18365ebf23
In ioctl(KD_FONT_OP_GET_TALL), userland tells through op->height which
vpitch should be used to copy over the font. In con_font_get, we were
not checking that it is within the maximum height value, and thus
userland could make the vc->vc_sw->con_font_get(vc, &font, vpitch);
call possibly overflow the allocated max_font_size bytes, and the
copy_to_user(op->data, font.data, c) call possibly read out of that
allocated buffer.
By checking vpitch against max_font_height, the max_font_size buffer
will always be large enough for the vc->vc_sw->con_font_get(vc, &font,
vpitch) call (since we already prevent loading a font larger than that),
and c = (font.width+7)/8 * vpitch * font.charcount will always remain
below max_font_size.
Fixes:
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.. | ||
.gitignore | ||
conmakehash.c | ||
consolemap.c | ||
cp437.uni | ||
defkeymap.c_shipped | ||
defkeymap.map | ||
keyboard.c | ||
Makefile | ||
selection.c | ||
vc_screen.c | ||
vt_ioctl.c | ||
vt.c |