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exec: properly apply capability bounding set, add inverted bounding sets
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17
TODO
17
TODO
@ -23,23 +23,26 @@ F15:
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* 0595f9a1c182a84581749823ef47c5f292e545f9 is borked, freezes shutdown
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(path: after installing inotify watches, recheck file again to fix race)
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* capability_bounding_set_drop not used
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* rework syslog.service being up logic in PID 1
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* rsyslog.service should hook itself into syslog.target?
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* syslog.target should be pulled in by multi-user.target?
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* pull in .service from meta .targers AND vice versa too. i.e. syslog.target ←→ rsyslog.service, rpcbind similarly
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* drop Names= option? Symlinks only should be used. We don't want to need to read all service files.
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Features:
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* hide passwords on TAB
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* add switch to systemctl to show enabled but not running services. Or
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another switch that shows service that have been running since
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booting but aren't running anymore.
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* reuse mkdtemp namespace dirs in /tmp?
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* don't strip facility from kmsg log messages as soon as that is possible.
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http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commitdiff;h=9d90c8d9cde929cbc575098e825d7c29d9f45054
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* recreate systemd'd D-Bus private socket file on SIGUSR2
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* recreate systemd's D-Bus private socket file on SIGUSR2
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* be more specific what failed:
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Unmounting file systems.
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@ -597,16 +597,34 @@
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</varlistentry>
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<varlistentry>
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<term><varname>Capabilities=</varname></term>
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<listitem><para>Controls the
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<term><varname>CapabilityBoundingSet=</varname></term>
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<listitem><para>Controls which
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capabilities to include in the
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capability bounding set for the
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executed process. See
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<citerefentry><refentrytitle>capabilities</refentrytitle><manvolnum>7</manvolnum></citerefentry>
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set for the executed process. Take a
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capability string as described in
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<citerefentry><refentrytitle>cap_from_text</refentrytitle><manvolnum>3</manvolnum></citerefentry>.
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Note that this capability set is
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usually influenced by the capabilities
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attached to the executed
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file.</para></listitem>
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for details. Takes a whitespace
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seperated list of capability names as
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read by
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<citerefentry><refentrytitle>cap_from_name</refentrytitle><manvolnum>3</manvolnum></citerefentry>.
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Capabilities listed will be included
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in the bounding set, all others are
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removed. If the list of capabilities
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is prefixed with ~ all but the listed
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capabilities will be included, the
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effect of this assignment
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inverted. Note that this option does
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not actually set or unset any
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capabilities in the effective,
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permitted or inherited capability
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sets. That's what
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<varname>Capabilities=</varname> is
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for. If this option is not used the
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capability bounding set is not
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modified on process execution, hence
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no limits on the capabilities of the
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process are enforced.</para></listitem>
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</varlistentry>
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<varlistentry>
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@ -625,16 +643,21 @@
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</varlistentry>
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<varlistentry>
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<term><varname>CapabilityBoundingSetDrop=</varname></term>
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<term><varname>Capabilities=</varname></term>
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<listitem><para>Controls the
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capability bounding set drop set for
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the executed process. See
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<citerefentry><refentrytitle>capabilities</refentrytitle><manvolnum>7</manvolnum></citerefentry>
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for details. Takes a list of
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capability names as read by
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<citerefentry><refentrytitle>cap_from_name</refentrytitle><manvolnum>3</manvolnum></citerefentry>.
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</para></listitem>
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set for the executed process. Take a
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capability string describing the
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effective, permitted and inherited
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capability sets as documented in
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<citerefentry><refentrytitle>cap_from_text</refentrytitle><manvolnum>3</manvolnum></citerefentry>.
