b9f5ce27c8
Introduce the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE flag for file truncation. This flag hooks into the path_truncate, file_truncate and file_alloc_security LSM hooks and covers file truncation using truncate(2), ftruncate(2), open(2) with O_TRUNC, as well as creat(). This change also increments the Landlock ABI version, updates corresponding selftests, and updates code documentation to document the flag. In security/security.c, allocate security blobs at pointer-aligned offsets. This fixes the problem where one LSM's security blob can shift another LSM's security blob to an unaligned address (reported by Nathan Chancellor). The following operations are restricted: open(2): requires the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE right if a file gets implicitly truncated as part of the open() (e.g. using O_TRUNC). Notable special cases: * open(..., O_RDONLY|O_TRUNC) can truncate files as well in Linux * open() with O_TRUNC does *not* need the TRUNCATE right when it creates a new file. truncate(2) (on a path): requires the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE right. ftruncate(2) (on a file): requires that the file had the TRUNCATE right when it was previously opened. File descriptors acquired by other means than open(2) (e.g. memfd_create(2)) continue to support truncation with ftruncate(2). Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> (LSM) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221018182216.301684-5-gnoack3000@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
457 lines
13 KiB
C
457 lines
13 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
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/*
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* Landlock LSM - System call implementations and user space interfaces
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*
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* Copyright © 2016-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
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* Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI
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*/
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#include <asm/current.h>
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#include <linux/anon_inodes.h>
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#include <linux/build_bug.h>
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#include <linux/capability.h>
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#include <linux/compiler_types.h>
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#include <linux/dcache.h>
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#include <linux/err.h>
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#include <linux/errno.h>
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#include <linux/fs.h>
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#include <linux/limits.h>
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#include <linux/mount.h>
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#include <linux/path.h>
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#include <linux/sched.h>
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#include <linux/security.h>
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#include <linux/stddef.h>
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#include <linux/syscalls.h>
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#include <linux/types.h>
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#include <linux/uaccess.h>
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#include <uapi/linux/landlock.h>
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#include "cred.h"
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#include "fs.h"
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#include "limits.h"
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#include "ruleset.h"
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#include "setup.h"
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/**
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* copy_min_struct_from_user - Safe future-proof argument copying
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*
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* Extend copy_struct_from_user() to check for consistent user buffer.
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*
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* @dst: Kernel space pointer or NULL.
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* @ksize: Actual size of the data pointed to by @dst.
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* @ksize_min: Minimal required size to be copied.
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* @src: User space pointer or NULL.
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* @usize: (Alleged) size of the data pointed to by @src.
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*/
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static __always_inline int
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copy_min_struct_from_user(void *const dst, const size_t ksize,
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const size_t ksize_min, const void __user *const src,
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const size_t usize)
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{
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/* Checks buffer inconsistencies. */
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BUILD_BUG_ON(!dst);
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if (!src)
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return -EFAULT;
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/* Checks size ranges. */
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BUILD_BUG_ON(ksize <= 0);
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BUILD_BUG_ON(ksize < ksize_min);
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if (usize < ksize_min)
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return -EINVAL;
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if (usize > PAGE_SIZE)
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return -E2BIG;
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/* Copies user buffer and fills with zeros. */
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return copy_struct_from_user(dst, ksize, src, usize);
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}
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/*
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* This function only contains arithmetic operations with constants, leading to
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* BUILD_BUG_ON(). The related code is evaluated and checked at build time,
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* but it is then ignored thanks to compiler optimizations.
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*/
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static void build_check_abi(void)
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{
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struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr;
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struct landlock_path_beneath_attr path_beneath_attr;
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size_t ruleset_size, path_beneath_size;
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/*
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* For each user space ABI structures, first checks that there is no
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* hole in them, then checks that all architectures have the same
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* struct size.
