linux/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
Will Deacon 6e5f092784 arm64: Remove Spectre-related CONFIG_* options
The spectre mitigations are too configurable for their own good, leading
to confusing logic trying to figure out when we should mitigate and when
we shouldn't. Although the plethora of command-line options need to stick
around for backwards compatibility, the default-on CONFIG options that
depend on EXPERT can be dropped, as the mitigations only do anything if
the system is vulnerable, a mitigation is available and the command-line
hasn't disabled it.

Remove CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR and CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD in favour of
enabling this code unconditionally.

Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
2020-09-29 16:08:15 +01:00

999 lines
25 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* Contains CPU specific errata definitions
*
* Copyright (C) 2014 ARM Ltd.
*/
#include <linux/arm-smccc.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/cpu.h>
#include <asm/cpu.h>
#include <asm/cputype.h>
#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
#include <asm/kvm_asm.h>
#include <asm/smp_plat.h>
static bool __maybe_unused
is_affected_midr_range(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope)
{
const struct arm64_midr_revidr *fix;
u32 midr = read_cpuid_id(), revidr;
WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible());
if (!is_midr_in_range(midr, &entry->midr_range))
return false;
midr &= MIDR_REVISION_MASK | MIDR_VARIANT_MASK;
revidr = read_cpuid(REVIDR_EL1);
for (fix = entry->fixed_revs; fix && fix->revidr_mask; fix++)
if (midr == fix->midr_rv && (revidr & fix->revidr_mask))
return false;
return true;
}
static bool __maybe_unused
is_affected_midr_range_list(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
int scope)
{
WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible());
return is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), entry->midr_range_list);
}
static bool __maybe_unused
is_kryo_midr(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope)
{
u32 model;
WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible());
model = read_cpuid_id();
model &= MIDR_IMPLEMENTOR_MASK | (0xf00 << MIDR_PARTNUM_SHIFT) |
MIDR_ARCHITECTURE_MASK;
return model == entry->midr_range.model;
}
static bool
has_mismatched_cache_type(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
int scope)
{
u64 mask = arm64_ftr_reg_ctrel0.strict_mask;
u64 sys = arm64_ftr_reg_ctrel0.sys_val & mask;
u64 ctr_raw, ctr_real;
WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible());
/*
* We want to make sure that all the CPUs in the system expose
* a consistent CTR_EL0 to make sure that applications behaves
* correctly with migration.
*
* If a CPU has CTR_EL0.IDC but does not advertise it via CTR_EL0 :
*
* 1) It is safe if the system doesn't support IDC, as CPU anyway
* reports IDC = 0, consistent with the rest.
*
* 2) If the system has IDC, it is still safe as we trap CTR_EL0
* access on this CPU via the ARM64_HAS_CACHE_IDC capability.
*
* So, we need to make sure either the raw CTR_EL0 or the effective
* CTR_EL0 matches the system's copy to allow a secondary CPU to boot.
*/
ctr_raw = read_cpuid_cachetype() & mask;
ctr_real = read_cpuid_effective_cachetype() & mask;
return (ctr_real != sys) && (ctr_raw != sys);
}
static void
cpu_enable_trap_ctr_access(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap)
{
u64 mask = arm64_ftr_reg_ctrel0.strict_mask;
bool enable_uct_trap = false;
/* Trap CTR_EL0 access on this CPU, only if it has a mismatch */
if ((read_cpuid_cachetype() & mask) !=
(arm64_ftr_reg_ctrel0.sys_val & mask))
enable_uct_trap = true;
/* ... or if the system is affected by an erratum */
if (cap->capability == ARM64_WORKAROUND_1542419)
enable_uct_trap = true;
if (enable_uct_trap)
sysreg_clear_set(sctlr_el1, SCTLR_EL1_UCT, 0);
}
atomic_t arm64_el2_vector_last_slot = ATOMIC_INIT(-1);
#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct bp_hardening_data, bp_hardening_data);
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_INDIRECT_VECTORS
static void __copy_hyp_vect_bpi(int slot, const char *hyp_vecs_start,
const char *hyp_vecs_end)
{
void *dst = lm_alias(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs + slot * SZ_2K);
int i;
for (i = 0; i < SZ_2K; i += 0x80)
memcpy(dst + i, hyp_vecs_start, hyp_vecs_end - hyp_vecs_start);
__flush_icache_range((uintptr_t)dst, (uintptr_t)dst + SZ_2K);
}
static void install_bp_hardening_cb(bp_hardening_cb_t fn,
const char *hyp_vecs_start,
const char *hyp_vecs_end)
{
static DEFINE_RAW_SPINLOCK(bp_lock);
int cpu, slot = -1;
/*
* detect_harden_bp_fw() passes NULL for the hyp_vecs start/end if
* we're a guest. Skip the hyp-vectors work.
