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Add tests for the host checking logic, clarify the behaviors (#20328)

Before, the combination of AllowedDomains/BlockedDomains/AllowLocalNetworks is confusing.

This PR adds tests for the logic, clarify the behaviors.
This commit is contained in:
wxiaoguang 2022-07-13 09:07:16 +08:00 committed by GitHub
parent d94f517643
commit f67a1030b3
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5 changed files with 54 additions and 8 deletions

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@ -2232,6 +2232,7 @@ ROUTER = console
;BLOCKED_DOMAINS = ;BLOCKED_DOMAINS =
;; ;;
;; Allow private addresses defined by RFC 1918, RFC 1122, RFC 4632 and RFC 4291 (false by default) ;; Allow private addresses defined by RFC 1918, RFC 1122, RFC 4632 and RFC 4291 (false by default)
;; If a domain is allowed by ALLOWED_DOMAINS, this option will be ignored.
;ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS = false ;ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS = false
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;

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@ -1083,7 +1083,7 @@ Task queue configuration has been moved to `queue.task`. However, the below conf
- `RETRY_BACKOFF`: **3**: Backoff time per http/https request retry (seconds) - `RETRY_BACKOFF`: **3**: Backoff time per http/https request retry (seconds)
- `ALLOWED_DOMAINS`: **\<empty\>**: Domains allowlist for migrating repositories, default is blank. It means everything will be allowed. Multiple domains could be separated by commas. Wildcard is supported: `github.com, *.github.com`. - `ALLOWED_DOMAINS`: **\<empty\>**: Domains allowlist for migrating repositories, default is blank. It means everything will be allowed. Multiple domains could be separated by commas. Wildcard is supported: `github.com, *.github.com`.
- `BLOCKED_DOMAINS`: **\<empty\>**: Domains blocklist for migrating repositories, default is blank. Multiple domains could be separated by commas. When `ALLOWED_DOMAINS` is not blank, this option has a higher priority to deny domains. Wildcard is supported. - `BLOCKED_DOMAINS`: **\<empty\>**: Domains blocklist for migrating repositories, default is blank. Multiple domains could be separated by commas. When `ALLOWED_DOMAINS` is not blank, this option has a higher priority to deny domains. Wildcard is supported.
- `ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS`: **false**: Allow private addresses defined by RFC 1918, RFC 1122, RFC 4632 and RFC 4291 - `ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS`: **false**: Allow private addresses defined by RFC 1918, RFC 1122, RFC 4632 and RFC 4291. If a domain is allowed by `ALLOWED_DOMAINS`, this option will be ignored.
- `SKIP_TLS_VERIFY`: **false**: Allow skip tls verify - `SKIP_TLS_VERIFY`: **false**: Allow skip tls verify
## Federation (`federation`) ## Federation (`federation`)

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@ -125,14 +125,14 @@ func (hl *HostMatchList) checkIP(ip net.IP) bool {
// MatchHostName checks if the host matches an allow/deny(block) list // MatchHostName checks if the host matches an allow/deny(block) list
func (hl *HostMatchList) MatchHostName(host string) bool { func (hl *HostMatchList) MatchHostName(host string) bool {
if hl == nil {
return false
}
hostname, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(host) hostname, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(host)
if err != nil { if err != nil {
hostname = host hostname = host
} }
if hl == nil {
return false
}
if hl.checkPattern(hostname) { if hl.checkPattern(hostname) {
return true return true
} }

