2d9da9b188
unprivileged unconfined can use change_profile to alter the confinement set by the mac admin. Allow restricting unprivileged unconfined by still allowing change_profile but stacking the change against unconfined. This allows unconfined to still apply system policy but allows the task to enter the new confinement. If unprivileged unconfined is required a sysctl is provided to switch to the previous behavior. Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2026 lines
53 KiB
C
2026 lines
53 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
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/*
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* AppArmor security module
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*
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* This file contains AppArmor LSM hooks.
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*
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* Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
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* Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
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*/
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#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
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#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
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#include <linux/mm.h>
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#include <linux/mman.h>
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#include <linux/mount.h>
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#include <linux/namei.h>
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#include <linux/ptrace.h>
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#include <linux/ctype.h>
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#include <linux/sysctl.h>
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#include <linux/audit.h>
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#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
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#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
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#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
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#include <linux/zstd.h>
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#include <net/sock.h>
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#include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
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#include "include/apparmor.h"
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#include "include/apparmorfs.h"
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#include "include/audit.h"
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#include "include/capability.h"
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#include "include/cred.h"
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#include "include/file.h"
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#include "include/ipc.h"
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#include "include/net.h"
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#include "include/path.h"
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#include "include/label.h"
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#include "include/policy.h"
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#include "include/policy_ns.h"
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#include "include/procattr.h"
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#include "include/mount.h"
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#include "include/secid.h"
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/* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
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int apparmor_initialized;
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union aa_buffer {
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struct list_head list;
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DECLARE_FLEX_ARRAY(char, buffer);
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};
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#define RESERVE_COUNT 2
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static int reserve_count = RESERVE_COUNT;
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static int buffer_count;
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static LIST_HEAD(aa_global_buffers);
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static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(aa_buffers_lock);
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/*
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* LSM hook functions
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*/
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/*
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* put the associated labels
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*/
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static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
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{
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aa_put_label(cred_label(cred));
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set_cred_label(cred, NULL);
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}
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/*
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* allocate the apparmor part of blank credentials
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*/
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static int apparmor_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
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{
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set_cred_label(cred, NULL);
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* prepare new cred label for modification by prepare_cred block
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*/
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static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
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gfp_t gfp)
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{
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set_cred_label(new, aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(old)));
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* transfer the apparmor data to a blank set of creds
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*/
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static void apparmor_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
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{
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set_cred_label(new, aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(old)));
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}
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static void apparmor_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
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{
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aa_free_task_ctx(task_ctx(task));
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}
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static int apparmor_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
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unsigned long clone_flags)
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{
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struct aa_task_ctx *new = task_ctx(task);
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aa_dup_task_ctx(new, task_ctx(current));
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return 0;
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}
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static int apparmor_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
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unsigned int mode)
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{
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struct aa_label *tracer, *tracee;
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const struct cred *cred;
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int error;
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cred = get_task_cred(child);
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tracee = cred_label(cred); /* ref count on cred */
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tracer = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
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error = aa_may_ptrace(current_cred(), tracer, cred, tracee,
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(mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) ? AA_PTRACE_READ
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: AA_PTRACE_TRACE);
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__end_current_label_crit_section(tracer);
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put_cred(cred);
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return error;
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}
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static int apparmor_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
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{
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struct aa_label *tracer, *tracee;
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const struct cred *cred;
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int error;
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tracee = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
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cred = get_task_cred(parent);
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tracer = cred_label(cred); /* ref count on cred */
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error = aa_may_ptrace(cred, tracer, current_cred(), tracee,
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AA_PTRACE_TRACE);
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put_cred(cred);
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__end_current_label_crit_section(tracee);
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return error;
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}
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/* Derived from security/commoncap.c:cap_capget */
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static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
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kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
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{
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struct aa_label *label;
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const struct cred *cred;
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rcu_read_lock();
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cred = __task_cred(target);
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label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);
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/*
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* cap_capget is stacked ahead of this and will
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* initialize effective and permitted.
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*/
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if (!unconfined(label)) {
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struct aa_profile *profile;
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struct label_it i;
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label_for_each_confined(i, label, profile) {
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struct aa_ruleset *rules;
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if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile))
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continue;
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rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
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typeof(*rules), list);
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*effective = cap_intersect(*effective,
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rules->caps.allow);
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*permitted = cap_intersect(*permitted,
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rules->caps.allow);
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}
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}
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rcu_read_unlock();
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aa_put_label(label);
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return 0;
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}
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static int apparmor_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
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int cap, unsigned int opts)
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{
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struct aa_label *label;
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int error = 0;
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label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);
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if (!unconfined(label))
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error = aa_capable(cred, label, cap, opts);
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aa_put_label(label);
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return error;
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}
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/**
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* common_perm - basic common permission check wrapper fn for paths
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* @op: operation being checked
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* @path: path to check permission of (NOT NULL)
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* @mask: requested permissions mask
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* @cond: conditional info for the permission request (NOT NULL)
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*
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* Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
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*/
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static int common_perm(const char *op, const struct path *path, u32 mask,
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struct path_cond *cond)
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{
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struct aa_label *label;
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int error = 0;
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label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
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if (!unconfined(label))
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error = aa_path_perm(op, current_cred(), label, path, 0, mask,
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cond);
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__end_current_label_crit_section(label);
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return error;
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}
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/**
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* common_perm_cond - common permission wrapper around inode cond
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* @op: operation being checked
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* @path: location to check (NOT NULL)
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* @mask: requested permissions mask
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*
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* Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
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*/
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static int common_perm_cond(const char *op, const struct path *path, u32 mask)
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{
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vfsuid_t vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_idmap(path->mnt),
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d_backing_inode(path->dentry));
