IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO GET AN ACCOUNT, please write an
email to Administrator. User accounts are meant only to access repo
and report issues and/or generate pull requests.
This is a purpose-specific Git hosting for
BaseALT
projects. Thank you for your understanding!
Только зарегистрированные пользователи имеют доступ к сервису!
Для получения аккаунта, обратитесь к администратору.
Guests like grsecurity that make heavy use of CR0.WP to implement kernel
level W^X will suffer from the implied VMEXITs.
With EPT there is no need to intercept a guest change of CR0.WP, so
simply make it a guest owned bit if we can do so.
This implies that a read of a guest's CR0.WP bit might need a VMREAD.
However, the only potentially affected user seems to be kvm_init_mmu()
which is a heavy operation to begin with. But also most callers already
cache the full value of CR0 anyway, so no additional VMREAD is needed.
The only exception is nested_vmx_load_cr3().
This change is VMX-specific, as SVM has no such fine grained control
register intercept control.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@grsecurity.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230322013731.102955-7-minipli@grsecurity.net
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>