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Note that these capability sets are
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usually influenced by the capabilities
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attached to the executed file. Due to
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that
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<varname>CapabilityBoundingSet=</varname>
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is probably the much more useful
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setting.</para></listitem>
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</varlistentry>
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<varlistentry>
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@ -234,6 +234,24 @@ int bus_execute_append_timer_slack_nsec(Manager *m, DBusMessageIter *i, const ch
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return 0;
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}
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int bus_execute_append_capability_bs(Manager *m, DBusMessageIter *i, const char *property, void *data) {
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ExecContext *c = data;
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uint64_t normal, inverted;
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assert(m);
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assert(i);
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assert(property);
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assert(c);
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/* We store this negated internally, to match the kernel, bu
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* we expose it normalized. */
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normal = *(uint64_t*) data;
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inverted = ~normal;
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return bus_property_append_uint64(m, i, property, &inverted);
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}
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int bus_execute_append_capabilities(Manager *m, DBusMessageIter *i, const char *property, void *data) {
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ExecContext *c = data;
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char *t = NULL;
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@ -131,7 +131,7 @@
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{ interface, "SyslogLevelPrefix", bus_property_append_bool, "b", &(context).syslog_level_prefix }, \
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{ interface, "Capabilities", bus_execute_append_capabilities, "s",&(context) }, \
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{ interface, "SecureBits", bus_property_append_int, "i", &(context).secure_bits }, \
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{ interface, "CapabilityBoundingSetDrop", bus_property_append_uint64, "t", &(context).capability_bounding_set_drop }, \
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{ interface, "CapabilityBoundingSet", bus_execute_append_capability_bs, "t", &(context).capability_bounding_set_drop }, \
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{ interface, "User", bus_property_append_string, "s", (context).user }, \
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{ interface, "Group", bus_property_append_string, "s", (context).group }, \
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{ interface, "SupplementaryGroups", bus_property_append_strv, "as", (context).supplementary_groups }, \
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@ -167,6 +167,7 @@ int bus_execute_append_cpu_sched_priority(Manager *m, DBusMessageIter *i, const
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int bus_execute_append_affinity(Manager *m, DBusMessageIter *i, const char *property, void *data);
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int bus_execute_append_timer_slack_nsec(Manager *m, DBusMessageIter *i, const char *property, void *data);
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int bus_execute_append_capabilities(Manager *m, DBusMessageIter *i, const char *property, void *data);
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int bus_execute_append_capability_bs(Manager *m, DBusMessageIter *i, const char *property, void *data);
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int bus_execute_append_rlimits(Manager *m, DBusMessageIter *i, const char *property, void *data);
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int bus_execute_append_command(Manager *m, DBusMessageIter *u, const char *property, void *data);
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int bus_execute_append_kill_mode(Manager *m, DBusMessageIter *i, const char *property, void *data);
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@ -1249,6 +1249,15 @@ int exec_spawn(ExecCommand *command,
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}
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}
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if (context->capability_bounding_set_drop)
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for (i = 0; i <= CAP_LAST_CAP; i++)
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if (context->capability_bounding_set_drop & ((uint64_t) 1ULL << (uint64_t) i)) {
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if (prctl(PR_CAPBSET_DROP, i) < 0) {
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r = EXIT_CAPABILITIES;
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goto fail_child;
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}
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}
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if (context->user)
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if (enforce_user(context, uid) < 0) {
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r = EXIT_USER;
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@ -1664,15 +1673,15 @@ void exec_context_dump(ExecContext *c, FILE* f, const char *prefix) {
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(c->secure_bits & SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED) ? "noroot-locked" : "");
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if (c->capability_bounding_set_drop) {
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fprintf(f, "%sCapabilityBoundingSetDrop:", prefix);
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fprintf(f, "%sCapabilityBoundingSet:", prefix);
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for (i = 0; i <= CAP_LAST_CAP; i++)
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if (c->capability_bounding_set_drop & (1 << i)) {
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if (!(c->capability_bounding_set_drop & ((uint64_t) 1ULL << (uint64_t) i))) {
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char *t;
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if ((t = cap_to_name(i))) {
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fprintf(f, " %s", t);
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free(t);
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cap_free(t);
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}
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}
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@ -852,12 +852,24 @@ static int config_parse_bounding_set(
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char *w;
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size_t l;
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char *state;
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bool invert = false;
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uint64_t sum = 0;
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assert(filename);
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assert(lvalue);
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assert(rvalue);
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assert(data);
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if (rvalue[0] == '~') {
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invert = true;
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rvalue++;
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}
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/* Note that we store this inverted internally, since the
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* kernel wants it like this. But we actually expose it
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* non-inverted everywhere to have a fully normalized
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* interface. */
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FOREACH_WORD_QUOTED(w, l, rvalue, state) {
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char *t;
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int r;
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@ -874,9 +886,14 @@ static int config_parse_bounding_set(
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return 0;
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}
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c->capability_bounding_set_drop |= 1 << cap;
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sum |= ((uint64_t) 1ULL) << (uint64_t) cap;
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}
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if (invert)
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c->capability_bounding_set_drop |= sum;
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else
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c->capability_bounding_set_drop |= ~sum;
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return 0;
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}
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@ -1772,7 +1789,7 @@ static int load_from_path(Unit *u, const char *path) {
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{ "SyslogLevelPrefix", config_parse_bool, &(context).syslog_level_prefix, section }, \
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{ "Capabilities", config_parse_capabilities, &(context), section }, \
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{ "SecureBits", config_parse_secure_bits, &(context), section }, \
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{ "CapabilityBoundingSetDrop", config_parse_bounding_set, &(context), section }, \
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{ "CapabilityBoundingSet", config_parse_bounding_set, &(context), section }, \
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{ "TimerSlackNSec", config_parse_timer_slack_nsec,&(context), section }, \
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{ "LimitCPU", config_parse_limit, &(context).rlimit[RLIMIT_CPU], section }, \
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{ "LimitFSIZE", config_parse_limit, &(context).rlimit[RLIMIT_FSIZE], section }, \
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