linux/security
Dmitry Kasatkin e0751257a6 ima: digital signature verification using asymmetric keys
Asymmetric keys were introduced in linux-3.7 to verify the signature on
signed kernel modules. The asymmetric keys infrastructure abstracts the
signature verification from the crypto details. This patch adds IMA/EVM
signature verification using asymmetric keys. Support for additional
signature verification methods can now be delegated to the asymmetric
key infrastructure.

Although the module signature header and the IMA/EVM signature header
could use the same format, to minimize the signature length and save
space in the extended attribute, this patch defines a new IMA/EVM
header format.  The main difference is that the key identifier is a
sha1[12 - 19] hash of the key modulus and exponent, similar to the
current implementation.  The only purpose of the key identifier is to
identify the corresponding key in the kernel keyring.  ima-evm-utils
was updated to support the new signature format.

While asymmetric signature verification functionality supports many
different hash algorithms, the hash used in this patch is calculated
during the IMA collection phase, based on the configured algorithm.
The default algorithm is sha1, but for backwards compatibility md5
is supported.  Due to this current limitation, signatures should be
generated using a sha1 hash algorithm.

Changes in this patch:
- Functionality has been moved to separate source file in order to get rid of
  in source #ifdefs.
- keyid is derived according to the RFC 3280. It does not require to assign
  IMA/EVM specific "description" when loading X509 certificate. Kernel
  asymmetric key subsystem automatically generate the description. Also
  loading a certificate does not require using of ima-evm-utils and can be
  done using keyctl only.
- keyid size is reduced to 32 bits to save xattr space.  Key search is done
  using partial match functionality of asymmetric_key_match().
- Kconfig option title was changed

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2013-02-06 21:22:18 -05:00
..
apparmor apparmor: fix IRQ stack overflow during free_profile 2012-10-25 02:12:50 +11:00
integrity ima: digital signature verification using asymmetric keys 2013-02-06 21:22:18 -05:00
keys keys: fix unreachable code 2012-12-20 17:40:21 -08:00
selinux bridge: update selinux perm table for RTM_NEWMDB and RTM_DELMDB 2012-12-15 17:14:38 -08:00
smack Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security 2012-12-16 15:40:50 -08:00
tomoyo consitify do_mount() arguments 2012-10-11 20:02:04 -04:00
yama Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace 2012-12-17 15:44:47 -08:00
capability.c security: introduce kernel_module_from_file hook 2012-12-14 13:05:24 +10:30
commoncap.c Fix cap_capable to only allow owners in the parent user namespace to have caps. 2012-12-14 13:50:32 -08:00
device_cgroup.c cgroup: rename ->create/post_create/pre_destroy/destroy() to ->css_alloc/online/offline/free() 2012-11-19 08:13:38 -08:00
inode.c securityfs: fix object creation races 2012-01-10 10:20:35 -05:00
Kconfig KEYS: Move the key config into security/keys/Kconfig 2012-05-11 10:56:56 +01:00
lsm_audit.c LSM: BUILD_BUG_ON if the common_audit_data union ever grows 2012-04-09 12:23:03 -04:00
Makefile security: Yama LSM 2012-02-10 09:18:52 +11:00
min_addr.c mmap_min_addr check CAP_SYS_RAWIO only for write 2010-04-23 08:56:31 +10:00
security.c ima: support new kernel module syscall 2012-12-14 13:05:26 +10:30