mirror of
https://gitlab.com/libvirt/libvirt.git
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4b561d49ad
Add checking in virt-host-validate for secure guest support on x86 for AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization. Signed-off-by: Boris Fiuczynski <fiuczy@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Paulo de Rezende Pinatti <ppinatti@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Bjoern Walk <bwalk@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Erik Skultety <eskultet@redhat.com>
530 lines
15 KiB
C
530 lines
15 KiB
C
/*
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* virt-host-validate-common.c: Sanity check helper APIs
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2012, 2014 Red Hat, Inc.
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*
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* This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
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* modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
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* License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
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* version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
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*
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* This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
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* Lesser General Public License for more details.
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*
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* You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
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* License along with this library. If not, see
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* <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
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*
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*/
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#include <config.h>
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#include <stdarg.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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#include <sys/utsname.h>
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#include <sys/stat.h>
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#include "viralloc.h"
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#include "vircgroup.h"
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#include "virfile.h"
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#include "virt-host-validate-common.h"
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#include "virstring.h"
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#include "virarch.h"
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#include "virutil.h"
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#define VIR_FROM_THIS VIR_FROM_NONE
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VIR_ENUM_IMPL(virHostValidateCPUFlag,
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VIR_HOST_VALIDATE_CPU_FLAG_LAST,
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"vmx",
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"svm",
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"sie",
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"158",
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"sev");
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static bool quiet;
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void virHostMsgSetQuiet(bool quietFlag)
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{
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quiet = quietFlag;
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}
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void virHostMsgCheck(const char *prefix,
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const char *format,
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...)
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{
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va_list args;
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char *msg;
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if (quiet)
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return;
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va_start(args, format);
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msg = g_strdup_vprintf(format, args);
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va_end(args);
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fprintf(stdout, _("%6s: Checking %-60s: "), prefix, msg);
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VIR_FREE(msg);
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}
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static bool virHostMsgWantEscape(void)
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{
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static bool detectTty = true;
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static bool wantEscape;
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if (detectTty) {
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if (isatty(STDOUT_FILENO))
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wantEscape = true;
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detectTty = false;
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}
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return wantEscape;
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}
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void virHostMsgPass(void)
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{
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if (quiet)
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return;
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if (virHostMsgWantEscape())
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fprintf(stdout, "\033[32m%s\033[0m\n", _("PASS"));
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else
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fprintf(stdout, "%s\n", _("PASS"));
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}
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static const char * failMessages[] = {
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N_("FAIL"),
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N_("WARN"),
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N_("NOTE"),
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};
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G_STATIC_ASSERT(G_N_ELEMENTS(failMessages) == VIR_HOST_VALIDATE_LAST);
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static const char *failEscapeCodes[] = {
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"\033[31m",
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"\033[33m",
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"\033[34m",
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};
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G_STATIC_ASSERT(G_N_ELEMENTS(failEscapeCodes) == VIR_HOST_VALIDATE_LAST);
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void virHostMsgFail(virHostValidateLevel level,
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const char *format,
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...)
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{
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va_list args;
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char *msg;
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if (quiet)
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return;
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va_start(args, format);
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msg = g_strdup_vprintf(format, args);
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va_end(args);
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if (virHostMsgWantEscape())
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fprintf(stdout, "%s%s\033[0m (%s)\n",
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failEscapeCodes[level], _(failMessages[level]), msg);
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else
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fprintf(stdout, "%s (%s)\n",
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_(failMessages[level]), msg);
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VIR_FREE(msg);
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}
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int virHostValidateDeviceExists(const char *hvname,
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const char *dev_name,
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virHostValidateLevel level,
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const char *hint)
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{
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virHostMsgCheck(hvname, "if device %s exists", dev_name);
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if (access(dev_name, F_OK) < 0) {
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virHostMsgFail(level, "%s", hint);
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return -1;
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}
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virHostMsgPass();
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return 0;
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}
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int virHostValidateDeviceAccessible(const char *hvname,
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const char *dev_name,
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virHostValidateLevel level,
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const char *hint)
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{
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virHostMsgCheck(hvname, "if device %s is accessible", dev_name);
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if (access(dev_name, R_OK|W_OK) < 0) {
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virHostMsgFail(level, "%s", hint);
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return -1;
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}
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virHostMsgPass();
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return 0;
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}
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int virHostValidateNamespace(const char *hvname,
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const char *ns_name,
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virHostValidateLevel level,
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const char *hint)
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{
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virHostMsgCheck(hvname, "for namespace %s", ns_name);
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char nspath[100];
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g_snprintf(nspath, sizeof(nspath), "/proc/self/ns/%s", ns_name);
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if (access(nspath, F_OK) < 0) {
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virHostMsgFail(level, "%s", hint);
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return -1;
