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This minus has been there since the unit was added in
d42d27ead9. I think the idea was not cause things
to fail if the user instance doesn't work. But ignoring the return value
doesn't seem to be the right way to approach the problem. In particular, if
the program fails to run, we'll get a bogus fail state, see
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1727895#c1:
with the minus:
$ systemctl start user@1002
Job for user@1002.service failed because the service did not take the steps required by its unit configuration.
See "systemctl status user@1002.service" and "journalctl -xe" for details.
without the minus:
$ systemctl start user@1002
Job for user@1002.service failed because the control process exited with error code.
See "systemctl status user@1002.service" and "journalctl -xe" for details.
This service uses PAM anyway, hence let pam_keyring set things up for
us. Moreover, this way we ensure that the invocation ID is not set for
this service as key, and thus can't confuse the user service's
invocation ID.
Fixes: #11649
Loggin in as root user and then switching the runlevel results in a
stop of the user manager, even though the user ist still logged in.
That leaves a broken user session.
Adding "IgnoreOnIsolate=true" to user@.service fixes this.
Unfortunately this needs a new binary to do the mount because there's just
too many special steps to outsource this to systemd-mount:
- EPERM needs to be treated specially
- UserRuntimeDir= setting must be obeyed
- SELinux label must be adjusted
This allows user@.service to be started independently of logind.
So 'systemctl start user@nnn' will start the user manager for user nnn.
Logind will start it too when the user logs in, and will stop it (unless
lingering is enabled) when the user logs out.
Fixes#7339.
CPU accounting has a too bad impact on performance to be enabled by
default. Therefore we should not delegate "cpu" for now.
OTOH since commit e0c46a7364, memory accounting
has been turned on for all units by default so it makes sense to delegate this
controller by default.
Now that we can configure which controllers to delegate precisely, let's
limit wht we delegate to the user session: only "cpu" and "pids" as a
minimal baseline.
Fixes: #1715
When dbus client connects to systemd-bus-proxyd through
Unix domain socket proxy takes client's smack label and sets for itself.
It is done before and independent of dropping privileges.
The reason of such soluton is fact that tests of access rights
performed by lsm may take place inside kernel, not only
in userspace of recipient of message.
The bus-proxyd needs CAP_MAC_ADMIN to manipulate its label.
In case of systemd running in system mode, CAP_MAC_ADMIN
should be added to CapabilityBoundingSet in service file of bus-proxyd.
In case of systemd running in user mode ('systemd --user')
it can be achieved by addition
Capabilities=cap_mac_admin=i and SecureBits=keep-caps
to user@.service file
and setting cap_mac_admin+ei on bus-proxyd binary.
For priviliged units this resource control property ensures that the
processes have all controllers systemd manages enabled.
For unpriviliged services (those with User= set) this ensures that
access rights to the service cgroup is granted to the user in question,
to create further subgroups. Note that this only applies to the
name=systemd hierarchy though, as access to other controllers is not
safe for unpriviliged processes.
Delegate=yes should be set for container scopes where a systemd instance
inside the container shall manage the hierarchies below its own cgroup
and have access to all controllers.
Delegate=yes should also be set for user@.service, so that systemd
--user can run, controlling its own cgroup tree.
This commit changes machined, systemd-nspawn@.service and user@.service
to set this boolean, in order to ensure that container management will
just work, and the user systemd instance can run fine.
This should fix some race with terminating systemd --user, where the
system systemd instance might race against the user systemd instance
when sending SIGTERM.
With the advent of systemd --user sessions, it's become very interesting to spawn X as a user unit, as well as accompanying processes that may have previously been in a .xinitrc/.xsession, or even just to replace a collection of XDG/GDM/KDM/etc session files with independent systemd --user units. The simplest case here would be to login on a tty, with the traditional /usr/sbin/login "login manager".
However, systemd --user (spawned by user@.service) is at the top level of the slice for the user, and does not inherit any environment variables from the login process. Given the number of common applications which rely on SHELL being set in the environment, it seems like the cleanest way to provide this variable is to set it to %s in the user@.service.
Ideally in the long-term, applications which rely on SHELL being set should be fixed to just grab it from getpwnam() or similar, but until that becomes more common, I propose this simple change to make user sessions a little bit nicer out of the box.
systemd-logind will start user@.service. user@.service unit uses
PAM with service name 'systemd-user' to perform account and session
managment tasks. Previously, the name was 'systemd-shared', it is
now changed to 'systemd-user'.
Most PAM installations use one common setup for different callers.
Based on a quick poll, distributions fall into two camps: those that
have system-auth (Redhat, Fedora, CentOS, Arch, Gentoo, Mageia,
Mandriva), and those that have common-auth (Debian, Ubuntu, OpenSUSE).
Distributions that have system-auth have just one configuration file
that contains auth, password, account, and session blocks, and
distributions that have common-auth also have common-session,
common-password, and common-account. It is thus impossible to use one
configuration file which would work for everybody. systemd-user now
refers to system-auth, because it seems that the approach with one
file is more popular and also easier, so let's follow that.
In order to prepare things for the single-writer cgroup scheme, let's
make logind use systemd's own primitives for cgroup management.
Every login user now gets his own private slice unit, in which his sessions
live in a scope unit each. Also, add user@$UID.service to the same
slice, and implicitly start it on first login.
While most folks will be using the derivative from user-session-units,
I'm updating this one to reflect some of the fixes and things to note
about user sessions:
- cgroup should be set with "%u" - username instead of %I
- set dbus path with %U explicitly too
- hint to folks that wish to use MEM_CG features in user sessions
- allow unit to be enabled for instances with systemctl enable
We finally got the OK from all contributors with non-trivial commits to
relicense systemd from GPL2+ to LGPL2.1+.
Some udev bits continue to be GPL2+ for now, but we are looking into
relicensing them too, to allow free copy/paste of all code within
systemd.
The bits that used to be MIT continue to be MIT.
The big benefit of the relicensing is that closed source code may now
link against libsystemd-login.so and friends.
