Merge pull request #4845 from poettering/various-smaller-fixes

Various smaller fixes

.mkosi/mkosi.fedora

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ Format=raw_btrfs
 Bootable=yes
 
 [Partitions]
-RootSize=2G
+RootSize=3G
 
 [Packages]
 BuildPackages=
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ BuildPackages=
         bzip2-devel
         cryptsetup-devel
         dbus-devel
+        diffutils
         docbook-style-xsl
         elfutils-devel
         gcc
@@ -69,4 +70,5 @@ BuildPackages=
         python3-devel
         python3-lxml
         qrencode-devel
+        tree
         xz-devel

Makefile.am

@@ -149,7 +149,8 @@ TESTS =
 endif
 AM_TESTS_ENVIRONMENT = \
 	export SYSTEMD_KBD_MODEL_MAP=$(abs_top_srcdir)/src/locale/kbd-model-map; \
-	export SYSTEMD_LANGUAGE_FALLBACK_MAP=$(abs_top_srcdir)/src/locale/language-fallback-map;
+	export SYSTEMD_LANGUAGE_FALLBACK_MAP=$(abs_top_srcdir)/src/locale/language-fallback-map; \
+	export PATH=$(abs_top_builddir):$$PATH;
 
 if ENABLE_BASH_COMPLETION
 dist_bashcompletion_DATA = $(dist_bashcompletion_data)

TODO

@@ -12,9 +12,6 @@ Bugfixes:
           Environment=ONE='one' "TWO='two two' too" THREE=
           ExecStart=/bin/python3 -c 'import sys;print(sys.argv)' $ONE $TWO $THREE
 
-* When systemctl --host is used, underlying ssh connection can remain open.
-  bus_close does not kill children?
-
 External:
 
 * Fedora: add an rpmlint check that verifies that all unit files in the RPM are listed in %systemd_post macros.
@@ -34,6 +31,38 @@ Features:
 * replace all canonicalize_file_name() invocations by chase_symlinks(), in
   particulr those where a rootdir is relevant.
 
+* maybe introduce gpt auto discovery for /var/tmp?
+
+* set ProtectSystem=strict for all our usual services.
+
+* maybe add gpt-partition-based user management: each user gets his own
+  LUKS-encrypted GPT partition with a new GPT type. A small nss module
+  enumerates users via udev partition enumeration. UIDs are assigned in a fixed
+  way: the partition index is added as offset to some fixed base uid. User name
+  is stored in GPT partition name. A PAM module authenticates the user via the
+  LUKS partition password. Benefits: strong per-user security, compatibility
+  with stateless/read-only/verity-enabled root. (other idea: do this based on
+  loopback files in /home, without GPT involvement)
+
+* gpt-auto logic: introduce support for discovering /var matching an image. For
+  that, use a partition type UUID that is hashed from the OS name (as encoded
+  in /etc/os-release), the architecture, and 4 new bits from the gpt flags
+  field of the root partition. This way can easily support multiple OS
+  installations on the same GPT partition table, without problems with
+  unmatched /var partitions.
+
+* gpt-auto logic: related to the above, maybe support a "secondary" root
+  partition, that is mounted to / and is writable, and where the actual root's
+  /usr is mounted into.
+
+* add dm-verity boots, and in nspawn (libcryptsetup knows this, should be relatively straight-forward)
+
+* machined: add apis to query /etc/machine-info data of a container
+
+* .mount and .swap units: add Format=yes|no option that formats the partition before mounting/enabling it, implicitly
+
+* gpt-auto logic: support encrypted swap, add kernel cmdline option to force it, and honour a gpt bit about it, plus maybe a configuration file
+
 * drop nss-myhostname in favour of nss-resolve?
 
 * drop internal dlopen() based nss-dns fallback in nss-resolve, and rely on the
@@ -279,8 +308,6 @@ Features:
 * For timer units: add some mechanisms so that timer units that trigger immediately on boot do not have the services
   they run added to the initial transaction and thus confuse Type=idle.
 
-* Run most system services with cgroupfs read-only and procfs with a more secure mode (doesn't work, since the hidepid= option is per-pid-namespace, not per-mount)
-
 * add bus api to query unit file's X fields.
 
