0c02183427
* Clean up vCPU targets, always returning generic v8 as the preferred target * Trap forwarding infrastructure for nested virtualization (used for traps that are taken from an L2 guest and are needed by the L1 hypervisor) * FEAT_TLBIRANGE support to only invalidate specific ranges of addresses when collapsing a table PTE to a block PTE. This avoids that the guest refills the TLBs again for addresses that aren't covered by the table PTE. * Fix vPMU issues related to handling of PMUver. * Don't unnecessary align non-stack allocations in the EL2 VA space * Drop HCR_VIRT_EXCP_MASK, which was never used... * Don't use smp_processor_id() in kvm_arch_vcpu_load(), but the cpu parameter instead * Drop redundant call to kvm_set_pfn_accessed() in user_mem_abort() * Remove prototypes without implementations RISC-V: * Zba, Zbs, Zicntr, Zicsr, Zifencei, and Zihpm support for guest * Added ONE_REG interface for SATP mode * Added ONE_REG interface to enable/disable multiple ISA extensions * Improved error codes returned by ONE_REG interfaces * Added KVM_GET_REG_LIST ioctl() implementation for KVM RISC-V * Added get-reg-list selftest for KVM RISC-V s390: * PV crypto passthrough enablement (Tony, Steffen, Viktor, Janosch) Allows a PV guest to use crypto cards. Card access is governed by the firmware and once a crypto queue is "bound" to a PV VM every other entity (PV or not) looses access until it is not bound anymore. Enablement is done via flags when creating the PV VM. * Guest debug fixes (Ilya) x86: * Clean up KVM's handling of Intel architectural events * Intel bugfixes * Add support for SEV-ES DebugSwap, allowing SEV-ES guests to use debug registers and generate/handle #DBs * Clean up LBR virtualization code * Fix a bug where KVM fails to set the target pCPU during an IRTE update * Fix fatal bugs in SEV-ES intrahost migration * Fix a bug where the recent (architecturally correct) change to reinject #BP and skip INT3 broke SEV guests (can't decode INT3 to skip it) * Retry APIC map recalculation if a vCPU is added/enabled * Overhaul emergency reboot code to bring SVM up to par with VMX, tie the "emergency disabling" behavior to KVM actually being loaded, and move all of the logic within KVM * Fix user triggerable WARNs in SVM where KVM incorrectly assumes the TSC ratio MSR cannot diverge from the default when TSC scaling is disabled up related code * Add a framework to allow "caching" feature flags so that KVM can check if the guest can use a feature without needing to search guest CPUID * Rip out the ancient MMU_DEBUG crud and replace the useful bits with CONFIG_KVM_PROVE_MMU * Fix KVM's handling of !visible guest roots to avoid premature triple fault injection * Overhaul KVM's page-track APIs, and KVMGT's usage, to reduce the API surface that is needed by external users (currently only KVMGT), and fix a variety of issues in the process This last item had a silly one-character bug in the topic branch that was sent to me. Because it caused pretty bad selftest failures in some configurations, I decided to squash in the fix. So, while the exact commit ids haven't been in linux-next, the code has (from the kvm-x86 tree). Generic: * Wrap kvm_{gfn,hva}_range.pte in a union to allow mmu_notifier events to pass action specific data without needing to constantly update the main handlers. * Drop unused function declarations Selftests: * Add testcases to x86's sync_regs_test for detecting KVM TOCTOU bugs * Add support for printf() in guest code and covert all guest asserts to use printf-based reporting * Clean up the PMU event filter test and add new testcases * Include x86 selftests in the KVM x86 MAINTAINERS entry -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQFIBAABCAAyFiEE8TM4V0tmI4mGbHaCv/vSX3jHroMFAmT1m0kUHHBib256aW5p QHJlZGhhdC5jb20ACgkQv/vSX3jHroMNgggAiN7nz6UC423FznuI+yO3TLm8tkx1 CpKh5onqQogVtchH+vrngi97cfOzZb1/AtifY90OWQi31KEWhehkeofcx7G6ERhj 5a9NFADY1xGBsX4exca/VHDxhnzsbDWaWYPXw5vWFWI6erft9Mvy3tp1LwTvOzqM v8X4aWz+g5bmo/DWJf4Wu32tEU6mnxzkrjKU14JmyqQTBawVmJ3RYvHVJ/Agpw+n hRtPAy7FU6XTdkmq/uCT+KUHuJEIK0E/l1js47HFAqSzwdW70UDg14GGo1o4ETxu RjZQmVNvL57yVgi6QU38/A0FWIsWQm5IlaX1Ug6x8pjZPnUKNbo9BY4T1g== =W+4p -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm Pull kvm updates from Paolo Bonzini: "ARM: - Clean up vCPU targets, always returning generic v8 as the preferred target - Trap forwarding infrastructure for nested virtualization (used for traps that are taken from an L2 guest and are needed by the L1 hypervisor) - FEAT_TLBIRANGE support