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struct path_cond cond = {
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vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid),
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d_backing_inode(path->dentry)->i_mode
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};
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if (!path_mediated_fs(path->dentry))
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return 0;
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return common_perm(op, path, mask, &cond);
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}
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/**
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* common_perm_dir_dentry - common permission wrapper when path is dir, dentry
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* @op: operation being checked
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* @dir: directory of the dentry (NOT NULL)
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* @dentry: dentry to check (NOT NULL)
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* @mask: requested permissions mask
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* @cond: conditional info for the permission request (NOT NULL)
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*
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* Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
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*/
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static int common_perm_dir_dentry(const char *op, const struct path *dir,
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struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask,
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struct path_cond *cond)
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{
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struct path path = { .mnt = dir->mnt, .dentry = dentry };
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return common_perm(op, &path, mask, cond);
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}
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/**
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* common_perm_rm - common permission wrapper for operations doing rm
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* @op: operation being checked
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* @dir: directory that the dentry is in (NOT NULL)
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* @dentry: dentry being rm'd (NOT NULL)
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* @mask: requested permission mask
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*
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* Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
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*/
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static int common_perm_rm(const char *op, const struct path *dir,
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struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask)
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{
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struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
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struct path_cond cond = { };
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vfsuid_t vfsuid;
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if (!inode || !path_mediated_fs(dentry))
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return 0;
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vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_idmap(dir->mnt), inode);
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cond.uid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid);
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cond.mode = inode->i_mode;
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return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond);
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}
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/**
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* common_perm_create - common permission wrapper for operations doing create
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* @op: operation being checked
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* @dir: directory that dentry will be created in (NOT NULL)
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* @dentry: dentry to create (NOT NULL)
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* @mask: request permission mask
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* @mode: created file mode
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*
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* Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
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*/
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static int common_perm_create(const char *op, const struct path *dir,
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struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask, umode_t mode)
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{
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struct path_cond cond = { current_fsuid(), mode };
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if (!path_mediated_fs(dir->dentry))
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return 0;
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return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond);
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}
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static int apparmor_path_unlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
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{
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return common_perm_rm(OP_UNLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE);
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}
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static int apparmor_path_mkdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
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umode_t mode)
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{
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return common_perm_create(OP_MKDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE,
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S_IFDIR);
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}
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static int apparmor_path_rmdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
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{
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return common_perm_rm(OP_RMDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE);
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}
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static int apparmor_path_mknod(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
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umode_t mode, unsigned int dev)
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{
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return common_perm_create(OP_MKNOD, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, mode);
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}
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static int apparmor_path_truncate(const struct path *path)
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{
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return common_perm_cond(OP_TRUNC, path, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_SETATTR);
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}
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static int apparmor_file_truncate(struct file *file)
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{
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return apparmor_path_truncate(&file->f_path);
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}
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static int apparmor_path_symlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
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const char *old_name)
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{
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return common_perm_create(OP_SYMLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE,
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S_IFLNK);
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}
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static int apparmor_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_dir,
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struct dentry *new_dentry)
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{
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struct aa_label *label;
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int error = 0;
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if (!path_mediated_fs(old_dentry))
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return 0;
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label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
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if (!unconfined(label))
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error = aa_path_link(current_cred(), label, old_dentry, new_dir,
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new_dentry);
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end_current_label_crit_section(label);
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return error;
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}
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static int apparmor_path_rename(const struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
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const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry,
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const unsigned int flags)
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{
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struct aa_label *label;
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int error = 0;
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if (!path_mediated_fs(old_dentry))
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return 0;
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if ((flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) && !path_mediated_fs(new_dentry))
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return 0;
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label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
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if (!unconfined(label)) {
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struct mnt_idmap *idmap = mnt_idmap(old_dir->mnt);
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vfsuid_t vfsuid;
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struct path old_path = { .mnt = old_dir->mnt,
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.dentry = old_dentry };
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struct path new_path = { .mnt = new_dir->mnt,
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.dentry = new_dentry };
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struct path_cond cond = {
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.mode = d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_mode
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};
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vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, d_backing_inode(old_dentry));
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cond.uid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid);
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if (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) {
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struct path_cond cond_exchange = {
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.mode = d_backing_inode(new_dentry)->i_mode,
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};
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vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, d_backing_inode(old_dentry));
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cond_exchange.uid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid);
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error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, current_cred(),
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label, &new_path, 0,
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MAY_READ | AA_MAY_GETATTR | MAY_WRITE |
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AA_MAY_SETATTR | AA_MAY_DELETE,
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&cond_exchange);
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if (!error)
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error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, current_cred(),
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label, &old_path,
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0, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_SETATTR |
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AA_MAY_CREATE, &cond_exchange);
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}
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if (!error)
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error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, current_cred(),
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label, &old_path, 0,
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MAY_READ | AA_MAY_GETATTR | MAY_WRITE |
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AA_MAY_SETATTR | AA_MAY_DELETE,
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&cond);
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if (!error)
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error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, current_cred(),
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label, &new_path,
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0, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_SETATTR |
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AA_MAY_CREATE, &cond);
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}
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end_current_label_crit_section(label);
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return error;
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}
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static int apparmor_path_chmod(const struct path *path, umode_t mode)
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{
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return common_perm_cond(OP_CHMOD, path, AA_MAY_CHMOD);
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}
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static int apparmor_path_chown(const struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid)
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{
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return common_perm_cond(OP_CHOWN, path, AA_MAY_CHOWN);
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}
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static int apparmor_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
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{
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return common_perm_cond(OP_GETATTR, path, AA_MAY_GETATTR);
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}
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static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file)
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{
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struct aa_file_ctx *fctx = file_ctx(file);
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struct aa_label *label;
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int error = 0;
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if (!path_mediated_fs(file->f_path.dentry))
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return 0;
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/* If in exec, permission is handled by bprm hooks.
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* Cache permissions granted by the previous exec check, with
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* implicit read and executable mmap which are required to
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* actually execute the image.