*/
if (!hyp_vecs_start) {
__this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.fn, fn);
return;
}
raw_spin_lock(&bp_lock);
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
if (per_cpu(bp_hardening_data.fn, cpu) == fn) {
slot = per_cpu(bp_hardening_data.hyp_vectors_slot, cpu);
break;
}
}
if (slot == -1) {
slot = atomic_inc_return(&arm64_el2_vector_last_slot);
BUG_ON(slot >= BP_HARDEN_EL2_SLOTS);
__copy_hyp_vect_bpi(slot, hyp_vecs_start, hyp_vecs_end);
}
__this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.hyp_vectors_slot, slot);
__this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.fn, fn);
raw_spin_unlock(&bp_lock);
}
#else
static void install_bp_hardening_cb(bp_hardening_cb_t fn,
const char *hyp_vecs_start,
const char *hyp_vecs_end)
{
__this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.fn, fn);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_INDIRECT_VECTORS */
#include <linux/arm-smccc.h>
static void __maybe_unused call_smc_arch_workaround_1(void)
{
arm_smccc_1_1_smc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, NULL);
}
static void call_hvc_arch_workaround_1(void)
{
arm_smccc_1_1_hvc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, NULL);
}
static void qcom_link_stack_sanitization(void)
{
u64 tmp;
asm volatile("mov %0, x30 \n"
".rept 16 \n"
"bl . + 4 \n"
".endr \n"
"mov x30, %0 \n"
: "=&r" (tmp));
}
static bool __nospectre_v2;
static int __init parse_nospectre_v2(char *str)
{
__nospectre_v2 = true;
return 0;
}
early_param("nospectre_v2", parse_nospectre_v2);
/*
* -1: No workaround
* 0: No workaround required
* 1: Workaround installed
*/
static int detect_harden_bp_fw(void)
{
bp_hardening_cb_t cb;
void *smccc_start, *smccc_end;
struct arm_smccc_res res;
u32 midr = read_cpuid_id();
arm_smccc_1_1_invoke(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID,
ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res);
switch ((int)res.a0) {
case 1:
/* Firmware says we're just fine */
return 0;
case 0:
break;
default:
return -1;
}
switch (arm_smccc_1_1_get_conduit()) {
case SMCCC_CONDUIT_HVC:
cb = call_hvc_arch_workaround_1;
/* This is a guest, no need to patch KVM vectors */
smccc_start = NULL;
smccc_end = NULL;
break;
case SMCCC_CONDUIT_SMC:
cb = call_smc_arch_workaround_1;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM)
smccc_start = __smccc_workaround_1_smc;
smccc_end = __smccc_workaround_1_smc +
__SMCCC_WORKAROUND_1_SMC_SZ;
#else
smccc_start = NULL;
smccc_end = NULL;
#endif
break;
default:
return -1;
}
if (((midr & MIDR_CPU_MODEL_MASK) == MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR) ||
((midr & MIDR_CPU_MODEL_MASK) == MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR_V1))
cb = qcom_link_stack_sanitization;
install_bp_hardening_cb(cb, smccc_start, smccc_end);
return 1;
}
DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(u64, arm64_ssbd_callback_required);
int ssbd_state __read_mostly = ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL;
static bool __ssb_safe = true;
static const struct ssbd_options {
const char *str;
int state;
} ssbd_options[] = {
{ "force-on", ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE, },
{ "force-off", ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE, },
{ "kernel", ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL, },
};
static int __init ssbd_cfg(char *buf)
{
int i;
if (!buf || !buf[0])
return -EINVAL;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(ssbd_options); i++) {
int len = strlen(ssbd_options[i].str);
if (strncmp(buf, ssbd_options[i].str, len))
continue;
ssbd_state = ssbd_options[i].state;
return 0;
}
return -EINVAL;
}
early_param("ssbd", ssbd_cfg);
