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Merge pull request #22926 from bluca/analyze_offline_filter

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analyze: fix offline checks for syscall filter and 'native' architecture
This commit is contained in:
Yu Watanabe 2022-04-01 23:43:18 +09:00 committed by GitHub
commit 37ebfe49de
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2 changed files with 10 additions and 7 deletions
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13
src/analyze/analyze-security.c
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@ -530,6 +530,8 @@ static int assess_restrict_namespaces(
return 0;
}
#if HAVE_SECCOMP
static int assess_system_call_architectures(
const struct security_assessor *a,
const SecurityInfo *info,
@ -537,16 +539,19 @@ static int assess_system_call_architectures(
uint64_t *ret_badness,
char **ret_description) {
uint32_t native = 0;
char *d;
uint64_t b;
assert(ret_badness);
assert(ret_description);
assert_se(seccomp_arch_from_string("native", &native) >= 0);
if (set_isempty(info->system_call_architectures)) {
b = 10;
d = strdup("Service may execute system calls with all ABIs");
} else if (set_contains(info->system_call_architectures, "native") &&
} else if (set_contains(info->system_call_architectures, UINT32_TO_PTR(native + 1)) &&
set_size(info->system_call_architectures) == 1) {
b = 0;
d = strdup("Service may execute system calls only with native ABI");
@ -564,8 +569,6 @@ static int assess_system_call_architectures(
return 0;
}
#if HAVE_SECCOMP
static bool syscall_names_in_filter(Hashmap *s, bool allow_list, const SyscallFilterSet *f, const char **ret_offending_syscall) {
const char *syscall;
@ -587,7 +590,7 @@ static bool syscall_names_in_filter(Hashmap *s, bool allow_list, const SyscallFi
if (id < 0)
continue;
if (hashmap_contains(s, syscall) == allow_list) {
if (hashmap_contains(s, syscall) != allow_list) {
log_debug("Offending syscall filter item: %s", syscall);
if (ret_offending_syscall)
*ret_offending_syscall = syscall;
@ -1476,6 +1479,7 @@ static const struct security_assessor security_assessor_table[] = {
.assess = assess_bool,
.offset = offsetof(SecurityInfo, restrict_address_family_other),
},
#if HAVE_SECCOMP
{
.id = "SystemCallArchitectures=",
.json_field = "SystemCallArchitectures",
@ -1484,7 +1488,6 @@ static const struct security_assessor security_assessor_table[] = {
.range = 10,
.assess = assess_system_call_architectures,
},
#if HAVE_SECCOMP
{
.id = "SystemCallFilter=~@swap",
.json_field = "SystemCallFilter_swap",

4
test/units/testsuite-65.sh
View File

@ -575,14 +575,14 @@ systemd-analyze security --threshold=90 --offline=true \
--root=/tmp/img/ testfile.service
# The strict profile adds a lot of sanboxing options
systemd-analyze security --threshold=20 --offline=true \
systemd-analyze security --threshold=25 --offline=true \
--security-policy=/tmp/testfile.json \
--profile=strict \
--root=/tmp/img/ testfile.service
set +e
# The trusted profile doesn't add any sanboxing options
systemd-analyze security --threshold=20 --offline=true \
systemd-analyze security --threshold=25 --offline=true \
--security-policy=/tmp/testfile.json \
--profile=/usr/lib/systemd/portable/profile/trusted/service.conf \
--root=/tmp/img/ testfile.service \