_key_payload_locked(key);
|
|
if (!ukp)
|
|
return -EKEYREVOKED;
|
|
|
|
if (cc->key_size != ukp->datalen)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(cc->key, ukp->data, cc->key_size);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int set_key_encrypted(struct crypt_config *cc, struct key *key)
|
|
{
|
|
const struct encrypted_key_payload *ekp;
|
|
|
|
ekp = key->payload.data[0];
|
|
if (!ekp)
|
|
return -EKEYREVOKED;
|
|
|
|
if (cc->key_size != ekp->decrypted_datalen)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(cc->key, ekp->decrypted_data, cc->key_size);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int set_key_trusted(struct crypt_config *cc, struct key *key)
|
|
{
|
|
const struct trusted_key_payload *tkp;
|
|
|
|
tkp = key->payload.data[0];
|
|
if (!tkp)
|
|
return -EKEYREVOKED;
|
|
|
|
if (cc->key_size != tkp->key_len)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(cc->key, tkp->key, cc->key_size);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int crypt_set_keyring_key(struct crypt_config *cc, const char *key_string)
|
|
{
|
|
char *new_key_string, *key_desc;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
struct key_type *type;
|
|
struct key *key;
|
|
int (*set_key)(struct crypt_config *cc, struct key *key);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Reject key_string with whitespace. dm core currently lacks code for
|
|
* proper whitespace escaping in arguments on DM_TABLE_STATUS path.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (contains_whitespace(key_string)) {
|
|
DMERR("whitespace chars not allowed in key string");
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* look for next ':' separating key_type from key_description */
|
|
key_desc = strchr(key_string, ':');
|
|
if (!key_desc || key_desc == key_string || !strlen(key_desc + 1))
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
if (!strncmp(key_string, "logon:", key_desc - key_string + 1)) {
|
|
type = &key_type_logon;
|
|
set_key = set_key_user;
|
|
} else if (!strncmp(key_string, "user:", key_desc - key_string + 1)) {
|
|
type = &key_type_user;
|
|
set_key = set_key_user;
|
|
} else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS) &&
|
|
!strncmp(key_string, "encrypted:", key_desc - key_string + 1)) {
|
|
type = &key_type_encrypted;
|
|
set_key = set_key_encrypted;
|
|
} else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) &&
|
|
!strncmp(key_string, "trusted:", key_desc - key_string + 1)) {
|
|
type = &key_type_trusted;
|
|
set_key = set_key_trusted;
|
|
} else {
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
new_key_string = kstrdup(key_string, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!new_key_string)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
key = request_key(type, key_desc + 1, NULL);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
|
|
kfree_sensitive(new_key_string);
|
|
return PTR_ERR(key);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
down_read(&key->sem);
|
|
|
|
ret = set_key(cc, key);
|
|
if (ret < 0) {
|
|
up_read(&key->sem);
|
|
key_put(key);
|
|
kfree_sensitive(new_key_string);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
up_read(&key->sem);
|
|
key_put(key);
|
|
|
|
/* clear the flag since following operations may invalidate previously valid key */
|
|
clear_bit(DM_CRYPT_KEY_VALID, &cc->flags);
|
|
|
|
ret = crypt_setkey(cc);
|
|
|
|
if (!ret) {
|
|
set_bit(DM_CRYPT_KEY_VALID, &cc->flags);
|
|
kfree_sensitive(cc->key_string);
|
|
cc->key_string = new_key_string;
|
|
} else
|
|
kfree_sensitive(new_key_string);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int get_key_size(char **key_string)
|
|
{
|
|
char *colon, dummy;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
if (*key_string[0] != ':')
|
|
return strlen(*key_string) >> 1;
|
|
|
|
/* look for next ':' in key string */
|
|
colon = strpbrk(*key_string + 1, ":");
|
|
if (!colon)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
if (sscanf(*key_string + 1, "%u%c", &ret, &dummy) != 2 || dummy != ':')
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
*key_string = colon;
|
|
|
|
/* remaining key string should be :<logon|user>:<key_desc> */
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
static int crypt_set_keyring_key(struct crypt_config *cc, const char *key_string)
|
|
{
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int get_key_size(char **key_string)
|
|
{
|
|
return (*key_string[0] == ':') ? -EINVAL : (int)(strlen(*key_string) >> 1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
|
|
|
|
static int crypt_set_key(struct crypt_config *cc, char *key)
|
|
{
|
|
int r = -EINVAL;
|
|
int key_string_len = strlen(key);
|
|
|
|
/* Hyphen (which gives a key_size of zero) means there is no key. */
|
|
if (!cc->key_size && strcmp(key, "-"))
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
/* ':' means the key is in kernel keyring, short-circuit normal key processing */
|
|
if (key[0] == ':') {
|
|
r = crypt_set_keyring_key(cc, key + 1);
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* clear the flag since following operations may invalidate previously valid key */
|
|
clear_bit(DM_CRYPT_KEY_VALID, &cc->flags);
|
|
|
|
/* wipe references to any kernel keyring key */
|
|
kfree_sensitive(cc->key_string);
|
|
cc->key_string = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* Decode key from its hex representation. */
|
|
if (cc->key_size && hex2bin(cc->key, key, cc->key_size) < 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
r = crypt_setkey(cc);
|
|
if (!r)
