IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO GET AN ACCOUNT, please write an
email to Administrator. User accounts are meant only to access repo
and report issues and/or generate pull requests.
This is a purpose-specific Git hosting for
BaseALT
projects. Thank you for your understanding!
Только зарегистрированные пользователи имеют доступ к сервису!
Для получения аккаунта, обратитесь к администратору.
The HASHKEYR register contains a secret per-process key to enable unique
hashes per process. In general it should not be exposed to userspace
at all and a regular process has no need to know its key.
However, checkpoint restore in userspace (CRIU) functionality requires
that a process be able to set the HASHKEYR of another process, otherwise
existing hashes on the stack would be invalidated by a new random key.
Exposing HASHKEYR in this way also makes it appear in core dumps, which
is a security concern. Multiple threads may share a key, for example
just after a fork() call, where the kernel cannot know if the child is
going to return back along the parent's stack. If such a thread is
coerced into making a core dump, then the HASHKEYR value will be
readable and able to be used against all other threads sharing that key,
effectively undoing any protection offered by hashst/hashchk.
Therefore we expose HASHKEYR to ptrace when CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is
enabled, providing a choice of increased security or migratable ROP
protected processes. This is similar to how ARM exposes its PAC keys.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Gray <bgray@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Russell Currey <ruscur@russell.cc>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20230616034846.311705-8-bgray@linux.ibm.com
97228ca375