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systemd/units/systemd-hostnamed.service.in

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hostnamed: introduce systemd-hostnamed http://www.freedesktop.org/wiki/Software/systemd/hostnamed
2011-04-16 02:02:54 +02:00
# This file is part of systemd.
#
# systemd is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
relicense to LGPLv2.1 (with exceptions) We finally got the OK from all contributors with non-trivial commits to relicense systemd from GPL2+ to LGPL2.1+. Some udev bits continue to be GPL2+ for now, but we are looking into relicensing them too, to allow free copy/paste of all code within systemd. The bits that used to be MIT continue to be MIT. The big benefit of the relicensing is that closed source code may now link against libsystemd-login.so and friends.
2012-04-12 00:20:58 +02:00
# under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by
# the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of the License, or
hostnamed: introduce systemd-hostnamed http://www.freedesktop.org/wiki/Software/systemd/hostnamed
2011-04-16 02:02:54 +02:00
# (at your option) any later version.
[Unit]
Description=Hostname Service
man: document systemd-hostnamed
2012-06-26 00:04:50 +02:00
Documentation=man:systemd-hostnamed.service(8) man:hostname(5) man:machine-info(5)
units: use https for the freedesktop url (#6227)
2017-06-29 04:54:12 +02:00
Documentation=https://www.freedesktop.org/wiki/Software/systemd/hostnamed
hostnamed: introduce systemd-hostnamed http://www.freedesktop.org/wiki/Software/systemd/hostnamed
2011-04-16 02:02:54 +02:00
[Service]
ExecStart=@rootlibexecdir@/systemd-hostnamed
BusName=org.freedesktop.hostname1
units: increase watchdog timeout to 3min for all our services Apparently, disk IO issues are more frequent than we hope, and 1min waiting for disk IO happens, so let's increase the watchdog timeout a bit, for all our services. See #1353 for an example where this triggers.
2015-09-23 17:27:39 +02:00
WatchdogSec=3min
units: further lock down our long-running services Let's make this an excercise in dogfooding: let's turn on more security features for all our long-running services. Specifically: - Turn on RestrictRealtime=yes for all of them - Turn on ProtectKernelTunables=yes and ProtectControlGroups=yes for most of them - Turn on RestrictAddressFamilies= for all of them, but different sets of address families for each Also, always order settings in the unit files, that the various sandboxing features are close together. Add a couple of missing, older settings for a numbre of unit files. Note that this change turns off AF_INET/AF_INET6 from udevd, thus effectively turning of networking from udev rule commands. Since this might break stuff (that is already broken I'd argue) this is documented in NEWS.
2016-08-26 13:23:27 +02:00
CapabilityBoundingSet=CAP_SYS_ADMIN
units: make use of PrivateTmp=yes and PrivateDevices=yes for all our long-running daemons
2014-03-19 16:45:28 +01:00
PrivateTmp=yes
PrivateDevices=yes
core: enable PrivateNetwork= for a number of our long running services where this is useful
2014-03-19 23:08:39 +01:00
PrivateNetwork=yes
units: switch on ProtectSystem=strict for our long running services Let's step up the protection a notch
2017-02-09 10:58:28 +01:00
ProtectSystem=strict
core: rename ReadOnlySystem= to ProtectSystem= and add a third value for also mounting /etc read-only Also, rename ProtectedHome= to ProtectHome=, to simplify things a bit. With this in place we now have two neat options ProtectSystem= and ProtectHome= for protecting the OS itself (and optionally its configuration), and for protecting the user's data.
2014-06-04 18:07:55 +02:00
ProtectHome=yes
units: further lock down our long-running services Let's make this an excercise in dogfooding: let's turn on more security features for all our long-running services. Specifically: - Turn on RestrictRealtime=yes for all of them - Turn on ProtectKernelTunables=yes and ProtectControlGroups=yes for most of them - Turn on RestrictAddressFamilies= for all of them, but different sets of address families for each Also, always order settings in the unit files, that the various sandboxing features are close together. Add a couple of missing, older settings for a numbre of unit files. Note that this change turns off AF_INET/AF_INET6 from udevd, thus effectively turning of networking from udev rule commands. Since this might break stuff (that is already broken I'd argue) this is documented in NEWS.
2016-08-26 13:23:27 +02:00
ProtectControlGroups=yes
ProtectKernelTunables=yes
units: turn on ProtectKernelModules= for most long-running services
2017-02-09 11:09:50 +01:00
ProtectKernelModules=yes
units: enable MemoryDenyWriteExecute (#3459) Secure daemons shipped by systemd by enabling MemoryDenyWriteExecute. Closes: #3459
2016-06-08 12:23:37 +00:00
MemoryDenyWriteExecute=yes
units: further lock down our long-running services Let's make this an excercise in dogfooding: let's turn on more security features for all our long-running services. Specifically: - Turn on RestrictRealtime=yes for all of them - Turn on ProtectKernelTunables=yes and ProtectControlGroups=yes for most of them - Turn on RestrictAddressFamilies= for all of them, but different sets of address families for each Also, always order settings in the unit files, that the various sandboxing features are close together. Add a couple of missing, older settings for a numbre of unit files. Note that this change turns off AF_INET/AF_INET6 from udevd, thus effectively turning of networking from udev rule commands. Since this might break stuff (that is already broken I'd argue) this is documented in NEWS.
2016-08-26 13:23:27 +02:00
RestrictRealtime=yes
units: restrict namespace for a good number of our own services Basically, we turn it on for most long-running services, with the exception of machined (whose child processes need to join containers here and there), and importd (which sandboxes tar in a CLONE_NEWNET namespace). machined is left unrestricted, and importd is restricted to use only "net"
2017-02-09 10:28:23 +01:00
RestrictNamespaces=yes
units: further lock down our long-running services Let's make this an excercise in dogfooding: let's turn on more security features for all our long-running services. Specifically: - Turn on RestrictRealtime=yes for all of them - Turn on ProtectKernelTunables=yes and ProtectControlGroups=yes for most of them - Turn on RestrictAddressFamilies= for all of them, but different sets of address families for each Also, always order settings in the unit files, that the various sandboxing features are close together. Add a couple of missing, older settings for a numbre of unit files. Note that this change turns off AF_INET/AF_INET6 from udevd, thus effectively turning of networking from udev rule commands. Since this might break stuff (that is already broken I'd argue) this is documented in NEWS.
2016-08-26 13:23:27 +02:00
RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX
units: make use of @reboot and @swap in our long-running service SystemCallFilter= settings Tighten security up a bit more.
2017-02-09 11:22:08 +01:00
SystemCallFilter=~@clock @cpu-emulation @debug @keyring @module @mount @obsolete @raw-io @reboot @swap
units: set SystemCallArchitectures=native on all our long-running services
2017-02-08 22:32:37 +01:00
SystemCallArchitectures=native
units: set LockPersonality= for all our long-running services (#6819) Let's lock things down. Also, using it is the only way how to properly test this to the fullest extent.
2017-09-14 19:45:40 +02:00
LockPersonality=yes
units: prohibit all IP traffic on all our long-running services (#6921) Let's lock things down further.
2017-10-04 14:16:28 +02:00
IPAddressDeny=any
units: switch on ProtectSystem=strict for our long running services Let's step up the protection a notch
2017-02-09 10:58:28 +01:00
ReadWritePaths=/etc
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