330bdcfadc
AF_RXRPC has a keepalive message generator that generates a message for a
peer ~20s after the last transmission to that peer to keep firewall ports
open. The implementation is incorrect in the following ways:
(1) It mixes up ktime_t and time64_t types.
(2) It uses ktime_get_real(), the output of which may jump forward or
backward due to adjustments to the time of day.
(3) If the current time jumps forward too much or jumps backwards, the
generator function will crank the base of the time ring round one slot
at a time (ie. a 1s period) until it catches up, spewing out VERSION
packets as it goes.
Fix the problem by:
(1) Only using time64_t. There's no need for sub-second resolution.
(2) Use ktime_get_seconds() rather than ktime_get_real() so that time
isn't perceived to go backwards.
(3) Simplifying rxrpc_peer_keepalive_worker() by splitting it into two
parts:
(a) The "worker" function that manages the buckets and the timer.
(b) The "dispatch" function that takes the pending peers and
potentially transmits a keepalive packet before putting them back
in the ring into the slot appropriate to the revised last-Tx time.
(4) Taking everything that's pending out of the ring and splicing it into
a temporary collector list for processing.
In the case that there's been a significant jump forward, the ring
gets entirely emptied and then the time base can be warped forward
before the peers are processed.
The warping can't happen if the ring isn't empty because the slot a
peer is in is keepalive-time dependent, relative to the base time.
(5) Limit the number of iterations of the bucket array when scanning it.
(6) Set the timer to skip any empty slots as there's no point waking up if
there's nothing to do yet.
This can be triggered by an incoming call from a server after a reboot with
AF_RXRPC and AFS built into the kernel causing a peer record to be set up
before userspace is started. The system clock is then adjusted by
userspace, thereby potentially causing the keepalive generator to have a
meltdown - which leads to a message like:
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 23s! [kworker/0:1:23]
...
Workqueue: krxrpcd rxrpc_peer_keepalive_worker
EIP: lock_acquire+0x69/0x80
...
Call Trace:
? rxrpc_peer_keepalive_worker+0x5e/0x350
? _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x29/0x60
? rxrpc_peer_keepalive_worker+0x5e/0x350
? rxrpc_peer_keepalive_worker+0x5e/0x350
? __lock_acquire+0x3d3/0x870
? process_one_work+0x110/0x340
? process_one_work+0x166/0x340
? process_one_work+0x110/0x340
? worker_thread+0x39/0x3c0
? kthread+0xdb/0x110
? cancel_delayed_work+0x90/0x90
? kthread_stop+0x70/0x70
? ret_from_fork+0x19/0x24
Fixes: ace45bec6d
("rxrpc: Fix firewall route keepalive")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
1259 lines
32 KiB
C
1259 lines
32 KiB
C
/* Kerberos-based RxRPC security
|
|
*
|
|
* Copyright (C) 2007 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
|
|
* Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
|
|
*
|
|
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
|
|
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
|
|
* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
|
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* 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
|
|
|
|
#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
|
|
#include <linux/module.h>
|
|
#include <linux/net.h>
|
|
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
|
|
#include <linux/udp.h>
|
|
#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
|
|
#include <linux/ctype.h>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
|
|
#include <net/sock.h>
|
|
#include <net/af_rxrpc.h>
|
|
#include <keys/rxrpc-type.h>
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|
#include "ar-internal.h"
|
|
|
|
#define RXKAD_VERSION 2
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#define MAXKRB5TICKETLEN 1024
|
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#define RXKAD_TKT_TYPE_KERBEROS_V5 256
|
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#define ANAME_SZ 40 /* size of authentication name */
|
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#define INST_SZ 40 /* size of principal's instance */
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#define REALM_SZ 40 /* size of principal's auth domain */
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#define SNAME_SZ 40 /* size of service name */
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|
|
struct rxkad_level1_hdr {
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__be32 data_size; /* true data size (excluding padding) */
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};
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|
|
struct rxkad_level2_hdr {
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__be32 data_size; /* true data size (excluding padding) */
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__be32 checksum; /* decrypted data checksum */
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* this holds a pinned cipher so that keventd doesn't get called by the cipher
|
|
* alloc routine, but since we have it to hand, we use it to decrypt RESPONSE
|
|
* packets
|
|
*/
|
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static struct crypto_skcipher *rxkad_ci;
|
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static DEFINE_MUTEX(rxkad_ci_mutex);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* initialise connection security
|
|
*/
|
|
static int rxkad_init_connection_security(struct rxrpc_connection *conn)
|
|
{
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|
struct crypto_skcipher *ci;
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struct rxrpc_key_token *token;
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int ret;
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_enter("{%d},{%x}", conn->debug_id, key_serial(conn->params.key));
|
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token = conn->params.key->payload.data[0];
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conn->security_ix = token->security_index;
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ci = crypto_alloc_skcipher("pcbc(fcrypt)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
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if (IS_ERR(ci)) {
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|
_debug("no cipher");
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|
ret = PTR_ERR(ci);
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|
goto error;
|
|
}
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|
|
if (crypto_skcipher_setkey(ci, token->kad->session_key,
|
|
sizeof(token->kad->session_key)) < 0)
|
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BUG();
|
|
|
|
switch (conn->params.security_level) {
|
|
case RXRPC_SECURITY_PLAIN:
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break;
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case RXRPC_SECURITY_AUTH:
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conn->size_align = 8;
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conn->security_size = sizeof(struct rxkad_level1_hdr);
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break;
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case RXRPC_SECURITY_ENCRYPT:
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conn->size_align = 8;
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conn->security_size = sizeof(struct rxkad_level2_hdr);
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break;
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|
default:
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ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
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goto error;
|
|
}
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|
|
|
conn->cipher = ci;
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ret = 0;
|
|
error:
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_leave(" = %d", ret);
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|
return ret;
|
|
}
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|
/*
|
|
* prime the encryption state with the invariant parts of a connection's
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* description
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|
*/
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static int rxkad_prime_packet_security(struct rxrpc_connection *conn)
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|
{
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|
struct rxrpc_key_token *token;
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SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, conn->cipher);
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struct scatterlist sg;
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struct rxrpc_crypt iv;
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__be32 *tmpbuf;
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size_t tmpsize = 4 * sizeof(__be32);
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|
|
_enter("");
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if (!conn->params.key)
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return 0;
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tmpbuf = kmalloc(tmpsize, GFP_KERNEL);
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|
if (!tmpbuf)
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|
return -ENOMEM;
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|
|
token = conn->params.key->payload.data[0];
|
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memcpy(&iv, token->kad->session_key, sizeof(iv));
|
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|
|
tmpbuf[0] = htonl(conn->proto.epoch);
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tmpbuf[1] = htonl(conn->proto.cid);
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tmpbuf[2] = 0;
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tmpbuf[3] = htonl(conn->security_ix);
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|
