f3b8788cde
Create a struct lsm_id to contain identifying information about Linux Security Modules (LSMs). At inception this contains the name of the module and an identifier associated with the security module. Change the security_add_hooks() interface to use this structure. Change the individual modules to maintain their own struct lsm_id and pass it to security_add_hooks(). The values are for LSM identifiers are defined in a new UAPI header file linux/lsm.h. Each existing LSM has been updated to include it's LSMID in the lsm_id. The LSM ID values are sequential, with the oldest module LSM_ID_CAPABILITY being the lowest value and the existing modules numbered in the order they were included in the main line kernel. This is an arbitrary convention for assigning the values, but none better presents itself. The value 0 is defined as being invalid. The values 1-99 are reserved for any special case uses which may arise in the future. This may include attributes of the LSM infrastructure itself, possibly related to namespacing or network attribute management. A special range is identified for such attributes to help reduce confusion for developers unfamiliar with LSMs. LSM attribute values are defined for the attributes presented by modules that are available today. As with the LSM IDs, The value 0 is defined as being invalid. The values 1-99 are reserved for any special case uses which may arise in the future. Cc: linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Mickael Salaun <mic@digikod.net> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Nacked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> [PM: forward ported beyond v6.6 due merge window changes] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
489 lines
12 KiB
C
489 lines
12 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
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/*
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* Yama Linux Security Module
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*
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* Author: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2010 Canonical, Ltd.
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* Copyright (C) 2011 The Chromium OS Authors.
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*/
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#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
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#include <linux/sysctl.h>
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#include <linux/ptrace.h>
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#include <linux/prctl.h>
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#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
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#include <linux/workqueue.h>
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#include <linux/string_helpers.h>
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#include <linux/task_work.h>
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#include <linux/sched.h>
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#include <linux/spinlock.h>
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#include <uapi/linux/lsm.h>
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#define YAMA_SCOPE_DISABLED 0
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#define YAMA_SCOPE_RELATIONAL 1
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#define YAMA_SCOPE_CAPABILITY 2
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#define YAMA_SCOPE_NO_ATTACH 3
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static int ptrace_scope = YAMA_SCOPE_RELATIONAL;
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/* describe a ptrace relationship for potential exception */
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struct ptrace_relation {
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struct task_struct *tracer;
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struct task_struct *tracee;
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bool invalid;
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struct list_head node;
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struct rcu_head rcu;
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};
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static LIST_HEAD(ptracer_relations);
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static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(ptracer_relations_lock);
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static void yama_relation_cleanup(struct work_struct *work);
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static DECLARE_WORK(yama_relation_work, yama_relation_cleanup);
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struct access_report_info {
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struct callback_head work;
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const char *access;
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struct task_struct *target;
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struct task_struct *agent;
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};
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static void __report_access(struct callback_head *work)
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{
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struct access_report_info *info =
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container_of(work, struct access_report_info, work);
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char *target_cmd, *agent_cmd;
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target_cmd = kstrdup_quotable_cmdline(info->target, GFP_KERNEL);
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agent_cmd = kstrdup_quotable_cmdline(info->agent, GFP_KERNEL);
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pr_notice_ratelimited(
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"ptrace %s of \"%s\"[%d] was attempted by \"%s\"[%d]\n",
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info->access, target_cmd, info->target->pid, agent_cmd,
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info->agent->pid);
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kfree(agent_cmd);
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kfree(target_cmd);
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put_task_struct(info->agent);
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put_task_struct(info->target);
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kfree(info);
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}
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/* defers execution because cmdline access can sleep */
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static void report_access(const char *access, struct task_struct *target,
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struct task_struct *agent)
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{
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struct access_report_info *info;
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char agent_comm[sizeof(agent->comm)];
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assert_spin_locked(&target->alloc_lock); /* for target->comm */
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if (current->flags & PF_KTHREAD) {
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/* I don't think kthreads call task_work_run() before exiting.
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* Imagine angry ranting about procfs here.
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*/
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pr_notice_ratelimited(
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"ptrace %s of \"%s\"[%d] was attempted by \"%s\"[%d]\n",
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access, target->comm, target->pid,
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get_task_comm(agent_comm, agent), agent->pid);
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return;
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}
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info = kmalloc(sizeof(*info), GFP_ATOMIC);
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if (!info)
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return;
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init_task_work(&info->work, __report_access);
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get_task_struct(target);
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get_task_struct(agent);
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info->access = access;
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info->target = target;
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info->agent = agent;
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if (task_work_add(current, &info->work, TWA_RESUME) == 0)
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return; /* success */
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WARN(1, "report_access called from exiting task");
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put_task_struct(target);
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put_task_struct(agent);
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kfree(info);
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}
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/**
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* yama_relation_cleanup - remove invalid entries from the relation list
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*
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*/
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static void yama_relation_cleanup(struct work_struct *work)
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{
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struct ptrace_relation *relation;
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spin_lock(&ptracer_relations_lock);
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rcu_read_lock();
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list_for_each_entry_rcu(relation, &ptracer_relations, node) {
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if (relation->invalid) {
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list_del_rcu(&relation->node);
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kfree_rcu(relation, rcu);
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}
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}
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rcu_read_unlock();
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spin_unlock(&ptracer_relations_lock);
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}
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/**
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* yama_ptracer_add - add/replace an exception for this tracer/tracee pair
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* @tracer: the task_struct of the process doing the ptrace
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* @tracee: the task_struct of the process to be ptraced
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*
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* Each tracee can have, at most, one tracer registered. Each time this
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* is called, the prior registered tracer will be replaced for the tracee.