|
|
set_bit(DM_CRYPT_KEY_VALID, &cc->flags);
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
/* Hex key string not needed after here, so wipe it. */
|
|
memset(key, '0', key_string_len);
|
|
|
|
return r;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int crypt_wipe_key(struct crypt_config *cc)
|
|
{
|
|
int r;
|
|
|
|
clear_bit(DM_CRYPT_KEY_VALID, &cc->flags);
|
|
get_random_bytes(&cc->key, cc->key_size);
|
|
|
|
/* Wipe IV private keys */
|
|
if (cc->iv_gen_ops && cc->iv_gen_ops->wipe) {
|
|
r = cc->iv_gen_ops->wipe(cc);
|
|
if (r)
|
|
return r;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
kfree_sensitive(cc->key_string);
|
|
cc->key_string = NULL;
|
|
r = crypt_setkey(cc);
|
|
memset(&cc->key, 0, cc->key_size * sizeof(u8));
|
|
|
|
return r;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void crypt_calculate_pages_per_client(void)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned long pages = (totalram_pages() - totalhigh_pages()) * DM_CRYPT_MEMORY_PERCENT / 100;
|
|
|
|
if (!dm_crypt_clients_n)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
pages /= dm_crypt_clients_n;
|
|
if (pages < DM_CRYPT_MIN_PAGES_PER_CLIENT)
|
|
pages = DM_CRYPT_MIN_PAGES_PER_CLIENT;
|
|
dm_crypt_pages_per_client = pages;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void *crypt_page_alloc(gfp_t gfp_mask, void *pool_data)
|
|
{
|
|
struct crypt_config *cc = pool_data;
|
|
struct page *page;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Note, percpu_counter_read_positive() may over (and under) estimate
|
|
* the current usage by at most (batch - 1) * num_online_cpus() pages,
|
|
* but avoids potential spinlock contention of an exact result.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (unlikely(percpu_counter_read_positive(&cc->n_allocated_pages) >= dm_crypt_pages_per_client) &&
|
|
likely(gfp_mask & __GFP_NORETRY))
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
page = alloc_page(gfp_mask);
|
|
if (likely(page != NULL))
|
|
percpu_counter_add(&cc->n_allocated_pages, 1);
|
|
|
|
return page;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void crypt_page_free(void *page, void *pool_data)
|
|
{
|
|
struct crypt_config *cc = pool_data;
|
|
|
|
__free_page(page);
|
|
percpu_counter_sub(&cc->n_allocated_pages, 1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void crypt_dtr(struct dm_target *ti)
|
|
{
|
|
struct crypt_config *cc = ti->private;
|
|
|
|
ti->private = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (!cc)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
if (cc->write_thread)
|
|
kthread_stop(cc->write_thread);
|
|
|
|
if (cc->io_queue)
|
|
destroy_workqueue(cc->io_queue);
|
|
if (cc->crypt_queue)
|
|
destroy_workqueue(cc->crypt_queue);
|
|
|
|
crypt_free_tfms(cc);
|
|
|
|
bioset_exit(&cc->bs);
|
|
|
|
mempool_exit(&cc->page_pool);
|
|
mempool_exit(&cc->req_pool);
|
|
mempool_exit(&cc->tag_pool);
|
|
|
|
WARN_ON(percpu_counter_sum(&cc->n_allocated_pages) != 0);
|
|
percpu_counter_destroy(&cc->n_allocated_pages);
|
|
|
|
if (cc->iv_gen_ops && cc->iv_gen_ops->dtr)
|
|
cc->iv_gen_ops->dtr(cc);
|
|
|
|
if (cc->dev)
|
|
dm_put_device(ti, cc->dev);
|
|
|
|
kfree_sensitive(cc->cipher_string);
|
|
kfree_sensitive(cc->key_string);
|
|
kfree_sensitive(cc->cipher_auth);
|
|
kfree_sensitive(cc->authenc_key);
|
|
|
|
mutex_destroy(&cc->bio_alloc_lock);
|
|
|
|
/* Must zero key material before freeing */
|
|
kfree_sensitive(cc);
|
|
|
|
spin_lock(&dm_crypt_clients_lock);
|
|
WARN_ON(!dm_crypt_clients_n);
|
|
dm_crypt_clients_n--;
|
|
crypt_calculate_pages_per_client();
|
|
spin_unlock(&dm_crypt_clients_lock);
|
|
|
|
dm_audit_log_dtr(DM_MSG_PREFIX, ti, 1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int crypt_ctr_ivmode(struct dm_target *ti, const char *ivmode)
|
|
{
|
|
struct crypt_config *cc = ti->private;
|
|
|
|
if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc))
|
|
cc->iv_size = crypto_aead_ivsize(any_tfm_aead(cc));
|
|
else
|
|
cc->iv_size = crypto_skcipher_ivsize(any_tfm(cc));
|
|
|
|
if (cc->iv_size)
|
|
/* at least a 64 bit sector number should fit in our buffer */
|
|
cc->iv_size = max(cc->iv_size,
|
|
(unsigned int)(sizeof(u64) / sizeof(u8)));
|
|
else if (ivmode) {
|
|
DMWARN("Selected cipher does not support IVs");
|
|
ivmode = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Choose ivmode, see comments at iv code. */
|
|
if (ivmode == NULL)
|
|
cc->iv_gen_ops = NULL;
|
|
else if (strcmp(ivmode, "plain") == 0)
|
|
cc->iv_gen_ops = &crypt_iv_plain_ops;
|
|
else if (strcmp(ivmode, "plain64") == 0)
|
|
cc->iv_gen_ops = &crypt_iv_plain64_ops;
|
|
else if (strcmp(ivmode, "plain64be") == 0)
|
|
cc->iv_gen_ops = &crypt_iv_plain64be_ops;
|
|
else if (strcmp(ivmode, "essiv") == 0)
|
|
cc->iv_gen_ops = &crypt_iv_essiv_ops;
|
|
else if (strcmp(ivmode, "benbi") == 0)
|
|
cc->iv_gen_ops = &crypt_iv_benbi_ops;
|
|
else if (strcmp(ivmode, "null") == 0)
|
|
cc->iv_gen_ops = &crypt_iv_null_ops;
|
|
else if (strcmp(ivmode, "eboiv") == 0)
|
|
cc->iv_gen_ops = &crypt_iv_eboiv_ops;
|
|
else if (strcmp(ivmode, "elephant") == 0) {
|
|
cc->iv_gen_ops = &crypt_iv_elephant_ops;
|
|
cc->key_parts = 2;
|
|
cc->key_extra_size = cc->key_size / 2;
|
|
if (cc->key_extra_size > ELEPHANT_MAX_KEY_SIZE)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
set_bit(CRYPT_ENCRYPT_PREPROCESS, &cc->cipher_flags);
|
|
} else if (strcmp(ivmode, "lmk") == 0) {
|
|
cc->iv_gen_ops = &crypt_iv_lmk_ops;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Version 2 and 3 is recognised according
|
|
* to length of provided multi-key string.