 * gpt-auto-generator:

man/sd_journal_print.xml

@@ -189,10 +189,9 @@ sd_journal_send("MESSAGE=Hello World, this is PID %lu!", (unsigned long) getpid(
   <refsect1>
     <title>Return Value</title>
 
-    <para>The four calls return 0 on success or a negative errno-style
-    error code. The
-    <citerefentry project='man-pages'><refentrytitle>errno</refentrytitle><manvolnum>3</manvolnum></citerefentry>
-    variable itself is not altered.</para>
+    <para>The five calls return 0 on success or a negative errno-style error code. The <citerefentry
+    project='man-pages'><refentrytitle>errno</refentrytitle><manvolnum>3</manvolnum></citerefentry> variable itself is
+    not altered.</para>
 
     <para>If
     <citerefentry><refentrytitle>systemd-journald</refentrytitle><manvolnum>8</manvolnum></citerefentry>
@@ -218,13 +217,11 @@ sd_journal_send("MESSAGE=Hello World, this is PID %lu!", (unsigned long) getpid(
   <refsect1>
     <title>Notes</title>
 
-    <para>The <function>sd_journal_print()</function>,
-    <function>sd_journal_printv()</function>,
-    <function>sd_journal_send()</function> and
-    <function>sd_journal_sendv()</function> interfaces are available
-    as a shared library, which can be compiled and linked to with the
-    <constant>libsystemd</constant> <citerefentry project='die-net'><refentrytitle>pkg-config</refentrytitle><manvolnum>1</manvolnum></citerefentry>
-    file.</para>
+    <para>The <function>sd_journal_print()</function>, <function>sd_journal_printv()</function>,
+    <function>sd_journal_send()</function>, <function>sd_journal_sendv()</function> and
+    <function>sd_journal_perror()</function> interfaces are available as a shared library, which can be compiled and
+    linked to with the <constant>libsystemd</constant> <citerefentry
+    project='die-net'><refentrytitle>pkg-config</refentrytitle><manvolnum>1</manvolnum></citerefentry> file.</para>
   </refsect1>
 
   <refsect1>

man/systemctl.xml

@@ -882,17 +882,21 @@ kobject-uevent 1 systemd-udevd-kernel.socket systemd-udevd.service
           <term><command>show</command> <optional><replaceable>PATTERN</replaceable>…|<replaceable>JOB</replaceable>…</optional></term>
 
           <listitem>
-            <para>Show properties of one or more units, jobs, or the
-            manager itself. If no argument is specified, properties of
-            the manager will be shown. If a unit name is specified,
-            properties of the unit are shown, and if a job ID is
-            specified, properties of the job are shown. By default, empty
-            properties are suppressed. Use <option>--all</option> to
-            show those too. To select specific properties to show, use
-            <option>--property=</option>. This command is intended to be
-            used whenever computer-parsable output is required. Use
-            <command>status</command> if you are looking for formatted
-            human-readable output.</para>
+            <para>Show properties of one or more units, jobs, or the manager itself. If no argument is specified,
+            properties of the manager will be shown. If a unit name is specified, properties of the unit are shown, and
+            if a job ID is specified, properties of the job are shown. By default, empty properties are suppressed. Use
+            <option>--all</option> to show those too. To select specific properties to show, use
+            <option>--property=</option>. This command is intended to be used whenever computer-parsable output is
+            required. Use <command>status</command> if you are looking for formatted human-readable output.</para>
+
+            <para>Many properties shown by <command>systemctl show</command> map directly to configuration settings of
+            the system and service manager and its unit files. Note that the properties shown by the command are
+            generally more low-level, normalized versions of the original configuration settings and expose runtime
+            state in addition to configuration. For example, properties shown for service units include the service's
+            current main process identifier as <literal>MainPID</literal> (which is runtime state), and time settings
+            are always exposed as properties ending in the <literal>…USec</literal> suffix even if a matching
+            configuration options end in <literal>…Sec</literal>, because microseconds is the normalized time unit used
+            by the system and service manager.</para>
           </listitem>
         </varlistentry>
         <varlistentry>

mkosi.build

@@ -22,4 +22,14 @@
 
 ./autogen.sh c
 make -j `nproc`
+
+make check
 make install
+
+mkdir -p $DESTDIR/etc
+
+cat > $DESTDIR/etc/issue <<EOF
+\S (built from systemd tree)
+Kernel \r on an \m (\l)
+
+EOF

src/basic/process-util.c

@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
 #include <sys/personality.h>
 #include <sys/prctl.h>
 #include <sys/types.h>
@@ -274,27 +275,100 @@ int get_process_cmdline(pid_t pid, size_t max_length, bool comm_fallback, char *
         return 0;
 }
 
