linux/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_get_stack_rawtp.c
Andrii Nakryiko 5e61f27070 libbpf: stop enforcing kern_version, populate it for users
Kernel version enforcement for kprobes/kretprobes was removed from
5.0 kernel in 6c4fc209fcf9 ("bpf: remove useless version check for prog load").
Since then, BPF programs were specifying SEC("version") just to please
libbpf. We should stop enforcing this in libbpf, if even kernel doesn't
care. Furthermore, libbpf now will pre-populate current kernel version
of the host system, in case we are still running on old kernel.

This patch also removes __bpf_object__open_xattr from libbpf.h, as
nothing in libbpf is relying on having it in that header. That function
was never exported as LIBBPF_API and even name suggests its internal
version. So this should be safe to remove, as it doesn't break ABI.

Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2019-10-05 18:09:47 -07:00

102 lines
3.0 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
#include <linux/bpf.h>
#include "bpf_helpers.h"
/* Permit pretty deep stack traces */
#define MAX_STACK_RAWTP 100
struct stack_trace_t {
int pid;
int kern_stack_size;
int user_stack_size;
int user_stack_buildid_size;
__u64 kern_stack[MAX_STACK_RAWTP];
__u64 user_stack[MAX_STACK_RAWTP];
struct bpf_stack_build_id user_stack_buildid[MAX_STACK_RAWTP];
};
struct {
__uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY);
__uint(max_entries, 2);
__uint(key_size, sizeof(int));
__uint(value_size, sizeof(__u32));
} perfmap SEC(".maps");
struct {
__uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY);
__uint(max_entries, 1);
__type(key, __u32);
__type(value, struct stack_trace_t);
} stackdata_map SEC(".maps");
/* Allocate per-cpu space twice the needed. For the code below
* usize = bpf_get_stack(ctx, raw_data, max_len, BPF_F_USER_STACK);
* if (usize < 0)
* return 0;
* ksize = bpf_get_stack(ctx, raw_data + usize, max_len - usize, 0);
*
* If we have value_size = MAX_STACK_RAWTP * sizeof(__u64),
* verifier will complain that access "raw_data + usize"
* with size "max_len - usize" may be out of bound.
* The maximum "raw_data + usize" is "raw_data + max_len"
* and the maximum "max_len - usize" is "max_len", verifier
* concludes that the maximum buffer access range is
* "raw_data[0...max_len * 2 - 1]" and hence reject the program.
*
* Doubling the to-be-used max buffer size can fix this verifier
* issue and avoid complicated C programming massaging.
* This is an acceptable workaround since there is one entry here.
*/
struct {
__uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY);
__uint(max_entries, 1);
__type(key, __u32);
__type(value, __u64[2 * MAX_STACK_RAWTP]);
} rawdata_map SEC(".maps");
SEC("raw_tracepoint/sys_enter")
int bpf_prog1(void *ctx)
{
int max_len, max_buildid_len, usize, ksize, total_size;
struct stack_trace_t *data;
void *raw_data;
__u32 key = 0;
data = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&stackdata_map, &key);
if (!data)
return 0;
max_len = MAX_STACK_RAWTP * sizeof(__u64);
max_buildid_len = MAX_STACK_RAWTP * sizeof(struct bpf_stack_build_id);
data->pid = bpf_get_current_pid_tgid();
data->kern_stack_size = bpf_get_stack(ctx, data->kern_stack,
max_len, 0);
data->user_stack_size = bpf_get_stack(ctx, data->user_stack, max_len,
BPF_F_USER_STACK);
data->user_stack_buildid_size = bpf_get_stack(
ctx, data->user_stack_buildid, max_buildid_len,
BPF_F_USER_STACK | BPF_F_USER_BUILD_ID);
bpf_perf_event_output(ctx, &perfmap, 0, data, sizeof(*data));
/* write both kernel and user stacks to the same buffer */
raw_data = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&rawdata_map, &key);
if (!raw_data)
return 0;
usize = bpf_get_stack(ctx, raw_data, max_len, BPF_F_USER_STACK);
if (usize < 0)
return 0;
ksize = bpf_get_stack(ctx, raw_data + usize, max_len - usize, 0);
if (ksize < 0)
return 0;
total_size = usize + ksize;
if (total_size > 0 && total_size <= max_len)
bpf_perf_event_output(ctx, &perfmap, 0, raw_data, total_size);
return 0;
}
char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";