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*/
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ruleset_size = sizeof(ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs);
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BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(ruleset_attr) != ruleset_size);
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BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(ruleset_attr) != 8);
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path_beneath_size = sizeof(path_beneath_attr.allowed_access);
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path_beneath_size += sizeof(path_beneath_attr.parent_fd);
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BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(path_beneath_attr) != path_beneath_size);
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BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(path_beneath_attr) != 12);
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}
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/* Ruleset handling */
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static int fop_ruleset_release(struct inode *const inode,
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struct file *const filp)
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{
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struct landlock_ruleset *ruleset = filp->private_data;
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landlock_put_ruleset(ruleset);
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return 0;
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}
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static ssize_t fop_dummy_read(struct file *const filp, char __user *const buf,
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const size_t size, loff_t *const ppos)
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{
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/* Dummy handler to enable FMODE_CAN_READ. */
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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static ssize_t fop_dummy_write(struct file *const filp,
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const char __user *const buf, const size_t size,
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loff_t *const ppos)
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{
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/* Dummy handler to enable FMODE_CAN_WRITE. */
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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/*
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* A ruleset file descriptor enables to build a ruleset by adding (i.e.
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* writing) rule after rule, without relying on the task's context. This
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* reentrant design is also used in a read way to enforce the ruleset on the
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* current task.
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*/
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static const struct file_operations ruleset_fops = {
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.release = fop_ruleset_release,
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.read = fop_dummy_read,
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.write = fop_dummy_write,
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};
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#define LANDLOCK_ABI_VERSION 3
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/**
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* sys_landlock_create_ruleset - Create a new ruleset
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*
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* @attr: Pointer to a &struct landlock_ruleset_attr identifying the scope of
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* the new ruleset.
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* @size: Size of the pointed &struct landlock_ruleset_attr (needed for
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* backward and forward compatibility).
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* @flags: Supported value: %LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION.
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*
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* This system call enables to create a new Landlock ruleset, and returns the
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* related file descriptor on success.
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*
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* If @flags is %LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION and @attr is NULL and @size is
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* 0, then the returned value is the highest supported Landlock ABI version
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* (starting at 1).
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*
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* Possible returned errors are:
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*
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* - %EOPNOTSUPP: Landlock is supported by the kernel but disabled at boot time;
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* - %EINVAL: unknown @flags, or unknown access, or too small @size;
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* - %E2BIG or %EFAULT: @attr or @size inconsistencies;
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* - %ENOMSG: empty &landlock_ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs.
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*/
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SYSCALL_DEFINE3(landlock_create_ruleset,
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const struct landlock_ruleset_attr __user *const, attr,
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const size_t, size, const __u32, flags)
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{
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struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr;
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struct landlock_ruleset *ruleset;
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int err, ruleset_fd;
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/* Build-time checks. */
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build_check_abi();
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if (!landlock_initialized)
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return -EOPNOTSUPP;
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if (flags) {
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if ((flags == LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION) && !attr &&
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!size)
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return LANDLOCK_ABI_VERSION;
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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/* Copies raw user space buffer. */
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err = copy_min_struct_from_user(&ruleset_attr, sizeof(ruleset_attr),
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offsetofend(typeof(ruleset_attr),
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handled_access_fs),
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attr, size);
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if (err)
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return err;
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/* Checks content (and 32-bits cast). */
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if ((ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs | LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS) !=
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LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS)
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return -EINVAL;
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/* Checks arguments and transforms to kernel struct. */
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ruleset = landlock_create_ruleset(ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs);
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if (IS_ERR(ruleset))
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return PTR_ERR(ruleset);
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/* Creates anonymous FD referring to the ruleset. */
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ruleset_fd = anon_inode_getfd("[landlock-ruleset]", &ruleset_fops,
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ruleset, O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC);
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if (ruleset_fd < 0)
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landlock_put_ruleset(ruleset);
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return ruleset_fd;
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}
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/*
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* Returns an owned ruleset from a FD. It is thus needed to call
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* landlock_put_ruleset() on the return value.