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@ -84,7 +84,10 @@ func IsMigrateURLAllowed(remoteURL string, doer *user_model.User) error {
// some users only use proxy, there is no DNS resolver. it's safe to ignore the LookupIP error // some users only use proxy, there is no DNS resolver. it's safe to ignore the LookupIP error
addrList, _ := net.LookupIP(hostName) addrList, _ := net.LookupIP(hostName)
return checkByAllowBlockList(hostName, addrList)
}
func checkByAllowBlockList(hostName string, addrList []net.IP) error {
var ipAllowed bool var ipAllowed bool
var ipBlocked bool var ipBlocked bool
for _, addr := range addrList { for _, addr := range addrList {
@ -93,12 +96,12 @@ func IsMigrateURLAllowed(remoteURL string, doer *user_model.User) error {
} }
var blockedError error var blockedError error
if blockList.MatchHostName(hostName) || ipBlocked { if blockList.MatchHostName(hostName) || ipBlocked {
blockedError = &models.ErrInvalidCloneAddr{Host: u.Host, IsPermissionDenied: true} blockedError = &models.ErrInvalidCloneAddr{Host: hostName, IsPermissionDenied: true}
} }
// if we have an allow-list, check the allow-list first // if we have an allow-list, check the allow-list before return to get the more accurate error
if !allowList.IsEmpty() { if !allowList.IsEmpty() {
if !allowList.MatchHostName(hostName) && !ipAllowed { if !allowList.MatchHostName(hostName) && !ipAllowed {
return &models.ErrInvalidCloneAddr{Host: u.Host, IsPermissionDenied: true} return &models.ErrInvalidCloneAddr{Host: hostName, IsPermissionDenied: true}
} }
} }
// otherwise, we always follow the blocked list // otherwise, we always follow the blocked list
@ -474,5 +477,7 @@ func Init() error {
allowList.AppendBuiltin(hostmatcher.MatchBuiltinPrivate) allowList.AppendBuiltin(hostmatcher.MatchBuiltinPrivate)
allowList.AppendBuiltin(hostmatcher.MatchBuiltinLoopback) allowList.AppendBuiltin(hostmatcher.MatchBuiltinLoopback)
} }
// TODO: at the moment, if ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS=false, ALLOWED_DOMAINS=domain.com, and domain.com has IP 127.0.0.1, then it's still allowed.
// if we want to block such case, the private&loopback should be added to the blockList when ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS=false
return nil return nil
} }

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@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
package migrations package migrations
import ( import (
"net"
"path/filepath" "path/filepath"
"testing" "testing"
@ -74,3 +75,42 @@ func TestMigrateWhiteBlocklist(t *testing.T) {
setting.ImportLocalPaths = old setting.ImportLocalPaths = old
} }
func TestAllowBlockList(t *testing.T) {
init := func(allow, block string, local bool) {
setting.Migrations.AllowedDomains = allow
setting.Migrations.BlockedDomains = block
setting.Migrations.AllowLocalNetworks = local
assert.NoError(t, Init())
}
// default, allow all external, block none, no local networks
init("", "", false)
assert.NoError(t, checkByAllowBlockList("domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("1.2.3.4")}))
assert.Error(t, checkByAllowBlockList("domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("127.0.0.1")}))
// allow all including local networks (it could lead to SSRF in production)
init("", "", true)
assert.NoError(t, checkByAllowBlockList("domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("1.2.3.4")}))
assert.NoError(t, checkByAllowBlockList("domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("127.0.0.1")}))
// allow wildcard, block some subdomains. if the domain name is allowed, then the local network check is skipped
init("*.domain.com", "blocked.domain.com", false)
assert.NoError(t, checkByAllowBlockList("sub.domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("1.2.3.4")}))
assert.NoError(t, checkByAllowBlockList("sub.domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("127.0.0.1")}))
assert.Error(t, checkByAllowBlockList("blocked.domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("1.2.3.4")}))
assert.Error(t, checkByAllowBlockList("sub.other.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("1.2.3.4")}))
// allow wildcard (it could lead to SSRF in production)
init("*", "", false)
assert.NoError(t, checkByAllowBlockList("domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("1.2.3.4")}))
assert.NoError(t, checkByAllowBlockList("domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("127.0.0.1")}))
// local network can still be blocked
init("*", "127.0.0.*", false)
assert.NoError(t, checkByAllowBlockList("domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("1.2.3.4")}))
assert.Error(t, checkByAllowBlockList("domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("127.0.0.1")}))
// reset
init("", "", false)
}