void __init arm64_update_smccc_conduit(struct alt_instr *alt,
__le32 *origptr, __le32 *updptr,
int nr_inst)
{
u32 insn;
BUG_ON(nr_inst != 1);
switch (arm_smccc_1_1_get_conduit()) {
case SMCCC_CONDUIT_HVC:
insn = aarch64_insn_get_hvc_value();
break;
case SMCCC_CONDUIT_SMC:
insn = aarch64_insn_get_smc_value();
break;
default:
return;
}
*updptr = cpu_to_le32(insn);
}
void __init arm64_enable_wa2_handling(struct alt_instr *alt,
__le32 *origptr, __le32 *updptr,
int nr_inst)
{
BUG_ON(nr_inst != 1);
/*
* Only allow mitigation on EL1 entry/exit and guest
* ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 handling if the SSBD state allows it to
* be flipped.
*/
if (arm64_get_ssbd_state() == ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL)
*updptr = cpu_to_le32(aarch64_insn_gen_nop());
}
void arm64_set_ssbd_mitigation(bool state)
{
int conduit;
if (this_cpu_has_cap(ARM64_SSBS)) {
if (state)
asm volatile(SET_PSTATE_SSBS(0));
else
asm volatile(SET_PSTATE_SSBS(1));
return;
}
conduit = arm_smccc_1_1_invoke(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2, state,
NULL);
WARN_ON_ONCE(conduit == SMCCC_CONDUIT_NONE);
}
static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
int scope)
{
struct arm_smccc_res res;
bool required = true;
s32 val;
bool this_cpu_safe = false;
int conduit;
WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible());
if (cpu_mitigations_off())
ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE;
/* delay setting __ssb_safe until we get a firmware response */
if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), entry->midr_range_list))
this_cpu_safe = true;
if (this_cpu_has_cap(ARM64_SSBS)) {
if (!this_cpu_safe)
__ssb_safe = false;
required = false;
goto out_printmsg;
}
conduit = arm_smccc_1_1_invoke(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID,
ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2, &res);
if (conduit == SMCCC_CONDUIT_NONE) {
ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN;
if (!this_cpu_safe)
__ssb_safe = false;
return false;
}
val = (s32)res.a0;
switch (val) {
case SMCCC_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED:
ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN;
if (!this_cpu_safe)
__ssb_safe = false;
return false;
/* machines with mixed mitigation requirements must not return this */
case SMCCC_RET_NOT_REQUIRED:
pr_info_once("%s mitigation not required\n", entry->desc);
ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_MITIGATED;
return false;
case SMCCC_RET_SUCCESS:
__ssb_safe = false;
required = true;
break;
case 1: /* Mitigation not required on this CPU */
required = false;
break;
default:
WARN_ON(1);
if (!this_cpu_safe)
__ssb_safe = false;
return false;
}
switch (ssbd_state) {
case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE:
arm64_set_ssbd_mitigation(false);
required = false;
break;
case ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL:
if (required) {
__this_cpu_write(arm64_ssbd_callback_required, 1);
arm64_set_ssbd_mitigation(true);
}
break;
case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE:
arm64_set_ssbd_mitigation(true);
required = true;
break;
default:
WARN_ON(1);
break;
}
out_printmsg:
switch (ssbd_state) {
case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE:
pr_info_once("%s disabled from command-line\n", entry->desc);
break;
case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE:
pr_info_once("%s forced from command-line\n", entry->desc);
break;
}
return required;
}
static void cpu_enable_ssbd_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap)
{
if (ssbd_state != ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE)