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sg_init_one(&sg, tmpbuf, tmpsize);
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skcipher_request_set_tfm(req, conn->cipher);
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skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
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skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, &sg, tmpsize, iv.x);
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crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req);
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skcipher_request_zero(req);
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memcpy(&conn->csum_iv, tmpbuf + 2, sizeof(conn->csum_iv));
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kfree(tmpbuf);
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_leave(" = 0");
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return 0;
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}
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|
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/*
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* partially encrypt a packet (level 1 security)
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|
*/
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static int rxkad_secure_packet_auth(const struct rxrpc_call *call,
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struct sk_buff *skb,
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u32 data_size,
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void *sechdr)
|
|
{
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struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb);
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SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, call->conn->cipher);
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struct rxkad_level1_hdr hdr;
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struct rxrpc_crypt iv;
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struct scatterlist sg;
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u16 check;
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_enter("");
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check = sp->hdr.seq ^ call->call_id;
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data_size |= (u32)check << 16;
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hdr.data_size = htonl(data_size);
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memcpy(sechdr, &hdr, sizeof(hdr));
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/* start the encryption afresh */
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memset(&iv, 0, sizeof(iv));
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sg_init_one(&sg, sechdr, 8);
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skcipher_request_set_tfm(req, call->conn->cipher);
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skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
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skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, &sg, 8, iv.x);
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crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req);
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skcipher_request_zero(req);
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_leave(" = 0");
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* wholly encrypt a packet (level 2 security)
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*/
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static int rxkad_secure_packet_encrypt(const struct rxrpc_call *call,
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struct sk_buff *skb,
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u32 data_size,
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void *sechdr)
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{
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const struct rxrpc_key_token *token;
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struct rxkad_level2_hdr rxkhdr;
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struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp;
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SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, call->conn->cipher);
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struct rxrpc_crypt iv;
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struct scatterlist sg[16];
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struct sk_buff *trailer;
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unsigned int len;
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u16 check;
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int nsg;
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int err;
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sp = rxrpc_skb(skb);
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_enter("");
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check = sp->hdr.seq ^ call->call_id;
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rxkhdr.data_size = htonl(data_size | (u32)check << 16);
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rxkhdr.checksum = 0;
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memcpy(sechdr, &rxkhdr, sizeof(rxkhdr));
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|
/* encrypt from the session key */
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token = call->conn->params.key->payload.data[0];
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memcpy(&iv, token->kad->session_key, sizeof(iv));
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sg_init_one(&sg[0], sechdr, sizeof(rxkhdr));
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skcipher_request_set_tfm(req, call->conn->cipher);
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skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
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|
skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &sg[0], &sg[0], sizeof(rxkhdr), iv.x);
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|
crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req);
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|
|
|
/* we want to encrypt the skbuff in-place */
|
|
nsg = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &trailer);
|
|
err = -ENOMEM;
|
|
if (nsg < 0 || nsg > 16)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
len = data_size + call->conn->size_align - 1;
|
|
len &= ~(call->conn->size_align - 1);
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|
|
|
sg_init_table(sg, nsg);
|
|
err = skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, 0, len);
|
|
if (unlikely(err < 0))
|
|
goto out;
|
|
skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, len, iv.x);
|
|
crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req);
|
|
|
|
_leave(" = 0");
|
|
err = 0;
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
skcipher_request_zero(req);
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* checksum an RxRPC packet header
|
|
*/
|
|
static int rxkad_secure_packet(struct rxrpc_call *call,
|
|
struct sk_buff *skb,
|
|
size_t data_size,
|
|
void *sechdr)
|
|
{
|
|
struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp;
|
|
SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, call->conn->cipher);
|
|
struct rxrpc_crypt iv;
|
|
struct scatterlist sg;
|
|
u32 x, y;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
sp = rxrpc_skb(skb);
|
|
|
|
_enter("{%d{%x}},{#%u},%zu,",
|
|
call->debug_id, key_serial(call->conn->params.key),
|
|
sp->hdr.seq, data_size);
|
|
|
|
if (!call->conn->cipher)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
ret = key_validate(call->conn->params.key);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
/* continue encrypting from where we left off */
|
|
memcpy(&iv, call->conn->csum_iv.x, sizeof(iv));
|
|
|
|
/* calculate the security checksum */
|
|
x = (call->cid & RXRPC_CHANNELMASK) << (32 - RXRPC_CIDSHIFT);
|
|
x |= sp->hdr.seq & 0x3fffffff;
|
|
call->crypto_buf[0] = htonl(call->call_id);
|
|
call->crypto_buf[1] = htonl(x);
|
|
|
|
sg_init_one(&sg, call->crypto_buf, 8);
|
|
skcipher_request_set_tfm(req, call->conn->cipher);
|
|
skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
|
|
skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, &sg, 8, iv.x);
|
|
crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req);
|
|
skcipher_request_zero(req);
|
|
|
|
y = ntohl(call->crypto_buf[1]);
|
|
y = (y >> 16) & 0xffff;
|
|
if (y == 0)
|
|
y = 1; /* zero checksums are not permitted */
|
|
sp->hdr.cksum = y;
|
|
|
|
switch (call->conn->params.security_level) {
|
|
case RXRPC_SECURITY_PLAIN:
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
case RXRPC_SECURITY_AUTH:
|
|
ret = rxkad_secure_packet_auth(call, skb, data_size, sechdr);
|
|
break;
|
|
case RXRPC_SECURITY_ENCRYPT:
|
|
ret = rxkad_secure_packet_encrypt(call, skb, data_size,
|
|
sechdr);
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
ret = -EPERM;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
_leave(" = %d [set %hx]", ret, y);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* decrypt partial encryption on a packet (level 1 security)
|
|
*/
|
|
static int rxkad_verify_packet_1(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb,
|
|
unsigned int offset, unsigned int len,
|
|
rxrpc_seq_t seq)
|
|
{
|
|
struct rxkad_level1_hdr sechdr;
|
|
SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, call->conn->cipher);
|
|
struct rxrpc_crypt iv;
|
|
struct scatterlist sg[16];
|
|
struct sk_buff *trailer;
|
|
bool aborted;
|
|
u32 data_size, buf;
|
|
u16 check;
|
|
int nsg, ret;
|
|
|
|
_enter("");
|
|
|
|
if (len < 8) {
|
|
aborted = rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, "rxkad_1_hdr", "V1H",
|
|
RXKADSEALEDINCON);
|
|
goto protocol_error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Decrypt the skbuff in-place. TODO: We really want to decrypt
|
|
* directly into the target buffer.