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*
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* Returns 0 if relationship was added, -ve on error.
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*/
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static int yama_ptracer_add(struct task_struct *tracer,
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struct task_struct *tracee)
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{
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struct ptrace_relation *relation, *added;
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added = kmalloc(sizeof(*added), GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!added)
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return -ENOMEM;
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added->tracee = tracee;
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added->tracer = tracer;
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added->invalid = false;
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spin_lock(&ptracer_relations_lock);
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rcu_read_lock();
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list_for_each_entry_rcu(relation, &ptracer_relations, node) {
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if (relation->invalid)
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continue;
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if (relation->tracee == tracee) {
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list_replace_rcu(&relation->node, &added->node);
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kfree_rcu(relation, rcu);
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goto out;
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}
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}
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list_add_rcu(&added->node, &ptracer_relations);
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out:
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rcu_read_unlock();
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spin_unlock(&ptracer_relations_lock);
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return 0;
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}
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/**
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* yama_ptracer_del - remove exceptions related to the given tasks
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* @tracer: remove any relation where tracer task matches
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* @tracee: remove any relation where tracee task matches
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*/
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static void yama_ptracer_del(struct task_struct *tracer,
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struct task_struct *tracee)
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{
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struct ptrace_relation *relation;
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bool marked = false;
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rcu_read_lock();
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list_for_each_entry_rcu(relation, &ptracer_relations, node) {
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if (relation->invalid)
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continue;
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if (relation->tracee == tracee ||
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(tracer && relation->tracer == tracer)) {
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relation->invalid = true;
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marked = true;
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}
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}
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rcu_read_unlock();
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if (marked)
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schedule_work(&yama_relation_work);
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}
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/**
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* yama_task_free - check for task_pid to remove from exception list
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* @task: task being removed
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*/
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static void yama_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
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{
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yama_ptracer_del(task, task);
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}
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/**
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* yama_task_prctl - check for Yama-specific prctl operations
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* @option: operation
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* @arg2: argument
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* @arg3: argument
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* @arg4: argument
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* @arg5: argument
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*
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* Return 0 on success, -ve on error. -ENOSYS is returned when Yama
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* does not handle the given option.
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*/
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static int yama_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
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unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
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{
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int rc = -ENOSYS;
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struct task_struct *myself = current;
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switch (option) {
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case PR_SET_PTRACER:
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/* Since a thread can call prctl(), find the group leader
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* before calling _add() or _del() on it, since we want
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* process-level granularity of control. The tracer group
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* leader checking is handled later when walking the ancestry
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* at the time of PTRACE_ATTACH check.
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*/
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rcu_read_lock();
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if (!thread_group_leader(myself))
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myself = rcu_dereference(myself->group_leader);
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get_task_struct(myself);
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rcu_read_unlock();
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if (arg2 == 0) {
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yama_ptracer_del(NULL, myself);
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rc = 0;
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} else if (arg2 == PR_SET_PTRACER_ANY || (int)arg2 == -1) {
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rc = yama_ptracer_add(NULL, myself);
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} else {
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struct task_struct *tracer;
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tracer = find_get_task_by_vpid(arg2);
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if (!tracer) {
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rc = -EINVAL;
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} else {
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rc = yama_ptracer_add(tracer, myself);
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put_task_struct(tracer);
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}
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}
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put_task_struct(myself);
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break;
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}
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return rc;
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}
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/**
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* task_is_descendant - walk up a process family tree looking for a match
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* @parent: the process to compare against while walking up from child
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* @child: the process to start from while looking upwards for parent
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*
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* Returns 1 if child is a descendant of parent, 0 if not.
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*/
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static int task_is_descendant(struct task_struct *parent,
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struct task_struct *child)
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{
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int rc = 0;
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struct task_struct *walker = child;
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if (!parent || !child)
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return 0;
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rcu_read_lock();
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if (!thread_group_leader(parent))
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parent = rcu_dereference(parent->group_leader);
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while (walker->pid > 0) {
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if (!thread_group_leader(walker))
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walker = rcu_dereference(walker->group_leader);
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if (walker == parent) {
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rc = 1;
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break;
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}
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walker = rcu_dereference(walker->real_parent);
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}
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rcu_read_unlock();
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return rc;
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}
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/**
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* ptracer_exception_found - tracer registered as exception for this tracee
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* @tracer: the task_struct of the process attempting ptrace
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* @tracee: the task_struct of the process to be ptraced
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*
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* Returns 1 if tracer has a ptracer exception ancestor for tracee.
