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mirror of https://github.com/systemd/systemd-stable.git synced 2024-12-22 13:33:56 +03:00

Merge pull request #11682 from topimiettinen/private-utsname

core: ProtectHostname feature
This commit is contained in:
Lennart Poettering 2019-02-20 14:12:15 +01:00 committed by GitHub
commit eb5149ba74
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26 changed files with 109 additions and 4 deletions

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@ -1129,6 +1129,17 @@ BindReadOnlyPaths=/var/lib/systemd</programlisting>
security.</para></listitem>
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
<term><varname>ProtectHostname=</varname></term>
<listitem><para>Takes a boolean argument. When set, sets up a new UTS namespace for the executed
processes. In addition, changing hostname or domainname is prevented. Defaults to off.</para>
<para>Note that the implementation of this setting might be impossible (for example if UTS namespaces are not
available), and the unit should be written in a way that does not solely rely on this setting for
security.</para></listitem>
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
<term><varname>ProtectKernelTunables=</varname></term>

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@ -777,6 +777,7 @@ const sd_bus_vtable bus_exec_vtable[] = {
SD_BUS_PROPERTY("TemporaryFileSystem", "a(ss)", property_get_temporary_filesystems, 0, SD_BUS_VTABLE_PROPERTY_CONST),
SD_BUS_PROPERTY("MountAPIVFS", "b", bus_property_get_bool, offsetof(ExecContext, mount_apivfs), SD_BUS_VTABLE_PROPERTY_CONST),
SD_BUS_PROPERTY("KeyringMode", "s", property_get_exec_keyring_mode, offsetof(ExecContext, keyring_mode), SD_BUS_VTABLE_PROPERTY_CONST),
SD_BUS_PROPERTY("ProtectHostname", "b", bus_property_get_bool, offsetof(ExecContext, protect_hostname), SD_BUS_VTABLE_PROPERTY_CONST),
/* Obsolete/redundant properties: */
SD_BUS_PROPERTY("Capabilities", "s", property_get_empty_string, 0, SD_BUS_VTABLE_PROPERTY_CONST|SD_BUS_VTABLE_HIDDEN),
@ -1153,6 +1154,9 @@ int bus_exec_context_set_transient_property(
if (streq(name, "LockPersonality"))
return bus_set_transient_bool(u, name, &c->lock_personality, message, flags, error);
if (streq(name, "ProtectHostname"))
return bus_set_transient_bool(u, name, &c->protect_hostname, message, flags, error);
if (streq(name, "UtmpIdentifier"))
return bus_set_transient_string(u, name, &c->utmp_id, message, flags, error);

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@ -1410,7 +1410,8 @@ static bool context_has_no_new_privileges(const ExecContext *c) {
c->private_devices ||
context_has_syscall_filters(c) ||
!set_isempty(c->syscall_archs) ||
c->lock_personality;
c->lock_personality ||
c->protect_hostname;
}
#if HAVE_SECCOMP
@ -2420,6 +2421,7 @@ static int apply_mount_namespace(
.protect_control_groups = context->protect_control_groups,
.protect_kernel_tunables = context->protect_kernel_tunables,
.protect_kernel_modules = context->protect_kernel_modules,
.protect_hostname = context->protect_hostname,
.mount_apivfs = context->mount_apivfs,
.private_mounts = context->private_mounts,
};
@ -3289,6 +3291,23 @@ static int exec_child(
}
}
if (context->protect_hostname) {
if (ns_type_supported(NAMESPACE_UTS)) {
if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUTS) < 0) {
*exit_status = EXIT_NAMESPACE;
return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to set up UTS namespacing: %m");
}
} else
log_unit_warning(unit, "ProtectHostname=yes is configured, but the kernel does not support UTS namespaces, ignoring namespace setup.");
#if HAVE_SECCOMP
r = seccomp_protect_hostname();
if (r < 0) {
*exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP;
return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply hostname restrictions: %m");
}
#endif
}
/* Drop groups as early as possbile */
if (needs_setuid) {
r = enforce_groups(gid, supplementary_gids, ngids);
@ -4166,7 +4185,8 @@ void exec_context_dump(const ExecContext *c, FILE* f, const char *prefix) {
"%sIgnoreSIGPIPE: %s\n"
"%sMemoryDenyWriteExecute: %s\n"
"%sRestrictRealtime: %s\n"
"%sKeyringMode: %s\n",
"%sKeyringMode: %s\n"
"%sProtectHostname: %s\n",
prefix, c->umask,
prefix, c->working_directory ? c->working_directory : "/",
prefix, c->root_directory ? c->root_directory : "/",
@ -4184,7 +4204,8 @@ void exec_context_dump(const ExecContext *c, FILE* f, const char *prefix) {
prefix, yes_no(c->ignore_sigpipe),
prefix, yes_no(c->memory_deny_write_execute),
prefix, yes_no(c->restrict_realtime),
prefix, exec_keyring_mode_to_string(c->keyring_mode));
prefix, exec_keyring_mode_to_string(c->keyring_mode),
prefix, yes_no(c->protect_hostname));
if (c->root_image)
fprintf(f, "%sRootImage: %s\n", prefix, c->root_image);