to only invalidate specific ranges of addresses when collapsing a table PTE to a block PTE. This avoids that the guest refills the TLBs again for addresses that aren't covered by the table PTE. - Fix vPMU issues related to handling of PMUver. - Don't unnecessary align non-stack allocations in the EL2 VA space - Drop HCR_VIRT_EXCP_MASK, which was never used... - Don't use smp_processor_id() in kvm_arch_vcpu_load(), but the cpu parameter instead - Drop redundant call to kvm_set_pfn_accessed() in user_mem_abort() - Remove prototypes without implementations RISC-V: - Zba, Zbs, Zicntr, Zicsr, Zifencei, and Zihpm support for guest - Added ONE_REG interface for SATP mode - Added ONE_REG interface to enable/disable multiple ISA extensions - Improved error codes returned by ONE_REG interfaces - Added KVM_GET_REG_LIST ioctl() implementation for KVM RISC-V - Added get-reg-list selftest for KVM RISC-V s390: - PV crypto passthrough enablement (Tony, Steffen, Viktor, Janosch) Allows a PV guest to use crypto cards. Card access is governed by the firmware and once a crypto queue is "bound" to a PV VM every other entity (PV or not) looses access until it is not bound anymore. Enablement is done via flags when creating the PV VM. - Guest debug fixes (Ilya) x86: - Clean up KVM's handling of Intel architectural events - Intel bugfixes - Add support for SEV-ES DebugSwap, allowing SEV-ES guests to use debug registers and generate/handle #DBs - Clean up LBR virtualization code - Fix a bug where KVM fails to set the target pCPU during an IRTE update - Fix fatal bugs in SEV-ES intrahost migration - Fix a bug where the recent (architecturally correct) change to reinject #BP and skip INT3 broke SEV guests (can't decode INT3 to skip it) - Retry APIC map recalculation if a vCPU is added/enabled - Overhaul emergency reboot code to bring SVM up to par with VMX, tie the "emergency disabling" behavior to KVM actually being loaded, and move all of the logic within KVM - Fix user triggerable WARNs in SVM where KVM incorrectly assumes the TSC ratio MSR cannot diverge from the default when TSC scaling is disabled up related code - Add a framework to allow "caching" feature flags so that KVM can check if the guest can use a feature without needing to search guest CPUID - Rip out the ancient MMU_DEBUG crud and replace the useful bits with CONFIG_KVM_PROVE_MMU - Fix KVM's handling of !visible guest roots to avoid premature triple fault injection - Overhaul KVM's page-track APIs, and KVMGT's usage, to reduce the API surface that is needed by external users (currently only KVMGT), and fix a variety of issues in the process Generic: - Wrap kvm_{gfn,hva}_range.pte in a union to allow mmu_notifier events to pass action specific data without needing to constantly update the main handlers. - Drop unused function declarations Selftests: - Add testcases to x86's sync_regs_test for detecting KVM TOCTOU bugs - Add support for printf() in guest code and covert all guest asserts to use printf-based reporting - Clean up the PMU event filter test and add new testcases - Include x86 selftests in the KVM x86 MAINTAINERS entry" * tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (279 commits) KVM: x86/mmu: Include mmu.h in spte.h KVM: x86/mmu: Use dummy root, backed by zero page, for !visible guest roots KVM: x86/mmu: Disallow guest from using !visible slots for page tables KVM: x86/mmu: Harden TDP MMU iteration against root w/o shadow page KVM: x86/mmu: Harden new PGD against roots without shadow pages KVM: x86/mmu: Add helper to convert root hpa to shadow page drm/i915/gvt: Drop final dependencies on KVM internal details KVM: x86/mmu: Handle KVM bookkeeping in page-track APIs, not callers KVM: x86/mmu: Drop @slot param from exported/external page-track APIs KVM: x86/mmu: Bug the VM if write-tracking is used but not enabled KVM: x86/mmu: Assert that correct locks are held for page write-tracking KVM: x86/mmu: Rename page-track APIs to reflect the new reality KVM: x86/mmu: Drop infrastructure for multiple page-track modes KVM: x86/mmu: Use page-track notifiers iff there are external users KVM: x86/mmu: Move KVM-only page-track declarations to internal header KVM: x86: Remove the unused page-track hook track_flush_slot() drm/i915/gvt: switch from ->track_flush_slot() to ->track_remove_region() KVM: x86: Add a new page-track hook to handle memslot deletion drm/i915/gvt: Don't bother removing write-protection on to-be-deleted slot KVM: x86: Reject memslot MOVE operations if KVMGT is attached ...