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*/
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if (current->in_execve) {
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fctx->allow = MAY_EXEC | MAY_READ | AA_EXEC_MMAP;
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return 0;
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}
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label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(file->f_cred);
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if (!unconfined(label)) {
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struct mnt_idmap *idmap = file_mnt_idmap(file);
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struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
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vfsuid_t vfsuid;
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struct path_cond cond = {
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.mode = inode->i_mode,
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};
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vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, inode);
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cond.uid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid);
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error = aa_path_perm(OP_OPEN, file->f_cred,
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label, &file->f_path, 0,
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aa_map_file_to_perms(file), &cond);
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/* todo cache full allowed permissions set and state */
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fctx->allow = aa_map_file_to_perms(file);
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}
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aa_put_label(label);
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return error;
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}
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static int apparmor_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
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{
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struct aa_file_ctx *ctx = file_ctx(file);
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struct aa_label *label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
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spin_lock_init(&ctx->lock);
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rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->label, aa_get_label(label));
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end_current_label_crit_section(label);
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return 0;
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}
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static void apparmor_file_free_security(struct file *file)
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{
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struct aa_file_ctx *ctx = file_ctx(file);
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if (ctx)
|
|
aa_put_label(rcu_access_pointer(ctx->label));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int common_file_perm(const char *op, struct file *file, u32 mask,
|
|
bool in_atomic)
|
|
{
|
|
struct aa_label *label;
|
|
int error = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* don't reaudit files closed during inheritance */
|
|
if (file->f_path.dentry == aa_null.dentry)
|
|
return -EACCES;
|
|
|
|
label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
|
|
error = aa_file_perm(op, current_cred(), label, file, mask, in_atomic);
|
|
__end_current_label_crit_section(label);
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int apparmor_file_receive(struct file *file)
|
|
{
|
|
return common_file_perm(OP_FRECEIVE, file, aa_map_file_to_perms(file),
|
|
false);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int apparmor_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
|
|
{
|
|
return common_file_perm(OP_FPERM, file, mask, false);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int apparmor_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
|
|
{
|
|
u32 mask = AA_MAY_LOCK;
|
|
|
|
if (cmd == F_WRLCK)
|
|
mask |= MAY_WRITE;
|
|
|
|
return common_file_perm(OP_FLOCK, file, mask, false);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int common_mmap(const char *op, struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
|
|
unsigned long flags, bool in_atomic)
|
|
{
|
|
int mask = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!file || !file_ctx(file))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (prot & PROT_READ)
|
|
mask |= MAY_READ;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Private mappings don't require write perms since they don't
|
|
* write back to the files
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((prot & PROT_WRITE) && !(flags & MAP_PRIVATE))
|
|
mask |= MAY_WRITE;
|
|
if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
|
|
mask |= AA_EXEC_MMAP;
|
|
|
|
return common_file_perm(op, file, mask, in_atomic);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int apparmor_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
|
|
unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
|
|
{
|
|
return common_mmap(OP_FMMAP, file, prot, flags, GFP_ATOMIC);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
|
|
unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot)
|
|
{
|
|
return common_mmap(OP_FMPROT, vma->vm_file, prot,
|
|
!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0,
|
|
false);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int apparmor_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
|
|
const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
|
|
{
|
|
struct aa_label *label;
|
|
int error = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Discard magic */
|
|
if ((flags & MS_MGC_MSK) == MS_MGC_VAL)
|
|
flags &= ~MS_MGC_MSK;
|
|
|
|
flags &= ~AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK;
|
|
|
|
label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
|
|
if (!unconfined(label)) {
|
|
if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
|
|
error = aa_remount(current_cred(), label, path, flags,
|
|
data);
|
|
else if (flags & MS_BIND)
|
|
error = aa_bind_mount(current_cred(), label, path,
|
|
dev_name, flags);
|
|
else if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE |
|
|
MS_UNBINDABLE))
|
|
error = aa_mount_change_type(current_cred(), label,
|
|
path, flags);
|
|
else if (flags & MS_MOVE)
|
|
error = aa_move_mount(current_cred(), label, path,
|
|
dev_name);
|
|
else
|
|
error = aa_new_mount(current_cred(), label, dev_name,
|
|
path, type, flags, data);
|
|
}
|
|
__end_current_label_crit_section(label);
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int apparmor_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
struct aa_label *label;
|
|
int error = 0;
|
|
|
|
label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
|
|
if (!unconfined(label))
|
|
error = aa_umount(current_cred(), label, mnt, flags);
|
|
__end_current_label_crit_section(label);
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int apparmor_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *old_path,
|
|
const struct path *new_path)
|
|
{
|
|
struct aa_label *label;
|
|
int error = 0;
|
|
|
|
label = aa_get_current_label();
|
|
if (!unconfined(label))
|
|
error = aa_pivotroot(current_cred(), label, old_path, new_path);
|
|
aa_put_label(label);
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, const char *name,
|
|
char **value)
|
|
{
|
|
int error = -ENOENT;
|
|
/* released below */
|
|
const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task);
|
|
struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current);
|
|
struct aa_label *label = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0)
|
|
label = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(cred));
|
|
else if (strcmp(name, "prev") == 0 && ctx->previous)
|
|
label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous);
|
|
else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && ctx->onexec)
|
|
label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->onexec);
|
|
else
|
|
error = -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
if (label)
|
|
error = aa_getprocattr(label, value);
|
|
|
|
aa_put_label(label);
|
|
put_cred(cred);
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int apparmor_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value,
|
|
size_t size)
|
|
{
|
|
char *command, *largs = NULL, *args = value;
|
|
size_t arg_size;
|
|
int error;
|
|
DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_NONE,
|
|
OP_SETPROCATTR);
|
|
|
|
if (size == 0)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
/* AppArmor requires that the buffer must be null terminated atm */
|
|
if (args[size - 1] != '\0') {
|
|
/* null terminate */
|
|
largs = args = kmalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!args)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
memcpy(args, value, size);
|
|
args[size] = '\0';
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
error = -EINVAL;
|
|
args = strim(args);
|
|
command = strsep(&args, " ");
|
|