|
|
* If present (version 3), last key is used as IV seed.
|
|
* All keys (including IV seed) are always the same size.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (cc->key_size % cc->key_parts) {
|
|
cc->key_parts++;
|
|
cc->key_extra_size = cc->key_size / cc->key_parts;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (strcmp(ivmode, "tcw") == 0) {
|
|
cc->iv_gen_ops = &crypt_iv_tcw_ops;
|
|
cc->key_parts += 2; /* IV + whitening */
|
|
cc->key_extra_size = cc->iv_size + TCW_WHITENING_SIZE;
|
|
} else if (strcmp(ivmode, "random") == 0) {
|
|
cc->iv_gen_ops = &crypt_iv_random_ops;
|
|
/* Need storage space in integrity fields. */
|
|
cc->integrity_iv_size = cc->iv_size;
|
|
} else {
|
|
ti->error = "Invalid IV mode";
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Workaround to parse HMAC algorithm from AEAD crypto API spec.
|
|
* The HMAC is needed to calculate tag size (HMAC digest size).
|
|
* This should be probably done by crypto-api calls (once available...)
|
|
*/
|
|
static int crypt_ctr_auth_cipher(struct crypt_config *cc, char *cipher_api)
|
|
{
|
|
char *start, *end, *mac_alg = NULL;
|
|
struct crypto_ahash *mac;
|
|
|
|
if (!strstarts(cipher_api, "authenc("))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
start = strchr(cipher_api, '(');
|
|
end = strchr(cipher_api, ',');
|
|
if (!start || !end || ++start > end)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
mac_alg = kmemdup_nul(start, end - start, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!mac_alg)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
mac = crypto_alloc_ahash(mac_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ALLOCATES_MEMORY);
|
|
kfree(mac_alg);
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(mac))
|
|
return PTR_ERR(mac);
|
|
|
|
cc->key_mac_size = crypto_ahash_digestsize(mac);
|
|
crypto_free_ahash(mac);
|
|
|
|
cc->authenc_key = kmalloc(crypt_authenckey_size(cc), GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!cc->authenc_key)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int crypt_ctr_cipher_new(struct dm_target *ti, char *cipher_in, char *key,
|
|
char **ivmode, char **ivopts)
|
|
{
|
|
struct crypt_config *cc = ti->private;
|
|
char *tmp, *cipher_api, buf[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
|
|
int ret = -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
cc->tfms_count = 1;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* New format (capi: prefix)
|
|
* capi:cipher_api_spec-iv:ivopts
|
|
*/
|
|
tmp = &cipher_in[strlen("capi:")];
|
|
|
|
/* Separate IV options if present, it can contain another '-' in hash name */
|
|
*ivopts = strrchr(tmp, ':');
|
|
if (*ivopts) {
|
|
**ivopts = '\0';
|
|
(*ivopts)++;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Parse IV mode */
|
|
*ivmode = strrchr(tmp, '-');
|
|
if (*ivmode) {
|
|
**ivmode = '\0';
|
|
(*ivmode)++;
|
|
}
|
|
/* The rest is crypto API spec */
|
|
cipher_api = tmp;
|
|
|
|
/* Alloc AEAD, can be used only in new format. */
|
|
if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc)) {
|
|
ret = crypt_ctr_auth_cipher(cc, cipher_api);
|
|
if (ret < 0) {
|
|
ti->error = "Invalid AEAD cipher spec";
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (*ivmode && !strcmp(*ivmode, "lmk"))
|
|
cc->tfms_count = 64;
|
|
|
|
if (*ivmode && !strcmp(*ivmode, "essiv")) {
|
|
if (!*ivopts) {
|
|
ti->error = "Digest algorithm missing for ESSIV mode";
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
ret = snprintf(buf, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "essiv(%s,%s)",
|
|
cipher_api, *ivopts);
|
|
if (ret < 0 || ret >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME) {
|
|
ti->error = "Cannot allocate cipher string";
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
}
|
|
cipher_api = buf;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cc->key_parts = cc->tfms_count;
|
|
|
|
/* Allocate cipher */
|
|
ret = crypt_alloc_tfms(cc, cipher_api);
|
|
if (ret < 0) {
|
|
ti->error = "Error allocating crypto tfm";
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc))
|
|
cc->iv_size = crypto_aead_ivsize(any_tfm_aead(cc));
|
|
else
|
|
cc->iv_size = crypto_skcipher_ivsize(any_tfm(cc));
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int crypt_ctr_cipher_old(struct dm_target *ti, char *cipher_in, char *key,
|
|
char **ivmode, char **ivopts)
|
|
{
|
|
struct crypt_config *cc = ti->private;
|
|
char *tmp, *cipher, *chainmode, *keycount;
|
|
char *cipher_api = NULL;
|
|
int ret = -EINVAL;
|
|
char dummy;
|
|
|
|
if (strchr(cipher_in, '(') || crypt_integrity_aead(cc)) {
|
|
ti->error = "Bad cipher specification";
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Legacy dm-crypt cipher specification
|
|
* cipher[:keycount]-mode-iv:ivopts