cap->matches(cap, SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU);
}
/* known invulnerable cores */
static const struct midr_range arm64_ssb_cpus[] = {
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A35),
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A53),
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A55),
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_BRAHMA_B53),
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_QCOM_KRYO_3XX_SILVER),
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_QCOM_KRYO_4XX_SILVER),
{},
};
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1463225
DEFINE_PER_CPU(int, __in_cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_wa);
static bool
has_cortex_a76_erratum_1463225(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
int scope)
{
return is_affected_midr_range_list(entry, scope) && is_kernel_in_hyp_mode();
}
#endif
static void __maybe_unused
cpu_enable_cache_maint_trap(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)
{
sysreg_clear_set(sctlr_el1, SCTLR_EL1_UCI, 0);
}
#define CAP_MIDR_RANGE(model, v_min, r_min, v_max, r_max) \
.matches = is_affected_midr_range, \
.midr_range = MIDR_RANGE(model, v_min, r_min, v_max, r_max)
#define CAP_MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(model) \
.matches = is_affected_midr_range, \
.midr_range = MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(model)
#define MIDR_FIXED(rev, revidr_mask) \
.fixed_revs = (struct arm64_midr_revidr[]){{ (rev), (revidr_mask) }, {}}
#define ERRATA_MIDR_RANGE(model, v_min, r_min, v_max, r_max) \
.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM, \
CAP_MIDR_RANGE(model, v_min, r_min, v_max, r_max)
#define CAP_MIDR_RANGE_LIST(list) \
.matches = is_affected_midr_range_list, \
.midr_range_list = list
/* Errata affecting a range of revisions of given model variant */
#define ERRATA_MIDR_REV_RANGE(m, var, r_min, r_max) \
ERRATA_MIDR_RANGE(m, var, r_min, var, r_max)
/* Errata affecting a single variant/revision of a model */
#define ERRATA_MIDR_REV(model, var, rev) \
ERRATA_MIDR_RANGE(model, var, rev, var, rev)
/* Errata affecting all variants/revisions of a given a model */
#define ERRATA_MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(model) \
.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM, \
CAP_MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(model)
/* Errata affecting a list of midr ranges, with same work around */
#define ERRATA_MIDR_RANGE_LIST(midr_list) \
.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM, \
CAP_MIDR_RANGE_LIST(midr_list)
/* Track overall mitigation state. We are only mitigated if all cores are ok */
static bool __hardenbp_enab = true;
static bool __spectrev2_safe = true;
int get_spectre_v2_workaround_state(void)
{
if (__spectrev2_safe)
return ARM64_BP_HARDEN_NOT_REQUIRED;
if (!__hardenbp_enab)
return ARM64_BP_HARDEN_UNKNOWN;
return ARM64_BP_HARDEN_WA_NEEDED;
}
/*
* List of CPUs that do not need any Spectre-v2 mitigation at all.
*/
static const struct midr_range spectre_v2_safe_list[] = {
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A35),
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A53),
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A55),
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_BRAHMA_B53),
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_HISI_TSV110),
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_QCOM_KRYO_3XX_SILVER),
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_QCOM_KRYO_4XX_SILVER),
{ /* sentinel */ }
};
/*
* Track overall bp hardening for all heterogeneous cores in the machine.
* We are only considered "safe" if all booted cores are known safe.
