linux/arch/x86/mm
Michael Kelley 812b0597fb x86/hyperv: Change vTOM handling to use standard coco mechanisms
Hyper-V guests on AMD SEV-SNP hardware have the option of using the
"virtual Top Of Memory" (vTOM) feature specified by the SEV-SNP
architecture. With vTOM, shared vs. private memory accesses are
controlled by splitting the guest physical address space into two
halves.

vTOM is the dividing line where the uppermost bit of the physical
address space is set; e.g., with 47 bits of guest physical address
space, vTOM is 0x400000000000 (bit 46 is set).  Guest physical memory is
accessible at two parallel physical addresses -- one below vTOM and one
above vTOM.  Accesses below vTOM are private (encrypted) while accesses
above vTOM are shared (decrypted). In this sense, vTOM is like the
GPA.SHARED bit in Intel TDX.

Support for Hyper-V guests using vTOM was added to the Linux kernel in
two patch sets[1][2]. This support treats the vTOM bit as part of
the physical address. For accessing shared (decrypted) memory, these
patch sets create a second kernel virtual mapping that maps to physical
addresses above vTOM.

A better approach is to treat the vTOM bit as a protection flag, not
as part of the physical address. This new approach is like the approach
for the GPA.SHARED bit in Intel TDX. Rather than creating a second kernel
virtual mapping, the existing mapping is updated using recently added
coco mechanisms.

When memory is changed between private and shared using
set_memory_decrypted() and set_memory_encrypted(), the PTEs for the
existing kernel mapping are changed to add or remove the vTOM bit in the
guest physical address, just as with TDX. The hypercalls to change the
memory status on the host side are made using the existing callback
mechanism. Everything just works, with a minor tweak to map the IO-APIC
to use private accesses.

To accomplish the switch in approach, the following must be done:

* Update Hyper-V initialization to set the cc_mask based on vTOM
  and do other coco initialization.

* Update physical_mask so the vTOM bit is no longer treated as part
  of the physical address

* Remove CC_VENDOR_HYPERV and merge the associated vTOM functionality
  under CC_VENDOR_AMD. Update cc_mkenc() and cc_mkdec() to set/clear
  the vTOM bit as a protection flag.

* Code already exists to make hypercalls to inform Hyper-V about pages
  changing between shared and private.  Update this code to run as a
  callback from __set_memory_enc_pgtable().

* Remove the Hyper-V special case from __set_memory_enc_dec()

* Remove the Hyper-V specific call to swiotlb_update_mem_attributes()
  since mem_encrypt_init() will now do it.

* Add a Hyper-V specific implementation of the is_private_mmio()
  callback that returns true for the IO-APIC and vTPM MMIO addresses

  [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20211025122116.264793-1-ltykernel@gmail.com/
  [2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20211213071407.314309-1-ltykernel@gmail.com/

  [ bp: Touchups. ]

Signed-off-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1679838727-87310-7-git-send-email-mikelley@microsoft.com
2023-03-27 09:31:43 +02:00
..
pat x86/hyperv: Change vTOM handling to use standard coco mechanisms 2023-03-27 09:31:43 +02:00
amdtopology.c x86/mm: Replace nodes_weight() with nodes_empty() where appropriate 2022-04-10 22:35:38 +02:00
cpu_entry_area.c prandom: remove prandom_u32_max() 2022-12-20 03:13:45 +01:00
debug_pagetables.c
dump_pagetables.c
extable.c x86: simplify load_unaligned_zeropad() implementation 2022-08-16 11:03:38 -07:00
fault.c Revert "x86: kmsan: sync metadata pages on page fault" 2023-02-02 22:33:01 -08:00
highmem_32.c
hugetlbpage.c arch/x86/mm/hugetlbpage.c: pud_huge() returns 0 when using 2-level paging 2022-11-08 15:57:25 -08:00
ident_map.c
init_32.c x86: mm: rename __is_kernel_text() to is_x86_32_kernel_text() 2021-11-09 10:02:51 -08:00
init_64.c mm/sparse-vmemmap: generalise vmemmap_populate_hugepages() 2022-12-11 18:12:12 -08:00
init.c x86/mm: fix poking_init() for Xen PV guests 2023-01-12 11:22:20 +01:00
iomap_32.c
ioremap.c x86/ioremap: Add hypervisor callback for private MMIO mapping in coco VM 2023-03-26 23:42:40 +02:00
kasan_init_64.c x86/kasan: Populate shadow for shared chunk of the CPU entry area 2022-12-15 10:37:28 -08:00
kaslr.c
kmmio.c x86/mm/kmmio: Remove redundant preempt_disable() 2022-12-12 10:54:48 -05:00
kmsan_shadow.c x86: kmsan: handle CPU entry area 2022-10-03 14:03:26 -07:00
maccess.c x86: Share definition of __is_canonical_address() 2022-02-02 13:11:42 +01:00
Makefile x86: kmsan: handle CPU entry area 2022-10-03 14:03:26 -07:00
mem_encrypt_amd.c x86/mm: Handle decryption/re-encryption of bss_decrypted consistently 2023-03-27 09:23:21 +02:00
mem_encrypt_boot.S x86/mm: Remove P*D_PAGE_MASK and P*D_PAGE_SIZE macros 2022-12-15 10:37:27 -08:00
mem_encrypt_identity.c x86/mm: Fix use of uninitialized buffer in sme_enable() 2023-03-16 12:22:25 +01:00
mem_encrypt.c virtio: replace arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access() 2022-06-06 08:22:01 +02:00
mm_internal.h
mmap.c
mmio-mod.c x86: Replace cpumask_weight() with cpumask_empty() where appropriate 2022-04-10 22:35:38 +02:00
numa_32.c
numa_64.c
numa_emulation.c x86/mm: Replace nodes_weight() with nodes_empty() where appropriate 2022-04-10 22:35:38 +02:00
numa_internal.h
numa.c x86/numa: Use cpumask_available instead of hardcoded NULL check 2022-08-03 11:44:57 +02:00
pf_in.c
pf_in.h
pgprot.c x86/mm: move protection_map[] inside the platform 2022-07-17 17:14:38 -07:00
pgtable_32.c
pgtable.c mm/pgtable: Fix multiple -Wstringop-overflow warnings 2022-12-01 08:50:38 -08:00
physaddr.c
physaddr.h
pkeys.c x86/pkeys: Clarify PKRU_AD_KEY macro 2022-06-07 16:06:33 -07:00
pti.c x86/mm: Remove P*D_PAGE_MASK and P*D_PAGE_SIZE macros 2022-12-15 10:37:27 -08:00
srat.c
testmmiotrace.c
tlb.c x86/cpu: Use cpu_feature_enabled() when checking global pages support 2023-01-25 10:32:06 +01:00