if (!args)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
args = skip_spaces(args);
|
|
if (!*args)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
arg_size = size - (args - (largs ? largs : (char *) value));
|
|
if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) {
|
|
if (strcmp(command, "changehat") == 0) {
|
|
error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
|
|
AA_CHANGE_NOFLAGS);
|
|
} else if (strcmp(command, "permhat") == 0) {
|
|
error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
|
|
AA_CHANGE_TEST);
|
|
} else if (strcmp(command, "changeprofile") == 0) {
|
|
error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_CHANGE_NOFLAGS);
|
|
} else if (strcmp(command, "permprofile") == 0) {
|
|
error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_CHANGE_TEST);
|
|
} else if (strcmp(command, "stack") == 0) {
|
|
error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_CHANGE_STACK);
|
|
} else
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
} else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0) {
|
|
if (strcmp(command, "exec") == 0)
|
|
error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_CHANGE_ONEXEC);
|
|
else if (strcmp(command, "stack") == 0)
|
|
error = aa_change_profile(args, (AA_CHANGE_ONEXEC |
|
|
AA_CHANGE_STACK));
|
|
else
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
} else
|
|
/* only support the "current" and "exec" process attributes */
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
|
|
if (!error)
|
|
error = size;
|
|
out:
|
|
kfree(largs);
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
fail:
|
|
ad.subj_label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
|
|
ad.info = name;
|
|
ad.error = error = -EINVAL;
|
|
aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, &ad, NULL);
|
|
end_current_label_crit_section(ad.subj_label);
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* apparmor_bprm_committing_creds - do task cleanup on committing new creds
|
|
* @bprm: binprm for the exec (NOT NULL)
|
|
*/
|
|
static void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
|
|
{
|
|
struct aa_label *label = aa_current_raw_label();
|
|
struct aa_label *new_label = cred_label(bprm->cred);
|
|
|
|
/* bail out if unconfined or not changing profile */
|
|
if ((new_label->proxy == label->proxy) ||
|
|
(unconfined(new_label)))
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
aa_inherit_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
|
|
|
|
current->pdeath_signal = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* reset soft limits and set hard limits for the new label */
|
|
__aa_transition_rlimits(label, new_label);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* apparmor_bprm_committed_creds() - do cleanup after new creds committed
|
|
* @bprm: binprm for the exec (NOT NULL)
|
|
*/
|
|
static void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
|
|
{
|
|
/* clear out temporary/transitional state from the context */
|
|
aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(task_ctx(current));
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void apparmor_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid)
|
|
{
|
|
struct aa_label *label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
|
|
*secid = label->secid;
|
|
__end_current_label_crit_section(label);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void apparmor_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
|
|
{
|
|
struct aa_label *label = aa_get_task_label(p);
|
|
*secid = label->secid;
|
|
aa_put_label(label);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task,
|
|
unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
|
|
{
|
|
struct aa_label *label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
|
|
int error = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!unconfined(label))
|
|
error = aa_task_setrlimit(current_cred(), label, task,
|
|
resource, new_rlim);
|
|
__end_current_label_crit_section(label);
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
|
|
int sig, const struct cred *cred)
|
|
{
|
|
const struct cred *tc;
|
|
struct aa_label *cl, *tl;
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
tc = get_task_cred(target);
|
|
tl = aa_get_newest_cred_label(tc);
|
|
if (cred) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Dealing with USB IO specific behavior
|
|
*/
|
|
cl = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);
|
|
error = aa_may_signal(cred, cl, tc, tl, sig);
|
|
aa_put_label(cl);
|
|
return error;
|
|
} else {
|
|
cl = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
|
|
error = aa_may_signal(current_cred(), cl, tc, tl, sig);
|
|
__end_current_label_crit_section(cl);
|
|
}
|
|
aa_put_label(tl);
|
|
put_cred(tc);
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* apparmor_sk_alloc_security - allocate and attach the sk_security field
|
|
*/
|
|
static int apparmor_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t flags)
|
|
{
|
|
struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx;
|
|
|
|
ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), flags);
|
|
if (!ctx)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
sk->sk_security = ctx;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* apparmor_sk_free_security - free the sk_security field
|
|
*/
|
|
static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
|
|
{
|
|
struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
|
|
|
|
sk->sk_security = NULL;
|
|
aa_put_label(ctx->label);
|
|
aa_put_label(ctx->peer);
|
|
kfree(ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* apparmor_sk_clone_security - clone the sk_security field
|
|
*/
|
|
static void apparmor_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk,
|
|
struct sock *newsk)
|
|
{
|
|
struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
|
|
struct aa_sk_ctx *new = aa_sock(newsk);
|
|
|
|
if (new->label)
|
|
aa_put_label(new->label);
|
|
new->label = aa_get_label(ctx->label);
|
|
|
|
if (new->peer)
|
|
aa_put_label(new->peer);
|
|
new->peer = aa_get_label(ctx->peer);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* apparmor_socket_create - check perms before creating a new socket
|
|
*/
|
|
static int apparmor_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
|
|
{
|
|
struct aa_label *label;
|
|
int error = 0;
|
|
|
|
AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
|
|
|
|
label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
|
|
if (!(kern || unconfined(label)))
|
|
error = af_select(family,
|
|
create_perm(label, family, type, protocol),
|
|
aa_af_perm(current_cred(), label,
|
|
OP_CREATE, AA_MAY_CREATE,
|
|
family, type, protocol));
|
|
end_current_label_crit_section(label);
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* apparmor_socket_post_create - setup the per-socket security struct
|
|
*
|
|
* Note:
|
|
* - kernel sockets currently labeled unconfined but we may want to
|
|
* move to a special kernel label
|
|
* - socket may not have sk here if created with sock_create_lite or
|
|
* sock_alloc. These should be accept cases which will be handled in
|
|
* sock_graft.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
|
|
int type, int protocol, int kern)
|
|
{
|
|
struct aa_label *label;
|
|
|
|
if (kern) {
|
|
label = aa_get_label(kernel_t);
|
|
} else
|
|
label = aa_get_current_label();
|
|
|
|
if (sock->sk) {
|
|
struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sock->sk);
|
|
|
|
aa_put_label(ctx->label);
|
|
ctx->label = aa_get_label(label);
|
|
}
|
|
aa_put_label(label);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* apparmor_socket_bind - check perms before bind addr to socket
|
|
*/
|
|
static int apparmor_socket_bind(struct socket *sock,
|
|
struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
|
|
{
|
|
AA_BUG(!sock);
|
|
AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
|
|
AA_BUG(!address);
|
|
AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
|
|
|
|
return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family,
|
|
bind_perm(sock, address, addrlen),
|
|
aa_sk_perm(OP_BIND, AA_MAY_BIND, sock->sk));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* apparmor_socket_connect - check perms before connecting @sock to @address
|
|
*/
|
|
static int apparmor_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
|
|
struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
|
|
{
|
|
AA_BUG(!sock);
|
|
AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
|
|
AA_BUG(!address);
|
|
AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
|
|
|
|
return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family,
|
|
connect_perm(sock, address, addrlen),
|
|
aa_sk_perm(OP_CONNECT, AA_MAY_CONNECT, sock->sk));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* apparmor_socket_listen - check perms before allowing listen
|
|
*/
|
|
static int apparmor_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
|
|
{
|
|
AA_BUG(!sock);
|
|
AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
|
|
AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
|
|
|
|
return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family,
|
|
listen_perm(sock, backlog),
|
|
aa_sk_perm(OP_LISTEN, AA_MAY_LISTEN, sock->sk));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* apparmor_socket_accept - check perms before accepting a new connection.