|
|
*/
|
|
tmp = cipher_in;
|
|
keycount = strsep(&tmp, "-");
|
|
cipher = strsep(&keycount, ":");
|
|
|
|
if (!keycount)
|
|
cc->tfms_count = 1;
|
|
else if (sscanf(keycount, "%u%c", &cc->tfms_count, &dummy) != 1 ||
|
|
!is_power_of_2(cc->tfms_count)) {
|
|
ti->error = "Bad cipher key count specification";
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
cc->key_parts = cc->tfms_count;
|
|
|
|
chainmode = strsep(&tmp, "-");
|
|
*ivmode = strsep(&tmp, ":");
|
|
*ivopts = tmp;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* For compatibility with the original dm-crypt mapping format, if
|
|
* only the cipher name is supplied, use cbc-plain.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!chainmode || (!strcmp(chainmode, "plain") && !*ivmode)) {
|
|
chainmode = "cbc";
|
|
*ivmode = "plain";
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(chainmode, "ecb") && !*ivmode) {
|
|
ti->error = "IV mechanism required";
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cipher_api = kmalloc(CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!cipher_api)
|
|
goto bad_mem;
|
|
|
|
if (*ivmode && !strcmp(*ivmode, "essiv")) {
|
|
if (!*ivopts) {
|
|
ti->error = "Digest algorithm missing for ESSIV mode";
|
|
kfree(cipher_api);
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
ret = snprintf(cipher_api, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
|
|
"essiv(%s(%s),%s)", chainmode, cipher, *ivopts);
|
|
} else {
|
|
ret = snprintf(cipher_api, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
|
|
"%s(%s)", chainmode, cipher);
|
|
}
|
|
if (ret < 0 || ret >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME) {
|
|
kfree(cipher_api);
|
|
goto bad_mem;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Allocate cipher */
|
|
ret = crypt_alloc_tfms(cc, cipher_api);
|
|
if (ret < 0) {
|
|
ti->error = "Error allocating crypto tfm";
|
|
kfree(cipher_api);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
kfree(cipher_api);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
bad_mem:
|
|
ti->error = "Cannot allocate cipher strings";
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int crypt_ctr_cipher(struct dm_target *ti, char *cipher_in, char *key)
|
|
{
|
|
struct crypt_config *cc = ti->private;
|
|
char *ivmode = NULL, *ivopts = NULL;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
cc->cipher_string = kstrdup(cipher_in, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!cc->cipher_string) {
|
|
ti->error = "Cannot allocate cipher strings";
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (strstarts(cipher_in, "capi:"))
|
|
ret = crypt_ctr_cipher_new(ti, cipher_in, key, &ivmode, &ivopts);
|
|
else
|
|
ret = crypt_ctr_cipher_old(ti, cipher_in, key, &ivmode, &ivopts);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
/* Initialize IV */
|
|
ret = crypt_ctr_ivmode(ti, ivmode);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
/* Initialize and set key */
|
|
ret = crypt_set_key(cc, key);
|
|
if (ret < 0) {
|
|
ti->error = "Error decoding and setting key";
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Allocate IV */
|
|
if (cc->iv_gen_ops && cc->iv_gen_ops->ctr) {
|
|
ret = cc->iv_gen_ops->ctr(cc, ti, ivopts);
|
|
if (ret < 0) {
|
|
ti->error = "Error creating IV";
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Initialize IV (set keys for ESSIV etc) */
|
|
if (cc->iv_gen_ops && cc->iv_gen_ops->init) {
|
|
ret = cc->iv_gen_ops->init(cc);
|
|
if (ret < 0) {
|
|
ti->error = "Error initialising IV";
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* wipe the kernel key payload copy */
|
|
if (cc->key_string)
|
|
memset(cc->key, 0, cc->key_size * sizeof(u8));
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int crypt_ctr_optional(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned int argc, char **argv)
|
|
{
|
|
struct crypt_config *cc = ti->private;
|
|
struct dm_arg_set as;
|
|
static const struct dm_arg _args[] = {
|
|
{0, 8, "Invalid number of feature args"},
|
|
};
|
|
unsigned int opt_params, val;
|
|
const char *opt_string, *sval;
|
|
char dummy;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
/* Optional parameters */
|
|
as.argc = argc;
|
|
as.argv = argv;
|
|
|
|
ret = dm_read_arg_group(_args, &as, &opt_params, &ti->error);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
while (opt_params--) {
|
|
opt_string = dm_shift_arg(&as);
|
|
if (!opt_string) {
|
|
ti->error = "Not enough feature arguments";
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!strcasecmp(opt_string, "allow_discards"))
|
|
ti->num_discard_bios = 1;
|
|
|
|
else if (!strcasecmp(opt_string, "same_cpu_crypt"))
|
|
set_bit(DM_CRYPT_SAME_CPU, &cc->flags);
|
|
|
|
else if (!strcasecmp(opt_string, "submit_from_crypt_cpus"))