709 lines
18 KiB
C
709 lines
18 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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/*
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* S390 version
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* Copyright IBM Corp. 1999
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* Author(s): Hartmut Penner (hp@de.ibm.com)
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* Ulrich Weigand (uweigand@de.ibm.com)
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*
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* Derived from "arch/i386/mm/fault.c"
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* Copyright (C) 1995 Linus Torvalds
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*/
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#include <linux/kernel_stat.h>
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#include <linux/perf_event.h>
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#include <linux/signal.h>
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#include <linux/sched.h>
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#include <linux/sched/debug.h>
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/errno.h>
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#include <linux/string.h>
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#include <linux/types.h>
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#include <linux/ptrace.h>
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#include <linux/mman.h>
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#include <linux/mm.h>
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#include <linux/compat.h>
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#include <linux/smp.h>
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#include <linux/kdebug.h>
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#include <linux/init.h>
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#include <linux/console.h>
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#include <linux/extable.h>
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#include <linux/hardirq.h>
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#include <linux/kprobes.h>
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#include <linux/uaccess.h>
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#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
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#include <linux/kfence.h>
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#include <asm/asm-extable.h>
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#include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
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#include <asm/diag.h>
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#include <asm/gmap.h>
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#include <asm/irq.h>
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#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
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#include <asm/facility.h>
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#include <asm/uv.h>
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#include "../kernel/entry.h"
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#define __FAIL_ADDR_MASK -4096L
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/*
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* Allocate private vm_fault_reason from top. Please make sure it won't
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* collide with vm_fault_reason.
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*/
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#define VM_FAULT_BADCONTEXT ((__force vm_fault_t)0x80000000)
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#define VM_FAULT_BADMAP ((__force vm_fault_t)0x40000000)
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#define VM_FAULT_BADACCESS ((__force vm_fault_t)0x20000000)
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#define VM_FAULT_SIGNAL ((__force vm_fault_t)0x10000000)
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#define VM_FAULT_PFAULT ((__force vm_fault_t)0x8000000)
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enum fault_type {
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KERNEL_FAULT,
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USER_FAULT,
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GMAP_FAULT,
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};
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static unsigned long store_indication __read_mostly;
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static int __init fault_init(void)
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{
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if (test_facility(75))
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store_indication = 0xc00;
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return 0;
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}
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early_initcall(fault_init);
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/*
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* Find out which address space caused the exception.