|
|
*/
|
|
nsg = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &trailer);
|
|
if (nsg < 0 || nsg > 16)
|
|
goto nomem;
|
|
|
|
sg_init_table(sg, nsg);
|
|
ret = skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, offset, 8);
|
|
if (unlikely(ret < 0))
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
/* start the decryption afresh */
|
|
memset(&iv, 0, sizeof(iv));
|
|
|
|
skcipher_request_set_tfm(req, call->conn->cipher);
|
|
skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
|
|
skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, 8, iv.x);
|
|
crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req);
|
|
skcipher_request_zero(req);
|
|
|
|
/* Extract the decrypted packet length */
|
|
if (skb_copy_bits(skb, offset, &sechdr, sizeof(sechdr)) < 0) {
|
|
aborted = rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, "rxkad_1_len", "XV1",
|
|
RXKADDATALEN);
|
|
goto protocol_error;
|
|
}
|
|
offset += sizeof(sechdr);
|
|
len -= sizeof(sechdr);
|
|
|
|
buf = ntohl(sechdr.data_size);
|
|
data_size = buf & 0xffff;
|
|
|
|
check = buf >> 16;
|
|
check ^= seq ^ call->call_id;
|
|
check &= 0xffff;
|
|
if (check != 0) {
|
|
aborted = rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, "rxkad_1_check", "V1C",
|
|
RXKADSEALEDINCON);
|
|
goto protocol_error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (data_size > len) {
|
|
aborted = rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, "rxkad_1_datalen", "V1L",
|
|
RXKADDATALEN);
|
|
goto protocol_error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
_leave(" = 0 [dlen=%x]", data_size);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
protocol_error:
|
|
if (aborted)
|
|
rxrpc_send_abort_packet(call);
|
|
return -EPROTO;
|
|
|
|
nomem:
|
|
_leave(" = -ENOMEM");
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* wholly decrypt a packet (level 2 security)
|
|
*/
|
|
static int rxkad_verify_packet_2(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb,
|
|
unsigned int offset, unsigned int len,
|
|
rxrpc_seq_t seq)
|
|
{
|
|
const struct rxrpc_key_token *token;
|
|
struct rxkad_level2_hdr sechdr;
|
|
SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, call->conn->cipher);
|
|
struct rxrpc_crypt iv;
|
|
struct scatterlist _sg[4], *sg;
|
|
struct sk_buff *trailer;
|
|
bool aborted;
|
|
u32 data_size, buf;
|
|
u16 check;
|
|
int nsg, ret;
|
|
|
|
_enter(",{%d}", skb->len);
|
|
|
|
if (len < 8) {
|
|
aborted = rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, "rxkad_2_hdr", "V2H",
|
|
RXKADSEALEDINCON);
|
|
goto protocol_error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Decrypt the skbuff in-place. TODO: We really want to decrypt
|
|
* directly into the target buffer.
|
|
*/
|
|
nsg = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &trailer);
|
|
if (nsg < 0)
|
|
goto nomem;
|
|
|
|
sg = _sg;
|
|
if (unlikely(nsg > 4)) {
|
|
sg = kmalloc_array(nsg, sizeof(*sg), GFP_NOIO);
|
|
if (!sg)
|
|
goto nomem;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sg_init_table(sg, nsg);
|
|
ret = skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, offset, len);
|
|
if (unlikely(ret < 0)) {
|
|
if (sg != _sg)
|
|
kfree(sg);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* decrypt from the session key */
|
|
token = call->conn->params.key->payload.data[0];
|
|
memcpy(&iv, token->kad->session_key, sizeof(iv));
|
|
|
|
skcipher_request_set_tfm(req, call->conn->cipher);
|
|
skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
|
|
skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, len, iv.x);
|
|
crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req);
|
|
skcipher_request_zero(req);
|
|
if (sg != _sg)
|
|
kfree(sg);
|
|
|
|
/* Extract the decrypted packet length */
|
|
if (skb_copy_bits(skb, offset, &sechdr, sizeof(sechdr)) < 0) {
|
|
aborted = rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, "rxkad_2_len", "XV2",
|
|
RXKADDATALEN);
|
|
goto protocol_error;
|
|
}
|
|
offset += sizeof(sechdr);
|
|
len -= sizeof(sechdr);
|
|
|
|
buf = ntohl(sechdr.data_size);
|
|
data_size = buf & 0xffff;
|
|
|
|
check = buf >> 16;
|
|
check ^= seq ^ call->call_id;
|
|
check &= 0xffff;
|
|
if (check != 0) {
|
|
aborted = rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, "rxkad_2_check", "V2C",
|
|
RXKADSEALEDINCON);
|
|
goto protocol_error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (data_size > len) {
|
|
aborted = rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, "rxkad_2_datalen", "V2L",
|
|
RXKADDATALEN);
|
|
goto protocol_error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
_leave(" = 0 [dlen=%x]", data_size);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
protocol_error:
|
|
if (aborted)
|
|
rxrpc_send_abort_packet(call);
|
|
return -EPROTO;
|
|
|
|
nomem:
|
|
_leave(" = -ENOMEM");
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Verify the security on a received packet or subpacket (if part of a
|
|
* jumbo packet).