-void rename_process(const char name[8]) {
-        assert(name);
+int rename_process(const char name[]) {
+        static size_t mm_size = 0;
+        static char *mm = NULL;
+        bool truncated = false;
+        size_t l;
 
-        /* This is a like a poor man's setproctitle(). It changes the
-         * comm field, argv[0], and also the glibc's internally used
-         * name of the process. For the first one a limit of 16 chars
-         * applies, to the second one usually one of 10 (i.e. length
-         * of "/sbin/init"), to the third one one of 7 (i.e. length of
-         * "systemd"). If you pass a longer string it will be
-         * truncated */
+        /* This is a like a poor man's setproctitle(). It changes the comm field, argv[0], and also the glibc's
+         * internally used name of the process. For the first one a limit of 16 chars applies; to the second one in
+         * many cases one of 10 (i.e. length of "/sbin/init") — however if we have CAP_SYS_RESOURCES it is unbounded;
+         * to the third one 7 (i.e. the length of "systemd". If you pass a longer string it will likely be
+         * truncated.
+         *
+         * Returns 0 if a name was set but truncated, > 0 if it was set but not truncated. */
 
+        if (isempty(name))
+                return -EINVAL; /* let's not confuse users unnecessarily with an empty name */
+
+        l = strlen(name);
+
+        /* First step, change the comm field. */
         (void) prctl(PR_SET_NAME, name);
+        if (l > 15) /* Linux process names can be 15 chars at max */
+                truncated = true;
 
-        if (program_invocation_name)
-                strncpy(program_invocation_name, name, strlen(program_invocation_name));
+        /* Second step, change glibc's ID of the process name. */
+        if (program_invocation_name) {
+                size_t k;
+
+                k = strlen(program_invocation_name);
+                strncpy(program_invocation_name, name, k);
+                if (l > k)
+                        truncated = true;
+        }
+
+        /* Third step, completely replace the argv[] array the kernel maintains for us. This requires privileges, but
+         * has the advantage that the argv[] array is exactly what we want it to be, and not filled up with zeros at
+         * the end. This is the best option for changing /proc/self/cmdline.*/
+        if (mm_size < l+1) {
+                size_t nn_size;
+                char *nn;
+
+                /* Let's not bother with this if we don't have euid == 0. Strictly speaking if people do weird stuff
+                 * with capabilities this could work even for euid != 0, but our own code generally doesn't do that,
+                 * hence let's use this as quick bypass check, to avoid calling mmap() if PR_SET_MM_ARG_START fails
+                 * with EPERM later on anyway. After all geteuid() is dead cheap to call, but mmap() is not. */
+                if (geteuid() != 0) {
+                        log_debug("Skipping PR_SET_MM_ARG_START, as we don't have privileges.");
+                        goto use_saved_argv;
+                }
+
+                nn_size = PAGE_ALIGN(l+1);
+                nn = mmap(NULL, nn_size, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
+                if (nn == MAP_FAILED) {
+                        log_debug_errno(errno, "mmap() failed: %m");
+                        goto use_saved_argv;
+                }
+
+                strncpy(nn, name, nn_size);
+
+                /* Now, let's tell the kernel about this new memory */
+                if (prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ARG_START, (unsigned long) nn, 0, 0) < 0) {
+                        log_debug_errno(errno, "PR_SET_MM_ARG_START failed, proceeding without: %m");
+                        (void) munmap(nn, nn_size);
+                        goto use_saved_argv;
+                }
+
+                /* And update the end pointer to the new end, too. If this fails, we don't really know what to do, it's
+                 * pretty unlikely that we can rollback, hence we'll just accept the failure, and continue. */
+                if (prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ARG_END, (unsigned long) nn + l + 1, 0, 0) < 0)
+                        log_debug_errno(errno, "PR_SET_MM_ARG_END failed, proceeding without: %m");
+
+                if (mm)
+                        (void) munmap(mm, mm_size);
+
+                mm = nn;
+                mm_size = nn_size;
+        } else
+                strncpy(mm, name, mm_size);
+
+use_saved_argv:
+        /* Fourth step: in all cases we'll also update the original argv[], so that our own code gets it right too if
+         * it still looks here */
 
         if (saved_argc > 0) {
                 int i;
 