*/
static bool __maybe_unused
check_branch_predictor(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope)
{
int need_wa;
WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible());
/* If the CPU has CSV2 set, we're safe */
if (cpuid_feature_extract_unsigned_field(read_cpuid(ID_AA64PFR0_EL1),
ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_SHIFT))
return false;
/* Alternatively, we have a list of unaffected CPUs */
if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), spectre_v2_safe_list))
return false;
/* Fallback to firmware detection */
need_wa = detect_harden_bp_fw();
if (!need_wa)
return false;
__spectrev2_safe = false;
/* forced off */
if (__nospectre_v2 || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
pr_info_once("spectrev2 mitigation disabled by command line option\n");
__hardenbp_enab = false;
return false;
}
if (need_wa < 0) {
pr_warn_once("ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 missing from firmware\n");
__hardenbp_enab = false;
}
return (need_wa > 0);
}
static void
cpu_enable_branch_predictor_hardening(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap)
{
cap->matches(cap, SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU);
}
static const __maybe_unused struct midr_range tx2_family_cpus[] = {
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_BRCM_VULCAN),
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CAVIUM_THUNDERX2),
{},
};
static bool __maybe_unused
needs_tx2_tvm_workaround(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
int scope)
{
int i;
if (!is_affected_midr_range_list(entry, scope) ||
!is_hyp_mode_available())
return false;
for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
if (MPIDR_AFFINITY_LEVEL(cpu_logical_map(i), 0) != 0)
return true;
}
return false;
}
static bool __maybe_unused
has_neoverse_n1_erratum_1542419(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
int scope)
{
u32 midr = read_cpuid_id();
bool has_dic = read_cpuid_cachetype() & BIT(CTR_DIC_SHIFT);
const struct midr_range range = MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_NEOVERSE_N1);
WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible());
return is_midr_in_range(midr, &range) && has_dic;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE
static const struct midr_range ca57_a72[] = {
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A57),
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A72),
{},
};
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI
static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_repeat_tlbi_list[] = {
#ifdef CONFIG_QCOM_FALKOR_ERRATUM_1009
{
ERRATA_MIDR_REV(MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR_V1, 0, 0)
},
{
.midr_range.model = MIDR_QCOM_KRYO,
.matches = is_kryo_midr,
},
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1286807
{
ERRATA_MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_CORTEX_A76, 0, 0, 3, 0),
},
#endif
{},
};
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_CAVIUM_ERRATUM_27456
const struct midr_range cavium_erratum_27456_cpus[] = {
/* Cavium ThunderX, T88 pass 1.x - 2.1 */
MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_THUNDERX, 0, 0, 1, 1),
/* Cavium ThunderX, T81 pass 1.0 */
MIDR_REV(MIDR_THUNDERX_81XX, 0, 0),
{},
};
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_CAVIUM_ERRATUM_30115
static const struct midr_range cavium_erratum_30115_cpus[] = {
/* Cavium ThunderX, T88 pass 1.x - 2.2 */
MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_THUNDERX, 0, 0, 1, 2),
/* Cavium ThunderX, T81 pass 1.0 - 1.2 */
MIDR_REV_RANGE(MIDR_THUNDERX_81XX, 0, 0, 2),
/* Cavium ThunderX, T83 pass 1.0 */
MIDR_REV(MIDR_THUNDERX_83XX, 0, 0),
{},
};
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_QCOM_FALKOR_ERRATUM_1003
static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities qcom_erratum_1003_list[] = {
{
ERRATA_MIDR_REV(MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR_V1, 0, 0),
},
{
.midr_range.model = MIDR_QCOM_KRYO,
.matches = is_kryo_midr,
},
{},
};
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_WORKAROUND_CLEAN_CACHE
static const struct midr_range workaround_clean_cache[] = {
#if defined(CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_826319) || \
defined(CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_827319) || \
defined(CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_824069)
/* Cortex-A53 r0p[012]: ARM errata 826319, 827319, 824069 */
MIDR_REV_RANGE(MIDR_CORTEX_A53, 0, 0, 2),
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_819472