|
|
*/
|
|
static int rxkad_verify_packet(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb,
|
|
unsigned int offset, unsigned int len,
|
|
rxrpc_seq_t seq, u16 expected_cksum)
|
|
{
|
|
SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, call->conn->cipher);
|
|
struct rxrpc_crypt iv;
|
|
struct scatterlist sg;
|
|
bool aborted;
|
|
u16 cksum;
|
|
u32 x, y;
|
|
|
|
_enter("{%d{%x}},{#%u}",
|
|
call->debug_id, key_serial(call->conn->params.key), seq);
|
|
|
|
if (!call->conn->cipher)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* continue encrypting from where we left off */
|
|
memcpy(&iv, call->conn->csum_iv.x, sizeof(iv));
|
|
|
|
/* validate the security checksum */
|
|
x = (call->cid & RXRPC_CHANNELMASK) << (32 - RXRPC_CIDSHIFT);
|
|
x |= seq & 0x3fffffff;
|
|
call->crypto_buf[0] = htonl(call->call_id);
|
|
call->crypto_buf[1] = htonl(x);
|
|
|
|
sg_init_one(&sg, call->crypto_buf, 8);
|
|
skcipher_request_set_tfm(req, call->conn->cipher);
|
|
skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
|
|
skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, &sg, 8, iv.x);
|
|
crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req);
|
|
skcipher_request_zero(req);
|
|
|
|
y = ntohl(call->crypto_buf[1]);
|
|
cksum = (y >> 16) & 0xffff;
|
|
if (cksum == 0)
|
|
cksum = 1; /* zero checksums are not permitted */
|
|
|
|
if (cksum != expected_cksum) {
|
|
aborted = rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, "rxkad_csum", "VCK",
|
|
RXKADSEALEDINCON);
|
|
goto protocol_error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch (call->conn->params.security_level) {
|
|
case RXRPC_SECURITY_PLAIN:
|
|
return 0;
|
|
case RXRPC_SECURITY_AUTH:
|
|
return rxkad_verify_packet_1(call, skb, offset, len, seq);
|
|
case RXRPC_SECURITY_ENCRYPT:
|
|
return rxkad_verify_packet_2(call, skb, offset, len, seq);
|
|
default:
|
|
return -ENOANO;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
protocol_error:
|
|
if (aborted)
|
|
rxrpc_send_abort_packet(call);
|
|
return -EPROTO;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Locate the data contained in a packet that was partially encrypted.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void rxkad_locate_data_1(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb,
|
|
unsigned int *_offset, unsigned int *_len)
|
|
{
|
|
struct rxkad_level1_hdr sechdr;
|
|
|
|
if (skb_copy_bits(skb, *_offset, &sechdr, sizeof(sechdr)) < 0)
|
|
BUG();
|
|
*_offset += sizeof(sechdr);
|
|
*_len = ntohl(sechdr.data_size) & 0xffff;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Locate the data contained in a packet that was completely encrypted.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void rxkad_locate_data_2(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb,
|
|
unsigned int *_offset, unsigned int *_len)
|
|
{
|
|
struct rxkad_level2_hdr sechdr;
|
|
|
|
if (skb_copy_bits(skb, *_offset, &sechdr, sizeof(sechdr)) < 0)
|
|
BUG();
|
|
*_offset += sizeof(sechdr);
|
|
*_len = ntohl(sechdr.data_size) & 0xffff;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Locate the data contained in an already decrypted packet.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void rxkad_locate_data(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb,
|
|
unsigned int *_offset, unsigned int *_len)
|
|
{
|
|
switch (call->conn->params.security_level) {
|
|
case RXRPC_SECURITY_AUTH:
|
|
rxkad_locate_data_1(call, skb, _offset, _len);
|
|
return;
|
|
case RXRPC_SECURITY_ENCRYPT:
|
|
rxkad_locate_data_2(call, skb, _offset, _len);
|
|
return;
|
|
default:
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* issue a challenge
|
|
*/
|
|
static int rxkad_issue_challenge(struct rxrpc_connection *conn)
|
|
{
|
|
struct rxkad_challenge challenge;
|
|
struct rxrpc_wire_header whdr;
|
|
struct msghdr msg;
|
|
struct kvec iov[2];
|
|
size_t len;
|
|
u32 serial;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
_enter("{%d,%x}", conn->debug_id, key_serial(conn->params.key));
|
|
|
|
ret = key_validate(conn->params.key);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
get_random_bytes(&conn->security_nonce, sizeof(conn->security_nonce));
|
|
|
|
challenge.version = htonl(2);
|
|
challenge.nonce = htonl(conn->security_nonce);
|
|
challenge.min_level = htonl(0);
|
|
challenge.__padding = 0;
|
|
|
|
msg.msg_name = &conn->params.peer->srx.transport;
|
|
msg.msg_namelen = conn->params.peer->srx.transport_len;
|
|
msg.msg_control = NULL;
|
|
msg.msg_controllen = 0;
|
|
msg.msg_flags = 0;
|
|
|
|
whdr.epoch = htonl(conn->proto.epoch);
|
|
whdr.cid = htonl(conn->proto.cid);
|
|
whdr.callNumber = 0;
|
|
whdr.seq = 0;
|
|
whdr.type = RXRPC_PACKET_TYPE_CHALLENGE;
|
|
whdr.flags = conn->out_clientflag;
|
|
whdr.userStatus = 0;
|
|
