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Not wired in by any unit type yet, just the basic to allocate,
ref, deref and plug in to other unit types.
Includes recording the trigger unit name and passing it to the
triggered unit as TRIGGER_UNIT= env var.
As suggested in
8b3ad3983f (r837345892)
The define is generalized and moved to path-lookup.h, where it seems to fit
better. This allows a recursive include to be removed and in general makes
things simpler.
Same idea as 03677889f0ef42cdc534bf3b31265a054b20a354.
No functional change intended. The type of the iterator is generally changed to
be 'const char*' instead of 'char*'. Despite the type commonly used, modifying
the string was not allowed.
I adjusted the naming of some short variables for clarity and reduced the scope
of some variable declarations in code that was being touched anyway.
rearrange_stdio() invalidates specified fds even on failure, which means
we should always invalidate the fds we pass in no matter what. Let's
make this explicit by using TAKE_FD() for that everywhere.
Note that in many places we such invalidation doesnt get us much
behaviour-wise, since we don't use the variables anymore later. But
TAKE_FD() in a way is also documentation, it encodes explicitly that the
fds are invalidated here, so I think it's a good thing to always make
this explicit here.
This adds a high level test verifying that syscall filtering in
combination with a simple architecture filter for the "native"
architecture works fine.
Currently there does not exist a way to specify a path relative to which
all binaries executed by Exec should be found. The only way is to
specify the absolute path.
This change implements the functionality to specify a path relative to which
binaries executed by Exec*= can be found.
Closes#6308
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Example Run:
foobar.service created below is a service unit file that has a non-existing key-value
pairing (foo = bar) and is thus, syntactically invalid.
maanya-goenka@debian:~/systemd (img-support)$ cat <<EOF>img/usr/lib/systemd/system/foobar.service
> [Unit]
> foo = bar
>
> [Service]
> ExecStart = /opt/script0.sh
> EOF
The failure to create foobar.service because of the recursive dependency searching and verification has been addressed
in a different PR: systemd-analyze: add option to return an error value when unit verification fails #20233
maanya-goenka@debian:~/systemd (img-support)$ sudo build/systemd-analyze verify --root=img/ foobar.service
/home/maanya-goenka/systemd/img/usr/lib/systemd/system/foobar.service:2: Unknown key name 'foo' in section 'Unit', ignoring.
foobar.service: Failed to create foobar.service/start: Unit sysinit.target not found.
Implement directives `NoExecPaths=` and `ExecPaths=` to control `MS_NOEXEC`
mount flag for the file system tree. This can be used to implement file system
W^X policies, and for example with allow-listing mode (NoExecPaths=/) a
compromised service would not be able to execute a shell, if that was not
explicitly allowed.
Example:
[Service]
NoExecPaths=/
ExecPaths=/usr/bin/daemon /usr/lib64 /usr/lib
Closes: #17942.
This adds the ability to specify truncate:PATH for StandardOutput= and
StandardError=, similar to the existing append:PATH. The code is mostly
copied from the related append: code. Fixes#8983.
... when called with a valid environment variable name. This means that
any time we call it with a fixed string, it is guaranteed to return 0.
(Also when the variable is not present in the environment block.)
test-execute is quite long and even with the test name it takes a moment
to find the relevant spot when something fails. Let's make things easier
by printing the exact location.
Define explicit action "kill" for SystemCallErrorNumber=.
In addition to errno code, allow specifying "kill" as action for
SystemCallFilter=.
---
v7: seccomp_parse_errno_or_action() returns -EINVAL if !HAVE_SECCOMP
v6: use streq_ptr(), let errno_to_name() handle bad values, kill processes,
init syscall_errno
v5: actually use seccomp_errno_or_action_to_string(), don't fail bus unit
parsing without seccomp
v4: fix build without seccomp
v3: drop log action
v2: action -> number
If the directory (/var/lib/private is most likely) has borked permissions, the
test will fail with a cryptic message and EXIT_STATE_DIRECTORY or similar. The
message from the child with more details gets lost somewhere. Let's avoid running
the test in that case and provide a simple error message instead.
E.g. systemd-238-12.git07f8cd5.fc28.ppc64 (which I encountered on a test machine)
has /var/lib/private with 0755.
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-knodel-terminology-02https://lwn.net/Articles/823224/
This gets rid of most but not occasions of these loaded terms:
1. scsi_id and friends are something that is supposed to be removed from
our tree (see #7594)
2. The test suite defines an API used by the ubuntu CI. We can remove
this too later, but this needs to be done in sync with the ubuntu CI.
3. In some cases the terms are part of APIs we call or where we expose
concepts the kernel names the way it names them. (In particular all
remaining uses of the word "slave" in our codebase are like this,
it's used by the POSIX PTY layer, by the network subsystem, the mount
API and the block device subsystem). Getting rid of the term in these
contexts would mean doing some major fixes of the kernel ABI first.
Regarding the replacements: when whitelist/blacklist is used as noun we
replace with with allow list/deny list, and when used as verb with
allow-list/deny-list.
Don't assume that 4MB can be allocated from stack since there could be smaller
DefaultLimitSTACK= in force, so let's use malloc(). NUL terminate the huge
strings by hand, also ensure termination in test_lz4_decompress_partial() and
optimize the memset() for the string.
Some items in /proc and /etc may not be accessible to poor unprivileged users
due to e.g. SELinux, BOFH or both, so check for EACCES and EPERM.
/var/tmp may be a symlink to /tmp and then path_compare() will always fail, so
let's stick to /tmp like elsewhere.
/tmp may be mounted with noexec option and then trying to execute scripts from
there would fail.
Detect and warn if seccomp is already in use, which could make seccomp test
fail if the syscalls are already blocked.
Unset $TMPDIR so it will not break specifier tests where %T is assumed to be
/tmp and %V /var/tmp.
The man pages state that the '+' prefix in Exec* directives should
ignore filesystem namespacing options such as PrivateTmp. Now it does.
This is very similar to #8842, just with PrivateTmp instead of
PrivateDevices.
For root, group enforcement needs to come after PrivateDevices=y set up
according to 096424d1230e0a0339735c51b43949809e972430. Add a test to
verify this is the case.
This particular test case keeps intermittently failing due to crashing
LSan when running under clang+ASan. Generally, sanitizers don't
like seccomp filters, so the best option here is to just switch this
test off for this scenario.