-                if (saved_argv[0])
-                        strncpy(saved_argv[0], name, strlen(saved_argv[0]));
+                if (saved_argv[0]) {
+                        size_t k;
+
+                        k = strlen(saved_argv[0]);
+                        strncpy(saved_argv[0], name, k);
+                        if (l > k)
+                                truncated = true;
+                }
 
                 for (i = 1; i < saved_argc; i++) {
                         if (!saved_argv[i])
@@ -303,6 +377,8 @@ void rename_process(const char name[8]) {
                         memzero(saved_argv[i], strlen(saved_argv[i]));
                 }
         }
+
+        return !truncated;
 }
 
 int is_kernel_thread(pid_t pid) {

src/basic/process-util.h

@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ void sigkill_waitp(pid_t *pid);
 
 int kill_and_sigcont(pid_t pid, int sig);
 
-void rename_process(const char name[8]);
+int rename_process(const char name[]);
 int is_kernel_thread(pid_t pid);
 
 int getenv_for_pid(pid_t pid, const char *field, char **_value);

src/basic/virt.c

@@ -409,8 +409,7 @@ int detect_container(void) {
         if (cached_found >= 0)
                 return cached_found;
 
-        /* /proc/vz exists in container and outside of the container,
-         * /proc/bc only outside of the container. */
+        /* /proc/vz exists in container and outside of the container, /proc/bc only outside of the container. */
         if (access("/proc/vz", F_OK) >= 0 &&
             access("/proc/bc", F_OK) < 0) {
                 r = VIRTUALIZATION_OPENVZ;
@@ -418,50 +417,58 @@ int detect_container(void) {
         }
 
         if (getpid() == 1) {
-                /* If we are PID 1 we can just check our own
-                 * environment variable */
+                /* If we are PID 1 we can just check our own environment variable, and that's authoritative. */
 
                 e = getenv("container");
                 if (isempty(e)) {
                         r = VIRTUALIZATION_NONE;
                         goto finish;
                 }
-        } else {
 
-                /* Otherwise, PID 1 dropped this information into a
-                 * file in /run. This is better than accessing
-                 * /proc/1/environ, since we don't need CAP_SYS_PTRACE
-                 * for that. */
-
-                r = read_one_line_file("/run/systemd/container", &m);
-                if (r == -ENOENT) {
-
-                        /* Fallback for cases where PID 1 was not
-                         * systemd (for example, cases where
-                         * init=/bin/sh is used. */
-
-                        r = getenv_for_pid(1, "container", &m);
-                        if (r <= 0) {
-
-                                /* If that didn't work, give up,
-                                 * assume no container manager.
-                                 *
-                                 * Note: This means we still cannot
-                                 * detect containers if init=/bin/sh
-                                 * is passed but privileges dropped,
-                                 * as /proc/1/environ is only readable
-                                 * with privileges. */
-
-                                r = VIRTUALIZATION_NONE;
-                                goto finish;
-                        }
-                }
-                if (r < 0)
-                        return r;
-
-                e = m;
+                goto translate_name;
         }
 
