Linus Torvalds b6e6cc1f78 Fix kCFI/FineIBT weaknesses
The primary bug Alyssa noticed was that with FineIBT enabled function
 prologues have a spurious ENDBR instruction:
 
   __cfi_foo:
 	endbr64
 	subl	$hash, %r10d
 	jz	1f
 	ud2
 	nop
   1:
   foo:
 	endbr64 <--- *sadface*
 
 This means that any indirect call that fails to target the __cfi symbol
 and instead targets (the regular old) foo+0, will succeed due to that
 second ENDBR.
 
 Fixing this lead to the discovery of a single indirect call that was
 still doing this: ret_from_fork(), since that's an assembly stub the
 compmiler would not generate the proper kCFI indirect call magic and it
 would not get patched.
 
 Brian came up with the most comprehensive fix -- convert the thing to C
 with only a very thin asm wrapper. This ensures the kernel thread
 boostrap is a proper kCFI call.
 
 While discussing all this, Kees noted that kCFI hashes could/should be
 poisoned to seal all functions whose address is never taken, further
 limiting the valid kCFI targets -- much like we already do for IBT.
 
 So what was a 'simple' observation and fix cascaded into a bunch of
 inter-related CFI infrastructure fixes.
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Merge tag 'x86_urgent_for_6.5_rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull x86 CFI fixes from Peter Zijlstra:
 "Fix kCFI/FineIBT weaknesses

  The primary bug Alyssa noticed was that with FineIBT enabled function
  prologues have a spurious ENDBR instruction:

    __cfi_foo:
	endbr64
	subl	$hash, %r10d
	jz	1f
	ud2
	nop
    1:
    foo:
	endbr64 <--- *sadface*

  This means that any indirect call that fails to target the __cfi
  symbol and instead targets (the regular old) foo+0, will succeed due
  to that second ENDBR.

  Fixing this led to the discovery of a single indirect call that was
  still doing this: ret_from_fork(). Since that's an assembly stub the
  compiler would not generate the proper kCFI indirect call magic and it
  would not get patched.

  Brian came up with the most comprehensive fix -- convert the thing to
  C with only a very thin asm wrapper. This ensures the kernel thread
  boostrap is a proper kCFI call.

  While discussing all this, Kees noted that kCFI hashes could/should be
  poisoned to seal all functions whose address is never taken, further
  limiting the valid kCFI targets -- much like we already do for IBT.

  So what was a 'simple' observation and fix cascaded into a bunch of
  inter-related CFI infrastructure fixes"

* tag 'x86_urgent_for_6.5_rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/cfi: Only define poison_cfi() if CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT=y
  x86/fineibt: Poison ENDBR at +0
  x86: Rewrite ret_from_fork() in C
  x86/32: Remove schedule_tail_wrapper()
  x86/cfi: Extend ENDBR sealing to kCFI
  x86/alternative: Rename apply_ibt_endbr()
  x86/cfi: Extend {JMP,CAKK}_NOSPEC comment
2023-07-14 20:19:25 -07:00
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2023-07-14 19:57:29 -07:00
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2023-07-14 19:57:29 -07:00
2023-07-01 09:24:31 -07:00
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2023-07-14 11:07:04 -07:00
2023-07-07 09:55:31 -07:00
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2023-07-03 15:32:22 -07:00
2022-09-28 09:02:20 +02:00
2023-06-26 16:43:54 -07:00
2022-10-10 12:00:45 -07:00
2023-07-09 13:53:13 -07:00

Linux kernel
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