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@ -272,6 +272,7 @@ struct ExecContext {
bool memory_deny_write_execute;
bool restrict_realtime;
bool protect_hostname;
bool oom_score_adjust_set:1;
bool nice_set:1;

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@ -133,6 +133,7 @@ $1.LogsDirectoryMode, config_parse_mode, 0,
$1.LogsDirectory, config_parse_exec_directories, 0, offsetof($1, exec_context.directories[EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS].paths)
$1.ConfigurationDirectoryMode, config_parse_mode, 0, offsetof($1, exec_context.directories[EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION].mode)
$1.ConfigurationDirectory, config_parse_exec_directories, 0, offsetof($1, exec_context.directories[EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION].paths)
$1.ProtectHostname, config_parse_bool, 0, offsetof($1, exec_context.protect_hostname)
m4_ifdef(`HAVE_PAM',
`$1.PAMName, config_parse_unit_string_printf, 0, offsetof($1, exec_context.pam_name)',
`$1.PAMName, config_parse_warn_compat, DISABLED_CONFIGURATION, 0')

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@ -1117,6 +1117,7 @@ static size_t namespace_calculate_mounts(
(ns_info->protect_control_groups ? 1 : 0) +
(ns_info->protect_kernel_modules ? ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_modules_table) : 0) +
protect_home_cnt + protect_system_cnt +
(ns_info->protect_hostname ? 2 : 0) +
(namespace_info_mount_apivfs(ns_info) ? ELEMENTSOF(apivfs_table) : 0);
}
@ -1301,6 +1302,17 @@ int setup_namespace(
goto finish;
}
if (ns_info->protect_hostname) {
*(m++) = (MountEntry) {
.path_const = "/proc/sys/kernel/hostname",
.mode = READONLY,
};
*(m++) = (MountEntry) {
.path_const = "/proc/sys/kernel/domainname",
.mode = READONLY,
};
}
assert(mounts + n_mounts == m);
/* Prepend the root directory where that's necessary */

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@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ struct NamespaceInfo {
bool protect_kernel_tunables:1;
bool protect_kernel_modules:1;
bool mount_apivfs:1;
bool protect_hostname:1;
};
struct BindMount {

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@ -754,7 +754,7 @@ static int bus_append_execute_property(sd_bus_message *m, const char *field, con
"PrivateMounts", "NoNewPrivileges", "SyslogLevelPrefix",
"MemoryDenyWriteExecute", "RestrictRealtime", "DynamicUser", "RemoveIPC",
"ProtectKernelTunables", "ProtectKernelModules", "ProtectControlGroups",
"MountAPIVFS", "CPUSchedulingResetOnFork", "LockPersonality"))
"MountAPIVFS", "CPUSchedulingResetOnFork", "LockPersonality", "ProtectHostname"))
return bus_append_parse_boolean(m, field, eq);

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@ -1762,3 +1762,40 @@ int seccomp_lock_personality(unsigned long personality) {
return 0;
}
int seccomp_protect_hostname(void) {
uint32_t arch;
int r;
SECCOMP_FOREACH_LOCAL_ARCH(arch) {
_cleanup_(seccomp_releasep) scmp_filter_ctx seccomp = NULL;
r = seccomp_init_for_arch(&seccomp, arch, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = seccomp_rule_add_exact(
seccomp,
SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM),
SCMP_SYS(sethostname),
0);
if (r < 0)
continue;
r = seccomp_rule_add_exact(
seccomp,
SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM),
SCMP_SYS(setdomainname),
0);
if (r < 0)
continue;
r = seccomp_load(seccomp);
if (IN_SET(r, -EPERM, -EACCES))
return r;
if (r < 0)
log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to apply hostname restrictions for architecture %s, skipping: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch));
}
return 0;
}

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@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ int seccomp_restrict_address_families(Set *address_families, bool whitelist);
int seccomp_restrict_realtime(void);
int seccomp_memory_deny_write_execute(void);
int seccomp_lock_personality(unsigned long personality);
int seccomp_protect_hostname(void);
extern const uint32_t seccomp_local_archs[];