/* Cortex-A53 r0p[01] : ARM errata 819472 */
MIDR_REV_RANGE(MIDR_CORTEX_A53, 0, 0, 1),
#endif
{},
};
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1418040
/*
* - 1188873 affects r0p0 to r2p0
* - 1418040 affects r0p0 to r3p1
*/
static const struct midr_range erratum_1418040_list[] = {
/* Cortex-A76 r0p0 to r3p1 */
MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_CORTEX_A76, 0, 0, 3, 1),
/* Neoverse-N1 r0p0 to r3p1 */
MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_NEOVERSE_N1, 0, 0, 3, 1),
/* Kryo4xx Gold (rcpe to rfpf) => (r0p0 to r3p1) */
MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_QCOM_KRYO_4XX_GOLD, 0xc, 0xe, 0xf, 0xf),
{},
};
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_845719
static const struct midr_range erratum_845719_list[] = {
/* Cortex-A53 r0p[01234] */
MIDR_REV_RANGE(MIDR_CORTEX_A53, 0, 0, 4),
/* Brahma-B53 r0p[0] */
MIDR_REV(MIDR_BRAHMA_B53, 0, 0),
{},
};
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_843419
static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities erratum_843419_list[] = {
{
/* Cortex-A53 r0p[01234] */
.matches = is_affected_midr_range,
ERRATA_MIDR_REV_RANGE(MIDR_CORTEX_A53, 0, 0, 4),
MIDR_FIXED(0x4, BIT(8)),
},
{
/* Brahma-B53 r0p[0] */
.matches = is_affected_midr_range,
ERRATA_MIDR_REV(MIDR_BRAHMA_B53, 0, 0),
},
{},
};
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_AT
static const struct midr_range erratum_speculative_at_list[] = {
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1165522
/* Cortex A76 r0p0 to r2p0 */
MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_CORTEX_A76, 0, 0, 2, 0),
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1319367
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A57),
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A72),
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1530923
/* Cortex A55 r0p0 to r2p0 */
MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_CORTEX_A55, 0, 0, 2, 0),
/* Kryo4xx Silver (rdpe => r1p0) */
MIDR_REV(MIDR_QCOM_KRYO_4XX_SILVER, 0xd, 0xe),
#endif
{},
};
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1463225
static const struct midr_range erratum_1463225[] = {
/* Cortex-A76 r0p0 - r3p1 */
MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_CORTEX_A76, 0, 0, 3, 1),
/* Kryo4xx Gold (rcpe to rfpf) => (r0p0 to r3p1) */
MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_QCOM_KRYO_4XX_GOLD, 0xc, 0xe, 0xf, 0xf),
{},
};
#endif
const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[] = {
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_WORKAROUND_CLEAN_CACHE
{
.desc = "ARM errata 826319, 827319, 824069, or 819472",
.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_CLEAN_CACHE,
ERRATA_MIDR_RANGE_LIST(workaround_clean_cache),
.cpu_enable = cpu_enable_cache_maint_trap,
},
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_832075
{
/* Cortex-A57 r0p0 - r1p2 */
.desc = "ARM erratum 832075",
.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_DEVICE_LOAD_ACQUIRE,
ERRATA_MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_CORTEX_A57,
0, 0,
1, 2),
},
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_834220
{
/* Cortex-A57 r0p0 - r1p2 */
.desc = "ARM erratum 834220",
.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_834220,
ERRATA_MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_CORTEX_A57,
0, 0,
1, 2),
},
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_843419
{
.desc = "ARM erratum 843419",
.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_843419,
.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM,
.matches = cpucap_multi_entry_cap_matches,
.match_list = erratum_843419_list,
},
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_845719
{
.desc = "ARM erratum 845719",
.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_845719,
ERRATA_MIDR_RANGE_LIST(erratum_845719_list),
},
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_CAVIUM_ERRATUM_23154
{
/* Cavium ThunderX, pass 1.x */
.desc = "Cavium erratum 23154",
.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_CAVIUM_23154,
ERRATA_MIDR_REV_RANGE(MIDR_THUNDERX, 0, 0, 1),
},
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_CAVIUM_ERRATUM_27456
{
.desc = "Cavium erratum 27456",
.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_CAVIUM_27456,
ERRATA_MIDR_RANGE_LIST(cavium_erratum_27456_cpus),
},
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_CAVIUM_ERRATUM_30115
{
.desc = "Cavium erratum 30115",
.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_CAVIUM_30115,
ERRATA_MIDR_RANGE_LIST(cavium_erratum_30115_cpus),