|
|
*
|
|
* Note: while @newsock is created and has some information, the accept
|
|
* has not been done.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int apparmor_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
|
|
{
|
|
AA_BUG(!sock);
|
|
AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
|
|
AA_BUG(!newsock);
|
|
AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
|
|
|
|
return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family,
|
|
accept_perm(sock, newsock),
|
|
aa_sk_perm(OP_ACCEPT, AA_MAY_ACCEPT, sock->sk));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int aa_sock_msg_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock,
|
|
struct msghdr *msg, int size)
|
|
{
|
|
AA_BUG(!sock);
|
|
AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
|
|
AA_BUG(!msg);
|
|
AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
|
|
|
|
return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family,
|
|
msg_perm(op, request, sock, msg, size),
|
|
aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* apparmor_socket_sendmsg - check perms before sending msg to another socket
|
|
*/
|
|
static int apparmor_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock,
|
|
struct msghdr *msg, int size)
|
|
{
|
|
return aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND, sock, msg, size);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* apparmor_socket_recvmsg - check perms before receiving a message
|
|
*/
|
|
static int apparmor_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock,
|
|
struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
return aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_RECVMSG, AA_MAY_RECEIVE, sock, msg, size);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* revaliation, get/set attr, shutdown */
|
|
static int aa_sock_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock)
|
|
{
|
|
AA_BUG(!sock);
|
|
AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
|
|
AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
|
|
|
|
return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family,
|
|
sock_perm(op, request, sock),
|
|
aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* apparmor_socket_getsockname - check perms before getting the local address
|
|
*/
|
|
static int apparmor_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
|
|
{
|
|
return aa_sock_perm(OP_GETSOCKNAME, AA_MAY_GETATTR, sock);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* apparmor_socket_getpeername - check perms before getting remote address
|
|
*/
|
|
static int apparmor_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
|
|
{
|
|
return aa_sock_perm(OP_GETPEERNAME, AA_MAY_GETATTR, sock);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* revaliation, get/set attr, opt */
|
|
static int aa_sock_opt_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock,
|
|
int level, int optname)
|
|
{
|
|
AA_BUG(!sock);
|
|
AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
|
|
AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
|
|
|
|
return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family,
|
|
opt_perm(op, request, sock, level, optname),
|
|
aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* apparmor_socket_getsockopt - check perms before getting socket options
|
|
*/
|
|
static int apparmor_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
|
|
int optname)
|
|
{
|
|
return aa_sock_opt_perm(OP_GETSOCKOPT, AA_MAY_GETOPT, sock,
|
|
level, optname);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* apparmor_socket_setsockopt - check perms before setting socket options
|
|
*/
|
|
static int apparmor_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
|
|
int optname)
|
|
{
|
|
return aa_sock_opt_perm(OP_SETSOCKOPT, AA_MAY_SETOPT, sock,
|
|
level, optname);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* apparmor_socket_shutdown - check perms before shutting down @sock conn
|
|
*/
|
|
static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
|
|
{
|
|
return aa_sock_perm(OP_SHUTDOWN, AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN, sock);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
|
|
/**
|
|
* apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb - check perms before associating skb to sk
|
|
*
|
|
* Note: can not sleep may be called with locks held
|
|
*
|
|
* dont want protocol specific in __skb_recv_datagram()
|
|
* to deny an incoming connection socket_sock_rcv_skb()
|
|
*/
|
|
static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
|
|
{
|
|
struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
|
|
|
|
if (!skb->secmark)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
return apparmor_secmark_check(ctx->label, OP_RECVMSG, AA_MAY_RECEIVE,
|
|
skb->secmark, sk);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label(struct sock *sk)
|
|
{
|
|
struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->peer)
|
|
return ctx->peer;
|
|
|
|
return ERR_PTR(-ENOPROTOOPT);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream - get security context of peer
|
|
*
|
|
* Note: for tcp only valid if using ipsec or cipso on lan
|
|
*/
|
|
static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
|
|
sockptr_t optval, sockptr_t optlen,
|
|
unsigned int len)
|
|
{
|
|
char *name = NULL;
|
|
int slen, error = 0;
|
|
struct aa_label *label;
|
|
struct aa_label *peer;
|
|
|
|
label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
|
|
peer = sk_peer_label(sock->sk);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(peer)) {
|
|
error = PTR_ERR(peer);
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
slen = aa_label_asxprint(&name, labels_ns(label), peer,
|
|
FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS |
|
|
FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
/* don't include terminating \0 in slen, it breaks some apps */
|
|
if (slen < 0) {
|
|
error = -ENOMEM;
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
if (slen > len) {
|
|
error = -ERANGE;
|
|
goto done_len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (copy_to_sockptr(optval, name, slen))
|
|
error = -EFAULT;
|
|
done_len:
|
|
if (copy_to_sockptr(optlen, &slen, sizeof(slen)))
|
|
error = -EFAULT;
|
|
done:
|
|
end_current_label_crit_section(label);
|
|
kfree(name);
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram - get security label of packet
|
|
* @sock: the peer socket
|
|
* @skb: packet data
|
|
* @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet
|
|
*
|
|
* Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
|
|
*/
|
|
static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
|
|
struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
/* TODO: requires secid support */
|
|
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* apparmor_sock_graft - Initialize newly created socket
|
|
* @sk: child sock
|
|
* @parent: parent socket
|
|
*
|
|
* Note: could set off of SOCK_CTX(parent) but need to track inode and we can
|
|
* just set sk security information off of current creating process label
|
|
* Labeling of sk for accept case - probably should be sock based
|
|
* instead of task, because of the case where an implicitly labeled
|
|
* socket is shared by different tasks.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
|
|
{
|
|
struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
|
|
|
|
if (!ctx->label)
|
|
ctx->label = aa_get_current_label();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
|
|
static int apparmor_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
|
|
struct request_sock *req)
|
|
{
|
|
struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
|
|
|
|
if (!skb->secmark)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
return apparmor_secmark_check(ctx->label, OP_CONNECT, AA_MAY_CONNECT,
|
|
skb->secmark, sk);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The cred blob is a pointer to, not an instance of, an aa_label.