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*/
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static struct landlock_ruleset *get_ruleset_from_fd(const int fd,
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const fmode_t mode)
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{
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struct fd ruleset_f;
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struct landlock_ruleset *ruleset;
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ruleset_f = fdget(fd);
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if (!ruleset_f.file)
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return ERR_PTR(-EBADF);
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/* Checks FD type and access right. */
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if (ruleset_f.file->f_op != &ruleset_fops) {
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ruleset = ERR_PTR(-EBADFD);
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goto out_fdput;
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}
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if (!(ruleset_f.file->f_mode & mode)) {
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ruleset = ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
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goto out_fdput;
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}
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ruleset = ruleset_f.file->private_data;
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if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ruleset->num_layers != 1)) {
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ruleset = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
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goto out_fdput;
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}
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landlock_get_ruleset(ruleset);
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out_fdput:
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fdput(ruleset_f);
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return ruleset;
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}
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/* Path handling */
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/*
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* @path: Must call put_path(@path) after the call if it succeeded.
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*/
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static int get_path_from_fd(const s32 fd, struct path *const path)
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{
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struct fd f;
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int err = 0;
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BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(
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fd, ((struct landlock_path_beneath_attr *)NULL)->parent_fd));
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/* Handles O_PATH. */
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f = fdget_raw(fd);
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if (!f.file)
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return -EBADF;
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/*
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* Forbids ruleset FDs, internal filesystems (e.g. nsfs), including
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* pseudo filesystems that will never be mountable (e.g. sockfs,
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* pipefs).
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*/
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if ((f.file->f_op == &ruleset_fops) ||
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(f.file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_INTERNAL) ||
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(f.file->f_path.dentry->d_sb->s_flags & SB_NOUSER) ||
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d_is_negative(f.file->f_path.dentry) ||
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IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(f.file->f_path.dentry))) {
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err = -EBADFD;
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goto out_fdput;
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}
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*path = f.file->f_path;
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path_get(path);
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out_fdput:
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fdput(f);
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return err;
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}
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/**
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* sys_landlock_add_rule - Add a new rule to a ruleset
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*
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* @ruleset_fd: File descriptor tied to the ruleset that should be extended
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* with the new rule.
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* @rule_type: Identify the structure type pointed to by @rule_attr (only
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* %LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH for now).
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* @rule_attr: Pointer to a rule (only of type &struct
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* landlock_path_beneath_attr for now).
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* @flags: Must be 0.
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*
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* This system call enables to define a new rule and add it to an existing
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* ruleset.
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*
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* Possible returned errors are:
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*
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* - %EOPNOTSUPP: Landlock is supported by the kernel but disabled at boot time;
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* - %EINVAL: @flags is not 0, or inconsistent access in the rule (i.e.
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* &landlock_path_beneath_attr.allowed_access is not a subset of the
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* ruleset handled accesses);
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* - %ENOMSG: Empty accesses (e.g. &landlock_path_beneath_attr.allowed_access);
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* - %EBADF: @ruleset_fd is not a file descriptor for the current thread, or a
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* member of @rule_attr is not a file descriptor as expected;
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* - %EBADFD: @ruleset_fd is not a ruleset file descriptor, or a member of
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* @rule_attr is not the expected file descriptor type;
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* - %EPERM: @ruleset_fd has no write access to the underlying ruleset;
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* - %EFAULT: @rule_attr inconsistency.
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*/
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SYSCALL_DEFINE4(landlock_add_rule, const int, ruleset_fd,
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const enum landlock_rule_type, rule_type,
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const void __user *const, rule_attr, const __u32, flags)
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{
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struct landlock_path_beneath_attr path_beneath_attr;
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struct path path;
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struct landlock_ruleset *ruleset;
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int res, err;
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if (!landlock_initialized)
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return -EOPNOTSUPP;
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/* No flag for now. */
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if (flags)
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return -EINVAL;
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/* Gets and checks the ruleset. */
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ruleset = get_ruleset_from_fd(ruleset_fd, FMODE_CAN_WRITE);
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if (IS_ERR(ruleset))
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return PTR_ERR(ruleset);
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if (rule_type != LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH) {
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err = -EINVAL;
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goto out_put_ruleset;
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}
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/* Copies raw user space buffer, only one type for now. */
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res = copy_from_user(&path_beneath_attr, rule_attr,
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sizeof(path_beneath_attr));
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if (res) {
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err = -EFAULT;
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goto out_put_ruleset;
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}
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/*
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* Informs about useless rule: empty allowed_access (i.e. deny rules)
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* are ignored in path walks.