+        /* Otherwise, PID 1 might have dropped this information into a file in /run. This is better than accessing
+         * /proc/1/environ, since we don't need CAP_SYS_PTRACE for that. */
+        r = read_one_line_file("/run/systemd/container", &m);
+        if (r >= 0) {
+                e = m;
+                goto translate_name;
+        }
+        if (r != -ENOENT)
+                return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to read /run/systemd/container: %m");
+
+        /* Fallback for cases where PID 1 was not systemd (for example, cases where init=/bin/sh is used. */
+        r = getenv_for_pid(1, "container", &m);
+        if (r > 0) {
+                e = m;
+                goto translate_name;
+        }
+        if (r < 0) /* This only works if we have CAP_SYS_PTRACE, hence let's better ignore failures here */
+                log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to read $container of PID 1, ignoring: %m");
+
+        /* Interestingly /proc/1/sched actually shows the host's PID for what we see as PID 1. Hence, if the PID shown
+         * there is not 1, we know we are in a PID namespace. and hence a container. */
+        r = read_one_line_file("/proc/1/sched", &m);
+        if (r >= 0) {
+                const char *t;
+
+                t = strrchr(m, '(');
+                if (!t)
+                        return -EIO;
+
+                if (!startswith(t, "(1,")) {
+                        r = VIRTUALIZATION_CONTAINER_OTHER;
+                        goto finish;
+                }
+        } else if (r != -ENOENT)
+                return r;
+
+        /* If that didn't work, give up, assume no container manager. */
+        r = VIRTUALIZATION_NONE;
+        goto finish;
+
+translate_name:
         for (j = 0; j < ELEMENTSOF(value_table); j++)
                 if (streq(e, value_table[j].value)) {
                         r = value_table[j].id;
@@ -471,7 +478,7 @@ int detect_container(void) {
         r = VIRTUALIZATION_CONTAINER_OTHER;
 
 finish:
-        log_debug("Found container virtualization %s", virtualization_to_string(r));
+        log_debug("Found container virtualization %s.", virtualization_to_string(r));
         cached_found = r;
         return r;
 }

src/journal/journalctl.c

@@ -2318,7 +2318,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
         if (arg_boot_offset != 0 &&
             sd_journal_has_runtime_files(j) > 0 &&
             sd_journal_has_persistent_files(j) == 0) {
-                log_info("Specifying boot ID has no effect, no persistent journal was found");
+                log_info("Specifying boot ID or boot offset has no effect, no persistent journal was found.");
                 r = 0;
                 goto finish;
         }

src/machine/machinectl.c

@@ -2769,7 +2769,7 @@ static int parse_argv(int argc, char *argv[]) {
         assert(argv);
 
         for (;;) {
-                static const char option_string[] = "-hp:als:H:M:qn:o:";
+                static const char option_string[] = "-hp:als:H:M:qn:o:E:";
 
                 c = getopt_long(argc, argv, option_string + reorder, options, NULL);
                 if (c < 0)

src/nspawn/nspawn-stub-pid1.c

@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 #include <sys/reboot.h>
 #include <sys/unistd.h>
 #include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/prctl.h>
 
 #include "fd-util.h"
 #include "log.h"
@@ -29,7 +30,22 @@
 #include "time-util.h"
 #include "def.h"
 
-int stub_pid1(void) {
+static int reset_environ(const char *new_environment, size_t length) {
+        unsigned long start, end;
+
+        start = (unsigned long) new_environment;
+        end = start + length;
+
+        if (prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ENV_START, start, 0, 0) < 0)
+                return -errno;
+
+        if (prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ENV_END, end, 0, 0) < 0)
+                return -errno;
+
+        return 0;
+}
+
+int stub_pid1(sd_id128_t uuid) {
         enum {
                 STATE_RUNNING,
                 STATE_REBOOT,
@@ -41,6 +57,11 @@ int stub_pid1(void) {
         pid_t pid;
         int r;
 
+        /* The new environment we set up, on the stack. */
+        char new_environment[] =
+                "container=systemd-nspawn\0"
+                "container_uuid=XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX";
+
         /* Implements a stub PID 1, that reaps all processes and processes a couple of standard signals. This is useful
          * for allowing arbitrary processes run in a container, and still have all zombies reaped. */
 
@@ -64,6 +85,12 @@ int stub_pid1(void) {
         close_all_fds(NULL, 0);
         log_open();
 
+        /* Flush out /proc/self/environ, so that we don't leak the environment from the host into the container. Also,
+         * set $container= and $container_uuid= so that clients in the container that query it from /proc/1/environ
+         * find them set set. */
+        sd_id128_to_string(uuid, new_environment + sizeof(new_environment) - SD_ID128_STRING_MAX);
+        reset_environ(new_environment, sizeof(new_environment));
+
         rename_process("STUBINIT");
 
         assert_se(sigemptyset(&waitmask) >= 0);

src/nspawn/nspawn-stub-pid1.h

@@ -19,4 +19,6 @@
   along with systemd; If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
 ***/
 