|
|
set_bit(DM_CRYPT_NO_OFFLOAD, &cc->flags);
|
|
else if (!strcasecmp(opt_string, "no_read_workqueue"))
|
|
set_bit(DM_CRYPT_NO_READ_WORKQUEUE, &cc->flags);
|
|
else if (!strcasecmp(opt_string, "no_write_workqueue"))
|
|
set_bit(DM_CRYPT_NO_WRITE_WORKQUEUE, &cc->flags);
|
|
else if (sscanf(opt_string, "integrity:%u:", &val) == 1) {
|
|
if (val == 0 || val > MAX_TAG_SIZE) {
|
|
ti->error = "Invalid integrity arguments";
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
cc->on_disk_tag_size = val;
|
|
sval = strchr(opt_string + strlen("integrity:"), ':') + 1;
|
|
if (!strcasecmp(sval, "aead")) {
|
|
set_bit(CRYPT_MODE_INTEGRITY_AEAD, &cc->cipher_flags);
|
|
} else if (strcasecmp(sval, "none")) {
|
|
ti->error = "Unknown integrity profile";
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cc->cipher_auth = kstrdup(sval, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!cc->cipher_auth)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
} else if (sscanf(opt_string, "sector_size:%hu%c", &cc->sector_size, &dummy) == 1) {
|
|
if (cc->sector_size < (1 << SECTOR_SHIFT) ||
|
|
cc->sector_size > 4096 ||
|
|
(cc->sector_size & (cc->sector_size - 1))) {
|
|
ti->error = "Invalid feature value for sector_size";
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ti->len & ((cc->sector_size >> SECTOR_SHIFT) - 1)) {
|
|
ti->error = "Device size is not multiple of sector_size feature";
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
cc->sector_shift = __ffs(cc->sector_size) - SECTOR_SHIFT;
|
|
} else if (!strcasecmp(opt_string, "iv_large_sectors"))
|
|
set_bit(CRYPT_IV_LARGE_SECTORS, &cc->cipher_flags);
|
|
else {
|
|
ti->error = "Invalid feature arguments";
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_ZONED
|
|
static int crypt_report_zones(struct dm_target *ti,
|
|
struct dm_report_zones_args *args, unsigned int nr_zones)
|
|
{
|
|
struct crypt_config *cc = ti->private;
|
|
|
|
return dm_report_zones(cc->dev->bdev, cc->start,
|
|
cc->start + dm_target_offset(ti, args->next_sector),
|
|
args, nr_zones);
|
|
}
|
|
#else
|
|
#define crypt_report_zones NULL
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Construct an encryption mapping:
|
|
* <cipher> [<key>|:<key_size>:<user|logon>:<key_description>] <iv_offset> <dev_path> <start>
|
|
*/
|
|
static int crypt_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned int argc, char **argv)
|
|
{
|
|
struct crypt_config *cc;
|
|
const char *devname = dm_table_device_name(ti->table);
|
|
int key_size;
|
|
unsigned int align_mask;
|
|
unsigned long long tmpll;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
size_t iv_size_padding, additional_req_size;
|
|
char dummy;
|
|
|
|
if (argc < 5) {
|
|
ti->error = "Not enough arguments";
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
key_size = get_key_size(&argv[1]);
|
|
if (key_size < 0) {
|
|
ti->error = "Cannot parse key size";
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cc = kzalloc(struct_size(cc, key, key_size), GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!cc) {
|
|
ti->error = "Cannot allocate encryption context";
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
}
|
|
cc->key_size = key_size;
|
|
cc->sector_size = (1 << SECTOR_SHIFT);
|
|
cc->sector_shift = 0;
|
|
|
|
ti->private = cc;
|
|
|
|
spin_lock(&dm_crypt_clients_lock);
|
|
dm_crypt_clients_n++;
|
|
crypt_calculate_pages_per_client();
|
|
spin_unlock(&dm_crypt_clients_lock);
|
|
|
|
ret = percpu_counter_init(&cc->n_allocated_pages, 0, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
|
|
/* Optional parameters need to be read before cipher constructor */
|
|
if (argc > 5) {
|
|
ret = crypt_ctr_optional(ti, argc - 5, &argv[5]);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = crypt_ctr_cipher(ti, argv[0], argv[1]);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
|
|
if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc)) {
|
|
cc->dmreq_start = sizeof(struct aead_request);
|
|
cc->dmreq_start += crypto_aead_reqsize(any_tfm_aead(cc));
|
|
align_mask = crypto_aead_alignmask(any_tfm_aead(cc));
|
|
} else {
|
|
cc->dmreq_start = sizeof(struct skcipher_request);
|
|
cc->dmreq_start += crypto_skcipher_reqsize(any_tfm(cc));
|
|
align_mask = crypto_skcipher_alignmask(any_tfm(cc));
|
|
}
|
|
cc->dmreq_start = ALIGN(cc->dmreq_start, __alignof__(struct dm_crypt_request));
|
|
|
|
if (align_mask < CRYPTO_MINALIGN) {
|
|
/* Allocate the padding exactly */
|
|
iv_size_padding = -(cc->dmreq_start + sizeof(struct dm_crypt_request))
|
|
& align_mask;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/*
|
|
* If the cipher requires greater alignment than kmalloc
|
|
* alignment, we don't know the exact position of the
|
|
* initialization vector. We must assume worst case.