whdr.securityIndex = conn->security_ix;
|
|
whdr._rsvd = 0;
|
|
whdr.serviceId = htons(conn->service_id);
|
|
|
|
iov[0].iov_base = &whdr;
|
|
iov[0].iov_len = sizeof(whdr);
|
|
iov[1].iov_base = &challenge;
|
|
iov[1].iov_len = sizeof(challenge);
|
|
|
|
len = iov[0].iov_len + iov[1].iov_len;
|
|
|
|
serial = atomic_inc_return(&conn->serial);
|
|
whdr.serial = htonl(serial);
|
|
_proto("Tx CHALLENGE %%%u", serial);
|
|
|
|
ret = kernel_sendmsg(conn->params.local->socket, &msg, iov, 2, len);
|
|
if (ret < 0) {
|
|
trace_rxrpc_tx_fail(conn->debug_id, serial, ret,
|
|
rxrpc_tx_fail_conn_challenge);
|
|
return -EAGAIN;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
conn->params.peer->last_tx_at = ktime_get_seconds();
|
|
_leave(" = 0");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* send a Kerberos security response
|
|
*/
|
|
static int rxkad_send_response(struct rxrpc_connection *conn,
|
|
struct rxrpc_host_header *hdr,
|
|
struct rxkad_response *resp,
|
|
const struct rxkad_key *s2)
|
|
{
|
|
struct rxrpc_wire_header whdr;
|
|
struct msghdr msg;
|
|
struct kvec iov[3];
|
|
size_t len;
|
|
u32 serial;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
_enter("");
|
|
|
|
msg.msg_name = &conn->params.peer->srx.transport;
|
|
msg.msg_namelen = conn->params.peer->srx.transport_len;
|
|
msg.msg_control = NULL;
|
|
msg.msg_controllen = 0;
|
|
msg.msg_flags = 0;
|
|
|
|
memset(&whdr, 0, sizeof(whdr));
|
|
whdr.epoch = htonl(hdr->epoch);
|
|
whdr.cid = htonl(hdr->cid);
|
|
whdr.type = RXRPC_PACKET_TYPE_RESPONSE;
|
|
whdr.flags = conn->out_clientflag;
|
|
whdr.securityIndex = hdr->securityIndex;
|
|
whdr.serviceId = htons(hdr->serviceId);
|
|
|
|
iov[0].iov_base = &whdr;
|
|
iov[0].iov_len = sizeof(whdr);
|
|
iov[1].iov_base = resp;
|
|
iov[1].iov_len = sizeof(*resp);
|
|
iov[2].iov_base = (void *)s2->ticket;
|
|
iov[2].iov_len = s2->ticket_len;
|
|
|
|
len = iov[0].iov_len + iov[1].iov_len + iov[2].iov_len;
|
|
|
|
serial = atomic_inc_return(&conn->serial);
|
|
whdr.serial = htonl(serial);
|
|
_proto("Tx RESPONSE %%%u", serial);
|
|
|
|
ret = kernel_sendmsg(conn->params.local->socket, &msg, iov, 3, len);
|
|
if (ret < 0) {
|
|
trace_rxrpc_tx_fail(conn->debug_id, serial, ret,
|
|
rxrpc_tx_fail_conn_response);
|
|
return -EAGAIN;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
conn->params.peer->last_tx_at = ktime_get_seconds();
|
|
_leave(" = 0");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* calculate the response checksum
|
|
*/
|
|
static void rxkad_calc_response_checksum(struct rxkad_response *response)
|
|
{
|
|
u32 csum = 1000003;
|
|
int loop;
|
|
u8 *p = (u8 *) response;
|
|
|
|
for (loop = sizeof(*response); loop > 0; loop--)
|
|
csum = csum * 0x10204081 + *p++;
|
|
|
|
response->encrypted.checksum = htonl(csum);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* encrypt the response packet
|
|
*/
|
|
static void rxkad_encrypt_response(struct rxrpc_connection *conn,
|
|
struct rxkad_response *resp,
|
|
const struct rxkad_key *s2)
|
|
{
|
|
SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, conn->cipher);
|
|
struct rxrpc_crypt iv;
|
|
struct scatterlist sg[1];
|
|
|
|
/* continue encrypting from where we left off */
|
|
memcpy(&iv, s2->session_key, sizeof(iv));
|
|
|
|
sg_init_table(sg, 1);
|
|
sg_set_buf(sg, &resp->encrypted, sizeof(resp->encrypted));
|
|
skcipher_request_set_tfm(req, conn->cipher);
|
|
skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
|
|
skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, sizeof(resp->encrypted), iv.x);
|
|
crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req);
|
|
skcipher_request_zero(req);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* respond to a challenge packet
|
|
*/
|
|
static int rxkad_respond_to_challenge(struct rxrpc_connection *conn,
|
|
struct sk_buff *skb,
|
|
u32 *_abort_code)
|
|
{
|
|
const struct rxrpc_key_token *token;
|
|
struct rxkad_challenge challenge;
|
|
struct rxkad_response *resp;
|
|
struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb);
|
|
const char *eproto;
|
|
u32 version, nonce, min_level, abort_code;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
_enter("{%d,%x}", conn->debug_id, key_serial(conn->params.key));
|
|
|
|
eproto = tracepoint_string("chall_no_key");
|
|
abort_code = RX_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
|
|
if (!conn->params.key)
|
|
goto protocol_error;
|
|
|
|
abort_code = RXKADEXPIRED;
|
|
ret = key_validate(conn->params.key);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
goto other_error;
|
|
|
|
eproto = tracepoint_string("chall_short");
|
|
abort_code = RXKADPACKETSHORT;
|
|
if (skb_copy_bits(skb, sizeof(struct rxrpc_wire_header),
|
|
&challenge, sizeof(challenge)) < 0)
|
|
goto protocol_error;
|
|
|
|
