6f7c41374b
syzbot is reporting that use of SOCKET_I()->sk from open() can result in use after free problem [1], for socket's inode is still reachable via /proc/pid/fd/n despite destruction of SOCKET_I()->sk already completed. At first I thought that this race condition applies to only open/getattr permission checks. But James Morris has pointed out that there are more permission checks where this race condition applies to. Thus, get rid of tomoyo_get_socket_name() instead of conditionally bypassing permission checks on sockets. As a side effect of this patch, "socket:[family=\$:type=\$:protocol=\$]" in the policy files has to be rewritten to "socket:[\$]". [1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=73d590010454403d55164cca23bd0565b1eb3b74 Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+0341f6a4d729d4e0acf1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Reported-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> |
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.. | ||
policy | ||
.gitignore | ||
audit.c | ||
common.c | ||
common.h | ||
condition.c | ||
domain.c | ||
environ.c | ||
file.c | ||
gc.c | ||
group.c | ||
Kconfig | ||
load_policy.c | ||
Makefile | ||
memory.c | ||
mount.c | ||
network.c | ||
realpath.c | ||
securityfs_if.c | ||
tomoyo.c | ||
util.c |