|
|
*/
|
|
iv_size_padding = align_mask;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* ...| IV + padding | original IV | original sec. number | bio tag offset | */
|
|
additional_req_size = sizeof(struct dm_crypt_request) +
|
|
iv_size_padding + cc->iv_size +
|
|
cc->iv_size +
|
|
sizeof(uint64_t) +
|
|
sizeof(unsigned int);
|
|
|
|
ret = mempool_init_kmalloc_pool(&cc->req_pool, MIN_IOS, cc->dmreq_start + additional_req_size);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
ti->error = "Cannot allocate crypt request mempool";
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cc->per_bio_data_size = ti->per_io_data_size =
|
|
ALIGN(sizeof(struct dm_crypt_io) + cc->dmreq_start + additional_req_size,
|
|
ARCH_DMA_MINALIGN);
|
|
|
|
ret = mempool_init(&cc->page_pool, BIO_MAX_VECS, crypt_page_alloc, crypt_page_free, cc);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
ti->error = "Cannot allocate page mempool";
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = bioset_init(&cc->bs, MIN_IOS, 0, BIOSET_NEED_BVECS);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
ti->error = "Cannot allocate crypt bioset";
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mutex_init(&cc->bio_alloc_lock);
|
|
|
|
ret = -EINVAL;
|
|
if ((sscanf(argv[2], "%llu%c", &tmpll, &dummy) != 1) ||
|
|
(tmpll & ((cc->sector_size >> SECTOR_SHIFT) - 1))) {
|
|
ti->error = "Invalid iv_offset sector";
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
cc->iv_offset = tmpll;
|
|
|
|
ret = dm_get_device(ti, argv[3], dm_table_get_mode(ti->table), &cc->dev);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
ti->error = "Device lookup failed";
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = -EINVAL;
|
|
if (sscanf(argv[4], "%llu%c", &tmpll, &dummy) != 1 || tmpll != (sector_t)tmpll) {
|
|
ti->error = "Invalid device sector";
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
cc->start = tmpll;
|
|
|
|
if (bdev_is_zoned(cc->dev->bdev)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* For zoned block devices, we need to preserve the issuer write
|
|
* ordering. To do so, disable write workqueues and force inline
|
|
* encryption completion.
|
|
*/
|
|
set_bit(DM_CRYPT_NO_WRITE_WORKQUEUE, &cc->flags);
|
|
set_bit(DM_CRYPT_WRITE_INLINE, &cc->flags);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* All zone append writes to a zone of a zoned block device will
|
|
* have the same BIO sector, the start of the zone. When the
|
|
* cypher IV mode uses sector values, all data targeting a
|
|
* zone will be encrypted using the first sector numbers of the
|
|
* zone. This will not result in write errors but will
|
|
* cause most reads to fail as reads will use the sector values
|
|
* for the actual data locations, resulting in IV mismatch.
|
|
* To avoid this problem, ask DM core to emulate zone append
|
|
* operations with regular writes.
|
|
*/
|
|
DMDEBUG("Zone append operations will be emulated");
|
|
ti->emulate_zone_append = true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc) || cc->integrity_iv_size) {
|
|
ret = crypt_integrity_ctr(cc, ti);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
|
|
cc->tag_pool_max_sectors = POOL_ENTRY_SIZE / cc->on_disk_tag_size;
|
|
if (!cc->tag_pool_max_sectors)
|
|
cc->tag_pool_max_sectors = 1;
|
|
|
|
ret = mempool_init_kmalloc_pool(&cc->tag_pool, MIN_IOS,
|
|
cc->tag_pool_max_sectors * cc->on_disk_tag_size);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
ti->error = "Cannot allocate integrity tags mempool";
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cc->tag_pool_max_sectors <<= cc->sector_shift;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = -ENOMEM;
|
|
cc->io_queue = alloc_workqueue("kcryptd_io/%s", WQ_MEM_RECLAIM, 1, devname);
|
|
if (!cc->io_queue) {
|
|
ti->error = "Couldn't create kcryptd io queue";
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (test_bit(DM_CRYPT_SAME_CPU, &cc->flags))
|
|
cc->crypt_queue = alloc_workqueue("kcryptd/%s", WQ_CPU_INTENSIVE | WQ_MEM_RECLAIM,
|
|
1, devname);
|
|
else
|
|
cc->crypt_queue = alloc_workqueue("kcryptd/%s",
|
|
WQ_CPU_INTENSIVE | WQ_MEM_RECLAIM | WQ_UNBOUND,
|
|
num_online_cpus(), devname);
|
|
if (!cc->crypt_queue) {
|
|
ti->error = "Couldn't create kcryptd queue";
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
spin_lock_init(&cc->write_thread_lock);
|
|
cc->write_tree = RB_ROOT;
|
|
|
|
cc->write_thread = kthread_run(dmcrypt_write, cc, "dmcrypt_write/%s", devname);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(cc->write_thread)) {
|
|
ret = PTR_ERR(cc->write_thread);
|
|
cc->write_thread = NULL;
|
|
ti->error = "Couldn't spawn write thread";
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ti->num_flush_bios = 1;
|
|
ti->limit_swap_bios = true;
|
|
ti->accounts_remapped_io = true;
|
|
|
|
dm_audit_log_ctr(DM_MSG_PREFIX, ti, 1);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
bad:
|
|
dm_audit_log_ctr(DM_MSG_PREFIX, ti, 0);
|
|
crypt_dtr(ti);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int crypt_map(struct dm_target *ti, struct bio *bio)
|
|
{
|
|
struct dm_crypt_io *io;
|
|
struct crypt_config *cc = ti->private;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If bio is REQ_PREFLUSH or REQ_OP_DISCARD, just bypass crypt queues.