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*/
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static enum fault_type get_fault_type(struct pt_regs *regs)
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{
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unsigned long trans_exc_code;
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trans_exc_code = regs->int_parm_long & 3;
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if (likely(trans_exc_code == 0)) {
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/* primary space exception */
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if (user_mode(regs))
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return USER_FAULT;
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if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PGSTE))
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return KERNEL_FAULT;
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if (test_pt_regs_flag(regs, PIF_GUEST_FAULT))
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return GMAP_FAULT;
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return KERNEL_FAULT;
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}
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if (trans_exc_code == 2)
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return USER_FAULT;
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if (trans_exc_code == 1) {
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/* access register mode, not used in the kernel */
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return USER_FAULT;
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}
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/* home space exception -> access via kernel ASCE */
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return KERNEL_FAULT;
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}
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static unsigned long get_fault_address(struct pt_regs *regs)
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{
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unsigned long trans_exc_code = regs->int_parm_long;
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return trans_exc_code & __FAIL_ADDR_MASK;
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}
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static bool fault_is_write(struct pt_regs *regs)
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{
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unsigned long trans_exc_code = regs->int_parm_long;
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return (trans_exc_code & store_indication) == 0x400;
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}
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static int bad_address(void *p)
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{
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unsigned long dummy;
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return get_kernel_nofault(dummy, (unsigned long *)p);
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}
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static void dump_pagetable(unsigned long asce, unsigned long address)
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{
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unsigned long *table = __va(asce & _ASCE_ORIGIN);
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pr_alert("AS:%016lx ", asce);
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switch (asce & _ASCE_TYPE_MASK) {
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case _ASCE_TYPE_REGION1:
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table += (address & _REGION1_INDEX) >> _REGION1_SHIFT;
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if (bad_address(table))
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goto bad;
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pr_cont("R1:%016lx ", *table);
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if (*table & _REGION_ENTRY_INVALID)
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goto out;
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table = __va(*table & _REGION_ENTRY_ORIGIN);
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fallthrough;
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case _ASCE_TYPE_REGION2:
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table += (address & _REGION2_INDEX) >> _REGION2_SHIFT;
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if (bad_address(table))
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goto bad;
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pr_cont("R2:%016lx ", *table);
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if (*table & _REGION_ENTRY_INVALID)
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goto out;
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table = __va(*table & _REGION_ENTRY_ORIGIN);
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fallthrough;
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case _ASCE_TYPE_REGION3:
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table += (address & _REGION3_INDEX) >> _REGION3_SHIFT;
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if (bad_address(table))
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goto bad;
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pr_cont("R3:%016lx ", *table);
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if (*table & (_REGION_ENTRY_INVALID | _REGION3_ENTRY_LARGE))
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goto out;
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table = __va(*table & _REGION_ENTRY_ORIGIN);
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fallthrough;
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case _ASCE_TYPE_SEGMENT:
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table += (address & _SEGMENT_INDEX) >> _SEGMENT_SHIFT;
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if (bad_address(table))
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goto bad;
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pr_cont("S:%016lx ", *table);
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if (*table & (_SEGMENT_ENTRY_INVALID | _SEGMENT_ENTRY_LARGE))
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goto out;
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table = __va(*table & _SEGMENT_ENTRY_ORIGIN);
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}
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table += (address & _PAGE_INDEX) >> _PAGE_SHIFT;
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if (bad_address(table))
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goto bad;
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pr_cont("P:%016lx ", *table);
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out:
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pr_cont("\n");
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return;
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bad:
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pr_cont("BAD\n");
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}
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static void dump_fault_info(struct pt_regs *regs)
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{
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unsigned long asce;
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pr_alert("Failing address: %016lx TEID: %016lx\n",
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regs->int_parm_long & __FAIL_ADDR_MASK, regs->int_parm_long);
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pr_alert("Fault in ");
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switch (regs->int_parm_long & 3) {
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case 3:
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pr_cont("home space ");
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break;
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case 2:
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pr_cont("secondary space ");
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break;
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case 1:
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pr_cont("access register ");
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break;
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case 0:
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pr_cont("primary space ");
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break;
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}
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pr_cont("mode while using ");
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switch (get_fault_type(regs)) {
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case USER_FAULT:
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asce = S390_lowcore.user_asce;
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pr_cont("user ");
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break;
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case GMAP_FAULT:
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asce = ((struct gmap *) S390_lowcore.gmap)->asce;
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pr_cont("gmap ");
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break;
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case KERNEL_FAULT:
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asce = S390_lowcore.kernel_asce;
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pr_cont("kernel ");
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break;
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default:
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unreachable();
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}
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pr_cont("ASCE.\n");
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dump_pagetable(asce, regs->int_parm_long & __FAIL_ADDR_MASK);
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}
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int show_unhandled_signals = 1;
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void report_user_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, long signr, int is_mm_fault)
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{
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if ((task_pid_nr(current) > 1) && !show_unhandled_signals)
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return;
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if (!unhandled_signal(current, signr))
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return;
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if (!printk_ratelimit())
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return;
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printk(KERN_ALERT "User process fault: interruption code %04x ilc:%d ",
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regs->int_code & 0xffff, regs->int_code >> 17);
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print_vma_addr(KERN_CONT "in ", regs->psw.addr);
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printk(KERN_CONT "\n");
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if (is_mm_fault)
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dump_fault_info(regs);
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show_regs(regs);
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}
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/*
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* Send SIGSEGV to task. This is an external routine
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* to keep the stack usage of do_page_fault small.