version = ntohl(challenge.version);
|
|
nonce = ntohl(challenge.nonce);
|
|
min_level = ntohl(challenge.min_level);
|
|
|
|
_proto("Rx CHALLENGE %%%u { v=%u n=%u ml=%u }",
|
|
sp->hdr.serial, version, nonce, min_level);
|
|
|
|
eproto = tracepoint_string("chall_ver");
|
|
abort_code = RXKADINCONSISTENCY;
|
|
if (version != RXKAD_VERSION)
|
|
goto protocol_error;
|
|
|
|
abort_code = RXKADLEVELFAIL;
|
|
ret = -EACCES;
|
|
if (conn->params.security_level < min_level)
|
|
goto other_error;
|
|
|
|
token = conn->params.key->payload.data[0];
|
|
|
|
/* build the response packet */
|
|
resp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct rxkad_response), GFP_NOFS);
|
|
if (!resp)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
resp->version = htonl(RXKAD_VERSION);
|
|
resp->encrypted.epoch = htonl(conn->proto.epoch);
|
|
resp->encrypted.cid = htonl(conn->proto.cid);
|
|
resp->encrypted.securityIndex = htonl(conn->security_ix);
|
|
resp->encrypted.inc_nonce = htonl(nonce + 1);
|
|
resp->encrypted.level = htonl(conn->params.security_level);
|
|
resp->kvno = htonl(token->kad->kvno);
|
|
resp->ticket_len = htonl(token->kad->ticket_len);
|
|
resp->encrypted.call_id[0] = htonl(conn->channels[0].call_counter);
|
|
resp->encrypted.call_id[1] = htonl(conn->channels[1].call_counter);
|
|
resp->encrypted.call_id[2] = htonl(conn->channels[2].call_counter);
|
|
resp->encrypted.call_id[3] = htonl(conn->channels[3].call_counter);
|
|
|
|
/* calculate the response checksum and then do the encryption */
|
|
rxkad_calc_response_checksum(resp);
|
|
rxkad_encrypt_response(conn, resp, token->kad);
|
|
ret = rxkad_send_response(conn, &sp->hdr, resp, token->kad);
|
|
kfree(resp);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
protocol_error:
|
|
trace_rxrpc_rx_eproto(NULL, sp->hdr.serial, eproto);
|
|
ret = -EPROTO;
|
|
other_error:
|
|
*_abort_code = abort_code;
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* decrypt the kerberos IV ticket in the response
|
|
*/
|
|
static int rxkad_decrypt_ticket(struct rxrpc_connection *conn,
|
|
struct sk_buff *skb,
|
|
void *ticket, size_t ticket_len,
|
|
struct rxrpc_crypt *_session_key,
|
|
time64_t *_expiry,
|
|
u32 *_abort_code)
|
|
{
|
|
struct skcipher_request *req;
|
|
struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb);
|
|
struct rxrpc_crypt iv, key;
|
|
struct scatterlist sg[1];
|
|
struct in_addr addr;
|
|
unsigned int life;
|
|
const char *eproto;
|
|
time64_t issue, now;
|
|
bool little_endian;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
u32 abort_code;
|
|
u8 *p, *q, *name, *end;
|
|
|
|
_enter("{%d},{%x}", conn->debug_id, key_serial(conn->server_key));
|
|
|
|
*_expiry = 0;
|
|
|
|
ret = key_validate(conn->server_key);
|
|
if (ret < 0) {
|
|
switch (ret) {
|
|
case -EKEYEXPIRED:
|
|
abort_code = RXKADEXPIRED;
|
|
goto other_error;
|
|
default:
|
|
abort_code = RXKADNOAUTH;
|
|
goto other_error;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ASSERT(conn->server_key->payload.data[0] != NULL);
|
|
ASSERTCMP((unsigned long) ticket & 7UL, ==, 0);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&iv, &conn->server_key->payload.data[2], sizeof(iv));
|
|
|
|
ret = -ENOMEM;
|
|
req = skcipher_request_alloc(conn->server_key->payload.data[0],
|
|
GFP_NOFS);
|
|
if (!req)
|
|
goto temporary_error;
|
|
|
|
sg_init_one(&sg[0], ticket, ticket_len);
|
|
skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
|
|
skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, ticket_len, iv.x);
|
|
crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req);
|
|
skcipher_request_free(req);
|
|
|
|
p = ticket;
|
|
end = p + ticket_len;
|
|
|
|
#define Z(field) \
|
|
({ \
|
|
u8 *__str = p; \
|
|
eproto = tracepoint_string("rxkad_bad_"#field); \
|
|
q = memchr(p, 0, end - p); \
|
|
if (!q || q - p > (field##_SZ)) \
|
|
goto bad_ticket; \
|
|
for (; p < q; p++) \
|
|
if (!isprint(*p)) \
|
|
goto bad_ticket; \
|
|
p++; \
|
|
__str; \
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
/* extract the ticket flags */
|
|
_debug("KIV FLAGS: %x", *p);
|
|
little_endian = *p & 1;
|
|
p++;
|
|
|
|
/* extract the authentication name */
|
|
name = Z(ANAME);
|
|
_debug("KIV ANAME: %s", name);
|
|
|
|
/* extract the principal's instance */
|
|
name = Z(INST);
|
|
_debug("KIV INST : %s", name);
|
|
|
|
/* extract the principal's authentication domain */
|
|
name = Z(REALM);
|
|
_debug("KIV REALM: %s", name);
|
|
|
|
eproto = tracepoint_string("rxkad_bad_len");
|
|
if (end - p < 4 + 8 + 4 + 2)
|
|
goto bad_ticket;
|
|
|
|
/* get the IPv4 address of the entity that requested the ticket */
|
|
memcpy(&addr, p, sizeof(addr));
|
|
p += 4;
|
|
_debug("KIV ADDR : %pI4", &addr);
|
|
|
|
/* get the session key from the ticket */
|
|
memcpy(&key, p, sizeof(key));
|
|