-int stub_pid1(void);
+#include "sd-id128.h"
+
+int stub_pid1(sd_id128_t uuid);

src/nspawn/nspawn.c

@@ -2278,7 +2278,7 @@ static int inner_child(
                         return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to change to specified working directory %s: %m", arg_chdir);
 
         if (arg_start_mode == START_PID2) {
-                r = stub_pid1();
+                r = stub_pid1(arg_uuid);
                 if (r < 0)
                         return r;
         }

src/sysv-generator/sysv-generator.c

@@ -292,8 +292,10 @@ static int sysv_translate_facility(SysvStub *s, unsigned line, const char *name,
                 if (!streq(table[i], n))
                         continue;
 
-                if (!table[i+1])
+                if (!table[i+1]) {
+                        *ret = NULL;
                         return 0;
+                }
 
                 m = strdup(table[i+1]);
                 if (!m)
@@ -312,7 +314,7 @@ static int sysv_translate_facility(SysvStub *s, unsigned line, const char *name,
                 if (r < 0)
                         return log_error_errno(r, "[%s:%u] Could not build name for facility %s: %m", s->path, line, name);
 
-                return r;
+                return 1;
         }
 
         /* Strip ".sh" suffix from file name for comparison */
@@ -324,8 +326,10 @@ static int sysv_translate_facility(SysvStub *s, unsigned line, const char *name,
         }
 
         /* Names equaling the file name of the services are redundant */
-        if (streq_ptr(n, filename))
+        if (streq_ptr(n, filename)) {
+                *ret = NULL;
                 return 0;
+        }
 
         /* Everything else we assume to be normal service names */
         m = sysv_translate_name(n);

src/test/test-process-util.c

@@ -355,10 +355,70 @@ static void test_get_process_cmdline_harder(void) {
         _exit(0);
 }
 
+static void test_rename_process_one(const char *p, int ret) {
+        _cleanup_free_ char *comm = NULL, *cmdline = NULL;
+        pid_t pid;
+        int r;
+
+        pid = fork();
+        assert_se(pid >= 0);
+
+        if (pid > 0) {
+                siginfo_t si;
+
+                assert_se(wait_for_terminate(pid, &si) >= 0);
+                assert_se(si.si_code == CLD_EXITED);
+                assert_se(si.si_status == EXIT_SUCCESS);
+
+                return;
+        }
+
+        /* child */
+        r = rename_process(p);
+
+        assert_se(r == ret ||
+                  (ret == 0 && r >= 0) ||
+                  (ret > 0 && r > 0));
+
+        if (r < 0)
+                goto finish;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_VALGRIND_VALGRIND_H
+        /* see above, valgrind is weird, we can't verify what we are doing here */
+        if (RUNNING_ON_VALGRIND)
+                goto finish;
+#endif
+
+        assert_se(get_process_comm(0, &comm) >= 0);
+        log_info("comm = <%s>", comm);
+        assert_se(strneq(comm, p, 15));
+
+        assert_se(get_process_cmdline(0, 0, false, &cmdline) >= 0);
+        log_info("cmdline = <%s>", cmdline);
+        assert_se(strneq(p, cmdline, strlen("test-process-util")));
+        assert_se(startswith(p, cmdline));
+
+finish:
+        _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
+}
+
+static void test_rename_process(void) {
+        test_rename_process_one(NULL, -EINVAL);
+        test_rename_process_one("", -EINVAL);
+        test_rename_process_one("foo", 1); /* should always fit */
+        test_rename_process_one("this is a really really long process name, followed by some more words", 0); /* unlikely to fit */
+        test_rename_process_one("1234567", 1); /* should always fit */
+}
+
 int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
+
+        log_set_max_level(LOG_DEBUG);
         log_parse_environment();
         log_open();
 
+        saved_argc = argc;
+        saved_argv = argv;
+
         if (argc > 1) {
                 pid_t pid = 0;
 
@@ -373,6 +433,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
         test_pid_is_alive();
         test_personality();
         test_get_process_cmdline_harder();
+        test_rename_process();
 
         return 0;
 }