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*/
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static noinline void do_sigsegv(struct pt_regs *regs, int si_code)
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{
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report_user_fault(regs, SIGSEGV, 1);
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force_sig_fault(SIGSEGV, si_code,
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(void __user *)(regs->int_parm_long & __FAIL_ADDR_MASK));
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}
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static noinline void do_no_context(struct pt_regs *regs, vm_fault_t fault)
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{
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enum fault_type fault_type;
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unsigned long address;
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bool is_write;
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if (fixup_exception(regs))
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return;
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fault_type = get_fault_type(regs);
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if ((fault_type == KERNEL_FAULT) && (fault == VM_FAULT_BADCONTEXT)) {
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address = get_fault_address(regs);
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is_write = fault_is_write(regs);
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if (kfence_handle_page_fault(address, is_write, regs))
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return;
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}
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/*
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* Oops. The kernel tried to access some bad page. We'll have to
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* terminate things with extreme prejudice.
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*/
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if (fault_type == KERNEL_FAULT)
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printk(KERN_ALERT "Unable to handle kernel pointer dereference"
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" in virtual kernel address space\n");
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else
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printk(KERN_ALERT "Unable to handle kernel paging request"
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" in virtual user address space\n");
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dump_fault_info(regs);
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die(regs, "Oops");
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}
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static noinline void do_low_address(struct pt_regs *regs)
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{
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/* Low-address protection hit in kernel mode means
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NULL pointer write access in kernel mode. */
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if (regs->psw.mask & PSW_MASK_PSTATE) {
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/* Low-address protection hit in user mode 'cannot happen'. */
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die (regs, "Low-address protection");
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}
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do_no_context(regs, VM_FAULT_BADACCESS);
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}
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static noinline void do_sigbus(struct pt_regs *regs)
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{
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/*
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* Send a sigbus, regardless of whether we were in kernel
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* or user mode.
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*/
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force_sig_fault(SIGBUS, BUS_ADRERR,
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(void __user *)(regs->int_parm_long & __FAIL_ADDR_MASK));
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}
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static noinline void do_fault_error(struct pt_regs *regs, vm_fault_t fault)
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{
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int si_code;
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switch (fault) {
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case VM_FAULT_BADACCESS:
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case VM_FAULT_BADMAP:
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/* Bad memory access. Check if it is kernel or user space. */
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if (user_mode(regs)) {
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/* User mode accesses just cause a SIGSEGV */
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si_code = (fault == VM_FAULT_BADMAP) ?
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SEGV_MAPERR : SEGV_ACCERR;
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do_sigsegv(regs, si_code);
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break;
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}
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fallthrough;
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case VM_FAULT_BADCONTEXT:
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case VM_FAULT_PFAULT:
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do_no_context(regs, fault);
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break;
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case VM_FAULT_SIGNAL:
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if (!user_mode(regs))
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do_no_context(regs, fault);
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break;
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default: /* fault & VM_FAULT_ERROR */
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if (fault & VM_FAULT_OOM) {
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if (!user_mode(regs))
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do_no_context(regs, fault);
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else
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pagefault_out_of_memory();
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} else if (fault & VM_FAULT_SIGSEGV) {
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/* Kernel mode? Handle exceptions or die */
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if (!user_mode(regs))
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do_no_context(regs, fault);
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else
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do_sigsegv(regs, SEGV_MAPERR);
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} else if (fault & VM_FAULT_SIGBUS) {
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/* Kernel mode? Handle exceptions or die */
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if (!user_mode(regs))
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do_no_context(regs, fault);
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else
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do_sigbus(regs);
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} else
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BUG();
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break;
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}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* This routine handles page faults. It determines the address,
|
|
* and the problem, and then passes it off to one of the appropriate
|
|
* routines.