|
|
*/
|
|
struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
|
|
.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct aa_label *),
|
|
.lbs_file = sizeof(struct aa_file_ctx),
|
|
.lbs_task = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx),
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, apparmor_capget),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, apparmor_capable),
|
|
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, apparmor_sb_mount),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, apparmor_sb_umount),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_pivotroot, apparmor_sb_pivotroot),
|
|
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_link, apparmor_path_link),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, apparmor_path_unlink),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, apparmor_path_symlink),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mkdir, apparmor_path_mkdir),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rmdir, apparmor_path_rmdir),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mknod, apparmor_path_mknod),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rename, apparmor_path_rename),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chmod, apparmor_path_chmod),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chown, apparmor_path_chown),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_truncate, apparmor_path_truncate),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, apparmor_inode_getattr),
|
|
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, apparmor_file_open),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, apparmor_file_receive),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, apparmor_file_permission),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, apparmor_file_alloc_security),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, apparmor_file_free_security),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, apparmor_mmap_file),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, apparmor_file_mprotect),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, apparmor_file_lock),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_truncate, apparmor_file_truncate),
|
|
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr),
|
|
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, apparmor_sk_alloc_security),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, apparmor_sk_free_security),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, apparmor_sk_clone_security),
|
|
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, apparmor_socket_create),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, apparmor_socket_post_create),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, apparmor_socket_bind),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, apparmor_socket_connect),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, apparmor_socket_listen),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, apparmor_socket_accept),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, apparmor_socket_sendmsg),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, apparmor_socket_recvmsg),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, apparmor_socket_getsockname),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, apparmor_socket_getpeername),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, apparmor_socket_getsockopt),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, apparmor_socket_setsockopt),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, apparmor_socket_shutdown),
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
|
|
#endif
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
|
|
apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram,
|
|
apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, apparmor_sock_graft),
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, apparmor_inet_conn_request),
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, apparmor_cred_alloc_blank),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, apparmor_cred_free),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, apparmor_cred_prepare),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, apparmor_cred_transfer),
|
|
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_for_exec, apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, apparmor_bprm_committing_creds),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, apparmor_bprm_committed_creds),
|
|
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, apparmor_task_free),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, apparmor_task_alloc),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getsecid_subj, apparmor_current_getsecid_subj),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, apparmor_task_getsecid_obj),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, apparmor_task_setrlimit),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, apparmor_task_kill),
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, aa_audit_rule_init),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, aa_audit_rule_known),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, aa_audit_rule_match),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, aa_audit_rule_free),
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, apparmor_secid_to_secctx),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, apparmor_secctx_to_secid),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, apparmor_release_secctx),
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* AppArmor sysfs module parameters
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
|
|
static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
|
|
#define param_check_aabool param_check_bool
|
|
static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aabool = {
|
|
.flags = KERNEL_PARAM_OPS_FL_NOARG,
|
|
.set = param_set_aabool,
|
|
.get = param_get_aabool
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
|
|
static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
|
|
#define param_check_aauint param_check_uint
|
|
static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aauint = {
|
|
.set = param_set_aauint,
|
|
.get = param_get_aauint
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static int param_set_aacompressionlevel(const char *val,
|
|
const struct kernel_param *kp);
|
|
static int param_get_aacompressionlevel(char *buffer,
|
|
const struct kernel_param *kp);
|
|
#define param_check_aacompressionlevel param_check_int
|
|
static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aacompressionlevel = {
|
|
.set = param_set_aacompressionlevel,
|
|
.get = param_get_aacompressionlevel
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
|
|
static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
|
|
#define param_check_aalockpolicy param_check_bool
|
|
static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aalockpolicy = {
|
|
.flags = KERNEL_PARAM_OPS_FL_NOARG,
|
|
.set = param_set_aalockpolicy,
|
|
.get = param_get_aalockpolicy
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static int param_set_audit(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
|
|
static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
|
|
|
|
static int param_set_mode(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
|
|
static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
|
|
|
|
/* Flag values, also controllable via /sys/module/apparmor/parameters
|
|
* We define special types as we want to do additional mediation.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* AppArmor global enforcement switch - complain, enforce, kill */
|
|
enum profile_mode aa_g_profile_mode = APPARMOR_ENFORCE;
|
|
module_param_call(mode, param_set_mode, param_get_mode,
|
|
&aa_g_profile_mode, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
|
|
|
|
/* whether policy verification hashing is enabled */
|
|
bool aa_g_hash_policy = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT);
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH
|
|
module_param_named(hash_policy, aa_g_hash_policy, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* whether policy exactly as loaded is retained for debug and checkpointing */
|
|
bool aa_g_export_binary = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY);
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY
|
|
module_param_named(export_binary, aa_g_export_binary, aabool, 0600);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* policy loaddata compression level */
|
|
int aa_g_rawdata_compression_level = AA_DEFAULT_CLEVEL;
|
|
module_param_named(rawdata_compression_level, aa_g_rawdata_compression_level,
|
|
aacompressionlevel, 0400);
|
|
|
|
/* Debug mode */
|
|
bool aa_g_debug = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_DEBUG_MESSAGES);
|
|
module_param_named(debug, aa_g_debug, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
|
|
|
|
/* Audit mode */
|
|
enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
|
|
module_param_call(audit, param_set_audit, param_get_audit,
|
|
&aa_g_audit, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
|
|
|
|
/* Determines if audit header is included in audited messages. This
|
|
* provides more context if the audit daemon is not running
|
|
*/
|
|
bool aa_g_audit_header = true;
|
|
module_param_named(audit_header, aa_g_audit_header, aabool,
|
|
S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
|
|
|
|
/* lock out loading/removal of policy
|
|
* TODO: add in at boot loading of policy, which is the only way to
|
|
* load policy, if lock_policy is set
|
|
*/
|
|
bool aa_g_lock_policy;
|
|
module_param_named(lock_policy, aa_g_lock_policy, aalockpolicy,
|
|
S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
|
|
|
|
/* Syscall logging mode */
|
|
bool aa_g_logsyscall;
|
|
module_param_named(logsyscall, aa_g_logsyscall, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
|
|
|
|
/* Maximum pathname length before accesses will start getting rejected */
|
|
unsigned int aa_g_path_max = 2 * PATH_MAX;
|
|
module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, S_IRUSR);
|
|
|
|
/* Determines how paranoid loading of policy is and how much verification
|
|
* on the loaded policy is done.
|
|
* DEPRECATED: read only as strict checking of load is always done now
|
|
* that none root users (user namespaces) can load policy.
