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Eric Dumazet b9d5772d60 net/packet: fix slab-out-of-bounds access in packet_recvmsg()

[ Upstream commit c700525fcc06b05adfea78039de02628af79e07a ]

syzbot found that when an AF_PACKET socket is using PACKET_COPY_THRESH
and mmap operations, tpacket_rcv() is queueing skbs with
garbage in skb->cb[], triggering a too big copy [1]

Presumably, users of af_packet using mmap() already gets correct
metadata from the mapped buffer, we can simply make sure
to clear 12 bytes that might be copied to user space later.

BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:225 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in packet_recvmsg+0x56c/0x1150 net/packet/af_packet.c:3489
Write of size 165 at addr ffffc9000385fb78 by task syz-executor233/3631

CPU: 0 PID: 3631 Comm: syz-executor233 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc7-syzkaller-02396-g0b3660695e80 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106
 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xf/0x336 mm/kasan/report.c:255
 __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:442 [inline]
 kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf mm/kasan/report.c:459
 check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:183 [inline]
 kasan_check_range+0x13d/0x180 mm/kasan/generic.c:189
 memcpy+0x39/0x60 mm/kasan/shadow.c:66
 memcpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:225 [inline]
 packet_recvmsg+0x56c/0x1150 net/packet/af_packet.c:3489
 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:948 [inline]
 sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:966 [inline]
 sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:962 [inline]
 ____sys_recvmsg+0x2c4/0x600 net/socket.c:2632
 ___sys_recvmsg+0x127/0x200 net/socket.c:2674
 __sys_recvmsg+0xe2/0x1a0 net/socket.c:2704
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7fdfd5954c29
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 41 15 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 c0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffcf8e71e48 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002f
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007fdfd5954c29
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000500 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 000000000000000d R09: 000000000000000d
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffcf8e71e60
R13: 00000000000f4240 R14: 000000000000c1ff R15: 00007ffcf8e71e54
 </TASK>

addr ffffc9000385fb78 is located in stack of task syz-executor233/3631 at offset 32 in frame:
 ____sys_recvmsg+0x0/0x600 include/linux/uio.h:246

this frame has 1 object:
 [32, 160) 'addr'

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffffc9000385fa80: 00 04 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 ffffc9000385fb00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00
>ffffc9000385fb80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f3
                                                                ^
 ffffc9000385fc00: f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1
 ffffc9000385fc80: f1 f1 f1 00 f2 f2 f2 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00
==================================================================

Fixes: 0fb375fb9b93 ("[AF_PACKET]: Allow for > 8 byte hardware addresses.")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220312232958.3535620-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

2022-03-23 09:00:34 +01:00

6lowpan

6lowpan: Off by one handling ->nexthdr

2020-01-29 10:24:22 +01:00

9p/trans_virtio: Remove sysfs file on probe failure

2021-09-26 13:36:18 +02:00

802

net/802/garp: fix memleak in garp_request_join()

2021-08-04 11:58:02 +02:00

8021q

vlan: fix memory leak in vlan_dev_set_egress_priority

2020-01-12 11:24:27 +01:00