|
|
*
|
|
* interruption code (int_code):
|
|
* 04 Protection -> Write-Protection (suppression)
|
|
* 10 Segment translation -> Not present (nullification)
|
|
* 11 Page translation -> Not present (nullification)
|
|
* 3b Region third trans. -> Not present (nullification)
|
|
*/
|
|
static inline vm_fault_t do_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int access)
|
|
{
|
|
struct gmap *gmap;
|
|
struct task_struct *tsk;
|
|
struct mm_struct *mm;
|
|
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
|
|
enum fault_type type;
|
|
unsigned long address;
|
|
unsigned int flags;
|
|
vm_fault_t fault;
|
|
bool is_write;
|
|
|
|
tsk = current;
|
|
/*
|
|
* The instruction that caused the program check has
|
|
* been nullified. Don't signal single step via SIGTRAP.
|
|
*/
|
|
clear_thread_flag(TIF_PER_TRAP);
|
|
|
|
if (kprobe_page_fault(regs, 14))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
mm = tsk->mm;
|
|
address = get_fault_address(regs);
|
|
is_write = fault_is_write(regs);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Verify that the fault happened in user space, that
|
|
* we are not in an interrupt and that there is a
|
|
* user context.
|
|
*/
|
|
fault = VM_FAULT_BADCONTEXT;
|
|
type = get_fault_type(regs);
|
|
switch (type) {
|
|
case KERNEL_FAULT:
|
|
goto out;
|
|
case USER_FAULT:
|
|
case GMAP_FAULT:
|
|
if (faulthandler_disabled() || !mm)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS, 1, regs, address);
|
|
flags = FAULT_FLAG_DEFAULT;
|
|
if (user_mode(regs))
|
|
flags |= FAULT_FLAG_USER;
|
|
if (is_write)
|
|
access = VM_WRITE;
|
|
if (access == VM_WRITE)
|
|
flags |= FAULT_FLAG_WRITE;
|
|
if (!(flags & FAULT_FLAG_USER))
|
|
goto lock_mmap;
|
|
vma = lock_vma_under_rcu(mm, address);
|
|
if (!vma)
|
|
goto lock_mmap;
|
|
if (!(vma->vm_flags & access)) {
|
|
vma_end_read(vma);
|
|
goto lock_mmap;
|
|
}
|
|
fault = handle_mm_fault(vma, address, flags | FAULT_FLAG_VMA_LOCK, regs);
|
|
if (!(fault & (VM_FAULT_RETRY | VM_FAULT_COMPLETED)))
|
|
vma_end_read(vma);
|
|
if (!(fault & VM_FAULT_RETRY)) {
|
|
count_vm_vma_lock_event(VMA_LOCK_SUCCESS);
|
|
if (likely(!(fault & VM_FAULT_ERROR)))
|
|
fault = 0;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
count_vm_vma_lock_event(VMA_LOCK_RETRY);
|
|
/* Quick path to respond to signals */
|
|
if (fault_signal_pending(fault, regs)) {
|
|
fault = VM_FAULT_SIGNAL;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
lock_mmap:
|
|
mmap_read_lock(mm);
|
|
|
|
gmap = NULL;
|
|
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PGSTE) && type == GMAP_FAULT) {
|
|
gmap = (struct gmap *) S390_lowcore.gmap;
|
|
current->thread.gmap_addr = address;
|
|
current->thread.gmap_write_flag = !!(flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE);
|
|
current->thread.gmap_int_code = regs->int_code & 0xffff;
|
|
address = __gmap_translate(gmap, address);
|
|
if (address == -EFAULT) {
|
|
fault = VM_FAULT_BADMAP;
|
|
goto out_up;
|
|
}
|
|
if (gmap->pfault_enabled)
|
|
flags |= FAULT_FLAG_RETRY_NOWAIT;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
retry:
|
|
fault = VM_FAULT_BADMAP;
|
|
vma = find_vma(mm, address);
|
|
if (!vma)
|
|
goto out_up;
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(vma->vm_start > address)) {
|
|
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN))
|
|
goto out_up;
|
|
vma = expand_stack(mm, address);
|
|
if (!vma)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Ok, we have a good vm_area for this memory access, so
|
|
* we can handle it..
