Create the arbitrary session, with the fixed session id 0xf, after system boot, for the case that application allocates the protected buffer without establishing any protection session. Because the hardware requires at least one alive session for protected buffer creation. This arbitrary session will need to be re-created after teardown or power event because hardware encryption key won't be valid after such cases. The session ID is exposed as part of the uapi so it can be used as part of userspace commands. v2: use gt->uncore->rpm (Chris) v3: s/arb_is_in_play/arb_is_valid (Chris), move set-up to the new init_hw function v4: move interface defs to separate header, set arb_is valid to false on fini (Rodrigo) v5: handle async component binding Signed-off-by: Huang, Sean Z <sean.z.huang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Daniele Ceraolo Spurio <daniele.ceraolospurio@intel.com> Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk> Cc: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20210924191452.1539378-8-alan.previn.teres.alexis@intel.com
18 lines
427 B
C
18 lines
427 B
C
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT */
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/*
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* Copyright(c) 2020, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
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*/
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#ifndef __INTEL_PXP_TEE_H__
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#define __INTEL_PXP_TEE_H__
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#include "intel_pxp.h"
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int intel_pxp_tee_component_init(struct intel_pxp *pxp);
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void intel_pxp_tee_component_fini(struct intel_pxp *pxp);
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int intel_pxp_tee_cmd_create_arb_session(struct intel_pxp *pxp,
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int arb_session_id);
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#endif /* __INTEL_PXP_TEE_H__ */
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