shaba/systemd-stable
1
1
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/systemd/systemd-stable.git synced 2024-12-22 13:33:56 +03:00
Code

bus: use inline trace argument for ANONYMOUS auth

Browse Source 
Rather than using a separate DATA round to transmit the trace-string of
the ANONYMOUS authentication scheme, transmit it inline as argument.
This requires a refactor of the client-side SASL parser, as we now have
a different set of replies depending on the mode used.

This fixes an issue where libdbus-1 does not query for trace-strings if
not transmit inline as AUTH-ANONYMOUS argument. It is unclear from the
wording of the spec whether this is a violation by libdbus-1. However,
we can work around it by simply changing our mode of transmittal.

(cherry picked from commit 347f48246f)
This commit is contained in:
David Rheinsberg 2022-06-29 13:37:40 +02:00 committed by Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek
parent 6349062326
commit bb803856bc
1 changed files with 61 additions and 51 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

112
src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-socket.c
View File

@ -156,75 +156,86 @@ static int bus_socket_write_auth(sd_bus *b) {
}
static int bus_socket_auth_verify_client(sd_bus *b) {
char *d, *e, *f, *start;
char *l, *lines[4] = {};
sd_id128_t peer;
size_t i, n;
int r;
assert(b);
/*
* We expect three response lines:
* "DATA\r\n"
* We expect up to three response lines:
* "DATA\r\n" (optional)
* "OK <server-id>\r\n"
* "AGREE_UNIX_FD\r\n" (optional)
*/
d = memmem_safe(b->rbuffer, b->rbuffer_size, "\r\n", 2);
if (!d)
return 0;
e = memmem_safe(d + 2, b->rbuffer_size - (d - (char*) b->rbuffer) - 2, "\r\n", 2);
if (!e)
return 0;
if (b->accept_fd) {
f = memmem_safe(e + 2, b->rbuffer_size - (e - (char*) b->rbuffer) - 2, "\r\n", 2);
if (!f)
return 0;
start = f + 2;
} else {
f = NULL;
start = e + 2;
n = 0;
lines[n] = b->rbuffer;
for (i = 0; i < 3; ++i) {
l = memmem_safe(lines[n], b->rbuffer_size - (lines[n] - (char*) b->rbuffer), "\r\n", 2);
if (l)
lines[++n] = l + 2;
else
break;
}
/* Nice! We got all the lines we need. First check the DATA line. */
/*
* If we sent a non-empty initial response, then we just expect an OK
* reply. We currently do this if, and only if, we picked ANONYMOUS.
* If we did not send an initial response, then we expect a DATA
* challenge, reply with our own DATA, and expect an OK reply. We do
* this for EXTERNAL.
* If FD negotiation was requested, we additionally expect
* an AGREE_UNIX_FD response in all cases.
*/
if (n < (b->anonymous_auth ? 1U : 2U) + !!b->accept_fd)
return 0; /* wait for more data */
if (d - (char*) b->rbuffer == 4) {
if (memcmp(b->rbuffer, "DATA", 4))
i = 0;
/* In case of EXTERNAL, verify the first response was DATA. */
if (!b->anonymous_auth) {
l = lines[i++];
if (lines[i] - l == 4 + 2) {
if (memcmp(l, "DATA", 4))
return -EPERM;
} else if (lines[i] - l == 3 + 32 + 2) {
/*
* Old versions of the server-side implementation of
* `sd-bus` replied with "OK <id>" to "AUTH" requests
* from a client, even if the "AUTH" line did not
* contain inlined arguments. Therefore, we also accept
* "OK <id>" here, even though it is technically the
* wrong reply. We ignore the "<id>" parameter, though,
* since it has no real value.
*/
if (memcmp(l, "OK ", 3))
return -EPERM;
} else
return -EPERM;
} else if (d - (char*) b->rbuffer == 3 + 32) {
/*
* Old versions of the server-side implementation of `sd-bus` replied with "OK <id>" to
* "AUTH" requests from a client, even if the "AUTH" line did not contain inlined
* arguments. Therefore, we also accept "OK <id>" here, even though it is technically the
* wrong reply. We ignore the "<id>" parameter, though, since it has no real value.
*/
if (memcmp(b->rbuffer, "OK ", 3))
return -EPERM;
} else
return -EPERM;
}
/* Now check the OK line. */
l = lines[i++];
if (e - d != 2 + 3 + 32)
if (lines[i] - l != 3 + 32 + 2)
return -EPERM;
if (memcmp(d + 2, "OK ", 3))
if (memcmp(l, "OK ", 3))
return -EPERM;
b->auth = b->anonymous_auth ? BUS_AUTH_ANONYMOUS : BUS_AUTH_EXTERNAL;
for (unsigned i = 0; i < 32; i += 2) {
for (unsigned j = 0; j < 32; j += 2) {
int x, y;
x = unhexchar(d[2 + 3 + i]);
y = unhexchar(d[2 + 3 + i + 1]);
x = unhexchar(l[3 + j]);
y = unhexchar(l[3 + j + 1]);
if (x < 0 || y < 0)
return -EINVAL;
peer.bytes[i/2] = ((uint8_t) x << 4 | (uint8_t) y);
peer.bytes[j/2] = ((uint8_t) x << 4 | (uint8_t) y);
}
if (!sd_id128_is_null(b->server_id) &&
@ -234,15 +245,15 @@ static int bus_socket_auth_verify_client(sd_bus *b) {
b->server_id = peer;
/* And possibly check the third line, too */
if (b->accept_fd) {
l = lines[i++];
b->can_fds = !!memory_startswith(l, lines[i] - l, "AGREE_UNIX_FD");
}
if (f)
b->can_fds =
(f - e == STRLEN("\r\nAGREE_UNIX_FD")) &&
memcmp(e + 2, "AGREE_UNIX_FD",
STRLEN("AGREE_UNIX_FD")) == 0;
assert(i == n);
b->rbuffer_size -= (start - (char*) b->rbuffer);
memmove(b->rbuffer, start, b->rbuffer_size);
b->rbuffer_size -= (lines[i] - (char*) b->rbuffer);
memmove(b->rbuffer, lines[i], b->rbuffer_size);
r = bus_start_running(b);
if (r < 0)
@ -646,9 +657,8 @@ static int bus_socket_start_auth_client(sd_bus *b) {
* message broker to aid debugging of clients. We fully anonymize the connection and use a
* static default.
*/
"\0AUTH ANONYMOUS\r\n"
/* HEX a n o n y m o u s */
"DATA 616e6f6e796d6f7573\r\n"
/* HEX a n o n y m o u s */
"\0AUTH ANONYMOUS 616e6f6e796d6f7573\r\n"
};
static const char sasl_auth_external[] = {
"\0AUTH EXTERNAL\r\n"