|
|
*/
|
|
bool aa_g_paranoid_load = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_PARANOID_LOAD);
|
|
module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool, S_IRUGO);
|
|
|
|
static int param_get_aaintbool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
|
|
static int param_set_aaintbool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
|
|
#define param_check_aaintbool param_check_int
|
|
static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aaintbool = {
|
|
.set = param_set_aaintbool,
|
|
.get = param_get_aaintbool
|
|
};
|
|
/* Boot time disable flag */
|
|
static int apparmor_enabled __ro_after_init = 1;
|
|
module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, aaintbool, 0444);
|
|
|
|
static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned long enabled;
|
|
int error = kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled);
|
|
if (!error)
|
|
apparmor_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
__setup("apparmor=", apparmor_enabled_setup);
|
|
|
|
/* set global flag turning off the ability to load policy */
|
|
static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!apparmor_enabled)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_admin_capable(NULL))
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
return param_set_bool(val, kp);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!apparmor_enabled)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL))
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!apparmor_enabled)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_admin_capable(NULL))
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
return param_set_bool(val, kp);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!apparmor_enabled)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL))
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
|
|
{
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
if (!apparmor_enabled)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
/* file is ro but enforce 2nd line check */
|
|
if (apparmor_initialized)
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
|
|
error = param_set_uint(val, kp);
|
|
aa_g_path_max = max_t(uint32_t, aa_g_path_max, sizeof(union aa_buffer));
|
|
pr_info("AppArmor: buffer size set to %d bytes\n", aa_g_path_max);
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!apparmor_enabled)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL))
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
return param_get_uint(buffer, kp);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Can only be set before AppArmor is initialized (i.e. on boot cmdline). */
|
|
static int param_set_aaintbool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct kernel_param kp_local;
|
|
bool value;
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
if (apparmor_initialized)
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
|
|
/* Create local copy, with arg pointing to bool type. */
|
|
value = !!*((int *)kp->arg);
|
|
memcpy(&kp_local, kp, sizeof(kp_local));
|
|
kp_local.arg = &value;
|
|
|
|
error = param_set_bool(val, &kp_local);
|
|
if (!error)
|
|
*((int *)kp->arg) = *((bool *)kp_local.arg);
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* To avoid changing /sys/module/apparmor/parameters/enabled from Y/N to
|
|
* 1/0, this converts the "int that is actually bool" back to bool for
|
|
* display in the /sys filesystem, while keeping it "int" for the LSM
|
|
* infrastructure.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int param_get_aaintbool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct kernel_param kp_local;
|
|
bool value;
|
|
|
|
/* Create local copy, with arg pointing to bool type. */
|
|
value = !!*((int *)kp->arg);
|
|
memcpy(&kp_local, kp, sizeof(kp_local));
|
|
kp_local.arg = &value;
|
|
|
|
return param_get_bool(buffer, &kp_local);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int param_set_aacompressionlevel(const char *val,
|
|
const struct kernel_param *kp)
|
|
{
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
if (!apparmor_enabled)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
if (apparmor_initialized)
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
|
|
error = param_set_int(val, kp);
|
|
|
|
aa_g_rawdata_compression_level = clamp(aa_g_rawdata_compression_level,
|
|
AA_MIN_CLEVEL, AA_MAX_CLEVEL);
|
|
pr_info("AppArmor: policy rawdata compression level set to %d\n",
|
|
aa_g_rawdata_compression_level);
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int param_get_aacompressionlevel(char *buffer,
|
|
const struct kernel_param *kp)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!apparmor_enabled)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL))
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
return param_get_int(buffer, kp);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!apparmor_enabled)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL))
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
return sprintf(buffer, "%s", audit_mode_names[aa_g_audit]);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int param_set_audit(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
if (!apparmor_enabled)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
if (!val)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_admin_capable(NULL))
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
|
|
i = match_string(audit_mode_names, AUDIT_MAX_INDEX, val);
|
|
if (i < 0)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
aa_g_audit = i;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!apparmor_enabled)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL))
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
|
|
return sprintf(buffer, "%s", aa_profile_mode_names[aa_g_profile_mode]);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int param_set_mode(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
if (!apparmor_enabled)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
if (!val)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_admin_capable(NULL))
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
|
|
i = match_string(aa_profile_mode_names, APPARMOR_MODE_NAMES_MAX_INDEX,
|
|
val);
|
|
if (i < 0)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
aa_g_profile_mode = i;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
char *aa_get_buffer(bool in_atomic)
|
|
{
|
|
union aa_buffer *aa_buf;
|
|
bool try_again = true;
|
|
gfp_t flags = (GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL | __GFP_NOWARN);
|
|
|
|
retry:
|
|
spin_lock(&aa_buffers_lock);
|
|
if (buffer_count > reserve_count ||
|
|
(in_atomic && !list_empty(&aa_global_buffers))) {
|
|
aa_buf = list_first_entry(&aa_global_buffers, union aa_buffer,
|
|
list);
|
|
list_del(&aa_buf->list);
|
|
buffer_count--;
|
|
spin_unlock(&aa_buffers_lock);
|
|
return aa_buf->buffer;
|
|
}
|
|
if (in_atomic) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* out of reserve buffers and in atomic context so increase
|
|
* how many buffers to keep in reserve
|
|
*/
|
|
reserve_count++;
|
|
flags = GFP_ATOMIC;
|
|
}
|
|
spin_unlock(&aa_buffers_lock);
|
|
|
|
if (!in_atomic)
|
|
might_sleep();
|
|
aa_buf = kmalloc(aa_g_path_max, flags);
|
|
if (!aa_buf) {
|
|
if (try_again) {
|
|
try_again = false;
|
|
goto retry;
|
|
}
|
|
pr_warn_once("AppArmor: Failed to allocate a memory buffer.\n");
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
return aa_buf->buffer;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void aa_put_buffer(char *buf)
|
|
{
|
|
union aa_buffer *aa_buf;
|
|
|
|
if (!buf)
|
|
return;
|
|
aa_buf = container_of(buf, union aa_buffer, buffer[0]);
|
|
|
|
spin_lock(&aa_buffers_lock);
|
|
list_add(&aa_buf->list, &aa_global_buffers);
|
|
buffer_count++;
|
|
spin_unlock(&aa_buffers_lock);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* AppArmor init functions
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* set_init_ctx - set a task context and profile on the first task.
|
|
*
|
|
* TODO: allow setting an alternate profile than unconfined
|
|
*/
|
|
static int __init set_init_ctx(void)
|
|
{
|
|
struct cred *cred = (__force struct cred *)current->real_cred;
|
|
|
|
set_cred_label(cred, aa_get_label(ns_unconfined(root_ns)));
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void destroy_buffers(void)
|
|
{
|
|
union aa_buffer *aa_buf;
|
|
|
|
spin_lock(&aa_buffers_lock);
|
|
while (!list_empty(&aa_global_buffers)) {
|
|
aa_buf = list_first_entry(&aa_global_buffers, union aa_buffer,
|
|
list);
|
|
list_del(&aa_buf->list);
|
|
spin_unlock(&aa_buffers_lock);
|
|
kfree(aa_buf);
|
|
spin_lock(&aa_buffers_lock);
|
|
}
|
|
spin_unlock(&aa_buffers_lock);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int __init alloc_buffers(void)
|
|
{
|
|
union aa_buffer *aa_buf;
|
|
int i, num;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* A function may require two buffers at once. Usually the buffers are
|
|
* used for a short period of time and are shared. On UP kernel buffers
|
|
* two should be enough, with more CPUs it is possible that more
|
|
* buffers will be used simultaneously. The preallocated pool may grow.
