bc1bb2a49b
SEV-SNP vTOM guest on Hyper-V. A vTOM guest basically splits the address space in two parts: encrypted and unencrypted. The use case being running unmodified guests on the Hyper-V confidential computing hypervisor - Double-buffer messages between the guest and the hardware PSP device so that no partial buffers are copied back'n'forth and thus potential message integrity and leak attacks are possible - Name the return value the sev-guest driver returns when the hw PSP device hasn't been called, explicitly - Cleanups -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCgAdFiEEzv7L6UO9uDPlPSfHEsHwGGHeVUoFAmRGl8gACgkQEsHwGGHe VUoEDhAAiw4+2nZR7XUJ7pewlXG7AJJZsVIpzzcF6Gyymn0LFCyMnP7O3snmFqzz aik0q2LzWrmDQ3Nmmzul0wtdsuW7Nik6BP9oF3WnB911+gGbpXyNWZ8EhOPNzkUR 9D8Sp6f0xmqNE3YuzEpanufiDswgUxi++DRdmIRAs1TTh4bfUFWZcib1pdwoqSmR oS3UfVwVZ4Ee2Qm1f3n3XQ0FUpsjWeARPExUkLEvd8XeonTP+6aGAdggg9MnPcsl 3zpSmOpuZ6VQbDrHxo3BH9HFuIUOd6S9PO++b9F6WxNPGEMk7fHa7ahOA6HjhgVz 5Da3BN16OS9j64cZsYHMPsBcd+ja1YmvvZGypsY0d6X4d3M1zTPW+XeLbyb+VFBy SvA7z+JuxtLKVpju65sNiJWw8ZDTSu+eEYNDeeGLvAj3bxtclJjcPdMEPdzxmC5K eAhmRmiFuVM4nXMAR6cspVTsxvlTHFtd5gdm6RlRnvd7aV77Zl1CLzTy8IHTVpvI t7XTbtjEjYc0pI6cXXptHEOnBLjXUMPcqgGFgJYEauH6EvrxoWszUZD0tS3Hw80A K+Rwnc70ubq/PsgZcF4Ayer1j49z1NPfk5D4EA7/ChN6iNhQA8OqHT1UBrHAgqls 2UAwzE2sQZnjDvGZghlOtFIQUIhwue7m93DaRi19EOdKYxVjV6U= =ZAw9 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'x86_sev_for_v6.4_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 SEV updates from Borislav Petkov: - Add the necessary glue so that the kernel can run as a confidential SEV-SNP vTOM guest on Hyper-V. A vTOM guest basically splits the address space in two parts: encrypted and unencrypted. The use case being running unmodified guests on the Hyper-V confidential computing hypervisor - Double-buffer messages between the guest and the hardware PSP device so that no partial buffers are copied back'n'forth and thus potential message integrity and leak attacks are possible - Name the return value the sev-guest driver returns when the hw PSP device hasn't been called, explicitly - Cleanups * tag 'x86_sev_for_v6.4_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/hyperv: Change vTOM handling to use standard coco mechanisms init: Call mem_encrypt_init() after Hyper-V hypercall init is done x86/mm: Handle decryption/re-encryption of bss_decrypted consistently Drivers: hv: Explicitly request decrypted in vmap_pfn() calls x86/hyperv: Reorder code to facilitate future work x86/ioremap: Add hypervisor callback for private MMIO mapping in coco VM x86/sev: Change snp_guest_issue_request()'s fw_err argument virt/coco/sev-guest: Double-buffer messages crypto: ccp: Get rid of __sev_platform_init_locked()'s local function pointer crypto: ccp - Name -1 return value as SEV_RET_NO_FW_CALL |
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.. | ||
channel_mgmt.c | ||
channel.c | ||
connection.c | ||
hv_balloon.c | ||
hv_common.c | ||
hv_debugfs.c | ||
hv_fcopy.c | ||
hv_kvp.c | ||
hv_snapshot.c | ||
hv_trace_balloon.h | ||
hv_trace.c | ||
hv_trace.h | ||
hv_util.c | ||
hv_utils_transport.c | ||
hv_utils_transport.h | ||
hv.c | ||
hyperv_vmbus.h | ||
Kconfig | ||
Makefile | ||
ring_buffer.c | ||
vmbus_drv.c |