},
#endif
{
.desc = "Mismatched cache type (CTR_EL0)",
.capability = ARM64_MISMATCHED_CACHE_TYPE,
.matches = has_mismatched_cache_type,
.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM,
.cpu_enable = cpu_enable_trap_ctr_access,
},
#ifdef CONFIG_QCOM_FALKOR_ERRATUM_1003
{
.desc = "Qualcomm Technologies Falkor/Kryo erratum 1003",
.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_QCOM_FALKOR_E1003,
.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM,
.matches = cpucap_multi_entry_cap_matches,
.match_list = qcom_erratum_1003_list,
},
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI
{
.desc = "Qualcomm erratum 1009, or ARM erratum 1286807",
.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI,
.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM,
.matches = cpucap_multi_entry_cap_matches,
.match_list = arm64_repeat_tlbi_list,
},
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_858921
{
/* Cortex-A73 all versions */
.desc = "ARM erratum 858921",
.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_858921,
ERRATA_MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A73),
},
#endif
{
.desc = "Branch predictor hardening",
.capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR,
.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM,
.matches = check_branch_predictor,
.cpu_enable = cpu_enable_branch_predictor_hardening,
},
#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE
{
.desc = "EL2 vector hardening",
.capability = ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS,
ERRATA_MIDR_RANGE_LIST(ca57_a72),
},
#endif
{
.desc = "Speculative Store Bypass Disable",
.capability = ARM64_SSBD,
.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM,
.matches = has_ssbd_mitigation,
.cpu_enable = cpu_enable_ssbd_mitigation,
.midr_range_list = arm64_ssb_cpus,
},
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1418040
{
.desc = "ARM erratum 1418040",
.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_1418040,
ERRATA_MIDR_RANGE_LIST(erratum_1418040_list),
.type = (ARM64_CPUCAP_SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU |
ARM64_CPUCAP_PERMITTED_FOR_LATE_CPU),
},
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_AT
{
.desc = "ARM errata 1165522, 1319367, or 1530923",
.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_AT,
ERRATA_MIDR_RANGE_LIST(erratum_speculative_at_list),
},
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1463225
{
.desc = "ARM erratum 1463225",
.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_1463225,
.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM,
.matches = has_cortex_a76_erratum_1463225,
.midr_range_list = erratum_1463225,
},
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_CAVIUM_TX2_ERRATUM_219
{
.desc = "Cavium ThunderX2 erratum 219 (KVM guest sysreg trapping)",
.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_CAVIUM_TX2_219_TVM,
ERRATA_MIDR_RANGE_LIST(tx2_family_cpus),
.matches = needs_tx2_tvm_workaround,
},
{
.desc = "Cavium ThunderX2 erratum 219 (PRFM removal)",
.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_CAVIUM_TX2_219_PRFM,
ERRATA_MIDR_RANGE_LIST(tx2_family_cpus),
},
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1542419
{
/* we depend on the firmware portion for correctness */
.desc = "ARM erratum 1542419 (kernel portion)",
.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_1542419,
.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM,
.matches = has_neoverse_n1_erratum_1542419,
.cpu_enable = cpu_enable_trap_ctr_access,
},
#endif
{
}
};
ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf)
{
return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
}
ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf)
{
switch (get_spectre_v2_workaround_state()) {
case ARM64_BP_HARDEN_NOT_REQUIRED:
return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
case ARM64_BP_HARDEN_WA_NEEDED:
return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: Branch predictor hardening\n");
case ARM64_BP_HARDEN_UNKNOWN:
default:
return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
}
}
ssize_t cpu_show_spec_store_bypass(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
if (__ssb_safe)
return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
switch (ssbd_state) {
case ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL:
case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE:
return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled via prctl\n");
}
return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
}