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Revert "Revert "Mount all fs nosuid when NoNewPrivileges=yes""

This reverts commit 1753d3021564671fba3d3196a84da657d15fb632.

Let's re-enable that feature now. As reported when the original commit
was merged, this causes some trouble on SELinux enabled systems. So,
in the subsequent commit, the feature will be disabled when SELinux is enabled.
But, anyway, this commit just re-enable that feature unconditionally.
This commit is contained in:
Yu Watanabe 2021-06-25 15:16:34 +09:00
parent de61a04b18
commit 6720e356c1
4 changed files with 39 additions and 3 deletions

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@ -675,9 +675,10 @@ CapabilityBoundingSet=~CAP_B CAP_C</programlisting>
<varname>SystemCallArchitectures=</varname>,
<varname>SystemCallFilter=</varname>, or
<varname>SystemCallLog=</varname> are specified. Note that even if this setting is overridden
by them, <command>systemctl show</command> shows the original value of this setting. Also see
<ulink url="https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/userspace-api/no_new_privs.html">No New
Privileges Flag</ulink>.</para></listitem>
by them, <command>systemctl show</command> shows the original value of this setting. In case the
service will be run in a new mount namespace anyway, all file systems are mounted with MS_NOSUID
flag. Also see <ulink url="https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/userspace-api/no_new_privs.html">
No New Privileges Flag</ulink>.</para></listitem>
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>

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@ -3190,6 +3190,8 @@ static int apply_mount_namespace(
.protect_proc = context->protect_proc,
.proc_subset = context->proc_subset,
.private_ipc = context->private_ipc || context->ipc_namespace_path,
/* If NNP is on, we can turn on MS_NOSUID, since it won't have any effect anymore. */
.mount_nosuid = context->no_new_privileges,
};
} else if (!context->dynamic_user && root_dir)
/*

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@ -1464,6 +1464,27 @@ static int make_noexec(const MountEntry *m, char **deny_list, FILE *proc_self_mo
return 0;
}
static int make_nosuid(const MountEntry *m, FILE *proc_self_mountinfo) {
bool submounts = false;
int r = 0;
assert(m);
assert(proc_self_mountinfo);
submounts = !IN_SET(m->mode, EMPTY_DIR, TMPFS);
if (submounts)
r = bind_remount_recursive_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), MS_NOSUID, MS_NOSUID, NULL, proc_self_mountinfo);
else
r = bind_remount_one_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), MS_NOSUID, MS_NOSUID, proc_self_mountinfo);
if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
return 0;
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to re-mount '%s'%s: %m", mount_entry_path(m),
submounts ? " and its submounts" : "");
return 0;
}
static bool namespace_info_mount_apivfs(const NamespaceInfo *ns_info) {
assert(ns_info);
@ -1660,6 +1681,17 @@ static int apply_mounts(
}
}
/* Fourth round, flip the nosuid bits without a deny list. */
if (ns_info->mount_nosuid)
for (MountEntry *m = mounts; m < mounts + *n_mounts; ++m) {
r = make_nosuid(m, proc_self_mountinfo);
if (r < 0) {
if (error_path && mount_entry_path(m))
*error_path = strdup(mount_entry_path(m));
return r;
}
}
return 1;
}

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@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ struct NamespaceInfo {
bool mount_apivfs;
bool protect_hostname;
bool private_ipc;
bool mount_nosuid;
ProtectHome protect_home;
ProtectSystem protect_system;
ProtectProc protect_proc;