p += 8;
|
|
_debug("KIV KEY : %08x %08x", ntohl(key.n[0]), ntohl(key.n[1]));
|
|
memcpy(_session_key, &key, sizeof(key));
|
|
|
|
/* get the ticket's lifetime */
|
|
life = *p++ * 5 * 60;
|
|
_debug("KIV LIFE : %u", life);
|
|
|
|
/* get the issue time of the ticket */
|
|
if (little_endian) {
|
|
__le32 stamp;
|
|
memcpy(&stamp, p, 4);
|
|
issue = rxrpc_u32_to_time64(le32_to_cpu(stamp));
|
|
} else {
|
|
__be32 stamp;
|
|
memcpy(&stamp, p, 4);
|
|
issue = rxrpc_u32_to_time64(be32_to_cpu(stamp));
|
|
}
|
|
p += 4;
|
|
now = ktime_get_real_seconds();
|
|
_debug("KIV ISSUE: %llx [%llx]", issue, now);
|
|
|
|
/* check the ticket is in date */
|
|
if (issue > now) {
|
|
abort_code = RXKADNOAUTH;
|
|
ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
|
|
goto other_error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (issue < now - life) {
|
|
abort_code = RXKADEXPIRED;
|
|
ret = -EKEYEXPIRED;
|
|
goto other_error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*_expiry = issue + life;
|
|
|
|
/* get the service name */
|
|
name = Z(SNAME);
|
|
_debug("KIV SNAME: %s", name);
|
|
|
|
/* get the service instance name */
|
|
name = Z(INST);
|
|
_debug("KIV SINST: %s", name);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
bad_ticket:
|
|
trace_rxrpc_rx_eproto(NULL, sp->hdr.serial, eproto);
|
|
abort_code = RXKADBADTICKET;
|
|
ret = -EPROTO;
|
|
other_error:
|
|
*_abort_code = abort_code;
|
|
return ret;
|
|
temporary_error:
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* decrypt the response packet
|
|
*/
|
|
static void rxkad_decrypt_response(struct rxrpc_connection *conn,
|
|
struct rxkad_response *resp,
|
|
const struct rxrpc_crypt *session_key)
|
|
{
|
|
SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, rxkad_ci);
|
|
struct scatterlist sg[1];
|
|
struct rxrpc_crypt iv;
|
|
|
|
_enter(",,%08x%08x",
|
|
ntohl(session_key->n[0]), ntohl(session_key->n[1]));
|
|
|
|
ASSERT(rxkad_ci != NULL);
|
|
|
|
mutex_lock(&rxkad_ci_mutex);
|
|
if (crypto_skcipher_setkey(rxkad_ci, session_key->x,
|
|
sizeof(*session_key)) < 0)
|
|
BUG();
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&iv, session_key, sizeof(iv));
|
|
|
|
sg_init_table(sg, 1);
|
|
sg_set_buf(sg, &resp->encrypted, sizeof(resp->encrypted));
|
|
skcipher_request_set_tfm(req, rxkad_ci);
|
|
skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
|
|
skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, sizeof(resp->encrypted), iv.x);
|
|
crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req);
|
|
skcipher_request_zero(req);
|
|
|
|
mutex_unlock(&rxkad_ci_mutex);
|
|
|
|
_leave("");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* verify a response
|
|
*/
|
|
static int rxkad_verify_response(struct rxrpc_connection *conn,
|
|
struct sk_buff *skb,
|
|
u32 *_abort_code)
|
|
{
|
|
struct rxkad_response *response;
|
|
struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb);
|
|
struct rxrpc_crypt session_key;
|
|
const char *eproto;
|
|
time64_t expiry;
|
|
void *ticket;
|
|
u32 abort_code, version, kvno, ticket_len, level;
|
|
__be32 csum;
|
|
int ret, i;
|
|
|
|
_enter("{%d,%x}", conn->debug_id, key_serial(conn->server_key));
|
|
|
|
ret = -ENOMEM;
|
|
response = kzalloc(sizeof(struct rxkad_response), GFP_NOFS);
|
|
if (!response)
|
|
goto temporary_error;
|
|
|
|
eproto = tracepoint_string("rxkad_rsp_short");
|
|
abort_code = RXKADPACKETSHORT;
|
|
if (skb_copy_bits(skb, sizeof(struct rxrpc_wire_header),
|
|
response, sizeof(*response)) < 0)
|
|
goto protocol_error;
|
|
if (!pskb_pull(skb, sizeof(*response)))
|
|
BUG();
|
|
|
|
version = ntohl(response->version);
|
|
ticket_len = ntohl(response->ticket_len);
|
|
kvno = ntohl(response->kvno);
|
|
_proto("Rx RESPONSE %%%u { v=%u kv=%u tl=%u }",
|
|
sp->hdr.serial, version, kvno, ticket_len);
|
|
|
|
eproto = tracepoint_string("rxkad_rsp_ver");
|
|
abort_code = RXKADINCONSISTENCY;
|
|
if (version != RXKAD_VERSION)
|
|
goto protocol_error;
|
|
|
|
eproto = tracepoint_string("rxkad_rsp_tktlen");
|
|
abort_code = RXKADTICKETLEN;
|
|
if (ticket_len < 4 || ticket_len > MAXKRB5TICKETLEN)
|
|
goto protocol_error;
|
|
|
|
eproto = tracepoint_string("rxkad_rsp_unkkey");
|
|
abort_code = RXKADUNKNOWNKEY;
|
|
if (kvno >= RXKAD_TKT_TYPE_KERBEROS_V5)
|
|
goto protocol_error;
|
|
|
|
/* extract the kerberos ticket and decrypt and decode it */
|
|
ret = -ENOMEM;
|
|
ticket = kmalloc(ticket_len, GFP_NOFS);
|
|
if (!ticket)
|
|
goto temporary_error;
|
|
|
|
eproto = tracepoint_string("rxkad_tkt_short");
|
|
abort_code = RXKADPACKETSHORT;
|
|
if (skb_copy_bits(skb, sizeof(struct rxrpc_wire_header),
|
|
ticket, ticket_len) < 0)
|
|
goto protocol_error_free;
|
|
|
|
ret = rxkad_decrypt_ticket(conn, skb, ticket, ticket_len, &session_key,
|
|
