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systemd-stable/units/systemd-timedated.service.in

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license: LGPL-2.1+ -> LGPL-2.1-or-later
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# SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later
Add SPDX license headers to unit files
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#
mechanisms: add mechanisms to change system locale and clock
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# This file is part of systemd.
#
# systemd is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
relicense to LGPLv2.1 (with exceptions) We finally got the OK from all contributors with non-trivial commits to relicense systemd from GPL2+ to LGPL2.1+. Some udev bits continue to be GPL2+ for now, but we are looking into relicensing them too, to allow free copy/paste of all code within systemd. The bits that used to be MIT continue to be MIT. The big benefit of the relicensing is that closed source code may now link against libsystemd-login.so and friends.
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# under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by
# the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of the License, or
mechanisms: add mechanisms to change system locale and clock
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# (at your option) any later version.
[Unit]
Description=Time & Date Service
man,units: link to the new dbus-api man pages
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Documentation=man:systemd-timedated.service(8)
Documentation=man:localtime(5)
Documentation=man:org.freedesktop.timedate1(5)
mechanisms: add mechanisms to change system locale and clock
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[Service]
BusName=org.freedesktop.timedate1
units: further lock down our long-running services Let's make this an excercise in dogfooding: let's turn on more security features for all our long-running services. Specifically: - Turn on RestrictRealtime=yes for all of them - Turn on ProtectKernelTunables=yes and ProtectControlGroups=yes for most of them - Turn on RestrictAddressFamilies= for all of them, but different sets of address families for each Also, always order settings in the unit files, that the various sandboxing features are close together. Add a couple of missing, older settings for a numbre of unit files. Note that this change turns off AF_INET/AF_INET6 from udevd, thus effectively turning of networking from udev rule commands. Since this might break stuff (that is already broken I'd argue) this is documented in NEWS.
2016-08-26 14:23:27 +03:00
CapabilityBoundingSet=CAP_SYS_TIME
units: deny access to block devices While the need for access to character devices can be tricky to determine for the general case, it's obvious that most of our services have no need to access block devices. For logind and timedated this can be tightened further.
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DeviceAllow=char-rtc r
meson: use jinja2 for unit templates We don't need two (and half) templating systems anymore, yay! I'm keeping the changes minimal, to make the diff manageable. Some enhancements due to a better templating system might be possible in the future. For handling of '## ' — see the next commit.
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ExecStart={{ROOTLIBEXECDIR}}/systemd-timedated
units: set NoNewPrivileges= for all long-running services Previously, setting this option by default was problematic due to SELinux (as this would also prohibit the transition from PID1's label to the service's label). However, this restriction has since been lifted, hence let's start making use of this universally in our services. On SELinux system this change should be synchronized with a policy update that ensures that NNP-ful transitions from init_t to service labels is permitted. An while we are at it: sort the settings in the unit files this touches. This might increase the size of the change in this case, but hopefully should result in stabler patches later on. Fixes: #1219
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IPAddressDeny=any
LockPersonality=yes
MemoryDenyWriteExecute=yes
NoNewPrivileges=yes
units: make use of PrivateTmp=yes and PrivateDevices=yes for all our long-running daemons
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PrivateTmp=yes
units: turn on ProtectProc= wherever suitable
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ProtectProc=invisible
units: further lock down our long-running services Let's make this an excercise in dogfooding: let's turn on more security features for all our long-running services. Specifically: - Turn on RestrictRealtime=yes for all of them - Turn on ProtectKernelTunables=yes and ProtectControlGroups=yes for most of them - Turn on RestrictAddressFamilies= for all of them, but different sets of address families for each Also, always order settings in the unit files, that the various sandboxing features are close together. Add a couple of missing, older settings for a numbre of unit files. Note that this change turns off AF_INET/AF_INET6 from udevd, thus effectively turning of networking from udev rule commands. Since this might break stuff (that is already broken I'd argue) this is documented in NEWS.