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*/
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if (!path_beneath_attr.allowed_access) {
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err = -ENOMSG;
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goto out_put_ruleset;
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}
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/*
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* Checks that allowed_access matches the @ruleset constraints
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* (ruleset->fs_access_masks[0] is automatically upgraded to 64-bits).
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*/
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if ((path_beneath_attr.allowed_access | ruleset->fs_access_masks[0]) !=
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ruleset->fs_access_masks[0]) {
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err = -EINVAL;
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goto out_put_ruleset;
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}
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/* Gets and checks the new rule. */
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err = get_path_from_fd(path_beneath_attr.parent_fd, &path);
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if (err)
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goto out_put_ruleset;
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/* Imports the new rule. */
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err = landlock_append_fs_rule(ruleset, &path,
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path_beneath_attr.allowed_access);
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path_put(&path);
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out_put_ruleset:
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landlock_put_ruleset(ruleset);
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return err;
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}
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/* Enforcement */
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/**
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* sys_landlock_restrict_self - Enforce a ruleset on the calling thread
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*
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* @ruleset_fd: File descriptor tied to the ruleset to merge with the target.
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* @flags: Must be 0.
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*
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* This system call enables to enforce a Landlock ruleset on the current
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* thread. Enforcing a ruleset requires that the task has %CAP_SYS_ADMIN in its
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* namespace or is running with no_new_privs. This avoids scenarios where
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* unprivileged tasks can affect the behavior of privileged children.
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*
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* Possible returned errors are:
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*
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* - %EOPNOTSUPP: Landlock is supported by the kernel but disabled at boot time;
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* - %EINVAL: @flags is not 0.
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* - %EBADF: @ruleset_fd is not a file descriptor for the current thread;
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* - %EBADFD: @ruleset_fd is not a ruleset file descriptor;
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* - %EPERM: @ruleset_fd has no read access to the underlying ruleset, or the
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* current thread is not running with no_new_privs, or it doesn't have
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* %CAP_SYS_ADMIN in its namespace.
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* - %E2BIG: The maximum number of stacked rulesets is reached for the current
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* thread.
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*/
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SYSCALL_DEFINE2(landlock_restrict_self, const int, ruleset_fd, const __u32,
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flags)
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{
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struct landlock_ruleset *new_dom, *ruleset;
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struct cred *new_cred;
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struct landlock_cred_security *new_llcred;
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int err;
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if (!landlock_initialized)
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return -EOPNOTSUPP;
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/*
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* Similar checks as for seccomp(2), except that an -EPERM may be
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* returned.
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*/
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if (!task_no_new_privs(current) &&
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!ns_capable_noaudit(current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
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return -EPERM;
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/* No flag for now. */
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if (flags)
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return -EINVAL;
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/* Gets and checks the ruleset. */
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ruleset = get_ruleset_from_fd(ruleset_fd, FMODE_CAN_READ);
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if (IS_ERR(ruleset))
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return PTR_ERR(ruleset);
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/* Prepares new credentials. */
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new_cred = prepare_creds();
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if (!new_cred) {
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err = -ENOMEM;
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goto out_put_ruleset;
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}
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new_llcred = landlock_cred(new_cred);
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/*
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* There is no possible race condition while copying and manipulating
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* the current credentials because they are dedicated per thread.
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*/
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new_dom = landlock_merge_ruleset(new_llcred->domain, ruleset);
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if (IS_ERR(new_dom)) {
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err = PTR_ERR(new_dom);
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goto out_put_creds;
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}
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/* Replaces the old (prepared) domain. */
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landlock_put_ruleset(new_llcred->domain);
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new_llcred->domain = new_dom;
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landlock_put_ruleset(ruleset);
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return commit_creds(new_cred);
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out_put_creds:
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abort_creds(new_cred);
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out_put_ruleset:
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landlock_put_ruleset(ruleset);
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return err;
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}
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