|
|
*/
|
|
fault = VM_FAULT_BADACCESS;
|
|
if (unlikely(!(vma->vm_flags & access)))
|
|
goto out_up;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If for any reason at all we couldn't handle the fault,
|
|
* make sure we exit gracefully rather than endlessly redo
|
|
* the fault.
|
|
*/
|
|
fault = handle_mm_fault(vma, address, flags, regs);
|
|
if (fault_signal_pending(fault, regs)) {
|
|
fault = VM_FAULT_SIGNAL;
|
|
if (flags & FAULT_FLAG_RETRY_NOWAIT)
|
|
goto out_up;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* The fault is fully completed (including releasing mmap lock) */
|
|
if (fault & VM_FAULT_COMPLETED) {
|
|
if (gmap) {
|
|
mmap_read_lock(mm);
|
|
goto out_gmap;
|
|
}
|
|
fault = 0;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(fault & VM_FAULT_ERROR))
|
|
goto out_up;
|
|
|
|
if (fault & VM_FAULT_RETRY) {
|
|
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PGSTE) && gmap &&
|
|
(flags & FAULT_FLAG_RETRY_NOWAIT)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* FAULT_FLAG_RETRY_NOWAIT has been set, mmap_lock has
|
|
* not been released
|
|
*/
|
|
current->thread.gmap_pfault = 1;
|
|
fault = VM_FAULT_PFAULT;
|
|
goto out_up;
|
|
}
|
|
flags &= ~FAULT_FLAG_RETRY_NOWAIT;
|
|
flags |= FAULT_FLAG_TRIED;
|
|
mmap_read_lock(mm);
|
|
goto retry;
|
|
}
|
|
out_gmap:
|
|
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PGSTE) && gmap) {
|
|
address = __gmap_link(gmap, current->thread.gmap_addr,
|
|
address);
|
|
if (address == -EFAULT) {
|
|
fault = VM_FAULT_BADMAP;
|
|
goto out_up;
|
|
}
|
|
if (address == -ENOMEM) {
|
|
fault = VM_FAULT_OOM;
|
|
goto out_up;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
fault = 0;
|
|
out_up:
|
|
mmap_read_unlock(mm);
|
|
out:
|
|
return fault;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void do_protection_exception(struct pt_regs *regs)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned long trans_exc_code;
|
|
int access;
|
|
vm_fault_t fault;
|
|
|
|
trans_exc_code = regs->int_parm_long;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Protection exceptions are suppressing, decrement psw address.
|
|
* The exception to this rule are aborted transactions, for these
|
|
* the PSW already points to the correct location.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!(regs->int_code & 0x200))
|
|
regs->psw.addr = __rewind_psw(regs->psw, regs->int_code >> 16);
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check for low-address protection. This needs to be treated
|
|
* as a special case because the translation exception code
|
|
* field is not guaranteed to contain valid data in this case.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (unlikely(!(trans_exc_code & 4))) {
|
|
do_low_address(regs);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
if (unlikely(MACHINE_HAS_NX && (trans_exc_code & 0x80))) {
|
|
regs->int_parm_long = (trans_exc_code & ~PAGE_MASK) |
|
|
(regs->psw.addr & PAGE_MASK);
|
|
access = VM_EXEC;
|
|
fault = VM_FAULT_BADACCESS;
|
|
} else {
|
|
access = VM_WRITE;
|
|
fault = do_exception(regs, access);
|
|
}
|
|
if (unlikely(fault))
|
|
do_fault_error(regs, fault);
|
|
}
|
|
NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_protection_exception);
|
|
|
|
void do_dat_exception(struct pt_regs *regs)
|
|
{
|
|
int access;
|
|
vm_fault_t fault;
|
|
|
|
access = VM_ACCESS_FLAGS;
|
|
fault = do_exception(regs, access);
|
|
if (unlikely(fault))
|
|
do_fault_error(regs, fault);
|
|
}
|
|
NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_dat_exception);
|
|
|
|
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PGSTE)
|
|
|
|
void do_secure_storage_access(struct pt_regs *regs)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned long addr = regs->int_parm_long & __FAIL_ADDR_MASK;
|
|
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
|
|
struct mm_struct *mm;
|
|
struct page *page;
|
|
struct gmap *gmap;
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* bit 61 tells us if the address is valid, if it's not we
|
|
* have a major problem and should stop the kernel or send a
|
|
* SIGSEGV to the process. Unfortunately bit 61 is not
|
|
* reliable without the misc UV feature so we need to check
|
|
* for that as well.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (uv_has_feature(BIT_UV_FEAT_MISC) &&
|
|
!test_bit_inv(61, ®s->int_parm_long)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* When this happens, userspace did something that it
|
|
* was not supposed to do, e.g. branching into secure
|
|
* memory. Trigger a segmentation fault.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (user_mode(regs)) {
|
|
send_sig(SIGSEGV, current, 0);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The kernel should never run into this case and we
|
|
* have no way out of this situation.