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*/
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static int ptracer_exception_found(struct task_struct *tracer,
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struct task_struct *tracee)
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{
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int rc = 0;
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struct ptrace_relation *relation;
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struct task_struct *parent = NULL;
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bool found = false;
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rcu_read_lock();
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/*
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* If there's already an active tracing relationship, then make an
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* exception for the sake of other accesses, like process_vm_rw().
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*/
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parent = ptrace_parent(tracee);
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if (parent != NULL && same_thread_group(parent, tracer)) {
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rc = 1;
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goto unlock;
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}
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/* Look for a PR_SET_PTRACER relationship. */
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if (!thread_group_leader(tracee))
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tracee = rcu_dereference(tracee->group_leader);
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list_for_each_entry_rcu(relation, &ptracer_relations, node) {
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if (relation->invalid)
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continue;
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if (relation->tracee == tracee) {
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parent = relation->tracer;
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found = true;
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break;
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}
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}
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if (found && (parent == NULL || task_is_descendant(parent, tracer)))
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rc = 1;
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unlock:
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rcu_read_unlock();
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return rc;
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}
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/**
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* yama_ptrace_access_check - validate PTRACE_ATTACH calls
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* @child: task that current task is attempting to ptrace
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* @mode: ptrace attach mode
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*
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* Returns 0 if following the ptrace is allowed, -ve on error.
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*/
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static int yama_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
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unsigned int mode)
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{
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int rc = 0;
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/* require ptrace target be a child of ptracer on attach */
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if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH) {
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switch (ptrace_scope) {
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case YAMA_SCOPE_DISABLED:
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/* No additional restrictions. */
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break;
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case YAMA_SCOPE_RELATIONAL:
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rcu_read_lock();
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if (!pid_alive(child))
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rc = -EPERM;
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if (!rc && !task_is_descendant(current, child) &&
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!ptracer_exception_found(current, child) &&
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!ns_capable(__task_cred(child)->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
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rc = -EPERM;
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rcu_read_unlock();
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break;
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case YAMA_SCOPE_CAPABILITY:
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rcu_read_lock();
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if (!ns_capable(__task_cred(child)->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
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rc = -EPERM;
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rcu_read_unlock();
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break;
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case YAMA_SCOPE_NO_ATTACH:
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default:
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rc = -EPERM;
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break;
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}
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}
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if (rc && (mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) == 0)
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report_access("attach", child, current);
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return rc;
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}
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/**
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* yama_ptrace_traceme - validate PTRACE_TRACEME calls
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* @parent: task that will become the ptracer of the current task
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*
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* Returns 0 if following the ptrace is allowed, -ve on error.
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*/
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static int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
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{
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int rc = 0;
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/* Only disallow PTRACE_TRACEME on more aggressive settings. */
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switch (ptrace_scope) {
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case YAMA_SCOPE_CAPABILITY:
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if (!has_ns_capability(parent, current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
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rc = -EPERM;
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break;
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case YAMA_SCOPE_NO_ATTACH:
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rc = -EPERM;
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break;
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}
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if (rc) {
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task_lock(current);
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report_access("traceme", current, parent);
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task_unlock(current);
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}
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return rc;
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}
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const struct lsm_id yama_lsmid = {
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.name = "yama",
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.id = LSM_ID_YAMA,
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};
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static struct security_hook_list yama_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
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LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, yama_ptrace_access_check),
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LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, yama_ptrace_traceme),
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LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prctl, yama_task_prctl),
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LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, yama_task_free),
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};
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#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
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static int yama_dointvec_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
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void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
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{
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struct ctl_table table_copy;
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if (write && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
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return -EPERM;
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/* Lock the max value if it ever gets set. */
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table_copy = *table;
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if (*(int *)table_copy.data == *(int *)table_copy.extra2)
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table_copy.extra1 = table_copy.extra2;
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return proc_dointvec_minmax(&table_copy, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
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}
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static int max_scope = YAMA_SCOPE_NO_ATTACH;
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static struct ctl_table yama_sysctl_table[] = {
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{
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.procname = "ptrace_scope",
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.data = &ptrace_scope,
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.maxlen = sizeof(int),
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.mode = 0644,
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.proc_handler = yama_dointvec_minmax,
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.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
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.extra2 = &max_scope,
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},
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{ }
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};
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static void __init yama_init_sysctl(void)
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{
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if (!register_sysctl("kernel/yama", yama_sysctl_table))
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panic("Yama: sysctl registration failed.\n");
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}
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#else
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static inline void yama_init_sysctl(void) { }
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#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
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static int __init yama_init(void)
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{
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pr_info("Yama: becoming mindful.\n");
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security_add_hooks(yama_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(yama_hooks), &yama_lsmid);
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yama_init_sysctl();
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return 0;
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}
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DEFINE_LSM(yama) = {
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.name = "yama",
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.init = yama_init,
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};
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