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journald: set a limit on the number of fields (1k)
We allocate a iovec entry for each field, so with many short entries, our memory usage and processing time can be large, even with a relatively small message size. Let's refuse overly long entries. CVE-2018-16865 https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1653861 What from I can see, the problem is not from an alloca, despite what the CVE description says, but from the attack multiplication that comes from creating many very small iovecs: (void* + size_t) for each three bytes of input message.
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@ -141,6 +141,11 @@ static int server_process_entry(
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}
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/* A property follows */
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if (n > ENTRY_FIELD_COUNT_MAX) {
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log_debug("Received an entry that has more than " STRINGIFY(ENTRY_FIELD_COUNT_MAX) " fields, ignoring entry.");
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r = 1;
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goto finish;
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}
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/* n existing properties, 1 new, +1 for _TRANSPORT */
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if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(iovec, m,
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@ -21,6 +21,9 @@
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#endif
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#define LINE_CHUNK 8*1024u
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/* The maximum number of fields in an entry */
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#define ENTRY_FIELD_COUNT_MAX 1024
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struct iovec_wrapper {
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struct iovec *iovec;
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size_t size_bytes;
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