|
|
* This preallocation has also the side-effect that AppArmor will be
|
|
* disabled early at boot if aa_g_path_max is extremly high.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (num_online_cpus() > 1)
|
|
num = 4 + RESERVE_COUNT;
|
|
else
|
|
num = 2 + RESERVE_COUNT;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
|
|
|
|
aa_buf = kmalloc(aa_g_path_max, GFP_KERNEL |
|
|
__GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL | __GFP_NOWARN);
|
|
if (!aa_buf) {
|
|
destroy_buffers();
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
}
|
|
aa_put_buffer(aa_buf->buffer);
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
|
|
static int apparmor_dointvec(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
|
|
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!aa_current_policy_admin_capable(NULL))
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
if (!apparmor_enabled)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
return proc_dointvec(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static struct ctl_table apparmor_sysctl_table[] = {
|
|
{
|
|
.procname = "unprivileged_userns_apparmor_policy",
|
|
.data = &unprivileged_userns_apparmor_policy,
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
.mode = 0600,
|
|
.proc_handler = apparmor_dointvec,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
.procname = "apparmor_display_secid_mode",
|
|
.data = &apparmor_display_secid_mode,
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
.mode = 0600,
|
|
.proc_handler = apparmor_dointvec,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
.procname = "apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_unconfined",
|
|
.data = &aa_unprivileged_unconfined_restricted,
|
|
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
|
|
.mode = 0600,
|
|
.proc_handler = apparmor_dointvec,
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{ }
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static int __init apparmor_init_sysctl(void)
|
|
{
|
|
return register_sysctl("kernel", apparmor_sysctl_table) ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
|
|
}
|
|
#else
|
|
static inline int apparmor_init_sysctl(void)
|
|
{
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER) && defined(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
|
|
static unsigned int apparmor_ip_postroute(void *priv,
|
|
struct sk_buff *skb,
|
|
const struct nf_hook_state *state)
|
|
{
|
|
struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx;
|
|
struct sock *sk;
|
|
|
|
if (!skb->secmark)
|
|
return NF_ACCEPT;
|
|
|
|
sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
|
|
if (sk == NULL)
|
|
return NF_ACCEPT;
|
|
|
|
ctx = aa_sock(sk);
|
|
if (!apparmor_secmark_check(ctx->label, OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND,
|
|
skb->secmark, sk))
|
|
return NF_ACCEPT;
|
|
|
|
return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static const struct nf_hook_ops apparmor_nf_ops[] = {
|
|
{
|
|
.hook = apparmor_ip_postroute,
|
|
.pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
|
|
.hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
|
|
.priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
|
|
},
|
|
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
|
|
{
|
|
.hook = apparmor_ip_postroute,
|
|
.pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
|
|
.hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
|
|
.priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
|
|
},
|
|
#endif
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static int __net_init apparmor_nf_register(struct net *net)
|
|
{
|
|
return nf_register_net_hooks(net, apparmor_nf_ops,
|
|
ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_nf_ops));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void __net_exit apparmor_nf_unregister(struct net *net)
|
|
{
|
|
nf_unregister_net_hooks(net, apparmor_nf_ops,
|
|
ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_nf_ops));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static struct pernet_operations apparmor_net_ops = {
|
|
.init = apparmor_nf_register,
|
|
.exit = apparmor_nf_unregister,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static int __init apparmor_nf_ip_init(void)
|
|
{
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
if (!apparmor_enabled)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
err = register_pernet_subsys(&apparmor_net_ops);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
panic("Apparmor: register_pernet_subsys: error %d\n", err);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
__initcall(apparmor_nf_ip_init);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
static char nulldfa_src[] = {
|
|
#include "nulldfa.in"
|
|
};
|
|
struct aa_dfa *nulldfa;
|
|
|
|
static char stacksplitdfa_src[] = {
|
|
#include "stacksplitdfa.in"
|
|
};
|
|
struct aa_dfa *stacksplitdfa;
|
|
struct aa_policydb *nullpdb;
|
|
|
|
static int __init aa_setup_dfa_engine(void)
|
|
{
|
|
int error = -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
nullpdb = aa_alloc_pdb(GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!nullpdb)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
nulldfa = aa_dfa_unpack(nulldfa_src, sizeof(nulldfa_src),
|
|
TO_ACCEPT1_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32) |
|
|
TO_ACCEPT2_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32));
|
|
if (IS_ERR(nulldfa)) {
|
|
error = PTR_ERR(nulldfa);
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
nullpdb->dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa);
|
|
nullpdb->perms = kcalloc(2, sizeof(struct aa_perms), GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!nullpdb->perms)
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
nullpdb->size = 2;
|
|
|
|
stacksplitdfa = aa_dfa_unpack(stacksplitdfa_src,
|
|
sizeof(stacksplitdfa_src),
|
|
TO_ACCEPT1_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32) |
|
|
TO_ACCEPT2_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32));
|
|
if (IS_ERR(stacksplitdfa)) {
|
|
error = PTR_ERR(stacksplitdfa);
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
fail:
|
|
aa_put_pdb(nullpdb);
|
|
aa_put_dfa(nulldfa);
|
|
nullpdb = NULL;
|
|
nulldfa = NULL;
|
|
stacksplitdfa = NULL;
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void __init aa_teardown_dfa_engine(void)
|
|
{
|
|
aa_put_dfa(stacksplitdfa);
|
|
aa_put_dfa(nulldfa);
|
|
aa_put_pdb(nullpdb);
|
|
nullpdb = NULL;
|
|
stacksplitdfa = NULL;
|
|
nulldfa = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int __init apparmor_init(void)
|
|
{
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
error = aa_setup_dfa_engine();
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
AA_ERROR("Unable to setup dfa engine\n");
|
|
goto alloc_out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
error = aa_alloc_root_ns();
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
AA_ERROR("Unable to allocate default profile namespace\n");
|
|
goto alloc_out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
error = apparmor_init_sysctl();
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
AA_ERROR("Unable to register sysctls\n");
|
|
goto alloc_out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
error = alloc_buffers();
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
AA_ERROR("Unable to allocate work buffers\n");
|
|
goto alloc_out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
error = set_init_ctx();
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
AA_ERROR("Failed to set context on init task\n");
|
|
aa_free_root_ns();
|
|
goto buffers_out;
|
|
}
|
|
security_add_hooks(apparmor_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_hooks),
|
|
"apparmor");
|
|
|
|
/* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */
|
|
apparmor_initialized = 1;
|
|
if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_COMPLAIN)
|
|
aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: complain mode enabled");
|
|
else if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_KILL)
|
|
aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: kill mode enabled");
|
|
else
|
|
aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized");
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
buffers_out:
|
|
destroy_buffers();
|
|
alloc_out:
|
|
aa_destroy_aafs();
|
|
aa_teardown_dfa_engine();
|
|
|
|
apparmor_enabled = false;
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
DEFINE_LSM(apparmor) = {
|
|
.name = "apparmor",
|
|
.flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
|
|
.enabled = &apparmor_enabled,
|
|
.blobs = &apparmor_blob_sizes,
|
|
.init = apparmor_init,
|
|
};
|