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}
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virHostMsgPass();
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return 0;
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}
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virBitmapPtr virHostValidateGetCPUFlags(void)
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{
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FILE *fp;
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virBitmapPtr flags = NULL;
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if (!(fp = fopen("/proc/cpuinfo", "r")))
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return NULL;
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if (!(flags = virBitmapNewQuiet(VIR_HOST_VALIDATE_CPU_FLAG_LAST)))
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goto cleanup;
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do {
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char line[1024];
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char *start;
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char **tokens;
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size_t ntokens;
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size_t i;
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if (!fgets(line, sizeof(line), fp))
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break;
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/* The line we're interested in is marked differently depending
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* on the architecture, so check possible prefixes */
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if (!STRPREFIX(line, "flags") &&
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!STRPREFIX(line, "Features") &&
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!STRPREFIX(line, "features") &&
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!STRPREFIX(line, "facilities"))
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continue;
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/* fgets() includes the trailing newline in the output buffer,
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* so we need to clean that up ourselves. We can safely access
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* line[strlen(line) - 1] because the checks above would cause
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* us to skip empty strings */
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line[strlen(line) - 1] = '\0';
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/* Skip to the separator */
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if (!(start = strchr(line, ':')))
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continue;
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/* Split the line using " " as a delimiter. The first token
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* will always be ":", but that's okay */
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if (!(tokens = virStringSplitCount(start, " ", 0, &ntokens)))
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continue;
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/* Go through all flags and check whether one of those we
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* might want to check for later on is present; if that's
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* the case, set the relevant bit in the bitmap */
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for (i = 0; i < ntokens; i++) {
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int value;
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if ((value = virHostValidateCPUFlagTypeFromString(tokens[i])) >= 0)
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ignore_value(virBitmapSetBit(flags, value));
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}
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virStringListFreeCount(tokens, ntokens);
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} while (1);
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cleanup:
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VIR_FORCE_FCLOSE(fp);
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return flags;
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}
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int virHostValidateLinuxKernel(const char *hvname,
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int version,
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virHostValidateLevel level,
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const char *hint)
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{
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struct utsname uts;
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unsigned long thisversion;
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uname(&uts);
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virHostMsgCheck(hvname, _("for Linux >= %d.%d.%d"),
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((version >> 16) & 0xff),
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((version >> 8) & 0xff),
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(version & 0xff));
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if (STRNEQ(uts.sysname, "Linux")) {
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virHostMsgFail(level, "%s", hint);
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return -1;
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}
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if (virParseVersionString(uts.release, &thisversion, true) < 0) {
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virHostMsgFail(level, "%s", hint);
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return -1;
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}
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if (thisversion < version) {
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virHostMsgFail(level, "%s", hint);
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return -1;
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} else {
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virHostMsgPass();
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return 0;
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}
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}
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#ifdef __linux__
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int virHostValidateCGroupControllers(const char *hvname,
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int controllers,
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virHostValidateLevel level)
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{
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virCgroupPtr group = NULL;
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int ret = 0;
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size_t i;
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if (virCgroupNewSelf(&group) < 0)
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return -1;
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for (i = 0; i < VIR_CGROUP_CONTROLLER_LAST; i++) {
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int flag = 1 << i;
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const char *cg_name = virCgroupControllerTypeToString(i);
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if (!(controllers & flag))
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continue;
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virHostMsgCheck(hvname, "for cgroup '%s' controller support", cg_name);
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if (!virCgroupHasController(group, i)) {
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ret = -1;
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virHostMsgFail(level, "Enable '%s' in kernel Kconfig file or "
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"mount/enable cgroup controller in your system",
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cg_name);
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} else {
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virHostMsgPass();
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}
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}
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virCgroupFree(&group);
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return ret;
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}
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#else /* !__linux__ */
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int virHostValidateCGroupControllers(const char *hvname G_GNUC_UNUSED,
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int controllers G_GNUC_UNUSED,
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virHostValidateLevel level)
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{
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virHostMsgFail(level, "%s", "This platform does not support cgroups");
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return -1;
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}
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#endif /* !__linux__ */
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int virHostValidateIOMMU(const char *hvname,
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virHostValidateLevel level)
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{
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virBitmapPtr flags;
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struct stat sb;
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const char *bootarg = NULL;
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bool isAMD = false, isIntel = false;
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virArch arch = virArchFromHost();
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struct dirent *dent;
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DIR *dir;
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int rc;
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flags = virHostValidateGetCPUFlags();
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if (flags && virBitmapIsBitSet(flags, VIR_HOST_VALIDATE_CPU_FLAG_VMX))
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isIntel = true;
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else if (flags && virBitmapIsBitSet(flags, VIR_HOST_VALIDATE_CPU_FLAG_SVM))
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isAMD = true;
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virBitmapFree(flags);
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if (isIntel) {
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virHostMsgCheck(hvname, "%s", _("for device assignment IOMMU support"));
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if (access("/sys/firmware/acpi/tables/DMAR", F_OK) == 0) {
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virHostMsgPass();
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bootarg = "intel_iommu=on";
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} else {
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virHostMsgFail(level,
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"No ACPI DMAR table found, IOMMU either "
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"disabled in BIOS or not supported by this "
