IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO GET AN ACCOUNT, please write an
email to Administrator. User accounts are meant only to access repo
and report issues and/or generate pull requests.
This is a purpose-specific Git hosting for
BaseALT
projects. Thank you for your understanding!
Только зарегистрированные пользователи имеют доступ к сервису!
Для получения аккаунта, обратитесь к администратору.
When set, the offset specified for the vtable entry is passed to the
handler as-is, and is not added to the userdata pointer. This is useful
in case methods/properties are mixed on the same vtable, that expect to
operate relative to some object in memory and that expect pointers to
absolute memory, or that just want a number passed.
libzstd is a new dependency for systemd that's not in a stable release
yet, so it's not pulled in by the RPM package dependency. Manually
include it in the package section so the image mkosi produces works. It
can be removed when the RPM depends on it.
Additionally, a number of packages in the list appear to be pulled in
because they're dependencies in the systemd rpm, so remove them.
Finally, mkosi v5 adds the proper fs utilities for bootable images type
so drop that dependency as well.
Limit size of various tmpfs mounts to 10% of RAM, except volatile root and /var
to 25%. Another exception is made for /dev (also /devs for PrivateDevices) and
/sys/fs/cgroup since no (or very few) regular files are expected to be used.
In addition, since directories, symbolic links, device specials and xattrs are
not counted towards the size= limit, number of inodes is also limited
correspondingly: 4MB size translates to 1k of inodes (assuming 4k each), 10% of
RAM (using 16GB of RAM as baseline) translates to 400k and 25% to 1M inodes.
Because nr_inodes option can't use ratios like size option, there's an
unfortunate side effect that with small memory systems the limit may be on the
too large side. Also, on an extremely small device with only 256MB of RAM, 10%
of RAM for /run may not be enough for re-exec of PID1 because 16MB of free
space is required.
We might pin a home through authentication and a different one through a
session, all from the same PAM context, like sudo does. Hence also store
the referencing fd keyed by the user name.
Since acquiring user records involves plenty of IPC we try to cache user
records in the PAM context between our various hooks. Previously we'd
just cache whatever we acquired, and use it from the on, forever until
the context is destroyed.
This is problematic however, since some programs (notably sudo) use the
same PAM context for multiple different operations. Specifically, sudo
first authenticates the originating user before creating a session for
the destination user, all with the same PAM context. Thankfully, there
was a safety check for this case in place that re-validated that the
cached user record actually matched our current idea of the user to
operate on, but this just meant the hook would fail entirely.
Let's rework this: let's key the cache by the user name, so that we do
not confused by the changing of the user name during the context's
lifecycle and always, strictly use the cached user record of the user we
operate on.
Essentially this just means we now include the user name in the PAM data
field.
Secondly, this gets rid of the extra PAM data field that indicates
whether a user record is from homed or something else. To simplify
things we instead just cache the user record twice: once for consumption
by pam_systemd_home (which only wants homed records) and once shared by
pam_systemd and pam_systemd_home (and whoever else wants it). The cache
entries simply have different field names.
These arguments contain UserRecord structures serialized to JSON,
however only the "secret" part of it, not a whole user record. We do
this since the secret part is conceptually part of the user record and
in some contexts we need a user record in full with both secret and
non-secret part, and in others just the secret and in other just the
non-secret part, but we want to keep this in memory in the same logic.
Hence, let's rename the arguments where we expect a user record
consisting only of the secret part to "secret".
This also makes sure the control buffer is properly aligned. This
matters, as otherwise the control buffer might not be aligned and the
cmsg buffer counting might be off. The incorrect alignment is becoming
visible by using recvmsg_safe() as we suddenly notice the MSG_CTRUNC bit
set because of this.
That said, apparently this isn't enough to make this work on all
kernels. Since I couldn't figure this out, we now add 1K to the buffer
to be sure. We do this once already, also for a pktinfo structure
(though an IPv4/IPv6) one. I am puzzled by this, but this shouldn't
matter much. it works locally just fine, except for those ubuntu CI
kernels...
While we are at it, make some other changes too, to simplify and
modernize the function.
Previously pam_systemd_home.so was relying on `PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF` to
display error messages to the user and also display the next prompt.
`PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF` was never meant as a way to convey information to
the user, and following the example set in pam_unix.so you can see that
it's meant to _only_ display the prompt. Details about why the
authentication failed should be done in a `PAM_ERROR_MSG` before
displaying a short prompt as per usual using `PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF`.
[127/1355] Compiling C object 'src/shared/5afaae1@@systemd-shared-245@sta/ethtool-util.c.o'
../src/shared/ethtool-util.c: In function ‘ethtool_get_permanent_macaddr’:
../src/shared/ethtool-util.c:260:60: warning: array subscript 5 is outside the bounds of an interior zero-length array ‘__u8[0]’ {aka ‘unsigned char[]’} [-Wzero-length-bounds]
260 | ret->ether_addr_octet[i] = epaddr.addr.data[i];
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~
In file included from ../src/shared/ethtool-util.c:5:
../src/shared/linux/ethtool.h:704:7: note: while referencing ‘data’
704 | __u8 data[0];
| ^~~~
../src/shared/ethtool-util.c: In function ‘ethtool_set_features’:
../src/shared/ethtool-util.c:488:31: warning: array subscript 0 is outside the bounds of an interior zero-length array ‘__u32[0]’ {aka ‘unsigned int[]’} [-Wzero-length-bounds]
488 | len = buffer.info.data[0];
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~
In file included from ../src/shared/ethtool-util.c:5:
../src/shared/linux/ethtool.h:631:8: note: while referencing ‘data’
631 | __u32 data[0];
| ^~~~
The kernel should not define the length of the array, but it does. We can't fix
that, so let's use a cast to avoid the warning.
For https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/6119#issuecomment-626073743.
v2:
- use #pragma instead of a cast. It seems the cast only works in some cases, and
gcc is "smart" enough to see beyond the cast. Unfortunately clang does not support
this warning, so we need to do a config check whether to try to suppress.
Fixes: #15757
(Note there's quite some confusion regarding "exit status" vs. "exit
code" in the docs here. We should clean this up fully one day. This
change tries to fix some occasions of the wrong use, but not all.)
Indicates that the tags list cannot be modified by notify_message function.
Since the tags list is created only once for multiple call to
notify_message functions.
I was looking for the explanation for the exclamation mark in the text,
and couldn't find it, searching for "!". Let's make this easier, and
indicate the character meant.
kernel 5.6 added support for a new flag for getrandom(): GRND_INSECURE.
If we set it we can get some random data out of the kernel random pool,
even if it is not yet initializated. This is great for us to initialize
hash table seeds and such, where it is OK if they are crap initially. We
used RDRAND for these cases so far, but RDRAND is only available on
newer CPUs and some archs. Let's now use GRND_INSECURE for these cases
as well, which means we won't needlessly delay boot anymore even on
archs/CPUs that do not have RDRAND.
Of course we never set this flag when generating crypto keys or uuids.
Which makes it different from RDRAND for us (and is the reason I think
we should keep explicit RDRAND support in): RDRAND we don't trust enough
for crypto keys. But we do trust it enough for UUIDs.
Apart from running CIFuzz for each relevant PR, let's run it
unconditionally for each push to master to detect possible issues
(caused by ignored PRs, etc.).
Followup to 94f660a8fe.