|
|
* - for REQ_PREFLUSH device-mapper core ensures that no IO is in-flight
|
|
* - for REQ_OP_DISCARD caller must use flush if IO ordering matters
|
|
*/
|
|
if (unlikely(bio->bi_opf & REQ_PREFLUSH ||
|
|
bio_op(bio) == REQ_OP_DISCARD)) {
|
|
bio_set_dev(bio, cc->dev->bdev);
|
|
if (bio_sectors(bio))
|
|
bio->bi_iter.bi_sector = cc->start +
|
|
dm_target_offset(ti, bio->bi_iter.bi_sector);
|
|
return DM_MAPIO_REMAPPED;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check if bio is too large, split as needed.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (unlikely(bio->bi_iter.bi_size > (BIO_MAX_VECS << PAGE_SHIFT)) &&
|
|
(bio_data_dir(bio) == WRITE || cc->on_disk_tag_size))
|
|
dm_accept_partial_bio(bio, ((BIO_MAX_VECS << PAGE_SHIFT) >> SECTOR_SHIFT));
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Ensure that bio is a multiple of internal sector encryption size
|
|
* and is aligned to this size as defined in IO hints.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (unlikely((bio->bi_iter.bi_sector & ((cc->sector_size >> SECTOR_SHIFT) - 1)) != 0))
|
|
return DM_MAPIO_KILL;
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(bio->bi_iter.bi_size & (cc->sector_size - 1)))
|
|
return DM_MAPIO_KILL;
|
|
|
|
io = dm_per_bio_data(bio, cc->per_bio_data_size);
|
|
crypt_io_init(io, cc, bio, dm_target_offset(ti, bio->bi_iter.bi_sector));
|
|
|
|
if (cc->on_disk_tag_size) {
|
|
unsigned int tag_len = cc->on_disk_tag_size * (bio_sectors(bio) >> cc->sector_shift);
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(tag_len > KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE))
|
|
io->integrity_metadata = NULL;
|
|
else
|
|
io->integrity_metadata = kmalloc(tag_len, GFP_NOIO | __GFP_NORETRY | __GFP_NOMEMALLOC | __GFP_NOWARN);
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(!io->integrity_metadata)) {
|
|
if (bio_sectors(bio) > cc->tag_pool_max_sectors)
|
|
dm_accept_partial_bio(bio, cc->tag_pool_max_sectors);
|
|
io->integrity_metadata = mempool_alloc(&cc->tag_pool, GFP_NOIO);
|
|
io->integrity_metadata_from_pool = true;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (crypt_integrity_aead(cc))
|
|
io->ctx.r.req_aead = (struct aead_request *)(io + 1);
|
|
else
|
|
io->ctx.r.req = (struct skcipher_request *)(io + 1);
|
|
|
|
if (bio_data_dir(io->base_bio) == READ) {
|
|
if (kcryptd_io_read(io, CRYPT_MAP_READ_GFP))
|
|
kcryptd_queue_read(io);
|
|
} else
|
|
kcryptd_queue_crypt(io);
|
|
|
|
return DM_MAPIO_SUBMITTED;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static char hex2asc(unsigned char c)
|
|
{
|
|
return c + '0' + ((unsigned int)(9 - c) >> 4 & 0x27);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void crypt_status(struct dm_target *ti, status_type_t type,
|
|
unsigned int status_flags, char *result, unsigned int maxlen)
|
|
{
|
|
struct crypt_config *cc = ti->private;
|
|
unsigned int i, sz = 0;
|
|
int num_feature_args = 0;
|
|
|
|
switch (type) {
|
|
case STATUSTYPE_INFO:
|
|
result[0] = '\0';
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case STATUSTYPE_TABLE:
|
|
DMEMIT("%s ", cc->cipher_string);
|
|
|
|
if (cc->key_size > 0) {
|
|
if (cc->key_string)
|
|
DMEMIT(":%u:%s", cc->key_size, cc->key_string);
|
|
else {
|
|
for (i = 0; i < cc->key_size; i++) {
|
|
DMEMIT("%c%c", hex2asc(cc->key[i] >> 4),
|
|
hex2asc(cc->key[i] & 0xf));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} else
|
|
DMEMIT("-");
|
|
|
|
DMEMIT(" %llu %s %llu", (unsigned long long)cc->iv_offset,
|
|
cc->dev->name, (unsigned long long)cc->start);
|
|
|
|
num_feature_args += !!ti->num_discard_bios;
|
|
num_feature_args += test_bit(DM_CRYPT_SAME_CPU, &cc->flags);
|
|
num_feature_args += test_bit(DM_CRYPT_NO_OFFLOAD, &cc->flags);
|
|
num_feature_args += test_bit(DM_CRYPT_NO_READ_WORKQUEUE, &cc->flags);
|
|
num_feature_args += test_bit(DM_CRYPT_NO_WRITE_WORKQUEUE, &cc->flags);
|
|
num_feature_args += cc->sector_size != (1 << SECTOR_SHIFT);
|
|
num_feature_args += test_bit(CRYPT_IV_LARGE_SECTORS, &cc->cipher_flags);
|
|
if (cc->on_disk_tag_size)
|
|
num_feature_args++;
|
|
if (num_feature_args) {
|
|
DMEMIT(" %d", num_feature_args);
|
|
if (ti->num_discard_bios)
|
|
DMEMIT(" allow_discards");
|
|
if (test_bit(DM_CRYPT_SAME_CPU, &cc->flags))
|
|
DMEMIT(" same_cpu_crypt");
|
|
if (test_bit(DM_CRYPT_NO_OFFLOAD, &cc->flags))
|
|
DMEMIT(" submit_from_crypt_cpus");
|
|
if (test_bit(DM_CRYPT_NO_READ_WORKQUEUE, &cc->flags))
|
|
DMEMIT(" no_read_workqueue");
|
|
if (test_bit(DM_CRYPT_NO_WRITE_WORKQUEUE, &cc->flags))
|
|
DMEMIT(" no_write_workqueue");
|
|
if (cc->on_disk_tag_size)
|
|
DMEMIT(" integrity:%u:%s", cc->on_disk_tag_size, cc->cipher_auth);
|
|
if (cc->sector_size != (1 << SECTOR_SHIFT))
|
|
DMEMIT(" sector_size:%d", cc->sector_size);
|
|
if (test_bit(CRYPT_IV_LARGE_SECTORS, &cc->cipher_flags))
|
|
DMEMIT(" iv_large_sectors");
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case STATUSTYPE_IMA:
|
|
DMEMIT_TARGET_NAME_VERSION(ti->type);
|
|
DMEMIT(",allow_discards=%c", ti->num_discard_bios ? 'y' : 'n');
|
|
DMEMIT(",same_cpu_crypt=%c", test_bit(DM_CRYPT_SAME_CPU, &cc->flags) ? 'y' : 'n');
|
|
DMEMIT(",submit_from_crypt_cpus=%c", test_bit(DM_CRYPT_NO_OFFLOAD, &cc->flags) ?