&expiry, _abort_code);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
goto temporary_error_free_resp;
|
|
|
|
/* use the session key from inside the ticket to decrypt the
|
|
* response */
|
|
rxkad_decrypt_response(conn, response, &session_key);
|
|
|
|
eproto = tracepoint_string("rxkad_rsp_param");
|
|
abort_code = RXKADSEALEDINCON;
|
|
if (ntohl(response->encrypted.epoch) != conn->proto.epoch)
|
|
goto protocol_error_free;
|
|
if (ntohl(response->encrypted.cid) != conn->proto.cid)
|
|
goto protocol_error_free;
|
|
if (ntohl(response->encrypted.securityIndex) != conn->security_ix)
|
|
goto protocol_error_free;
|
|
csum = response->encrypted.checksum;
|
|
response->encrypted.checksum = 0;
|
|
rxkad_calc_response_checksum(response);
|
|
eproto = tracepoint_string("rxkad_rsp_csum");
|
|
if (response->encrypted.checksum != csum)
|
|
goto protocol_error_free;
|
|
|
|
spin_lock(&conn->channel_lock);
|
|
for (i = 0; i < RXRPC_MAXCALLS; i++) {
|
|
struct rxrpc_call *call;
|
|
u32 call_id = ntohl(response->encrypted.call_id[i]);
|
|
|
|
eproto = tracepoint_string("rxkad_rsp_callid");
|
|
if (call_id > INT_MAX)
|
|
goto protocol_error_unlock;
|
|
|
|
eproto = tracepoint_string("rxkad_rsp_callctr");
|
|
if (call_id < conn->channels[i].call_counter)
|
|
goto protocol_error_unlock;
|
|
|
|
eproto = tracepoint_string("rxkad_rsp_callst");
|
|
if (call_id > conn->channels[i].call_counter) {
|
|
call = rcu_dereference_protected(
|
|
conn->channels[i].call,
|
|
lockdep_is_held(&conn->channel_lock));
|
|
if (call && call->state < RXRPC_CALL_COMPLETE)
|
|
goto protocol_error_unlock;
|
|
conn->channels[i].call_counter = call_id;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
spin_unlock(&conn->channel_lock);
|
|
|
|
eproto = tracepoint_string("rxkad_rsp_seq");
|
|
abort_code = RXKADOUTOFSEQUENCE;
|
|
if (ntohl(response->encrypted.inc_nonce) != conn->security_nonce + 1)
|
|
goto protocol_error_free;
|
|
|
|
eproto = tracepoint_string("rxkad_rsp_level");
|
|
abort_code = RXKADLEVELFAIL;
|
|
level = ntohl(response->encrypted.level);
|
|
if (level > RXRPC_SECURITY_ENCRYPT)
|
|
goto protocol_error_free;
|
|
conn->params.security_level = level;
|
|
|
|
/* create a key to hold the security data and expiration time - after
|
|
* this the connection security can be handled in exactly the same way
|
|
* as for a client connection */
|
|
ret = rxrpc_get_server_data_key(conn, &session_key, expiry, kvno);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
goto temporary_error_free_ticket;
|
|
|
|
kfree(ticket);
|
|
kfree(response);
|
|
_leave(" = 0");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
protocol_error_unlock:
|
|
spin_unlock(&conn->channel_lock);
|
|
protocol_error_free:
|
|
kfree(ticket);
|
|
protocol_error:
|
|
kfree(response);
|
|
trace_rxrpc_rx_eproto(NULL, sp->hdr.serial, eproto);
|
|
*_abort_code = abort_code;
|
|
return -EPROTO;
|
|
|
|
temporary_error_free_ticket:
|
|
kfree(ticket);
|
|
temporary_error_free_resp:
|
|
kfree(response);
|
|
temporary_error:
|
|
/* Ignore the response packet if we got a temporary error such as
|
|
* ENOMEM. We just want to send the challenge again. Note that we
|
|
* also come out this way if the ticket decryption fails.
|
|
*/
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* clear the connection security
|
|
*/
|
|
static void rxkad_clear(struct rxrpc_connection *conn)
|
|
{
|
|
_enter("");
|
|
|
|
if (conn->cipher)
|
|
crypto_free_skcipher(conn->cipher);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Initialise the rxkad security service.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int rxkad_init(void)
|
|
{
|
|
/* pin the cipher we need so that the crypto layer doesn't invoke
|
|
* keventd to go get it */
|
|
rxkad_ci = crypto_alloc_skcipher("pcbc(fcrypt)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
|
|
return PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(rxkad_ci);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Clean up the rxkad security service.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void rxkad_exit(void)
|
|
{
|
|
if (rxkad_ci)
|
|
crypto_free_skcipher(rxkad_ci);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* RxRPC Kerberos-based security
|
|
*/
|
|
const struct rxrpc_security rxkad = {
|
|
.name = "rxkad",
|
|
.security_index = RXRPC_SECURITY_RXKAD,
|
|
.init = rxkad_init,
|
|
.exit = rxkad_exit,
|
|
.init_connection_security = rxkad_init_connection_security,
|
|
.prime_packet_security = rxkad_prime_packet_security,
|
|
.secure_packet = rxkad_secure_packet,
|
|
.verify_packet = rxkad_verify_packet,
|
|
.locate_data = rxkad_locate_data,
|
|
.issue_challenge = rxkad_issue_challenge,
|
|
.respond_to_challenge = rxkad_respond_to_challenge,
|
|
.verify_response = rxkad_verify_response,
|
|
.clear = rxkad_clear,
|
|
};
|