|
|
*/
|
|
panic("Unexpected PGM 0x3d with TEID bit 61=0");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch (get_fault_type(regs)) {
|
|
case GMAP_FAULT:
|
|
mm = current->mm;
|
|
gmap = (struct gmap *)S390_lowcore.gmap;
|
|
mmap_read_lock(mm);
|
|
addr = __gmap_translate(gmap, addr);
|
|
mmap_read_unlock(mm);
|
|
if (IS_ERR_VALUE(addr)) {
|
|
do_fault_error(regs, VM_FAULT_BADMAP);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
fallthrough;
|
|
case USER_FAULT:
|
|
mm = current->mm;
|
|
mmap_read_lock(mm);
|
|
vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
|
|
if (!vma) {
|
|
mmap_read_unlock(mm);
|
|
do_fault_error(regs, VM_FAULT_BADMAP);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
page = follow_page(vma, addr, FOLL_WRITE | FOLL_GET);
|
|
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(page)) {
|
|
mmap_read_unlock(mm);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
if (arch_make_page_accessible(page))
|
|
send_sig(SIGSEGV, current, 0);
|
|
put_page(page);
|
|
mmap_read_unlock(mm);
|
|
break;
|
|
case KERNEL_FAULT:
|
|
page = phys_to_page(addr);
|
|
if (unlikely(!try_get_page(page)))
|
|
break;
|
|
rc = arch_make_page_accessible(page);
|
|
put_page(page);
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
BUG();
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
do_fault_error(regs, VM_FAULT_BADMAP);
|
|
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_secure_storage_access);
|
|
|
|
void do_non_secure_storage_access(struct pt_regs *regs)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned long gaddr = regs->int_parm_long & __FAIL_ADDR_MASK;
|
|
struct gmap *gmap = (struct gmap *)S390_lowcore.gmap;
|
|
|
|
if (get_fault_type(regs) != GMAP_FAULT) {
|
|
do_fault_error(regs, VM_FAULT_BADMAP);
|
|
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (gmap_convert_to_secure(gmap, gaddr) == -EINVAL)
|
|
send_sig(SIGSEGV, current, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_non_secure_storage_access);
|
|
|
|
void do_secure_storage_violation(struct pt_regs *regs)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned long gaddr = regs->int_parm_long & __FAIL_ADDR_MASK;
|
|
struct gmap *gmap = (struct gmap *)S390_lowcore.gmap;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If the VM has been rebooted, its address space might still contain
|
|
* secure pages from the previous boot.
|
|
* Clear the page so it can be reused.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!gmap_destroy_page(gmap, gaddr))
|
|
return;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Either KVM messed up the secure guest mapping or the same
|
|
* page is mapped into multiple secure guests.
|
|
*
|
|
* This exception is only triggered when a guest 2 is running
|
|
* and can therefore never occur in kernel context.
|
|
*/
|
|
printk_ratelimited(KERN_WARNING
|
|
"Secure storage violation in task: %s, pid %d\n",
|
|
current->comm, current->pid);
|
|
send_sig(SIGSEGV, current, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_PGSTE */
|