|
|
'y' : 'n');
|
|
DMEMIT(",no_read_workqueue=%c", test_bit(DM_CRYPT_NO_READ_WORKQUEUE, &cc->flags) ?
|
|
'y' : 'n');
|
|
DMEMIT(",no_write_workqueue=%c", test_bit(DM_CRYPT_NO_WRITE_WORKQUEUE, &cc->flags) ?
|
|
'y' : 'n');
|
|
DMEMIT(",iv_large_sectors=%c", test_bit(CRYPT_IV_LARGE_SECTORS, &cc->cipher_flags) ?
|
|
'y' : 'n');
|
|
|
|
if (cc->on_disk_tag_size)
|
|
DMEMIT(",integrity_tag_size=%u,cipher_auth=%s",
|
|
cc->on_disk_tag_size, cc->cipher_auth);
|
|
if (cc->sector_size != (1 << SECTOR_SHIFT))
|
|
DMEMIT(",sector_size=%d", cc->sector_size);
|
|
if (cc->cipher_string)
|
|
DMEMIT(",cipher_string=%s", cc->cipher_string);
|
|
|
|
DMEMIT(",key_size=%u", cc->key_size);
|
|
DMEMIT(",key_parts=%u", cc->key_parts);
|
|
DMEMIT(",key_extra_size=%u", cc->key_extra_size);
|
|
DMEMIT(",key_mac_size=%u", cc->key_mac_size);
|
|
DMEMIT(";");
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void crypt_postsuspend(struct dm_target *ti)
|
|
{
|
|
struct crypt_config *cc = ti->private;
|
|
|
|
set_bit(DM_CRYPT_SUSPENDED, &cc->flags);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int crypt_preresume(struct dm_target *ti)
|
|
{
|
|
struct crypt_config *cc = ti->private;
|
|
|
|
if (!test_bit(DM_CRYPT_KEY_VALID, &cc->flags)) {
|
|
DMERR("aborting resume - crypt key is not set.");
|
|
return -EAGAIN;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void crypt_resume(struct dm_target *ti)
|
|
{
|
|
struct crypt_config *cc = ti->private;
|
|
|
|
clear_bit(DM_CRYPT_SUSPENDED, &cc->flags);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Message interface
|
|
* key set <key>
|
|
* key wipe
|
|
*/
|
|
static int crypt_message(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned int argc, char **argv,
|
|
char *result, unsigned int maxlen)
|
|
{
|
|
struct crypt_config *cc = ti->private;
|
|
int key_size, ret = -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
if (argc < 2)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
if (!strcasecmp(argv[0], "key")) {
|
|
if (!test_bit(DM_CRYPT_SUSPENDED, &cc->flags)) {
|
|
DMWARN("not suspended during key manipulation.");
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (argc == 3 && !strcasecmp(argv[1], "set")) {
|
|
/* The key size may not be changed. */
|
|
key_size = get_key_size(&argv[2]);
|
|
if (key_size < 0 || cc->key_size != key_size) {
|
|
memset(argv[2], '0', strlen(argv[2]));
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = crypt_set_key(cc, argv[2]);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
if (cc->iv_gen_ops && cc->iv_gen_ops->init)
|
|
ret = cc->iv_gen_ops->init(cc);
|
|
/* wipe the kernel key payload copy */
|
|
if (cc->key_string)
|
|
memset(cc->key, 0, cc->key_size * sizeof(u8));
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
if (argc == 2 && !strcasecmp(argv[1], "wipe"))
|
|
return crypt_wipe_key(cc);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
DMWARN("unrecognised message received.");
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int crypt_iterate_devices(struct dm_target *ti,
|
|
iterate_devices_callout_fn fn, void *data)
|
|
{
|
|
struct crypt_config *cc = ti->private;
|
|
|
|
return fn(ti, cc->dev, cc->start, ti->len, data);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void crypt_io_hints(struct dm_target *ti, struct queue_limits *limits)
|
|
{
|
|
struct crypt_config *cc = ti->private;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Unfortunate constraint that is required to avoid the potential
|
|
* for exceeding underlying device's max_segments limits -- due to
|
|
* crypt_alloc_buffer() possibly allocating pages for the encryption
|
|
* bio that are not as physically contiguous as the original bio.
|
|
*/
|
|
limits->max_segment_size = PAGE_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
limits->logical_block_size =
|
|
max_t(unsigned int, limits->logical_block_size, cc->sector_size);
|
|
limits->physical_block_size =
|
|
max_t(unsigned int, limits->physical_block_size, cc->sector_size);
|
|
limits->io_min = max_t(unsigned int, limits->io_min, cc->sector_size);
|
|
limits->dma_alignment = limits->logical_block_size - 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static struct target_type crypt_target = {
|
|
.name = "crypt",
|
|
.version = {1, 24, 0},
|
|
.module = THIS_MODULE,
|
|
.ctr = crypt_ctr,
|
|
.dtr = crypt_dtr,
|
|
.features = DM_TARGET_ZONED_HM,
|
|
.report_zones = crypt_report_zones,
|
|
.map = crypt_map,
|
|
.status = crypt_status,
|
|
.postsuspend = crypt_postsuspend,
|
|
.preresume = crypt_preresume,
|
|
.resume = crypt_resume,
|
|
.message = crypt_message,
|
|
.iterate_devices = crypt_iterate_devices,
|
|
.io_hints = crypt_io_hints,
|
|
};
|
|
module_dm(crypt);
|
|
|
|
MODULE_AUTHOR("Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>");
|
|
MODULE_DESCRIPTION(DM_NAME " target for transparent encryption / decryption");
|
|
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
|