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"hardware platform");
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return -1;
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}
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} else if (isAMD) {
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virHostMsgCheck(hvname, "%s", _("for device assignment IOMMU support"));
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if (access("/sys/firmware/acpi/tables/IVRS", F_OK) == 0) {
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virHostMsgPass();
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bootarg = "iommu=pt iommu=1";
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} else {
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virHostMsgFail(level,
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"No ACPI IVRS table found, IOMMU either "
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"disabled in BIOS or not supported by this "
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"hardware platform");
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return -1;
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}
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} else if (ARCH_IS_PPC64(arch)) {
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/* Empty Block */
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} else if (ARCH_IS_S390(arch)) {
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/* On s390x, we skip the IOMMU check if there are no PCI
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* devices (which is quite usual on s390x). If there are
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* no PCI devices the directory is still there but is
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* empty. */
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if (!virDirOpen(&dir, "/sys/bus/pci/devices"))
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return 0;
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rc = virDirRead(dir, &dent, NULL);
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VIR_DIR_CLOSE(dir);
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if (rc <= 0)
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return 0;
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} else {
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virHostMsgFail(level,
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"Unknown if this platform has IOMMU support");
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return -1;
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}
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/* We can only check on newer kernels with iommu groups & vfio */
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if (stat("/sys/kernel/iommu_groups", &sb) < 0)
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return 0;
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if (!S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode))
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return 0;
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virHostMsgCheck(hvname, "%s", _("if IOMMU is enabled by kernel"));
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if (sb.st_nlink <= 2) {
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if (bootarg)
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virHostMsgFail(level,
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"IOMMU appears to be disabled in kernel. "
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"Add %s to kernel cmdline arguments", bootarg);
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else
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virHostMsgFail(level, "IOMMU capability not compiled into kernel.");
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return -1;
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}
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virHostMsgPass();
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return 0;
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}
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bool virHostKernelModuleIsLoaded(const char *module)
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{
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FILE *fp;
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bool ret = false;
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if (!(fp = fopen("/proc/modules", "r")))
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return false;
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do {
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char line[1024];
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if (!fgets(line, sizeof(line), fp))
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break;
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if (STRPREFIX(line, module)) {
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ret = true;
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break;
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}
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} while (1);
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VIR_FORCE_FCLOSE(fp);
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return ret;
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}
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int virHostValidateSecureGuests(const char *hvname,
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virHostValidateLevel level)
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{
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virBitmapPtr flags;
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bool hasFac158 = false;
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bool hasAMDSev = false;
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virArch arch = virArchFromHost();
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g_autofree char *cmdline = NULL;
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static const char *kIBMValues[] = {"y", "Y", "on", "ON", "oN", "On", "1"};
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g_autofree char *mod_value = NULL;
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flags = virHostValidateGetCPUFlags();
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if (flags && virBitmapIsBitSet(flags, VIR_HOST_VALIDATE_CPU_FLAG_FACILITY_158))
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hasFac158 = true;
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else if (flags && virBitmapIsBitSet(flags, VIR_HOST_VALIDATE_CPU_FLAG_SEV))
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hasAMDSev = true;
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virBitmapFree(flags);
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virHostMsgCheck(hvname, "%s", _("for secure guest support"));
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if (ARCH_IS_S390(arch)) {
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if (hasFac158) {
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if (!virFileIsDir("/sys/firmware/uv")) {
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virHostMsgFail(level, "IBM Secure Execution not supported by "
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"the currently used kernel");
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return 0;
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}
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if (virFileReadValueString(&cmdline, "/proc/cmdline") < 0)
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return -1;
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/* we're prefix matching rather than equality matching here, because
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* kernel would treat even something like prot_virt='yFOO' as
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* enabled
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*/
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if (virKernelCmdlineMatchParam(cmdline, "prot_virt", kIBMValues,
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G_N_ELEMENTS(kIBMValues),
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VIR_KERNEL_CMDLINE_FLAGS_SEARCH_FIRST |
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VIR_KERNEL_CMDLINE_FLAGS_CMP_PREFIX)) {
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virHostMsgPass();
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return 1;
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} else {
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virHostMsgFail(level,
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"IBM Secure Execution appears to be disabled "
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"in kernel. Add prot_virt=1 to kernel cmdline "
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"arguments");
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}
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} else {
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virHostMsgFail(level, "Hardware or firmware does not provide "
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"support for IBM Secure Execution");
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}
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} else if (hasAMDSev) {
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if (virFileReadValueString(&mod_value, "/sys/module/kvm_amd/parameters/sev") < 0) {
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virHostMsgFail(level, "AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization not "
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"supported by the currently used kernel");
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return 0;
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}
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if (mod_value[0] != '1') {
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virHostMsgFail(level,
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"AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization appears to be "
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"disabled in kernel. Add kvm_amd.sev=1 "
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"to the kernel cmdline arguments");
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return 0;
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}
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if (virFileExists("/dev/sev")) {
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virHostMsgPass();
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return 1;
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} else {
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virHostMsgFail(level,
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"AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization appears to be "
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"disabled in firemare.");
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}
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} else {
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virHostMsgFail(level,
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"Unknown if this platform has Secure Guest support");
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return -1;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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