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@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ PrivateNetwork=yes
PrivateTmp=yes
ProtectControlGroups=yes
ProtectHome=yes
ProtectHostname=yes
ProtectKernelModules=yes
ProtectKernelTunables=yes
ProtectSystem=strict

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@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ PrivateNetwork=yes
PrivateTmp=yes
ProtectControlGroups=yes
ProtectHome=yes
ProtectHostname=yes
ProtectKernelModules=yes
ProtectKernelTunables=yes
ProtectSystem=strict

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@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ KillMode=mixed
CapabilityBoundingSet=CAP_CHOWN CAP_FOWNER CAP_FSETID CAP_MKNOD CAP_SETFCAP CAP_SYS_ADMIN CAP_SETPCAP CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE
NoNewPrivileges=yes
MemoryDenyWriteExecute=yes
ProtectHostname=yes
RestrictRealtime=yes
RestrictNamespaces=net
RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET AF_INET6

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@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ PrivateDevices=yes
PrivateNetwork=yes
ProtectControlGroups=yes
ProtectHome=yes
ProtectHostname=yes
ProtectKernelModules=yes
ProtectKernelTunables=yes
RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET AF_INET6

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@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ PrivateNetwork=yes
PrivateTmp=yes
ProtectControlGroups=yes
ProtectHome=yes
ProtectHostname=yes
ProtectKernelModules=yes
ProtectKernelTunables=yes
ProtectSystem=strict

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@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ NoNewPrivileges=yes
PrivateDevices=yes
ProtectControlGroups=yes
ProtectHome=yes
ProtectHostname=yes
ProtectKernelModules=yes
ProtectKernelTunables=yes
RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET AF_INET6

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@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ IPAddressDeny=any
LockPersonality=yes
MemoryDenyWriteExecute=yes
NoNewPrivileges=yes
ProtectHostname=yes
Restart=always
RestartSec=0
RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_NETLINK

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@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ PrivateNetwork=yes
PrivateTmp=yes
ProtectControlGroups=yes
ProtectHome=yes
ProtectHostname=yes
ProtectKernelModules=yes
ProtectKernelTunables=yes
ProtectSystem=strict

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@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ IPAddressDeny=any
LockPersonality=yes
MemoryDenyWriteExecute=yes
NoNewPrivileges=yes
ProtectHostname=yes
Restart=always
RestartSec=0
RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_NETLINK

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@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ IPAddressDeny=any
LockPersonality=yes
MemoryDenyWriteExecute=yes
NoNewPrivileges=yes
ProtectHostname=yes
RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_NETLINK AF_INET AF_INET6
RestrictRealtime=yes
SystemCallArchitectures=native

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@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ MemoryDenyWriteExecute=yes
NoNewPrivileges=yes
ProtectControlGroups=yes
ProtectHome=yes
ProtectHostname=yes
ProtectKernelModules=yes
ProtectSystem=strict
Restart=on-failure

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@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ BusName=org.freedesktop.portable1
WatchdogSec=3min
CapabilityBoundingSet=CAP_KILL CAP_SYS_PTRACE CAP_SYS_ADMIN CAP_SETGID CAP_SYS_CHROOT CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE CAP_CHOWN CAP_FOWNER CAP_FSETID CAP_MKNOD
MemoryDenyWriteExecute=yes
ProtectHostname=yes
RestrictRealtime=yes
RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_NETLINK AF_INET AF_INET6
SystemCallFilter=@system-service @mount

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@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ PrivateDevices=yes
PrivateTmp=yes
ProtectControlGroups=yes
ProtectHome=yes
ProtectHostname=yes
ProtectKernelModules=yes
ProtectKernelTunables=yes
ProtectSystem=strict

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@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ NoNewPrivileges=yes
PrivateTmp=yes
ProtectControlGroups=yes
ProtectHome=yes
ProtectHostname=yes
ProtectKernelModules=yes
ProtectKernelTunables=yes
ProtectSystem=strict

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@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ PrivateDevices=yes
PrivateTmp=yes
ProtectControlGroups=yes
ProtectHome=yes
ProtectHostname=yes
ProtectKernelModules=yes
ProtectKernelTunables=yes
ProtectSystem=strict

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@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ KillMode=mixed
WatchdogSec=3min
TasksMax=infinity
PrivateMounts=yes
ProtectHostname=yes
MemoryDenyWriteExecute=yes
RestrictRealtime=yes
RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_NETLINK AF_INET AF_INET6