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man: make clear NNP has no effect on processes invoked through systemd-run/at/crontab and such things

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Lennart Poettering 2022-10-31 12:13:26 +01:00 committed by Luca Boccassi
parent 6d040d84f5
commit 5bdf35c14e
1 changed files with 22 additions and 21 deletions
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43
man/systemd.exec.xml
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@ -708,27 +708,28 @@ CapabilityBoundingSet=~CAP_B CAP_C</programlisting>
setgid bits, or filesystem capabilities). This is the simplest and most effective way to ensure that
a process and its children can never elevate privileges again. Defaults to false, but certain
settings override this and ignore the value of this setting. This is the case when
<varname>DynamicUser=</varname>,
<varname>LockPersonality=</varname>,
<varname>MemoryDenyWriteExecute=</varname>,
<varname>PrivateDevices=</varname>,
<varname>ProtectClock=</varname>,
<varname>ProtectHostname=</varname>,
<varname>ProtectKernelLogs=</varname>,
<varname>ProtectKernelModules=</varname>,
<varname>ProtectKernelTunables=</varname>,
<varname>RestrictAddressFamilies=</varname>,
<varname>RestrictNamespaces=</varname>,
<varname>RestrictRealtime=</varname>,
<varname>RestrictSUIDSGID=</varname>,
<varname>SystemCallArchitectures=</varname>,
<varname>SystemCallFilter=</varname>, or
<varname>SystemCallLog=</varname> are specified. Note that even if this setting is overridden
by them, <command>systemctl show</command> shows the original value of this setting. In case the
service will be run in a new mount namespace anyway and SELinux is disabled, all file systems
are mounted with <constant>MS_NOSUID</constant> flag. Also see
<ulink url="https://docs.kernel.org/userspace-api/no_new_privs.html">No New
Privileges Flag</ulink>.</para></listitem>
<varname>DynamicUser=</varname>, <varname>LockPersonality=</varname>,
<varname>MemoryDenyWriteExecute=</varname>, <varname>PrivateDevices=</varname>,
<varname>ProtectClock=</varname>, <varname>ProtectHostname=</varname>,
<varname>ProtectKernelLogs=</varname>, <varname>ProtectKernelModules=</varname>,
<varname>ProtectKernelTunables=</varname>, <varname>RestrictAddressFamilies=</varname>,
<varname>RestrictNamespaces=</varname>, <varname>RestrictRealtime=</varname>,
<varname>RestrictSUIDSGID=</varname>, <varname>SystemCallArchitectures=</varname>,
<varname>SystemCallFilter=</varname>, or <varname>SystemCallLog=</varname> are specified. Note that
even if this setting is overridden by them, <command>systemctl show</command> shows the original
value of this setting. In case the service will be run in a new mount namespace anyway and SELinux is
disabled, all file systems are mounted with <constant>MS_NOSUID</constant> flag. Also see <ulink
url="https://docs.kernel.org/userspace-api/no_new_privs.html">No New Privileges
Flag</ulink>.</para>
<para>Note that this setting only has an effect on the unit's processes themselves (or any processes
directly or indirectly forked off them). It has no effect on processes potentially invoked on request
of them through tools such as <citerefentry
project='man-pages'><refentrytitle>at</refentrytitle><manvolnum>1p</manvolnum></citerefentry>,
<citerefentry
project='man-pages'><refentrytitle>crontab</refentrytitle><manvolnum>1p</manvolnum></citerefentry>,
<citerefentry><refentrytitle>systemd-run</refentrytitle><manvolnum>1</manvolnum></citerefentry>, or
arbitrary IPC services.</para></listitem>
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>