2016-08-26 14:23:27 +03:00
ProtectControlGroups=yes
units: set NoNewPrivileges= for all long-running services Previously, setting this option by default was problematic due to SELinux (as this would also prohibit the transition from PID1's label to the service's label). However, this restriction has since been lifted, hence let's start making use of this universally in our services. On SELinux system this change should be synchronized with a policy update that ensures that NNP-ful transitions from init_t to service labels is permitted. An while we are at it: sort the settings in the unit files this touches. This might increase the size of the change in this case, but hopefully should result in stabler patches later on. Fixes: #1219
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ProtectHome=yes
units: enable ProtectHostname=yes
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ProtectHostname=yes
units: turn on ProtectProc= wherever suitable
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ProtectKernelLogs=yes
units: turn on ProtectKernelModules= for most long-running services
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ProtectKernelModules=yes
units: set NoNewPrivileges= for all long-running services Previously, setting this option by default was problematic due to SELinux (as this would also prohibit the transition from PID1's label to the service's label). However, this restriction has since been lifted, hence let's start making use of this universally in our services. On SELinux system this change should be synchronized with a policy update that ensures that NNP-ful transitions from init_t to service labels is permitted. An while we are at it: sort the settings in the unit files this touches. This might increase the size of the change in this case, but hopefully should result in stabler patches later on. Fixes: #1219
2018-11-12 19:19:48 +03:00
ProtectKernelTunables=yes
ProtectSystem=strict
ReadWritePaths=/etc
units: further lock down our long-running services Let's make this an excercise in dogfooding: let's turn on more security features for all our long-running services. Specifically: - Turn on RestrictRealtime=yes for all of them - Turn on ProtectKernelTunables=yes and ProtectControlGroups=yes for most of them - Turn on RestrictAddressFamilies= for all of them, but different sets of address families for each Also, always order settings in the unit files, that the various sandboxing features are close together. Add a couple of missing, older settings for a numbre of unit files. Note that this change turns off AF_INET/AF_INET6 from udevd, thus effectively turning of networking from udev rule commands. Since this might break stuff (that is already broken I'd argue) this is documented in NEWS.
2016-08-26 14:23:27 +03:00
RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX
units: set NoNewPrivileges= for all long-running services Previously, setting this option by default was problematic due to SELinux (as this would also prohibit the transition from PID1's label to the service's label). However, this restriction has since been lifted, hence let's start making use of this universally in our services. On SELinux system this change should be synchronized with a policy update that ensures that NNP-ful transitions from init_t to service labels is permitted. An while we are at it: sort the settings in the unit files this touches. This might increase the size of the change in this case, but hopefully should result in stabler patches later on. Fixes: #1219
2018-11-12 19:19:48 +03:00
RestrictNamespaces=yes
RestrictRealtime=yes
units: turn on RestrictSUIDSGID= in most of our long-running daemons
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RestrictSUIDSGID=yes
units: set SystemCallArchitectures=native on all our long-running services
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SystemCallArchitectures=native
units: set NoNewPrivileges= for all long-running services Previously, setting this option by default was problematic due to SELinux (as this would also prohibit the transition from PID1's label to the service's label). However, this restriction has since been lifted, hence let's start making use of this universally in our services. On SELinux system this change should be synchronized with a policy update that ensures that NNP-ful transitions from init_t to service labels is permitted. An while we are at it: sort the settings in the unit files this touches. This might increase the size of the change in this case, but hopefully should result in stabler patches later on. Fixes: #1219
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SystemCallErrorNumber=EPERM
SystemCallFilter=@system-service @clock
meson: use jinja2 for unit templates We don't need two (and half) templating systems anymore, yay! I'm keeping the changes minimal, to make the diff manageable. Some enhancements due to a better templating system might be possible in the future. For handling of '## ' — see the next commit.
2021-05-16 12:55:36 +03:00
{{SERVICE_WATCHDOG}}
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