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Kernel developers working on confidential computing for virtualized environments in x86 operate under a set of assumptions regarding the Linux kernel threat model that differs from the traditional view. Historically, the Linux threat model acknowledges attackers residing in userspace, as well as a limited set of external attackers that are able to interact with the kernel through networking or limited HW-specific exposed interfaces (e.g. USB, thunderbolt). The goal of this document is to explain additional attack vectors that arise in the virtualized confidential computing space. Reviewed-by: Larry Dewey <larry.dewey@amd.com> Reviewed-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com> Co-developed-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Carlos Bilbao <carlos.bilbao@amd.com> Message-ID: <98804f27-c2e7-74d6-d671-1eda927e19fe@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
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======================
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Security Documentation
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======================
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.. toctree::
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:maxdepth: 1
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credentials
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snp-tdx-threat-model
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IMA-templates
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keys/index
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lsm
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lsm-development
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sak
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SCTP
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self-protection
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siphash
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tpm/index
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digsig
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landlock
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secrets/index
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